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Introduction 
Since Ghana gained independence in 1957, the government has searched for health 
financing arrangements that would ensure equity in access to healthcare. The 
country is a constitutional democracy with an executive president. Ghana in West 
Africa is bordered by the Gulf of Guinea to the south, Ivory Coast to the west, 
Burkina Faso to the north and Togo to the east. The country is divided into 10 
regions: Ashanti Region, Brong-Ahafo Region, Central Region, Eastern Region, 
Greater Accra Region, Northern Region, Upper East Region, Upper West Region, 
Volta Region, and Western Region. The regions are then divided into second-level 
administrative districts, and currently there are 170 districts. In line with the coun-
try’s decentralisation policy, the districts are the basic unit of planning and political 
administration. The districts implement government policies and their input influ-
ences administrative and developmental decision-making. District assemblies 
provide input that informs Government decisions and policies. The population is 25 
million people living in a country that is approximately the size of the United 
Kingdom and occupies a total land area of 238,539 square kilometres. 
In the mid-1980s, a dream of a national health insurance began, but this did not 
materialise until the National Health Insurance Act (Act 650) was passed in August 
2003. The Act enjoined all districts to establish mutual health insurance schemes 
(Government of Ghana 2003). The National Health Insurance Schemes (NHIS) 
became operational in March 2004 with the projection that within five years, every 
resident of Ghana should belong to a health insurance scheme that adequately 
provided access to quality healthcare. The objective of the NHIS is stated in the 
National Health Insurance Policy Framework as follows: 
Ultimately, the vision of government in instituting a health insurance scheme … is to assure 
equitable and universal access for all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality package of 
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essential healthcare…Within the next five years, every resident of Ghana shall belong to a health 
insurance scheme that adequately covers him or her against the need to pay out of pocket at the 
point of service use to obtain access to a defined package of acceptable quality of health service 
(Ministry of Health 2002 and 2004). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Ghana 
 
Source: Google maps 
 
 
Policy-makers based their decision to introduce the NHIS on the risk-sharing 
elements that were similar to the traditional solidarity networks that many Ghana-
ians already participated in. Traditional solidarity networks are based on a relation-
ship of mutual trust and reciprocity for mutual benefit. Therefore, the government 
presented the NHIS as an opportunity for Ghanaians to protect themselves against 
ill health, which is not the focus of most informal mutual support groups. Despite 
the high aspirations and ambitious target, five years later the majority of Ghanaians 
are still without health insurance. At the beginning of my fieldwork, when I asked a 
community leader why people were not enrolling, he gave me a sermon. Below is a 
summary of his words that gives a clear picture of the complex reasons why NHIS 
coverage is low: 
Health insurance is good in the sense that it provides the insured quick access to healthcare. Some of us 
have not renewed our card because our expectations have not been met. The problem is not so much about 
the cost of premium, but we want to get drugs at the hospital and not to go about roaming looking for 
drugs that sometimes you have to pay for even though you are insured. We also want to be treated with 
respect. There are people who register and wait for so long before getting their card. Others just don’t 
understand why they should pay if they are not going to fall sick. 
This study is the anthropological component of a larger research project: ‘Reach-
ing the poor in Ghana’s NHIS’ that explores barriers to enrolment and retention of 
members and the effect of a multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme 
(MSPSP) for improving NHIS’ enrolment and membership retention rates and 
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identification of indigents for premium exemption. The project set out to investigate 
how to improve NHIS coverage using multi-stakeholder groups. The research team 
for the project included two health economists (Jehu-Appiah and Aryeetey) and one 
medical anthropologist, the author of this book. Specifically, the research team 
investigated the low rates of enrolment and retention in the NHIS in Ghana. For the 
anthropological component of the study, I used an ethnographic approach to hear 
from stakeholders at all levels of the Ghanaian healthcare system including the 
patients. Local-level stakeholders of the NHIS (community members, health 
providers and DHIS staff) gave suggestions for interventions to improve enrolment 
and retention. The suggested interventions were implemented and their effective-
ness evaluated. The findings that are presented in this book include work I per-
formed as a member of the research team, as well as work I conducted alone. 
The study used a multi-level approach to determine the feasibility of using multi-
stakeholder collaborative groups – problem-solving groups1 (PSGs) – to stimulate 
NHIS enrolment and retain members. This approach encourages the engagement of 
public policy stakeholders to address public policy implementation challenges. The 
rationale for the PSG concept is encompassed in an Akan2 proverb: “Tikorc nkc 
agyina” (One head does not go into consultation). This implies that problems are 
better solved when two or more people engage in consultation and share ideas. 
Thus, PSGs comprised of key NHIS stakeholders were set up in fifteen intervention 
communities in the Central Region (seven communities) and Eastern Region (eight 
communities) of Ghana to identify barriers to enrolment as well as to develop and 
implement interventions to increase enrolment and retain members. The study 
makes significant contributions to public policy consideration of the use of stake-
holder collaborations to address implementation challenges. 
Health insurance in Ghana: A brief overview 
It is necessary to provide a brief overview of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS) as a relatively new health financing policy in Ghana to contextualise this 
study. 
                                              
1
  PSG is a concept used in this study to describe a multi-stakeholder problem-solving group made up of 
representatives of the three key local stakeholders of the NHIS. The rationale underlying the PSG is that 
many issues that affect implementation of the NHIS are multi-dimensional such that interventions de-
signed by a single stakeholder working alone might not address problems in the communities; health 
facilities or DHISs (see further Chapters 4 and 5). 
2
  Akan is the dominant Ghanaian language and spoken by the majority of Ghanaians. 
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Evolution of national health insurance in Ghana 
The genesis of modern healthcare in Ghana dates back to the mid 1800s when the 
first hospital was built in 1868, which was a British colony at the time (see Senah 
1997, Arhinful 2003). Initially, the British wanted to provide affordable healthcare 
for Europeans, so public health facilities were established in the southern part of the 
country. Civil and public servants enjoyed free healthcare while the rest of the 
population paid minimal fees. Interestingly, despite the limited facilities, equity was 
assured by a payment structure that required higher income earners to pay more 
when their utilisation exceeded a certain limit (see Arhinful 2003). However, this 
situation changed in 1930-31 as a result of the Great Depression when the Gold 
Coast Medical Department increased the fees for private patients. With the passage 
of the first Hospital and Dispensary Fee Ordinance in 1898, government officials 
and their dependants were charged small admission fees, while non-official Africans 
and Europeans paid according to their occupation and status (Arhinful 2003). 
In 1952, Ghana was given self-rule, and the Maude Commission’s report recom-
mended free healthcare service in public facilities for all Gold Coasters. Since then, 
attempts to ensure equity in access to quality healthcare resulted in the introduction 
of various health-financing policies including fee-free3, user-fees4, cash and carry5, 
and health insurance. 
When Ghana achieved independence in 1957, fee-free healthcare was introduced 
in all public facilities and at all levels as part of President Nkrumah’s socialist 
development agenda to ensure equity in access to quality healthcare for all Ghana-
ians. However, during the economic decline in the 1960s, sustaining the free 
healthcare regime became a challenge. As a result, the government introduced the 
Hospital Fees Regulation in 1963 (Legislative Instrument (LI) 1277) leading to the 
implementation of what was termed ‘insignificant fees’. After the overthrow of 
Nkrumah in 1966, the National Liberation Council (NLC) set up the Easmon 
Committee to revise a range of social and economic policies. The committee 
recommended that hospital fees be raised. This led to the enactment of the Hospital 
Fee Decree 360 in 1969, which was followed by the Hospital Fee Amendment Act 
325 in 1970 and the Hospital Fee Act 387 in 1971 by the Progress Party under Prime 
Minister Busia, who took over power from the National Liberation Council (NLC). 
Under these regimes, user-fees were charged in all public health facilities in the 
country. The fees were heavily subsidised and negligible, and therefore, healthcare 
was often described as virtually free. Unsurprisingly, the fees did not solve the 
                                              
3
  Fee-free refers to free access to healthcare for all residents in Ghana at public facilities. 
4
  User-fees refer to out-of-pocket payments for some healthcare services at the point of utilisation. 
5
  Cash and carry led to out-of-pocket payment for full cost of drugs in public health facilities. It was a 
WHO and UNICEF initiative adopted by African Health Ministers in Bamako, Mali, in 1987, that was 
expected to improve drug supplies in public health facilities. 
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problems of shortages of essential drugs, deteriorating buildings or the quality of 
services (Goodman & Waddington 1993). Nonetheless, further decline in the 
economy in the late 1970s and 1980s resulted in heavy cuts in budgetary allocations 
to the health sector and made the system unsustainable. This resulted in consistent 
shortfalls in drugs, unavailability of equipment and other consumables in public 
health institutions (Ministry of Health 2002, 2004). 
In 1981, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) raised fees for hospi-
tal services since the government could no longer bear the full cost of healthcare for 
all Ghanaians. Notwithstanding the adverse findings that user-fees denied many 
Ghanaians access to healthcare, the LI 1277 was replaced with LI 1313 in 1985. 
The LI 1313 was a comprehensive cost-sharing and fee-for-service system except 
for specified conditions and communicable diseases. The Act aimed to improve the 
quality of healthcare service, and create a 15 per cent recovery of recurrent expendi-
ture as well as the full-cost recovery of drugs. Although the policy improved the 
quality of care, shortages of drugs and poor staff motivation negatively impacted the 
accessibility of vulnerable groups and this was publically criticised. The availability 
of medicines in health facilities improved, but not all patients were able to pay for 
their drugs (Asensu-Okyere et al. 1998, Nyonator & Kutzin 1999, Waddington & 
Enyimayew 1989, 1990, Garshong et al. 2001). 
The projection of the negative impact of user-fees on the utilisation and afforda-
bility of drugs by vulnerable groups made an alternative healthcare financing policy 
imperative. As expected, the reaction to the inequity in access to healthcare in a 
low-income country like Ghana was strong; so the PNDC responded to these 
criticisms by contracting local and international experts in the early 1990s to make 
recommendations for creating a national health insurance organisation. At this time, 
the first Health Sector Five Year Programme of Work project analysed the nation’s 
health. Several challenges including geographical and financial access to basic 
services, inadequate funding of health services, poor quality of care and poor inter-
sectoral linkages were identified as constraints to improving the health of Ghanaians 
(Aikins 2003). Consequently, many organisations including the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), World Health Organisation (WHO) and the European 
Union proposed establishing national health insurance to improve healthcare 
delivery in the country. 
As a result, in August 1995, the Ministry of Health (MoH) received proposals 
from a private consultancy group on the feasibility of establishing a centralised 
company to provide a compulsory social health insurance for all Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)6 contributors and registered cocoa farmers. The 
                                              
6
  SSNIT is a government pension scheme in Ghana that most formal sector workers and their employers 
contribute to. 
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report also recommended setting up pilot rural-based community-finance schemes 
for non-formal sector workers. These events finally led to the launch of a pilot 
national health insurance scheme by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
government in four districts (New Juabeng, Birim South, Kwawu South and the 
Suhum Kraboah Coaltar) in the Eastern Region in 1997. This pilot stalled and was 
never realised (see Arhinful 2003). Though the pilot could not provide practical 
lessons about the feasibility of a national health insurance in the country, it in-
creased awareness about alternative healthcare financing mechanisms and served to 
stimulate further debate to find a sustainable healthcare financing system that 
reflected the needs and aspirations of Ghanaians. 
These events culminated in the creation of community-based health insurance 
schemes (CBHISs) run by religious and community groups and local government 
administration in the early 1990s. The MoH encouraged the creation of CBHISs 
with support from international donors. Many CBHISs received logistic, cash and 
technical support at various times from the MoH, religious organisations and 
development partners such as The World Bank, Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA) and Partnership for Health Reformplus (PHRplus)7. Following 
the establishment of CBHISs, district-based voluntary mutual health insurance 
schemes proliferated between 2001 and 2003. The numbers increased from 47 in 
2001 to 168 in 2003. Although some of the initial schemes collapsed, many of them 
endured until the NHIS was introduced. The Nkoranza scheme, which was judged 
as the best performing scheme, covered 30 per cent of their target population. 
However, it must be noted that this scheme was supported by DANIDA and other 
NGOs (Arhin Tenkorang 2001), which might have accounted for their relative 
success. 
Despite the fact that the pilot NHIS stalled in 1999, the MoH maintained that 
they should remain the promoter and facilitator and not an implementer of the NHIS 
after re-examining the scheme. The government was inspired by the modest success 
of some CBHISs and continued the initiative of establishing a viable NHIS. The 
SSNIT also began planning another centralised health insurance scheme to be run 
by a company, the Ghana Health Care Company (Agyepong & Adjei 2008), but this 
did not materialise before the change in government on 7 January 2001. 
In January 2001, upon resuming office and having committed to implement a 
national health insurance, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) created a seven member 
Ministerial Health Financing Task Force under the chairmanship of the Director for 
Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of the MoH. The Task Force was to 
                                              
7
  PHRplus is an organisation funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
as an attempt to address the growing inequality in healthcare access. 
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advise the government on how to develop appropriate health insurance legislation 
and finance it. 
The NHIS was a major policy shift in health financing therefore, experts in the 
field, service providers and all Ghanaians keenly followed the development of the 
programme. This explains why the NPP (the main opposition party) capitalised on 
the NDC’s inability to institute a national health insurance and included the NHIS in 
their manifesto for the 2000 general election. Many social commentators described 
the policy-making policy as full of wrangling and political rhetoric (Rajkotia 2007, 
Agyepong & Adjei 2008) and being dominated by “trusted and close political 
associates” of the government (Agyepong & Adjei 2008: 55). This led to the 
resignation of several members of the Task Force so that by the end of 2002 only 
one original member remained. Nevertheless, the NPP government was determined 
to implement the NHIS before the general elections in December 2004, so they put 
the bill before Parliament one week prior to their recess in July 2003 (see Agyepong 
& Adjei 2008). This drew various reactions from individuals depending on which 
political side they belonged to. Notwithstanding the bickering in and outside 
Parliament in protest, the bill was passed as a new National Health Insurance Law 
(Act 650)8 under a certificate of urgency in 2003 (Government of Ghana 2003). The 
NHIS became operational in March 2004, and District Heath Insurance Schemes 
(DHISs) were established in all districts in the country by the end of 2005. The goal 
was to replace cash-and-carry systems, correct the inequity in access to healthcare, 
and protect people (especially the poor) from the high costs of healthcare services. 
Though the Act enjoins every Ghanaian to belong to an insurance scheme, the 
individual does not suffer a penalty for not enrolling. 
The NHI Act established three main health insurance schemes: 
• District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes 
• Private Mutual Health Insurance Schemes 
• Private Commercial Health Insurance Schemes 
Structure of the National Health Insurance Authority 
The Act established the National Health Insurance Council, now Authority (NHIA), 
as a governing body that is headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The Act 
gives the President of Ghana the sole power to appoint the chairperson and members 
of the Council (Government of Ghana 2003). As an implementing agency of the 
NHIS, the NHIA is responsible for policy planning, monitoring and evaluation of 
DHISs. It has the following structure: 
• The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) 
                                              
8
  The NDC walked out of Parliament in protest against the passage of National Health Insurance Bill. 
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• The National Health Insurance Secretariat 
• Regional Offices 
• District Health Insurance Schemes 
Since the healthcare system’s preparedness for the smooth beginning of the NHIS 
was critical, the criteria for healthcare facilities for accreditation9 to operate under 
the NHIS were specified in the National Health Insurance Regulations (NHIRs) 
2004 (LI 1809). The NHIA grants accreditation to both public and private healthcare 
providers and monitors their performance. It also administers the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF), which includes: 
• 2.5 per cent Value Added Tax (VAT) 
• 2.5 per cent SSNIT contribution of formal sector workers as their premium 
• Premiums from non-SSNIT contributors in the formal sector and informal 
sector 
• Money allocated to the NHIF fund by Parliament 
• Income from investments by NHIA, donations and gifts. 
The NHIA pays service providers from the fund. It also makes proposals to the 
MoH for policy formulation (such as reviews of the NHIS drug list) and sets tariffs 
and benefits for subscribers in consultation with stakeholders. 
Regional managers, who serve as links between the NHIA, DHISs and healthcare 
providers, run NHIA regional offices. They monitor and supervise DHISs’ opera-
tions and provide technical support for capacity development and claims manage-
ment. The District Health Insurance Assembly supports the Board of Trustees to 
appoint the management team to handle the day-to-day administration of DHISs. 
The functions of the Board are enforcement of the constitution and budget approval. 
The Board also checks the DHISs’ operations and the financial accounts. The Board 
was dissolved in January 2009 and its functions were taken over by a Caretaker 
Committees.10 The management team consists of the scheme manager, accountant, 
management information system manager, claims manager, publicity and marketing 
manager (popularly called public relations officer, PRO) and the data entry operator. 
                                              
9
  To qualify for accreditation, a healthcare facility must have: operated for at least six months, a good 
record in healthcare services delivery and the required human resources, equipment, physical structures 
and other requirements set by the NHIA. There must be acceptance of quality assurance standards and 
payment mechanism and adoption of the referral protocols, practice guidelines and health resource-
sharing arrangements of the schemes as approved by the NHIA. Also, health facilities seeking accredita-
tion must have their own formal quality assurance programme, respect the rights of patients, adhere to 
information system requirements, have a reporting mechanism and maintain accurate client records, 
results and cost of services rendered. The healthcare facility must comply with all corrective actions to 
ensure quality of service and agree to allow inspection of facilities and financial and other records relevant 
to health insurance (National Health Insurance Regulations 2004). 
10
  The Caretaker Committee consists of the District Coordinating Director, the District Finance Officer, a 
representative of the NHIA from the regional office and the DHIS manager. 
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The DHISs mobilise revenue from informal sector workers, and recruit and train 
collectors who collect premiums from informal sector workers and undertake 
education about health insurance in the district. For efficient operations, each DHIS 
was expected to be divided into Health Insurance Communities and a Community 
Health Insurance Committee (CHIC) formed to oversee the collection of premiums 
and registration fees and to ensure that monies collected are deposited in the District 
Health Insurance Fund. The CHIC members are meant to be selected from the 
community and include a chairman, secretary, collectors, PRO and a member. 
However, the few CHICs that were set up collapsed soon after formation due to lack 
of financial support. Other DHISs never set up these communities and committees. 
Only the collectors were active in the communities at the time of data collection. 
Features of Ghana’s National Health insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
The NHIS is unique in the sense that unlike other schemes in African countries, such 
as Benin, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania (Chankova et al. 2008), it is a fusion of 
elements of both the social health insurance scheme (SHIS)11 and community-based 
health insurance scheme (CBHIS)12 models to ensure nation-wide coverage of 
formal and informal sector workers. Thus, the NHIS is the first scheme in Africa 
initiated by a government with a centralised authority and national coverage. With 
the NHIS, residents in a district (local government administration area) prepay for 
healthcare services under a united nationalised system of service provision and 
financing determined by the NHIA. The DHISs operate under a decentralised 
administration with some level of operational autonomy. 
Though enrolment in the NHIS is meant to be compulsory, in essence, it is volun-
tary and based on a mutual or participatory model in which the NHIA functions as 
the insurer. In this model, an insurer collects contributions from members or 
households and pays service providers. As a third party, it protects the contributors’ 
interest by ensuring good quality of care and negotiates both benefit packages and 
the cost of care (Criel 2000, Ekman 2004). The NHIS is run on the basis of the 
household as the unit of registration; children are registered under at least one parent 
                                              
11
  SHISs take many forms. They are usually set up with government funds as part of social security systems 
and are compulsory. Premiums are generally subsidised by the government and applied to formal sector 
workers with pre-defined payments (related to their income) by employer and employee rather than risks 
with specified benefits. The advantages include: coverage for more people, regular flow of funds into the 
scheme and protection of patients’ rights. The greatest disadvantage is the exclusion of the poor since the 
insurance is usually biased towards urban areas and government employees while neglecting the rural and 
informal sector workers (Con &Walford 1998, Atim 1998). 
12
  CBHISs are normally locally based and often found in rural areas. They cover both rich and poor informal 
sector workers and have a very strong social solidarity function (Atim 1998). Though CBHISs have failed 
to meet their intended objectives due to poor design and implementation, they stand a better chance of 
improving healthcare access for the poor than user-fees (see Bennet & Gilson 2001) and of reducing the 
gap between the poor and the less poor (De Allegri & Sauerborn 2007). 
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or guardian. Furthermore, unlike many other schemes that depend mainly on cross-
subsidisation of contributions from formal and relatively “better off” informal sector 
workers to subsidise the contribution from the poor, the NHIS is also dependent on 
2.5 per cent value-added tax specifically introduced to support it. The NHIA also 
sets a minimum premium level13 for non-SSNIT formal and non-formal sector 
workers determined by economic groups. It provides an exemption for vulnerable 
groups. The rationale is to ensure that NHIS does not become an unequally distrib-
uted national resource and to minimise the exclusion of vulnerable people while 
helping the government fulfil the vision of providing equitable and sustainable 
quality healthcare as a model for poverty reduction (National Health Insurance 
Authority 2008). Vulnerable groups include: the aged (70 years and above and 
SSNIT pensioners), indigents, and children below 18 years (if at least one of the 
parents is registered) (National Health Insurance Regulations 2004). Pregnant 
women were subsequently added to the exempt group under a special safe-
motherhood initiative. Everyone, except pregnant women, pays a registration fee 
and wait for a three-month mandatory period before accessing services. Member-
ships are renewed annually. However, it must be noted that since 2010, children 
below five years of age do not have to be registered in concert with their parents or 
guardians and their waiting period has also been waived. 
The Act specifies a minimum package that covers 95 per cent of diseases reported 
in health facilities in Ghana and requires no co-payment. The insurance covers 
healthcare services at all levels except the following: 
• Rehabilitation other than physiotherapy; appliances and prostheses; cosmetic 
surgery; HIV retroviral drugs; assisted reproduction; echocardiography; pho-
tography; angiography; orthoptics; kidney dialysis; heart and brain surgery 
other than those resulting from accidents; cancer treatment other than cervical 
and breast cancer and organ transplant, VIP wards and treatment abroad 
• Non-listed drugs 
• Medical examinations for visas, employment and admission to academic insti-
tutions etc. 
• Mortuary service (National Health Insurance Authority 2008). 
It is worth mentioning that among the three schemes established by the NHI Act, 
only the NHIS has been embraced by most Ghanaians. This could be because of the 
low premium levels due to the significant governmental financial support and 
subsidy for enrolling vulnerable groups. These are features that were not applicable 
                                              
13
  A minimum premium paid by the poor is about GH¢ 14 [about US$10], middle income earners pays GH¢ 
22 [about US$15] and maximum of GH¢ 48 [about US$30] is paid by the very rich per adult household 
member per annum in addition to GH¢ 4.00 [US$2.5] as a registration fee. 
  
11 
in the other two schemes. As a result, the private mutual health insurance schemes 
died a natural death since they could not mobilise adequate resources from the 
private sector to sustain their operations. The private commercial schemes on the 
other hand, continue to exist, but cover less than one per cent of the population 
(Ghana Statistical Service et al. 2009). 
Healthcare delivery and seeking care under the NHIS 
The health sector in Ghana functions on an agency model. The MoH is responsible 
for policy making, sector oversight and coordination and is headed by the Minister 
of Health. The Ghana Health Service (GHS) is the implementing and regulatory 
agency responsible for public sector service delivery and controls all healthcare 
professionals. The GHS is headed by a Director General of Health with autonomous 
power to administer health services. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 The structure of the Ghana Health Service 
National level
Regional level
District level
Sub-district level
Community level
• Ghana Health Service Council
• Office of the Director General and Deputy 
Director General
• Eight National Divisional Directors 
• Supported by Regional Health Management Teams
• Regions are headed by 10 Regional Directors of 
Health Services
• Regional Health Committees
• All 170 districts are headed by District Directors of Health 
Services
• Supported by the District Health Management Teams
• District Health Committees
• Sub District Health Management Teams
Represents the 3 administration levels
 
Source: Ghana Health Service, http://www.ghanahealthservice.org 
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Functionally, GHS is organised at five levels: national, regional, district, sub-
district and community. The structure is vertical with a centralised administrative 
system. However, as a result of the decentralisation of the government and health 
sector reform with an emphasis on primary healthcare and participation of the 
lowest level, services are now integrated from the national level to regions, districts, 
sub-districts and communities. 
The GHS is governed by the Ghana Health Service Council, which recommends 
healthcare delivery policies and programmes to the Minister of Health and advises 
him or her on posts in the service. In addition, the Ghana Service Council promotes 
collaboration between the MoH, teaching hospitals and the GHS. The three teaching 
hospitals located regionally (in Accra, the capital city located in the Greater Accra 
Region; in Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Region; and in Tamale, the capital of 
the Northern Region) are autonomous and used as referral facilities. 
At the regional level, there are Regional Health Directorates managed by Region-
al Directors of Health Services and services are delivered at the regional hospitals, 
which are the final referral point within the regions. At the district level, the District 
Director of Health Services (DDHSs) heads the District Health Directorate (DHD) 
that supervises all health facilities in the district and provides support to the sub-
districts. All but the newly created districts have a district hospital that serves as 
referral point in the district. The sub-district also provides preventive and curative 
services and supervises health centres, health posts, community-based health 
planning and services (CHPS)14 under their area of control. At the community level, 
basic preventive and curative services for minor illnesses are addressed at health 
post and CHPS compounds. Although the majority of health facilities in Ghana are 
public, there are a significant number of faith-based (mainly Christian Health 
Association of Ghana15) and private facilities owned by institutions and individuals 
throughout the country. 
Under the NHIS, healthcare is obtained within an approved network of providers: 
all public health, faith-based, quasi-government and some private facilities. In 
addition, some private pharmacies and chemist shops are also approved. The 
 
                                              
14
  CHPS is a national programme of community-based care provided by resident nurses who are referred to 
as community health officers. CHPS, introduced in 1999, reduces barriers to geographical access to 
healthcare and provides basic level preventive and curative services for minor ailments at the community 
and household levels (Nyonator et al. 2005). 
15
  The Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG) is a non-governmental organisation that brings 
together churches that provide health services. CHAG is the second largest provider of health services in 
the country (about 42% of care in Ghana is delivered by the 183 member institutions, including district 
hospitals), and is predominantly located in rural and underserved communities throughout the country. 
CHAG’s ultimate goal is to improve people’s health status, especially the marginalised and the poor in 
fulfilment of Christ’s healing ministry and to help translate the government’s policy of ensuring equity in 
access to healthcare through the NHIS (see also http://www.chagghana.org).  
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Figure 1.3 Ghana Health Service healthcare services by level 
• Curative services are delivered at the regional hospitals and public health 
services by the District Health Management Team (DHMT) as well as the 
Public Health division of the regional hospital. 
• The Regional Health Administration or Directorate (RHA) provides 
supervision and management support to the districts and sub-districts within 
each region.
• Curative services are provided by district hospitals many of which are mission or 
faith based. Public health services are provided by the DHMT and the Public 
Health unit of the district hospitals.  
• The District Health Administration (DHA) provides supervision and 
management support to their sub-districts.
• Both preventive and curative services are provided by the health centers as 
well as out-reach services to the communities within their catchment area. 
• Basic preventive and curative services for minor ailments are being 
addressed at the community and household level with the introduction of 
the Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHPS).
• The role played by the traditional birth attendants (TBAs) and the 
traditional healers is also receiving national recognition.
Source: Ghana Health Service, http://www.ghanahealthservice.org 
 
 
LI 1809 mandates that the first point of access to healthcare under the NHIS should 
be a primary healthcare facility that includes community-based health planning and 
services (CHPS), health centres, district hospitals, polyclinics16, quasi-public 
hospitals, private hospitals, clinics and maternity homes. However, where the only 
facility in the community is a regional hospital, it is also considered a primary 
healthcare facility. 
Health providers operate under contract with the NHIS and are paid a predeter-
mined tariff based on a diagnostics-related structure for all service providers. Claims 
are made within specific guidelines for reimbursement. The National Health 
Insurance Regulations (NHIRs) oblige health providers to apply and pass renewable 
accreditation appraisal to qualify for service provision. This requires that healthcare  
 
                                              
16
  A polyclinic is the urban version of a health centre and usually larger, Polyclinics are found mainly in 
metropolitan areas, manned by physicians and offer more comprehensive healthcare services. 
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Figure 1.4 Ghana Health Service facilities 
Health Centre (rural)
Medical Assistant and staffed with 
programme heads in the areas of midwifery, 
laboratory services, public health, 
environmental, and nutrition. Each health 
center serves a population of approximately 
20,000. They provide basic curative and 
preventive medicine for adults and children 
as well as reproductive health services. They 
provide minor surgical services such as 
incision and drainage. They augment their 
service coverage with outreach services and 
refer severe and complicated conditions to 
appropriate levels
Polyclinic (urban)
Polyclinics are usually larger, offer a more 
comprehensive array of services, are manned 
by physicians, and can offer complicated 
surgical services. 
District Hospitals
are the facilities for 
clinical care at the 
district level. District 
hospitals serve an 
average population of 
100,000–200,000 
people in a clearly 
defined geographical 
area. The number of 
beds in a district 
hospital is usually 
between 50 and 60. It 
is the first referral 
hospital and forms and 
integral part of the 
district health system.
Regional 
Hospitals
 
 
 
providers are professionally qualified and have adhered to the quality assurance 
programme set by the GHS. The NHIA also applies a performance-monitoring 
system that involves periodic inspection of health facilities, data collection for 
service rendered to determine the cost and effectiveness of service, and adherence to 
accepted and known standards of healthcare practice (National Health Insurance 
Regulations 2004). 
Research objective and questions 
Research objective 
The main objective of this study (as the anthropological component of the larger 
project, ‘Reaching the poor in Ghana’s NHIS’) is to explore if and how problem-
solving groups (PSGs) can increase enrolment in the NHIS and help retain members. 
The use of PSGs to identify barriers to enrolment and design and implement 
interventions aims to encourage stakeholders to adopt an open and critical posture 
needed to address NHIS implementation challenges at the level of the community, 
health facility and DHIS as well as improve NHIS coverage. 
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This study provides information on how the multi-stakeholder problem-solving 
programme (MSPSP), a bottom-up participatory intervention approach can be used 
to influence people to enrol and stay in the NHIS. It seeks to add to the knowledge 
base of how to effectively engage key stakeholders to address the challenges of 
public policies. This study also provides information that can guide other developing 
countries struggling to expand SHISs and CBHISs coverage. Conclusions drawn 
from this pilot study might make the MSPSP attractive to policy makers in Ghana 
and allow for nationwide scale-up. This work is also expected to prompt further 
research in the field. 
Research questions 
The central question this study addresses is: How effective are PSGs in increasing 
NHIS enrolment and retention of members? To answer this question, this study 
focused on both the process and outcome of the MSPSP and posed the following 
questions: 
• What factors influence enrolment in the NHIS and non-renewal of member-
ship? 
• What are the processes involved in setting up PSGs? 
• How do PSGs identify barriers, and develop and implement intervention activ-
ities? 
• What factors enhanced problems-solving groups’ achievements? 
• What are the outcomes of PSG intervention activities? 
Each empirical chapter in this study focuses on one of the above questions. The 
study presents the process and attendant activities of creating PSGs as well as the 
intervention implementation process and outcomes. The work is based on the 
assumption that many stakeholder collaborations are not successful because they do 
not follow a rigorous process of recruiting members and effectively engaging them 
to identify and implement locally tailored solutions to achieve a maximum impact. 
Significance of the study 
We have done everything possible since the introduction of the scheme to get people insured. 
But the people are difficult and will not register. Some will register and will not renew their card 
until they are sick, then they come to worry us. We always educate them on the benefits of 
health insurance and the need to regularly renew their card. But they think if they don’t fall sick, 
then they have been cheated (Henry, a DHIS manager). 
The comment above is the summary of a chat I had with Henry, a District Health 
Insurance Scheme’s (DHIS) public relations officer (PRO), when I went to register 
my mother in the NHIS, a year before the start of this study. His lamentation about 
the limited progress in expanding NHIS coverage can be summarised with an 
expression in Akan as follows: “Sԑ wotwԑ ahoma na sԑ ԑmma a, na biribi kura mu” 
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(If you are pulling a rope and it does not come, there is something holding it back). 
In the context of this study, the expression highlights the need to explore what is 
holding back the DHISs’ ability to improve NHIS coverage to appreciable levels 
and retain members. 
Since health is a merit good, the government introduced the NHIS to ensure that 
all Ghanaians had optimal healthcare. Despite the significantly subsidised premi-
ums, evidence shows that NHIS enrolment is low. In 2008, the Ghana Demographic 
and Health Survey found that a high proportion of men (70%) and women (60%), 
aged 15-49 and 15-59 respectively, were not covered by health insurance (Ghana 
Statistical Service et al. 2009). Although health insurance premium exemptions in 
general were shifted from a health facility-based system plagued with implementa-
tion problems (see Nyonator & Kutzin 1999, Garshong et al. 2001, Badasu 2004) to 
a national health insurance-based exemption, the latter also appears to exclude the 
core poor population (Aikins & Arhinful 2006, Witter & Garshong 2009, MoH 
2008). Unfortunately, it appears that very few people benefit from the NHIS 
premium exemption. 
Bitran & Giedlon (2003) reviewed health insurance exemptions in low-income 
countries (Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Thailand, and Chile) and concluded 
that they all have problems with eligibility criteria. Thus, the DHISs’ failure to reach 
the majority of Ghanaians, especially the core poor, despite granting them premium 
exemptions, undermines the objective of the NHIS policy. This is a critical issue that 
needs to be explored in a period when the government of Ghana is making frantic 
efforts to reach the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) using 
the NHIS. 
This study goes beyond the scope of most studies that focus on one stakeholder 
and often use only quantitative methods (Asante & Aikins 2008, Basaza et al. 2008). 
This research used ethnographic methods to engage local NHIS stakeholders to 
explore and address barriers to enrolment and retain members. An effective investi-
gation that included all stakeholders was required. Thus the multi-level approach 
made it possible to assemble the findings into categories and provided evidence that 
captured the ‘whole story’ of low NHIS enrolment and retention rates. The findings 
also provided in-depth information about the interplay of barriers at the community, 
health provider and DHIS levels; therefore, we now have a better understanding of 
how each stakeholder’s actions affect the people’s health insurance decision-
making. 
The NHIS is a new payment mechanism for healthcare services and this creates a 
new relationship between insured patients and health providers with attendant 
challenges. This study explores this new relationship and provides an ethnographic 
account of the patients, and providers’ experiences. The NHIS was introduced 
within a historical context that made it an inherently political intervention. This 
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study also explored how the politics surrounding the introduction of the NHIS 
affected people’s decision to enrol or not and the work of DHISs. 
In the social sciences, approaches that engage stakeholders to share ideas and 
carry out intervention activities have been found to be helpful in solving social 
problems (Van der Geest 1990, Tones & Green 2004). Unfortunately, the use of 
stakeholder input at the local level to explore the challenges of public policy 
implementation has not been explored much in Ghana. As rightly pointed out by 
Lasker & Weiss (2003), collaborations where community stakeholders and members 
are only asked to provide feedback and input about their plans do not produce the 
best result for solving community problems. Thus, the effective engagement of 
stakeholders from the onset of a programme like the NHIS is more likely to address 
the challenges, since the local stakeholders have a better understanding of the local 
context and what works best for them. Also, using the MSPSP’s approach and 
examining the views of participants involved in the intervention while exploring 
contextual factors provides a rigorous interpretation of the situation. 
Finally, stakeholders’ intervention studies in health financing, especially to im-
prove enrolment in SHISs, are scarce. This study generated evidence to show that it 
is feasible to engage stakeholders of the NHIS to improve coverage and make a 
valuable contribution regarding how to stimulate enrolment and retain members. 
Also, analysing PSG members’ and stakeholders’ participation in an intervention 
provides information about factors that might elicit cooperation and sustain com-
mitment as well as identifying who should lead such efforts. The MSPSP, therefore, 
provides an evidence-based intervention and shows how stakeholders at the local 
level can be mobilised to develop and carry out interventions that address public 
policy implementation challenges. This approach contributes to the theory and 
practice of a stakeholder-collaborative intervention and provides a useful framework 
to guide the NHIA, DHISs and other institutions managing similar schemes in low-
income countries for addressing the difficult task of expanding and retaining 
members to translate the goal of ensuring equity in access to healthcare into reality. 
Theoretical framework and concepts 
The theoretical orientation of this study is situated within critical medical anthropol-
ogy, which advocates for stakeholder engagement to respond to problems with 
interventions (Singer 1989, Scheper-Hughes 1990). In response to criticism that 
medical anthropologists have failed to contribute to solving mankind’s problems 
(Kiefer 1971) and lacked accountability to the researched (Glasser 1988), medical 
anthropologists began to consider that the discipline has both a professional and 
moral obligation to reveal, discuss and address broad socio-economic, cultural and 
political contexts in which health inequities are manifested (Farmer 2005, Scheper-
Hughes 1992). This also addressed the concern that medical anthropology had too 
  
18
restrictive a focus on the micro-level (Singer 1989). Others added that decision-
making without considering what happens at local levels effectively misses a 
majority of people whose lives are affected by those policies (Van der Geest et al. 
1990, Press 1990). These authors argued that traditional anthropologists who 
confine themselves to one level when studying a phenomenon gain limited infor-
mation, since important factors at other levels may be overlooked. 
In this study, the theoretical concepts of a multi-level perspective as well as resil-
ience and trust were chosen based on the principles that the NHIS was introduced as 
a social development agenda that required the effective engagement of implementers 
and targets of the policy to identify and address implementation challenges. The 
collaboration must be based on trust to enable the group to work effectively to 
improve confidence in the NHIS and ensure the goal of strengthening patients to 
manage the adversities of ill health is attained. These concepts are intertwined and 
provide an in-depth understanding of NHIS coverage and the outcome of a multi-
stakeholder problem-solving programme. The concepts are explained and the 
background of each is discussed to provide a theoretical introduction to the empiri-
cal chapters. 
Multi-level perspective 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) departs from the early medical anthropology 
perspective, which often excluded a wider context of stakeholders’ experiences in 
analysing healthcare issues (Baer et al 1986). The MLP approach emphasises that to 
understand a phenomenon, information should be gathered from actors and events at 
various levels of a social organisation. This will enable the researcher to provide a 
comprehensive description of the phenomenon, give a more credible explanation 
and draw more convincing conclusions. Proponents of the MLP argue that macro- 
and micro-level processes and structures as well as actors’ varied interest interact to 
affect a phenomenon (Van der Geest et al. 1990, Press 1990). The MLP is thus 
based on the assumption that: 
Developments at the various levels are linked to one another and that the nature of these linkages 
has to be studied in order to understand properly what takes place at a specific level. The word 
‘level’, a metaphor, refers in particular to the international, national, regional and local tiers of 
social organisation (Van der Geest et al. 1990: 1026). 
Regarding healthcare issues, the MLP is used as a tool to explore and explain 
actors’ interest, behaviour and power relations and how these affect the outcome of 
policies and programmes. Press (1990) was concerned about the inequality of 
medical resources and the control of Western biomedicine over local medical 
systems, especially in countries with limited resources. He asserted that both 
patients and clinicians tend to have disparate values and behavioural characteristics 
that may not be fully understood or explained through a model that gives excessive 
weight to a ‘single element’ of a ‘single actor’ compared to one that uses a ‘multi-
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level’, ‘multi-element’ approach (Press 1990: 1001-1002). Press put nationalism, 
Islam and Christianity at the top of the social organisational ladder. Communities 
and sub-systems were next. Finally, at the individual level were the worldviews of 
participants in a clinical interaction. In general, Press proposes a multi-level ap-
proach to counter a ‘mono-focal’ approach to provide a causal explanation of a 
phenomenon (1990: 1002). For the MLP, the theoretical assumption is that various 
actors on multiple levels are involved in a policy or programme and have their own 
interests that determine how they react. The MLP thus highlights how these interests 
guide the actors’ beliefs and actions and why they may clash with those who have 
other interests. 
The MLP also considers that ideas and events that affect a phenomenon are not 
uni-directional. The influence of these ideas and events can be from higher to lower 
levels and vice versa or even be circular (Van der Geest et al. 1990: 1026). As will 
be seen later in this book, actors’ dissenting views during the implementation of the 
NHIS policy-making process transcended from the MoH to the remotest community 
in Ghana and drew distinct reactions from various people depending on their 
political affiliation. Those who saw the NHIS as a governmental political tool to 
retain power prevented DHISs’ staff from promoting the scheme and discouraged 
people from enrolling. This means that actors at the lowest level can also influence 
reactions to a policy and undermine implementers’ efforts. 
Van der Geest et al. (1990: 1025) argued that with growing state intervention in 
rural societies and the increase of global economic interdependence, researchers 
who confine their work to one level gain only a one-sided perspective on a phenom-
enon. They emphasised social phenomenon studies should be linked to all levels of 
social organisations and called it ‘linkages perspective’ (1990: 1026). The authors 
referred to the ‘linkages’ as: “Some form of communication transmitted by man or 
by material means and moving from one level to another” (Van der Geest et al. 
1990: 1026). 
The MLP also considers that linkages take place across time. Thus considering 
the historical development of a phenomenon ensures a deeper understanding and 
helps to provide a better explanation than focusing only on the present. As shown in 
the empirical chapters, events leading to the introduction of the NHIS and the 
policy-making process affected how stakeholders reacted to it and had consequences 
for acceptance. 
These points indicate the potential benefits of the multi-level perspective (MLP) 
for anthropological work. I used the MLP as a conceptual and methodological tool 
to guide this study. The MLP provides an appropriate framework to help conceptual-
ise the NHIS as a health financing policy that involves various actors at multiple 
levels of the health system. As will become apparent in the empirical chapters, 
policy makers, implementers and community members have varied interests in the 
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NHIS that determine their behaviour and practices, which often conflict with policy 
goals and make it difficult to achieve the goal of universal coverage and ensure 
equity in access to healthcare. The nature of these interactions and subsequent 
effects are complex and can only be fully understood by exploring what happens at 
all the levels. I will thus use the MLP to unearth various types of linkages to capture 
the varied interests, beliefs and practices as well as contextual factors that affect 
enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members. This will help provide in-depth 
information that reflects stakeholders’ worldviews about the NHIS and give credible 
explanations to the persistent low enrolment and retention rates. 
Methodologically, the MLP provides a useful tool that will help achieve the goals 
of the multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme (MSPSP) to be instituted by 
this study. I thus posit that engaging local stakeholders at multiple levels in the 
MSPSP (rather than focusing on a single level or stakeholder) has the potential of 
producing the synergy needed to get to the root causes of barriers and develop 
appropriate intervention activities that can address their varied concerns. It will also 
help develop implementation strategies to reach all targets and improve enrolment 
and retention of members in the NHIS. 
Literature supporting the use of MLP 
Van der Geest et al. (1990) applied the MLP to examine why Primary Healthcare 
(PHC) did not work in many countries as intended though it was unanimously 
approved at a WHO meeting in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, in 1978. They show how 
national governments, health professionals and community members had conflicting 
interests in the PHC. Governments were interested in the PHC because it could 
provide cheap healthcare services and advance their political interest. Health 
professionals disliked PHC because of a lack of financial opportunities and local 
communities often saw it as inferior healthcare. The authors’ study thus provided a 
comprehensive explanation why PHC’s goal of providing health for all by the year 
2000 was not achieved. Twelve years after the PHC deadline of providing health for 
all by the 2000, many countries still have poor health indicators. 
Kinsman (2008) employed the multi-level approach to evaluate HIV/AIDS inter-
vention programmes in Uganda and showed that policy change can come from both 
higher and lower levels and vice versa. His study showed how national- and local-
level actors involved in the provision of anti-retro virus (ARV) medications resisted 
scale-up because it was not in their interest. At the national level, some actors feared 
a loss of authority and financing in other areas of AIDS control in which they were 
important players. At the local level, there was discomfort when some of the best 
doctors moved into ARV provision and about the negative effects this had on other 
aspects of the health system. The doctors’ interests were prioritised above saving 
dying patients. Kinsman shows that the doctors’ interests were eventually given up, 
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though reluctantly, and the government was forced to change their policy when 
cheap generic drugs were imported into the country by a private organisation. This 
indicates how a major policy change can emanate from lower to higher levels. 
Although Agyepong & Adjei (2008) did not explicitly mention the MLP, they 
demonstrate that interests of actors involved in the NHIS policy making process 
weakened the checks and balances needed to protect the reform processes. They 
illustrate how the government’s interest in the need to prove the regime’s legitimacy 
along with the technocrats’ and bureaucrats’ desire to maintain scientific integrity 
and political neutrality did not result in the best policy choices. Their paper revealed 
the need to effectively engage key stakeholders in defining and addressing the 
challenges of a new policy to ensure attaining the goals. With the concept of 
conflicting interest in mind, one can see how actors’ interests often undermine the 
policy making process so explanations of low enrolment must not only be sought at 
the community level, but also at the national level. In addition, events during the 
policy making process must also be considered. 
Regarding the planning and implementation of intervention programmes, studies 
have illustrated the value of employing a multi-level approach in promoting and 
addressing challenges of health policies. They show that engaging key stakeholders 
in intervention programmes has the potential of success. Nastasi & Hitchcock 
(2009) in their study of a community-based multi-level sexual risk-prevention 
programme in the United States found that involving stakeholders from various 
levels built ownership and commitment to the intervention. Their study showed that 
adopting a multi-level approach and engaging key stakeholders in an intervention 
programme translated into adequate support and created the necessary conditions for 
achieving positive outcomes. 
Challenges when using the MLP 
The concept of the MLP and results from studies that used it as presented above, 
indicate its value for anthropological research and intervention studies. But the 
approach has challenges. The most difficult is the methodological requirement of 
research being performed at multiple sites using several data sources. This usually 
involves significant travel, making the research expensive, time-consuming, and 
complex compared to studies that focus on a single level or one stakeholder. 
Another challenge is that although intervention programmes can be well designed 
and theoretically grounded, the natural settings of the social context, implementers 
and targets can be more varied than initially expected. This increases the linkages to 
be explored and may lead to an expansion of the research focus to cover a wider 
context than initially planned further compounding logistical problems. However, 
the advantage to this approach is a more comprehensive explanation of the phenom-
enon, since significantly more interacting factors are captured. 
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The MLP, like many other anthropological perspectives, has been criticised for its 
complexity in data interpretation. The more data sources, the more difficult it is to 
determine relationships and draw conclusions. Duncan et al. (1998: 114) point out 
that the multi-level approach has great potential, but needs to be used cautiously. 
They argued that the model: “Opens up the possibility of interpretive confusion and 
overstatement of conclusions.” As seen later in this book, the difficulty in this study 
was the complexity of determining the most important factor or factors at each level 
or levels that had the greatest effect on NHIS enrolment and membership non-
renewal rate. This problem may be seen as a threat to the validity and generalisabil-
ity of the results, especially in the context of the effectiveness of randomised control 
trials. But, this is actually the reality of the NHIS intervention that involves a social 
phenomenon. When many factors interact, they become an asset instead of a threat 
to validity. The multiple factors help explain variations in the intervention’s out-
come. 
In summary, regardless of these difficulties, the MLP has the advantage of help-
ing reveal more hidden layers of information and produce results that more accurate-
ly reflect the reality than a focus on a single level or one stakeholder would have 
done. 
Resilience 
Resilience, as a concept, has been used for investigations in a number of disciplines 
such as ecology, climate, psychology and healthcare. For example, ecologists apply 
the concept to ecological systems to explain environmental sustainability despite 
exposure to adverse conditions. Violanti et al. (2000) define resilience in the field of 
trauma as a function of personal characteristics and the existence of community 
practices that help mitigate the consequences of adversity and maximise the poten-
tial for recovery and growth. In clinical terms, resilience is used to account for 
successful adaptations to ill health (Brown & Mueler 1970). According to Niehof 
(2008: 217) the concept of resilience overlaps with vulnerability and is socially and 
culturally embedded and shaped by emotions and personality characteristics. Niehof 
suggests that the ‘sources’ of resilience can be external (e.g. social support or 
financial help) as well as internal (e.g. psychic strength). 
In this study, I define resilience as the capacity to access resources that strengthen 
a person’s ability to regain health or adapt to a disease. Thus resilience does not 
mean ignoring feelings of stress nor does it necessarily remove stress, but rather 
resilience strengthens the patient to adapt positively to the condition and overcome 
the worst impact of disease. Despite the variation in the definition and use of 
resilience as a concept, it is generally defined across all disciplines as coping with 
adversity and the ability to ‘bounce-back’ (see Davis 1993, Niehof 2008, Van der 
Geest 2008). 
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Two main tenets of resilience are as follows: (1) an individual must first experi-
ence adversity that encompasses negative life circumstances, which makes him or 
her vulnerable, then resilience is developed to manage the stress and resume 
previous levels of functioning and (2) resilience is a function of internal strength that 
enables an individual to take action to utilise external support to produce sustained 
strength to recover from or adapt positively to an adverse condition. This conceptu-
alisation of resilience applies to my study because sickness is a stressful condition 
that needs both inner power and external support. People must make a choice to 
enrol in the NHIS to harness financial protection against expensive healthcare costs 
and in doing so, they are strengthened to prevail over the hardship and recover from 
the suffering that accompanies sickness and bounce back to normalcy or adapt to it 
and live positively with their condition. 
Studies have shown the relevance of both internal and external factors in the 
development of resilience. Van der Geest (2008) explored the experience of old 
people in Ghana who were confronted with declines in health and precarious 
economic conditions. He reports that although these conditions usually cause 
misery, his respondents accepted their adverse conditions, without giving in to 
bitterness, and adapted positively. One woman’s adaptive behaviour was attributed 
to her personal strength and family support. In a study of HIV/AIDS patients in 
northern Zambia, Wiegers (2008) observes that differences in responses to AIDS-
related adversity largely depend on resilience that is a result of social protection, 
economic support and access to ARV treatment. She contends that the individual’s 
ability to mobilise resources plays a role in determining whether resilience is 
developed or not. 
While I agree with the abovementioned authors that various external factors aid 
the development of resilience during ill health, I emphasise the economic factor 
because sickness diverts productive work and seriously impairs livelihoods, thereby 
increasing patients’ vulnerability. With the monetisation of healthcare, patients face 
a heavy financial burden (especially those suffering from chronic diseases); hence 
there is a need for economic support to recover from or cope with their condition. 
As Kitano & Lewis (2005) point out, poverty plays a key role in the lack of resili-
ence during ill health. In Ghana, support from extended family members who 
provide material and social support to sick people has dwindled or is no more 
(Kumado & Gockel 2003, Arhinful 2003). The nuclear family’s support is also lost 
due to the high cost of treatment. Poor patients are more vulnerable to the adversities 
of sickness due to a lack of access to healthcare or expensive healthcare payments. 
In Ghana, protracted sickness is usually interpreted as a curse resulting from wrong 
doing on the part of the patient (cf. Dapaah 2012). This often leads to the withdrawal 
of social and financial support even by nuclear family members, which causes 
considerable stress and weakens the patient’s resilience to manage the devastating 
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effect of the disease. From these perspectives, the NHIS as a support that is outside 
the family has become a critical factor in the development of resilience when sick. 
Considering one important focus of this study – reaching the poor in the NHIS – I 
use resilience to explain why people enrol and renew their membership in the NHIS, 
or do not. I use resilience to examine three main issues: (1) whether the NHIS 
strengthens patients not to succumb to adversities of sickness, but rather strive to 
regain their health or adapt to chronic diseases, (2) explain what happens to unin-
sured patients, especially the poor, (3) to identify factors that prevent people, 
especially the poor who need health insurance most, to manage the adversities of ill-
health by enrolling in the NHIS. I conceive the NHIS to be an external support that 
enhances people’s resilience and people must act and use their internal power to 
harness its potential benefits to manage ill health. 
The studies presented above, show the value of resilience in healthcare and health 
insurance research, but also present methodological challenges. As mentioned 
earlier, resilience is a function of inner strength and external support. The difficulty 
is that one has to also rely on the patient’s report to estimate their inner strength 
while developing resilience. This often depends on a person’s emotional state, which 
can fluctuate. As Van der Geest (2008) observes in his study, one respondent gave 
contradictory responses regarding her feelings about her adverse condition. Moreo-
ver, there are many external factors that can prevent people from developing 
resilience, so the difficulty is how to determine their resilience or lack of it. For 
example, how can the researcher estimate whether not enrolling in the NHIS is due 
to lack of inner strength or structural factors that prevented people from enrolling or 
remaining in an insurance scheme? 
I suggest that resilience in healthcare and health insurance is best measured 
through combining qualitative information with quantitative data. This gives better 
insight into whether health insurance is a resilience-enhancing factor or not and 
what factors account for the non-enrolment of people who need it most. Spending a 
significant amount of time interacting with key informants on several occasions 
makes it possible to reconcile the ambiguities in their narratives. Otherwise, the 
results could be understated or overestimated. This means that resilience cannot be 
accurately measured using only quantitative methods or even one-time interviews, 
since these techniques are often snapshots of before and after and likely to miss 
relevant information to give a credible account. These difficulties highlight the need 
to use resilience with caution in healthcare and insurance research and conclusions 
should be drawn with restraint. 
Trust 
In this study, trust will be used to: (1) explore the reasons for enrolling, not enrolling 
and remaining in the NHIS, (2) explore the basis for PSG members’ and stakehold-
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ers’ participation in the MSPSP. Trust is described as an optimistic expectation of 
honest behaviour by agents involved in a transaction based on the belief that the 
outcome will be beneficial to them. By and large, trust is used to explain the reasons 
behind actors’ behaviour towards one other and or institutions involved in a transac-
tion. Gambetta (2000) contends that trust in human relations is based on the expecta-
tion that they are likely to behave in ways that are beneficial or at least not harmful 
to them. 
In the social sciences, trust is classified in two ways: personalised trust and gen-
eralised trust (see Simmel 1990, Kääriäinen 2007, Gilson 2006). Personalised trust 
develops on the basis of experience and interaction with the other person who has 
proven worthy of trust. Generalised trust refers to trust in people and institutions 
whether we know them or have interacted with them or not. The main principle is 
that we expect others and/or the institutions to act in our interest. For example, 
institutions such as the church, police, health system and their employees are 
expected to protect our interest. Trust serves as a lubricant of social relations at 
various levels that ensures that society functions smoothly (Simmel 1990, 
Kääriäinen 2007). Simmel (1990) makes the strongest point about the value of trust 
contending that without general trust, society will disintegrate. 
In Ghana, people trust traditional leaders and the chieftaincy institution because 
they are considered to be the repository of traditional norms and values and are 
expected to act in ways that protect the community members’ interests. Community 
members see their chiefs and elders as trustworthy and rely on them to settle civil 
and some criminal cases such as land disputes, marriage problems and theft because 
they believe they will receive fair judgement. Trust also serves as the basis of 
support systems and networks such as pataase17 and nnoboa18. Trust thus ensures 
the survival of individuals and communities as a whole. However, there is also 
general distrust in some formal institutions because of past experiences with local 
mutual support schemes and inefficient enforcement of regulatory mechanisms to 
address corruption and ensure accountability among state officials (cf. Arhinful 
2003). 
Trust in health insurance is generally defined as health providers’ competence 
and quality of service (Gilson 2003, Mechanic 1998, Schneider 2005). These are 
considered important in building trust in health insurance schemes because health 
providers have been contracted to provide healthcare and make vital decisions 
                                              
17
  Pataase is an association of mostly fishermen who come together to support each other in times of 
economic stress. They provide financial assistance to members. Their main focus is funeral costs of 
members or their close relatives. 
18
  Nnoboa (support weeding) is a mutual help group. The name refers to local support networks formed by 
farmers to support each other on their farms. In these groups, trust and commitment to achieve individual 
and group objectives is the key principle. 
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concerning the patient. How they provide the services and interact with insured 
patients affects enrolment in the scheme. In the context of healthcare, Gilson (2003: 
1456) describes trust as “A strategic behaviour rooted in risk and expectations about 
how another person will behave.” She explains that trust ranges between complete 
trust and complete distrust and contends that effective healthcare requires not only 
care, but also a trusting relationship between providers and patients. Hall et al. 
(2001) also defines trust as an optimistic acceptance of a vulnerable situation in 
which a person believes that their interest will be considered by another person. 
They argue that illness makes patients vulnerable and so they need to trust a physi-
cian whose duty is to promote their interest by providing appropriate treatment. For 
health insurance, trust gives the insured assurance that he or she will be treated well 
when sick and influences him or her to enrol. Studies have revealed that trust and 
mistrust are based on multiple factors. Mechanic (1998) describes trust in health 
insurance in three dimensions: 
1. Patients’ trust in health providers, which is based on their previous experience 
with providers’ technical and interpersonal competence, that is, their ability to 
diagnose and treat illness and act in patient’s interest. 
2. Patients’ trust in insurers is based on their reputation of providing consistent 
and improved access to healthcare. 
3. Trust is generated by the control mechanism for legal enforcement of com-
mitment like contracts. 
Mechanic concludes that insurers can build a reputation of trustworthiness by 
demonstrating control over the healthcare process and their responsiveness to 
consumers needs, and ensuring quality healthcare. Schneider (2005), in his study of 
health insurance schemes in Rwanda, confirms Mechanic’s observation and adds 
that state authorities who join the same scheme and campaign for membership as 
well as supervise providers’ performances create trust-building structures. Thus 
health providers and insurers are expected to create a trustworthy relationship with 
the clients to stimulate enrolment; making trust an important element in health 
insurance decision-making. 
The above-mentioned conceptualisations and pre-conditions of trust are relevant 
for this study because individuals are potentially vulnerable to sickness, so they 
make a strategic decision to enrol in health insurance with the belief that the insurer 
will contract a physician to provide good quality healthcare services. In addition, the 
NHIS benefits stated in the policy are to regulate the behaviour of the insured, health 
providers and insurers. However, the NHIS’ inability to pay health providers 
promptly and provide insured patients with what is promised often creates distrust 
and discourages people from enrolling. I present a few examples of health insurance 
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studies that show the relevance of trust and mistrust in health insurance decision-
making. 
Arhinful (2003) reports that enrolment in insurance schemes in Ghana is based on 
trust and mistrust leads to non-enrolment. Some of his respondents indicated that 
they would not join a health insurance scheme because they had no trust in the 
scheme. He showed that the health facilities’ inability to meet insured patients’ 
expectations of good quality healthcare services discouraged other people from 
enrolling. Basaza et al. (2007) in their evaluation of two health insurance schemes in 
Uganda identified a lack of information, limited community involvement, and lack 
of trust in the management of the schemes as contributing to their underachieve-
ment. In a study of health insurance schemes in Rwanda, Schneider (2005) reveals 
that the companies often lack the capacity to bring about better quality of care and 
this negatively affects enrolment. He observes that providers’ interpersonal skills are 
one of the key factors in building trust in service providers. 
Given the objective of this study – to explore if and how problem-solving groups 
(PSGs) can improve NHIS enrolment and retention rates – my interest was to 
understand the pre-conditions of trust and distrust and their effect on enrolment. 
Therefore, I use trust and mistrust to assess two main issues: (1) to examine the 
reasons for low enrolment in the NHIS and retention rate, (2) to determine the 
approaches PSGs could adopt to improve trust and stimulate NHIS enrolment and 
retention of members. I used trust to analyse how people strategically take the risk 
of purchasing health insurance premiums based on the expectation that DHISs 
would issue NHIS cards promptly and health facilities would provide access to 
quality healthcare services. When the patient’s expectations are not met, there can 
be complete distrust and they do not renew their membership. Alternatively, the 
patient’s level of trust declines, but they still remain in the insurance scheme 
because it is better than accessing healthcare as an uninsured patient. 
Regarding the MSPSP, I assume that trust elicits cooperative behaviour and en-
sures the effective participation by members and stakeholders in the intervention. 
From this perspective, I use trust to examine factors that elicit cooperation among 
PSG members and stakeholders and sustain their commitment to the intervention 
while working together to achieve positive outcomes. 
Studies have shown that trust elicits cooperation among group members and leads 
to a commitment to achieve common goals (D’Amour et al. 2005, Henneman et al. 
1995, Gambetta 2000, Currall & Inkpen 2006). Gambetta (2000), in his analysis of 
the basis of cooperative behaviour, contends that trust facilitates collective action, 
and elicits cooperation. He suggests that trust is built through individual and group 
member’s attitudes (that contain information about their trustworthiness or mistrust) 
towards each other. Currall & Inkpen (2006), in their study about how trust evolves, 
reported that building trust follows an incremental pattern. According to the authors, 
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trust originates from one-on-one relationships among individuals, groups and 
organisations and evolves over time. During the development phase, one may first 
trust in small ways, observe whether the trust is upheld or violated, and then proceed 
with caution to develop trust in the group. This signifies that trust is built through 
constant interaction among those involved and maintained through conscious 
activities, such as effective communication and respect for each other’s views. Thus, 
although groups are formed by mutual consent, trust-based relationships need to be 
created and sustained to encourage individual members to remain committed to the 
group to ensure their effective participation in activities. Since my study involves 
engaging representatives from communities, health facilities and DHISs to form 
problem-solving groups (PSGs), I will examine how PSG facilitators build trust 
among group members and stakeholders to elicit and sustain their cooperation and 
commitment to the intervention. In this respect, I discuss trust as a factor that creates 
the synergy needed to enhance PSG activities and achievement of intervention 
goals. I argue that with trust, PSG members talk openly about their challenges and 
expectations without fear of intimidation. This reveals conditions that usually affect 
participation in group activities and intervention outcome and provides guidelines 
for developing effective intervention programmes to promote public policy. 
Despite the relevance of trust in helping understand enrolment in health insurance 
schemes and retention of members, assessing trust conditions might be difficult 
because other factors influence health insurance decision-making. For example, 
accepting the need to invest in health insurance influence enrolment and does not 
depend on trust or mistrust. However, respondents might not disclose other reasons 
for not enrolling or renewing their membership if they feel it might be embarrassing. 
As made apparent in the empirical chapters, respondents can give socially desirable 
responses that contradict their real motives for not enrolling and renewing their 
membership in the NHIS. Their real motives only emerged after further discussions. 
This means a methodological approach that provides the researcher the opportunity 
to delve into the key informants’ real motives and capture the non-verbal cues that 
add meaning to their expressions is required. This helps isolate trust-building factors 
and other factors that create mistrust and provide a more credible explanation for 
low NHIS coverage. 
Regarding participation in PSG activities, group members could have other inter-
ests apart from trust as the basis for their participation in collaborative groups and 
not necessarily the commitment to the programme objectives. This can only be 
revealed using ethnographic methods that create the opportunity to probe further 
why people participate or do not participate in group activities other than only 
relying on their expressions. This helps the researcher to carefully examine the 
participant’s narratives about the basis and conditions of trust before drawing 
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conclusions. Again, the participants’ level of trust cannot be measured through 
surveys or one-time interviews that risk capturing only socially desirable answers. 
Outline of the study 
The study is organised in nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the study and 
provides an overview of health insurance in Ghana and health service delivery under 
the NHIS. I state the study objective, research questions, and significance of the 
study. I also discuss the theoretical orientation of the study and explain the concepts 
that will appear in the book. The chapter ends with an outline of the book. The study 
design, relevant information about the study sites, data collection tools and analyti-
cal techniques are presented in chapter two. I conclude the chapter with a reflection 
on the researcher’s role as participant observer in the intervention group. 
Chapter three discusses barriers and enablers to enrolment in the NHIS and reten-
tion of members. It presents NHIS implementation challenges experienced by 
community members, health workers and DHIS staff and how they affect enrolment 
and retention rates. Attention is also given to the politics surrounding the introduc-
tion of the NHIS and the effect on enrolment. 
Chapters four, five and six focus on the MSPSP and the outcomes. Chapter four 
describes procedures followed in setting up the intervention group, PSGs and 
processes used to select members and facilitators. Chapter five discusses the tools 
and approaches that the PSGs developed to identify barriers to enrolment in the 
NHIS and retention of members, and the implementation of intervention activities. 
Chapter six presents and explains the outcome of the intervention. 
Chapter seven discusses factors that enhanced PSGs’ functioning while chapter 
eight examines factors that limited their efforts at improving enrolment and retention 
rates. 
Chapter nine concludes the book with a brief overview of the MSPSP and the 
theoretical reflection on the findings taking up the concepts of MLP, resilience and 
trust. I end the chapter with conclusions and recommendations regarding what could 
be done to improve NHIS coverage and retention of members and implications for 
further research. 
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Study design, fieldwork and 
methodological issues 
Introduction 
In recent years, multi-level stakeholder interventions have become common in the 
social sciences using various study designs depending on the level at which change 
is measured. The aim of this study – to explore if and how problem-solving groups 
(PSGs) can stimulate enrolment and retention of members in Ghana’s National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) – requires a methodological approach that can 
capture the perspectives of all stakeholders involved and the factors that influence 
peoples’ decisions to enrol (or not to enrol) and remain in the scheme. In this 
chapter, I discuss the research design, study sites and methodological issues. I start 
with a description of the design and study sites, the data sources and techniques. 
Next, through reflection, I discuss methodological issues encountered in the field. I 
end with presentation of the ethical issues related to the conduct of health-related 
research in Ghana. 
Study design 
This study is the anthropological component of a multidisciplinary cluster-
randomised trial (CRT) to explore problems of low enrolment in the NHIS and the 
high rates of membership non-renewal. The research project, ‘Reaching the poor in 
Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme’ includes 30 districts in the Central and 
Eastern Region of Ghana. The research team included two health economists whose 
main focus was on barriers to enrolment in the NHIS, utilisation of healthcare 
services and identification of the poor for premium exemption. Although this 
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ethnographic study was carried out in two intervention communities in the Central 
Region (Assin Achiano and Anomabo), it also draws on data from five other 
intervention communities in the Central Region and pre- and post-intervention 
household surveys conducted in 30communities in the Central and Eastern Region. 
A cluster-randomised trial (CRT) design is a form of randomised controlled trial 
in which communities rather than individuals or households are randomised into 
either intervention or control groups. The CRT generally stands out as an approach 
to gather evidence and provide the clearest possible results on the effectiveness of 
interventions (see Donner & Klar 2000). Randomisation ensures that there will be an 
even distribution of the demographic, economic, behavioural and other characteris-
tics of study participants for all interventions and control groups; hence, this 
approach permits comparability of results across communities (Hennerkens & 
Buring 1987). However, a major challenge for intervention programmes carried out 
across multiple sites is the potential for variation in the context, participants and 
implementers. Questions of causality are usually best addressed via randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) designs (Shadish et al. 2002); however, nuances that are 
missed in RCT may be examined through qualitative approaches (Brantlinger et al. 
2005). The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods accounts for process 
and context factors as noted by Tones & Green (2004).Traditional notions of 
experimental designs for implementing and evaluating intervention using only 
quantitative methods do not consider contextual variations within natural settings 
that may be more varied than initially expected; hence they miss the possible 
interaction of process and context factors that determine outcome. To account for 
these factors, I used both qualitative and quantitative data to assess the intervention 
outcomes to make the generalisability of results under specific conditions acceptable 
(see Roland & Torgensen 1998). Mixed methods provide comprehensive explana-
tions and bring out critical elements such as the interest, behaviours and practices of 
stakeholders that interact to influence outcome. In this respect, Nutbeam (1999:100) 
suggests: “The most compelling evidence of effectiveness comes from studies that 
combine different research methods – quantitative with qualitative.” Hence my 
combined methodologies permitted me to triangulate process and context infor-
mation about the intervention with survey data to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
PSGs’ intervention activities across communities. Using the best of ‘both worlds’, I 
am able to provide a holistic picture of the intervention and better explanation of the 
outcomes. 
The study was divided into three phases. Figure 2.1 shows the three phases of the 
study: pre-intervention, intervention and post-intervention. Phase one was the pre-
intervention household survey conducted in 30 communities in the Central and 
Eastern Region of Ghana. The purpose of the pre-intervention survey was to provide 
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Figure 2.1 Study framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purposely selected 30 districts in Central and Eastern Regions to participate in the study 
and pre-intervention household survey 
15 control communities and health 
facilities patronised and DHIS offices 
not exposed to the MSPSP 
15 intervention communities and health 
facilities patronised and DHIS offices exposed 
to the multi-stakeholder problem-solving 
programme (MSPSP) 
Central Region: Districts are randomly assigned to intervention (7) or control (6) 
Eastern Region: Districts are randomly assigned to intervention (8) or control (9) 
Post-intervention household survey was conducted in the 30 communities that participated 
in the pre-intervention survey 
Assessment of the effect of PSG activities on health providers’, DHIS staff’s and commu-
nity members’ behaviour and practices concerning enrolment and renewal in the NHIS 
Phase 1: Pre-intervention 
Phase 2: Intervention 
Phase 3: Post-intervention 
- Observations, interviews, conversations in 2 
Central Region intervention communities 
- Conversations in the 5 other Central Region 
intervention communities 
- Interviews in 2 Central Region intervention communities 
- Conversations with stakeholders 
- FGDs with PSG members in all 7 Central Region intervention 
communities 
Problem-solving group (PSGs) were set up in 
intervention communities 
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information about the NHIS status of households and individuals in all communi-
ties1 against which the effect of the intervention could be measured. 
The second phase involved creating problem-solving groups (PSGs) consisting of 
representatives of communities, health providers and DHISs staff in seven of the 13 
randomly selected communities in the Central Region and in eight of the 17 random-
ly selected communities from the Eastern Region that were designated as interven-
tion communities. The intervention communities were matched with non-
intervention communities with similar characteristics (seven non-intervention 
communities in the Central Region and eight in the Eastern Region). The interven-
tion was launched in June 2009. During the intervention I was a participant observer 
in two PSGs in the Central Region (Assin Achiano in the Assin North District and 
Anomabo in the Mfantsiman East District). I focused on PSG meetings and inter-
vention activities designed to improve NHIS enrolment and retention. I also con-
ducted key informant interviews and had conversations with stakeholders in both 
communities. However, I also had conversations with PSG members in the other 
five intervention communities in the Central Region, while visiting them during the 
course of the intervention. 
In the third phase, the post-intervention, the post-intervention household survey 
data was collected once again in all 30 communities that had participated in the pre-
intervention household survey. I held focused group discussions (FGDs) with all 
PSG members in the Central Region. The results of the pre- and post-intervention 
household surveys were used to assess the effect of PSG activities on enrolment 
with the NHIS and retention of members, while the qualitative information was used 
to explain the outcome of the intervention. 
Study setting 
Figure 2.2 shows the two regions – Central and Eastern – where the study was 
conducted. Ghana is divided into 10 administrative regions, which are further 
divided into 170 districts with well-defined geographical boundaries. The two 
regions were purposely selected because it was essential to have similar regions with 
comparable demographic, socio-economic and cultural characteristics to include 30 
districts with DHISs offices in the CRT. Both regions are comparable in terms of 
rural/urban composition, poverty incidence, major socio-economic activities, social 
organisation (in terms of living arrangements), informal support network and access 
to healthcare. These characteristics were considered to be possible influences on a 
person’s decision to enrol in the NHIS and renew their membership. The dominant 
                                              
1
  A community is defined as a unit of social network within a geographical area. In this study it is defined 
as an enumeration area (EA) demarcated by Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). An EA covers a whole 
community, part of a community or a number of small settlements. 
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ethnic group in both regions is Akan and minority groups are the Krobo in the 
Eastern Region and the Effutu in the Central Region. Access to healthcare services 
is 60.1 per cent and 67.2 per cent in Eastern and Central Region respectively, 
compared to the national average of 57.8 per cent (Ghana Statistical Service et al. 
2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Map of Ghana showing the two study regions with the number of 
districts with DHIS offices 
 
 
 
The Central Region is situated in coastal and forest zones in Southern Ghana with 
17 administrative districts and a population of 1,843,403. At the time of the pre-
intervention household survey, the Eastern Region had an estimated population of 
2,322,030 and 21 administrative districts and was a forest area. The majority of the 
work force in both regions is engaged in the agricultural sector – mainly farming 
and fishing. The sector employs 33.1 per cent of women and 35.7 per cent of men 
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aged 15-49 years in the Central Region and 22.5 per cent of women and 45 per cent 
of men in the Eastern Region (Ghana Statistical Service et al. 2009). Fishing is the 
predominant occupation along the coast in the Central Region, but less so in the 
Eastern Region (only persons living in communities along the Volta Lake are 
engaged in fishing). The two regions have similar poverty incidence of 45 per cent 
and 40 per cent respectively (Ghana Statistical Service 2007), but the Central 
Region has a lower (23.2%) currently insured population aged 15-49 years than the 
Eastern Region (49.6%) (Ghana Statistical Service et al. 2009). 
Selection of study sites for intervention activities 
The district assembly concept and the on-going decentralisation process make the 
districts the focus of government policies. The district officials are thus responsible 
for implementing public policies with the regions having a supervisory role. Hence, 
the district level was the focus of the study intervention. Each district has a health 
directorate that coordinates and supervises all activities of both public and private 
health facilities that provide basic and referral services. Many, but not all, districts 
have at least one hospital. Similarly, the DIHSs offices are located in each district 
capital with NHIS collectors based throughout the communities. 
All 30 districts with DHIS offices in the two regions – 13 in the Central Region 
and 17 in the Eastern Region – were included in the study. Newly created districts 
without DHIS offices were excluded from the study.2 One census enumeration area 
(EA) was randomly selected from a district using computer-generated numbers in 
Excel and a lottery approach. For the purpose of this study, EAs are referred to as 
communities. Of the 30 communities, 39.5 per cent were urban, 38.8 per cent semi-
urban and 21.8 rural. 
Since it was not possible to blind control communities located within the same 
district to intervention activities, the district was the unit of randomisation to prevent 
experimental contamination. Therefore, one community was randomly selected from 
each of the 30 districts to ensure that control communities were blinded to interven-
tion activities and the risk of a spill-over effect was eliminated. Following the pre-
intervention household survey, we stratified the 30 communities in the two regions 
into rural, semi-urban and urban and randomly selected 15 communities in each 
region for the intervention. We took into consideration the current enrolment levels 
and poverty incidence as captured by our baseline household survey to minimise an 
imbalance of socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the two groups. 
Intervention activities were carried out in 15 intervention communities, the health 
facilities they patronised and DHIS offices (eight in the East Region and seven in 
                                              
2
  There were newly created districts in both regions that did not have DHIS offices, hence were ineligible 
for the study. 
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the Central Region). No activity was carried out in control communities. These 
measures made it possible for drawing causal inferences between intervention and 
control communities about the effect of PSG intervention activities on the dependent 
variable (enrolment and non-renewal rate). 
In the Central Region, two intervention communities – Anomabo and Assin 
Achiano – were selected for the anthropological component of the study that is 
reported here (Figure 2.3/4). 
 
 
Figure 2.3/4 Map of Anomabo (A on left) and Assin Achiano (A on right) 
  
Source: Google maps 
 
 
Selection of Anomabo and Assin Achiano as case study communities 
Both Anomabo and Assin Achiano are in the Central Region. They were used as 
case study communities for the anthropological component of the study because 
they represent the ecology and the main economic activities of the region – coastal 
and forest as well as fishing and farming. Anomabo is a fishing community while 
farming is the main economic activity in Assin Achiano. They also have similar 
socio-cultural practices and proximity to health facilities. Indicators in the two 
communities that affect enrolment and retention in the NHIS include the seasonality 
of income and proximity to health facilities. 
Anomabo, an urban fishing community in the Mfantsiman East District of the 
Central Region, is located along the Atlantic Ocean on the Accra-Cape Coast 
Highway. It is approximately 10 kilometres from Cape Coast, the regional capital. 
The main source of income for the men is fishing, while the women engage in 
trading, which is normally selling fish. Assin Achiano on the other hand, is a rural 
farming community located in the forest zone in the Assin North district of the 
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Central Region. It is off the Cape Coast-Nyamoransa-Kumasi Highway. Both men 
and women are engaged in farming. They grow cocoa and oil palm as commercial 
crops and food (cassava, plantain and cocoyam) mainly for their own consumption. 
Though income is seasonal in both communities, the situation is worse in 
Anomabo where the majority of the population are unemployed half of the year. 
Fishing is done mainly from June to November after which only few fishermen 
engage in deep-sea fishing and earn income. The situation is slightly better in Assin 
Achiano, where, after the cocoa season (September to December), people still 
receive some minimal income from palmnut, cassava and plantain. 
Our pre-intervention household survey result showed that only 4.8 per cent of the 
population were currently insured3 in Anomabo, 11.3 per cent had been previously 
insured4 and 83.8 per cent had never insured5. In Assin Achiano 20.5 per cent were 
currently insured, 12.7 per cent previously insured and 66.9 per cent had never 
insured. 
The educational level of the population is relatively low in both communities but 
worse in Anomabo where almost half the population (46.2%) have had no formal 
education and 44.2 per cent completed primary school. Only nine per cent have 
completed secondary school and less than one per cent (0.6%) tertiary education. In 
Assin Achiano, 18.5 per cent had no formal education, 64.5 per cent completed 
primary education, 42.3 per cent completed secondary education and 3.7 per cent 
completed tertiary education (Table A.1, Appendix 2). 
In terms of access to health facilities, both districts have a district hospital with 
numerous lower levels of health facilities (health centres, clinics, private health 
facilities and CHPS compound (see figure 1.4 in chapter one). Access to healthcare 
is 74.3 per cent and 67.0 per cent in the Mfantsiman and Assin North districts 
respectively (Ghana Statistical Service 2004). However, with the expansion of the 
community-based health planning and services (CHPS) in recent times, the situation 
has improved with many more communities having access to a health facility within 
five kilometres. Regarding proximity, there is a health centre in Anomabo and a 
district hospital at Saltpond, the district capital, about eight kilometres away. 
Achiano on the other hand, is located between two health centres – Kushea about 
five kilometres away and Praso seven kilometres away. However, Praso Presbyteri-
an Health Centre is patronised by the majority of the people in Achiano because of 
its strategic location close to the district hospital. 
                                              
3
  People who are currently insured with a valid NHIS cards are eligible to access healthcare services 
without paying. 
4
  People who were previously insured but did not renew their membership, could not access healthcare 
with their NHIS cards. 
5
  People who were never insured are those who had never registered with the NHIS. 
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Social organisation and social security in Anomabo and Assin Achiano 
Anomabo and Assin Achiano are closely knit communities with extended families 
living close to each other as is usual in Ghanaian rural and traditional urban settle-
ments. The typical living arrangement is extended families living in one structure 
referred to as a compound house6. Compound houses usually consist of various 
households7 and/or nuclear families as sub-units. The people live in the compound 
house and interact with each other, but function separately. Although this kind of 
communal living is expected to translate into offering support in times of adversity 
such as ill-health, these traditions have diminished with modernity making extend-
ed-family support a secondary responsibility. The majority of respondents in this 
study live in compound houses with other extended family members, but do not 
necessarily receive support from them. 
Quantitative data collection 
Quantitative data was obtained from two rounds of household surveys (pre-
intervention and post-intervention), conducted in the Eastern and Central Regions of 
Ghana between 8 March and 6 April 2009 and 7 March 2011 to 4 April 2011 
respectively. 
Selection of respondents for the household surveys and data collection 
The sample was drawn using a three-stage procedure. First, the research team 
purposely selected all the 30 districts with District Health Insurance Scheme (DHIS) 
offices from the two regions (17 from the Eastern Region and 13 from the Central 
Region). Second, we randomly selected one enumeration area8 (community) from 
each district. Third, the research team mapped and numbered all residential struc-
tures within the selected communities out of which 110 households were randomly 
selected. The pre-intervention survey involved 3,301 households, which covered 
13,857 individuals. This total consisted of 1,646 households (7,234 individuals) in 
the intervention communities and 1,635 households (6,623 individuals) in the 
control communities in the two regions. In 2011, all 3,301 household heads who 
participated in the pre-intervention household survey were followed-up to assess the 
effect of the MSPSP on enrolment and retention rates. In the post-intervention 
household survey, 149 households were lost reducing our post-intervention sample 
to 3,152 households with 12,810 individuals. This included 1,562 households (6,790 
                                              
6
  A compound house is a structure made up of one or more households who see themselves as separate 
units with distinct living arrangements. 
7
  A household consist of a person or persons who live together in the same house or room in a compound 
and share the same housekeeping arrangements and see themselves as one unit. 
8
  EAs are clusters of residential structures classified by the Ghana Statistical Services (Ghana Statistical 
Services 2002). 
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individuals) from intervention communities and 1,590 (6,020 individuals) from 
control communities in the two regions. The changes in the number of households 
and individuals were mainly due to household relocations to other communities or 
the death of individual household members. 
The data collected in the pre-intervention survey included socio-demographic 
information about the respondents’ age, sex, occupation, education, religion and 
marital status, income and expenditure, NHIS status, reasons for enrolling or not 
enrolling with the NHIS or not renewing membership and the effect of NHIS on 
utilisation of healthcare services. There were also questions on opinions related to 
health providers’ attitudes and behaviour, DHIS services, quality of healthcare 
services and community beliefs and practices. 
To address the issue of validity, households were randomly selected to participate 
in the pre-intervention survey and data sources were effectively triangulated. The 
pre-intervention household survey questionnaire was translated using a back 
translation method. Experienced research assistants were trained in techniques of 
questionnaire administration to reduce interviewer bias. The questionnaires were 
pretested and challenges identified and addressed. Pre- and post-intervention 
household surveys were identical. Finally, research assistants worked independently 
from the PSG members who implemented the intervention to also reduce bias. 
Quantitative data analysis 
Quantitative data from the pre-and post-intervention household surveys was used to 
measure the effect of the intervention on enrolment in the NHIS and retention of 
members. The analysis included descriptive statistics including: frequencies, 
crosstabs and chi-square to show relationship among variables. NHIS status was 
placed into three categories: currently insured, previously insured and never insured. 
Probit logistic regression was used to analyse the effect of PSG intervention ac-
tivities on the two outcomes measures: enrolment in the NHIS and membership non-
renewal rate. The model is often used to predict treatment effects in case control and 
intervention studies to determine the success or failure of the programme. The 
category coded 1 is the ‘response’ category, exposed to experimental condition and 
the referent group, not exposed to the experiment is 0 (Field 2009). The model 
predicts changes in the dependent variable, that is, enrolment in the NHIS and 
membership non-renewal rate in intervention communities as a result of their 
exposure to PSG activities compared to the control group. It shows how likely or 
unlikely residents in intervention communities are to enrol or not renew their 
membership compared to those in the control group. For example, if the estimated 
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(β) (the treatment effect for enrolment),9 is 0.5 then respondents in intervention 
communities are 50 per cent more likely to be enrolled compared to those in the 
control group (see Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000: 47-50). The associated confidence 
interval (CI) standard errors are used to assess the suitability of the model and p-
values, the strength of the association. To assess if the change in enrolment is 
explained by exposure to PSG activities, key socio-demographic variables includ-
ing: place of residence, wealth, sex, age and education, marital status, religion, 
household size and chronic disease known to affect enrolment in SHISs and the 
NHIS (see Asante & Aikins 2008, Adusei-Asante 2009, Sarpong et al. 2010, Jehu-
Appiah et al. 2011) were used as covariates in the model. 
To assess whether the intervention improved enrolment and membership non-
renewal rate among the poor, cross tabulation was used to examine changes in 
enrolment among wealth quintiles between baseline and intervention period (2009 
and 2011). Finally, the impact of the intervention on the enrolment and retention 
rates in specific communities was assessed using Pearson’s chi-square test conduct-
ed as two-sided and declared significant for p-values <0.05. All analyses were done 
in STATA 10 and SPSS version 16. 
Qualitative data collection 
Qualitative information to assess the effect of PSG activities on community mem-
bers, health providers and DHIS staff was gathered throughout the three phases of 
the study. Key informants were selected from community members, health providers 
and DHIS staff. My data collection focused on PSG activities, the behaviours and 
opinions of community members, health providers and DHIS staff. Techniques used 
to gather information included participant observation, informal conversation, key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). I triangulated these 
methods and data sources by asking various participants the same questions in 
disparate contexts. These data sources and varying techniques helped generate in-
depth information about the issues being explored. For example, barriers identified 
at PSG meetings were discussed with key informants in individual conversations 
with community members, health providers and DHIS staff. I also presented 
information gathered from key informants and individual conversations, community 
leaders and stakeholders’ meetings for discussion at PSG meetings. This approach 
of triangulation described by Jenkins (1992: 55) as a ‘promiscuity of methods’ 
                                              
9
  β is the coefficient of the independent variable (dummy for intervention) on the dependent variable. It 
shows the amount of change on the dependent variable and is used to predict the effect of the intervention 
on enrolment and non-renewal rates. Positive values show positive relationship and negative indicates 
inverse relationship. 
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provided multiple perspectives about the issues explored and in-depth information 
while creating a means of verifying the authenticity of the data. 
Selection of key informants 
Twenty key informants were purposely selected from each of the two study sites for 
a total of 40. The key informants were as follows: 11 from the community, 5 from 
local health facilities, 2 from the District Health Directorate and 2 from the DHISs. 
Additional key informants were selected from the national level of healthcare: two 
from the NHIA and one from the MoH and one from GHS headquarters. 
Key informants were not selected before going to the field. They were chosen 
after a few weeks of fieldwork. I began identifying key informants after I had met 
PSG members or was approached by people who wanted to share their experiences 
with either DHIS staff or health providers when it became known that I was investi-
gating insurance. Some key informants were selected by serendipity since they 
happened to be in the same location where I was doing my research. The selection 
of community key informants was based on two issues: their potential to provide 
meaningful information and their representativeness of one of the three categories of 
the population of interest (currently insured, previously insured and never insured). 
Gender, education and health status were also considered. 
Key informants who were health providers or worked in the DHIS offices, on the 
other hand, were purposely selected at the onset of the fieldwork. The main criterion 
used to select them was their work schedule and their contact with community 
members or insight into NHIS operations in their institutions. 
Key informant interviews 
In intervention studies, changes in individual behaviours and institutional practices 
can be measured using surveys, but they do not really go beyond the observed 
change to provide reasons for the outcomes. Critical information about participants’ 
perspectives, processes and contexts that explain the cause-and-effect relationship 
characteristic of intervention studies is often missed. As Lapan (2004) observes, 
face-to-face interviews provide perspectives and insights into special knowledge that 
only participants possess. I heard the participants’ perspectives and opinions and 
observe what they often expressed through their gestures. As a result, I was able to 
capture their perspectives, experiences and how the social environment affected 
their decisions about health insurance. Nonetheless, interviews were time consuming 
since discordant views often led to long arguments. Another difficulty was that the 
interviews attracted on-lookers who express opinions that had to be discussed. 
I conducted 44 key-informant interviews with community members and health 
providers in Anomabo and Assin Achiano and staff of DHISs, the NHIA, MoH and 
GHS headquarters (see Table A.2, Appendix 2, for their profiles). The interviews 
lasted between 20 and 30 minutes. They were either audio recorded or hand written 
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depending on the interviewee’s preference or the circumstances10. I engaged all 
informants (except the four from the NHIA, MoH and GHS) in conversation during 
the intervention. In addition, I had informal conversations and discussions with 
community members, DHIS officials and health providers who I did not consider to 
be key informants. Information gathered from community members included 
reasons why they did not enrol or renew their memberships, the benefits they 
derived from the NHIS, insured patients’ experiences accessing healthcare, and 
quality of service delivery among others. I solicited information on the challenges 
experienced in implementing the NHIS policy from DHISs’ staff and health provid-
ers. 
When the intervention was complete, I engaged all key informants in follow-up 
interviews to explore the results. Discussions usually started with a presentation of 
the pre- and post-intervention household survey results from the entire study (30 
districts) and specific community survey results. The survey results were used to 
explore factors that may have accounted for the observed outcome. The key inform-
ants who were interviewed before the intervention were also engaged in regular 
informal conversations during the course of the intervention and had follow-up 
interviews after the intervention (except for two, a community leader who died and a 
District Director of Health Services (DHSSs) who was transferred during the 
intervention). I did however interview the two key informants who replaced the 
missing two mentioned above, because they were well aware of the intervention and 
had participated in some PSG activities. The topics explored in these key informant 
interviews included knowledge of intervention activities and the effects on commu-
nity members, health providers and DHIS staff. 
Participant observation 
Participant observation was a main technique for data collection. This trademark 
distinguishes anthropologists’ work from other social scientists. As Spradley (1980) 
argues participant observation creates a social situation that makes it possible for the 
researcher to engage in activities appropriate to the situation by observing the 
subject of study and their activities. He points out the approach allows pertinent 
features of the daily life of the study setting to be recorded even if they are not 
discussed by interviewees. Thus, my participation in the intervention PSGs allowed 
me to observe aspects of the participants’ activities and gather relevant information 
that might not have been revealed through interviews. 
                                              
10
  For example, when the interview was conducted at a noisy place, audio recording was not feasible. This 
normally occurred at the beach where fishermen were busy mending their nets or in compound houses 
where others played loud music. 
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During the intervention, I was a participant observer in the PSGs in Anomabo and 
Assin Achiano. My daily research tasks were observation and participation in PSG 
meetings and intervention activities. I also had informal conversations with mem-
bers of the two intervention communities, health providers in the local health 
facilities and district health directorates they patronised and staff from their respec-
tive DHISs. Since the majority of my fieldwork was in Anomabo and Assin 
Achiano, I divided my time between the two communities and planned my schedule 
around those PSG activities and frequently went to health facilities that the people 
patronised and the respective DHIS offices for observation. I also chatted with staff 
and the clients. In addition, I visited the other five PSGs in Central Region at least 
three times and took part in their meetings and intervention activities. During my 
stay in each community, I had informal interactions with community members, 
health providers and DHIS staff. 
I also visited key informants at home and shared meals with them in Anomabo 
and Assin Achiano. I adopted this strategy because it was not possible to observe 
sensitive issues such as corruption or get information from people directly involved. 
These strategies gave me the opportunity to eavesdrop on conversations about the 
research issues. This approach also ensured that individual perspectives were not 
missed which was particularly helpful because participants talked more in informal 
individual conversation than in group discussions, interviews or in answers on 
questionnaires. Sometimes, I heard rumours that helped me re-direct my line of 
enquiry. I also observed how problem-solving tools and participatory approaches 
were used to identify barriers to enrolment, develop and implement intervention 
activities to improve enrolment and retain members. 
Focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) are used to gain in-depth information (see Senah 
1997). FGDs generally provide information that is not captured by other data 
collection methods. In my case, FGDs were particularly useful for obtaining relevant 
feedback on collected data and to enrich my understanding of various key-informant 
perspectives. 
At the end of the intervention, I held FGDs with PSG members in all seven inter-
vention-communities in the Central Region to assess the effect of the intervention on 
all stakeholders. The main issues discussed were views on the intervention and 
outcome. The information gathered included: (1) PSG members’ views about the 
intervention, (2) how stakeholders were involved in PSG activities, (3) the effect of 
the intervention on community members, health providers and DHIS staff, and (4) 
the processes and intervention activities and factors that contributed to the outcome. 
This provided evidence to construct a holistic picture of what had happened, how it 
occurred and why a particular outcome was achieved. The interactions provided 
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deeper insight into the data as participants’ information was probed and sometimes 
challenged and credibility established. 
To address the issue of validity, four steps were taken to ensure that the infor-
mation gathered reflected the studied phenomena. Regarding the implementation of 
the MSPSP and the conduct of PSG activities, PSG members and facilitators were 
selected using the same method. All facilitators were trained in leadership and 
facilitation skills. The application of problem-solving tools was given in one 
workshop to ensure uniformity in the execution of the MSPSP. I also explored and 
verified issues that emerged across communities and groups to explore contradictory 
data. Above all, I used the FGDs as a final check on data gathered from interviews, 
observations and survey results. The reaction and feedback that I received from PSG 
members provided deeper insight into the data, which helped me ensure that it 
reflected the views of participants and minimised subtle biases in my interpretation 
of the data. I believe that I present a fair reflection of participants’ views and 
represent the target population. 
Qualitative data analysis 
The information gathered was manually analysed. Qualitative information pro-
cessing started with regular organisation of my observations, discussions and 
conversation notes while in the field to address my research questions and identify 
initial patterns in the data. As fieldwork progressed, I manually transcribed my 
interviews and grouped them according to themes. At the end of my fieldwork, the 
data set was then analysed in its entirety and responses from various participants 
grouped under each theme according to the three stakeholder groups: community 
members, health providers and DHIS officials. 
As Oakley et al. (2006) observed using process and outcome data to measure the 
effectiveness of intervention activities enriches the interpretation of results. I 
arranged typical narratives by key informants and PSG members that described 
barriers to enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members, the intervention 
process (including activities), and events that occurred during the intervention 
period and finally, my respondents’ observed changes among community members, 
health providers and DHIS staff. I also categorised what my respondents thought 
had caused the changes. The information from my respondents (key informants and 
PSG members) was grouped according to what was observed at each level that they 
linked to the changes in enrolment and retention rates. I used the typical expressions 
that my respondents used to create summary statements. Next I created a list of 
comments related to each theme and systematically checked them for information 
that supported the summary statements and explained the quantitative results of the 
outcome of the intervention. When respondents’ comments suggested dissimilar 
points of view, the contradiction was described and observations in the field were 
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used to explain what I believed guided people’s reasoning. Summary statements that 
described each stakeholder’s points of view were verified by discussing my sum-
mary statements with key informants and PSG members to determine whether I had 
summarised their comments accurately. 
Finally, the information was subjected to thematic and content analysis to exam-
ine factors that had direct effect on PSG activities and thus on enrolment in the 
NHIS and non-renewal of membership from the stakeholders’ perspectives. This 
helped me to explore the respondents’ narratives that depicted antecedents that 
governed participants’ behaviour and practices as well as the intervention outcome 
(increase in enrolment and no improvement in retention rates). Thus interrogation of 
the data highlighted the core issues that the stakeholders were most concerned about. 
These analytical approaches, careful selection of key informants and effective 
triangulation of data sources minimised bias in the data presented in this book. 
Double role of the researcher: An asset or hindrance? 
The ensuing discussion explores whether the researchers’ dual role as a member of 
an intervention group was an asset or an obstacle in the research process. The issues 
raised in this discussion are situated within the entire research process and focus on 
methodological issues. I start with the peculiar advantages that I gained as a result of 
my dual role. I then address the dilemmas and challenges I faced and how I man-
aged them to optimise playing both roles. 
Benefits of dual roles in a research process 
In this study, my combining observation of and participation in PSG intervention 
activities was a complex enterprise with opportunities and challenges. I used 
reflective skills and an empathic understanding of the social context to effectively 
manage the challenges and benefit from the opportunities. 
A number of social scientists have discussed the benefits of dual roles in ethno-
graphic studies (Harrington 2002, Kinsman 2008, Kyakuwa 2011, Dapaah 2012), 
while others have given account of challenges they faced (Oosterhoff 2008, Mulemi 
2010). According to Van der Geest & Finkler (2004), the tenets of anthropological 
study pose peculiar challenges for carrying out fieldwork especially in a health 
facility. For example, it is not uncommon for research projects to be delayed 
because gatekeepers, such as health providers, are apprehensive about allowing an 
outsider into their work space. As a result, some researchers have hidden their 
identity or gone completely undercover to gain access. For instance, Dapaah (2012) 
reports on healthcare providers’ reservation about his presence in a Ghanaian 
hospital. However, a double role in this case can help a researcher to bypass power-
ful gatekeepers. Since I was a participant in the intervention group, access to the 
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healthcare facilities was not a problem. Eventually, I derived three benefits from my 
dual role. 
First, my membership in the PSG gave me the advantage of gaining access to the 
‘field’ and I had a smooth entry to my study sites: communities, health facilities and 
DHISs’ offices. At health facilities, I was introduced to colleagues of the PSG 
members as a group member, and thus I was allowed into their midst and the staff 
willingly accepted my interview appointments. Moreover, because I was often seen 
in the company of health providers and DHIS staff on the premises, after a few 
weeks my presence became less noticeable and invasive. 
Second, it could have been very difficult for me to explore my research topic with 
healthcare personnel and community members as a complete outsider only playing 
the role of a researcher. I resolved the problem of obtrusiveness that could have led 
to pretence and holding back information by hanging out with individual PSG 
members and engaging them in informal conversations. It also helped that I am a 
Ghanaian and speak the local language. This made me less of a stranger, not only to 
PSG members, but also their colleagues. So I easily went to the beach, church 
services and visited PSG members and key informants at home. The frequent 
informal interactions minimised pretence and the PSG members and key informants 
allowed me to have conversations about the study even when I did not initiate the 
subject. Thus, I was able to observe the backstage behaviour of some community 
members, health providers and DHIS staff. I had the opportunity to ask follow-up 
questions within and outside group meetings on sensitive issues such as malpractice 
and confirmed that it does occur. For example, the collection of unauthorised fees 
was denied at PSG meetings and could not be observed, but was revealed during 
these more ‘casual’ times with PSG members as I probed what had transpired during 
intervention activities and listening to spontaneous remarks at PSG meetings. 
Third, my deep involvement in PSG activities helped me experience the reality of 
the intervention process and gain deeper insight into contextual factors and structur-
al challenges that affected the PSGs’ work and by consequence the outcome of the 
intervention. My role as a PSG member made stakeholders see me as someone who 
appreciated their challenges and could help improve their situation, so they had 
forthright conversations with me. Community members in particular saw my 
presence as an opportunity for expressing their dissatisfaction about the quality of 
healthcare services. Thus my dual role facilitated data collection and provided 
reliable information that helped me construct a more accurate picture of the inter-
vention programme as it unfolded. This role also established the credibility of my 
reports, since I heard stories with deeper nuances than an outsider just observing the 
intervention process would have done. 
Despite the advantages, I also point out that playing a dual role creates the prob-
lem of the researcher’s persona hindering some people from participating in inter-
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vention activities. Based on the behaviour of a few PSG members, heads of health 
facilities and DHIS managers towards my presence, I sometimes believed that they 
thought I was evaluating their work to write a performance report. Some PSG 
members defended negative things said about them during discussions and I noticed 
from their gestures that their defence was just an attempt to present a good image of 
their institution. Their gestures sometimes showed that they were not sure whether 
or not my observations would be shared with the authorities. I believe these key 
informants held back information that they thought was embarrassing. In the case of 
heads of institutions, I observed what I refer to as ‘a gentleman’s behaviour’. Some 
of them did not honour invitations to stakeholders’ meetings and intervention 
activities. The impression I got was that they were reluctant to have an open and 
frank discussion because they feared it might reveal negative things about them or 
their institution. Perhaps due to their apprehension, they sent subordinates when 
invited. This did not create the same impression as their presence would have done. 
For example, the presence of heads of health facilities and DHIS managers in 
stakeholders’ meetings and community durbars11 created a better impression of the 
intervention since community representatives perceived it as a show of support for 
the NHIS and the intervention thereby increasing their commitment to PSG activi-
ties. Health providers and DHIS staff also attached more seriousness to the interven-
tion when the head of their institution attended PSG activities. The head’s presence 
thus assured health providers and DHIS staff (within and outside PSGs) that the 
challenges they faced implementing the NHIS would be addressed. Unfortunately, 
not many heads of institutions attended stakeholders meetings and community 
durbars. 
Methodological dilemmas 
I faced three main challenges during this research. First, whether or not to contribute 
to discussions during PSG meetings and thus not disrupt the group environment, or 
how and to what extent I should participate in intervention activities; second, how I 
should manage participants’ expectations; and third, how I could ensure that the 
intervention process and events were recorded objectively and the outcome results 
interpreted dispassionately. 
I decided to only prompt PSG facilitators when I believed that the theoretical 
basis of the intervention was not being followed. If I had not done so, then the 
purpose of the intervention would have been defeated. In this action, I drew their 
attention to critical issues that the group sometimes overlooked. This occurred early 
                                              
11
  Community durbars are usually public gatherings held to celebrate festivals or used as a platform to 
sensitise community members and other stakeholders about public issues that affect them. Durbars are 
usually attended by chiefs and their elders and community members and officials who interact and com-
municate their views on the issues discussed. 
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in the PSG activities, especially during problem identification. At this time, I 
observed that depending on who facilitated a meeting, the PSG member consciously 
or unconsciously tried to focus on negative behaviours and practices attributed to 
others and paid less attention to barriers at their level. For example, when health 
providers or DHIS staffs were leading discussions, they focused on barriers at the 
community level as the main cause of low enrolment in the NHIS and high member-
ship non-renewal rate and gave less attention to issues related to their negative 
behaviours and practices. In such situations, I drew their attention to the need to be 
open-minded and look at barriers from all levels and not draw hasty conclusions. 
After a few such contributions to discussions that provoked debates in critical areas 
of the intervention, I noticed PSG members were better at conceptualising the 
intervention and rationale. Addressing a similar methodological concern Harrington 
(2002: 50) points out: “Making ethnography credible depends on walking a fine line 
between participation and observation: being immersed enough to know what you 
are talking about while being separate enough to offer a critical analysis.” 
In this study, I can say that my double role helped me to give a critical and in-
depth account of the intervention process and events. What is important is to 
develop strategies to be a successful participant observer. Self-management and 
critical reflection abilities are essential to set limits and maintain a good balance 
between observation and participation during data collection. 
Further, though every researcher encounters problems in the field, playing double 
roles especially in an intervention programme that involved multiple stakeholders in 
the researcher’s home country presents challenges that may affect data collection. 
First, since enrolment in a health insurance scheme is based on values and behav-
iour, I anticipated that my background as a Ghanaian studying in my home country 
and my personal views on the subject might bias discussions at meetings. My 
familiarity with the subject might make me take many things for granted and not pay 
attention to details, thereby biasing my interpretation of participants’ views. I 
managed these issues by not being on the frontline of PSG activities, limiting my 
talking, and increasing my listening during discussions; I only asked questions to 
clarify observations I had made. By not making my views known on pertinent 
issues, the discussions remained open for participants to express their views. My 
questions helped me to understand the participants’ perspectives and realities and 
decreased biased interpretation. 
The second dilemma was how to manage the expectations of key informants 
especially so I could continue to enjoy their cooperation. The problem of partici-
pants requesting financial assistance from social researchers has been widely 
discussed in the literature. Scott et al. (2006: 34) speak of a ‘project syndrome’ 
when researchers are treated as sources of financial support for study participants. I 
had to manage the key informants who asked me for financial support. PSG mem-
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bers asked me to help the elderly pay their registration fees for the NHIS and help 
the core poor receive an exemption. Although I was introduced as a researcher and 
reminded PSG and community members several times about my role and that the 
project did not provide financial support, their expectations of financial support and 
demands did not stop. Some PSG and community members considered me as a 
programme manager working in a non-governmental organisation (NGO); hence 
they expected me to provide financial support for their participation in intervention 
activities and the study. I must state that some demands were made because of a lack 
of experience with intervention studies. In my conversations with some PSG 
members and key informants, they indicated that they only knew of NGOs that 
implement interventions, which are accompanied by some financial assistance or 
hand-outs. So I occasionally gave gifts to ensure their continuous cooperation. 
However, I did take the opportunity to clearly explain my role as a researcher and 
not a programme manager, so they should not expect any financial assistance. 
PSG and community members also expected me to confront the DHIS staff and 
collectors who did not want to register people they considered as qualified for 
exemption. Similar to Evans-Pritchard (1976) and Scheper-Hughes (1992), who 
both intervened during their research to help their study participants, I found myself 
initiating procedures to help people by recommending to collectors and DHIS staff 
that the core poor must be exempted. In a few cases, I was successful; however, I 
was cautious and tried not to show signs of aligning with a particular stakeholder. 
Some community representatives in the PSGs expected me to confront health 
providers and DHISs staff who they accused of corruption. But considering the 
implications of this action for my study, I turned down the requests. However, I did 
raise these incidents during key informant interviews, PSGs and stakeholders’ 
meetings for the group to decide on what action to take. 
The third issue was how to ensure that my participation did not bias my interpre-
tation of the intervention process, events and outcomes. There is a general percep-
tion that when doing fieldwork in one’s home country, a researcher runs the risk of 
developing ‘over rapport’ with research subjects, which might impede receiving 
objective information (Zaman 2005 : 31). In my case, it was not just that I was doing 
research at home, but I was also working with an insider’s perspective on the NHIS, 
which I term as both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ information. The mutual trust that I 
developed with PSG members led to empathy and sometimes sympathy. For 
example, my familiar relationship with DHIS staff and community members 
sometimes led me to sympathise with some of their corrupt practices that they 
termed ‘giving favours’, e.g., not sanctioning defaulters and collecting more than the 
premium and registration fees. This created a problem on how to distance myself 
from the ‘negative’ information that was important to the subject of study but may 
have been embarrassing to individual group members when published. As Okely 
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(1984) observes, the research report bears the mark of future scrutiny and I call this 
image management. Is it more important to maintain a researcher’s position when 
the findings are made public, or to be concerned about upholding the trust of key 
informants? In this respect, my dilemma was whether to publish the ‘negative’ 
without looking over my shoulder for PSG members’ reaction when they read about 
what they had told me in confidence. In this regard, Van Ginkel (1994: 15) notes: 
“Many ethnographers refrain from writing things that are potentially harmful to their 
key informants’ interest.” This demands a negotiated approach to maintain objectivi-
ty while keeping the participants’ trust. I used an interpretive perspective in my 
analysis (O’Brien 2001). I did this through self-reflection and employed emic12 
perspectives and etic13 accounts of the various issues. I maintained my position as a 
researcher and brought out both the positive and negative information while keeping 
stakeholders’ identities confidential. 
I was also cautious of Davidson & Layder’s (1994) observation that reflexivity 
could lead to researchers’ hypersensitivity to their role in constructing the data and 
lack of confidence in the findings. I was personally disappointed that the interven-
tion did not achieve all objectives. In the end, the intervention only increased 
enrolment overall, but failed to improve retention rate and enrolment among the core 
poor. As an initiator of the intervention and with my interest in the PSGs’ perfor-
mance, I had to make a conscious effort to stand back while writing and interpreting 
the processes dispassionately. I was assisted by the survey results, which determined 
the final outcome of the intervention. The post-intervention household survey 
provided the final quantitative answers about the success and failure of the project. 
Triangulating qualitative and quantitative data helped me to interpret the results. I 
also organised a focus group with all PSG members in the Central Region after the 
intervention was complete to examine the outcome. These discussions provided 
additional explanations for the intervention outcome, which I added to my final data 
making me confident that I captured the participants’ reality and point of view in my 
interpretation and conclusions. Although the information presented in the following 
chapters may be complex and sometimes conflicting, it is my interpretation of 
events based on data that I believe to be reliable, and no more. My participant role 
might have prevented me from being an independent interest-free researcher and 
thus, I make no universal claims that what I present is bias free. 
To conclude, the debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a re-
searcher playing dual role is not an either/or affair. I am convinced my participation 
in PSG intervention activities was necessary. It helped me capture more dimensions 
                                              
12
  An ‘emic’ perspective describes behaviours and understandings in terms of meaningful experiences to the 
actor. 
13
  By contrast, an ‘etic’ account is a description of a phenomenon in terms of its meaning to the observing 
outsider. 
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of the phenomenon and process factors that enabled me provide in-depth causal 
explanations to the outcomes of the intervention. As Oosterhoff (2009: 257-258) 
argues: “In public health action research, the goal is not just to learn but also to 
change and improve the status quo.” Similarly, my involvement in PSG activities 
made it possible for me to offer suggestions in critical areas of the intervention that 
helped the PSGs to better conceptualise the intervention and enhanced their work. In 
addition, my insider’s knowledge of what PSGs’ experienced implementing the 
problem-solving intervention programme helped me give an in-depth account of the 
intervention process, factors and challenges that influenced PSGs’ work and by 
consequence the outcome of the intervention. My dual role thus helped me not to be 
disconnected from reality, so I could offer insightful suggestions to improve 
intervention practice. 
Ethical issues 
For health-related research to be conducted in Ghana, it is obligatory to obtain 
ethical approval from a recognised board to protect the interests of participants. The 
Ghana Health Service (GHS) vets research proposals to ensure that proposed studies 
use appropriate designs especially for data collection, storage and publication to 
ensure researchers do not cause harm to participants. The proposal for this study was 
vetted and approved by the ethics committee of the GHS. 
Before I had access to health facilities and DHISs, we [the project team] had to 
seek approval from the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) and GHS, the 
two institutions directly involved in the implementation of the NHIS policy. Before 
the study commenced, we held discussions with the top officials at the headquarters 
of both institutions to inform them about the project. Then we went to the regional 
and district levels before going to individual health facilities that provide healthcare 
to the communities and which were selected for the study to discuss the project. We 
also sought the officials’ permission to use their staff as PSG members. These visits 
were preceded by official letters to NHIA and GHS headquarters and the two 
Regional Directors of Health Services (DDHSs) and NHIA regional managers who 
in turn wrote to the District Directors of Health Services in their respective regions, 
heads of health facilities and District Health Insurance Scheme (DHIS) managers. 
Many of these officials were gatekeepers who provided protection against undesira-
ble interference in the study and intervention. 
Following these protocols was quite easy because of the principal investigator’s 
(one of my local supervisors in Ghana and a regional director of GHS) connection 
with regional directors of GHS and DDHSs. Equally important was seeking permis-
sion from traditional leaders to carry out the study in their communities. The staff of 
the various District Health Directorates facilitated our approval from the traditional 
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leaders as they had good relationships with them. They introduced us to the chiefs 
and opinion leaders who readily granted us permission to go forward. 
Anonymity of respondents 
Although there was no potential risk in participating in this study, utmost care was 
taken to protect the confidentiality and identity of participants. The political percep-
tion of the NHIS makes the issue of protecting respondents’ anonymity rather 
complex in the writing of this book. Similar to Van der Geest’s (2003) observation 
that all key informants in his study of old age in Ghana were disappointed when 
their names did not appear in his book, here the desire for anonymity was mixed and 
I had various reactions from key informants. At the community level, the need for 
anonymity was less relevant as they did not care about revealing their identities. 
They wanted their names and pictures to be attached to their views in my study. 
However, health providers and DHIS staff did not want to be associated with views 
on topics they perceived as critical of their organisations. Some were reluctant to 
have their interviews recorded, so I had to write their responses. 
As Green & Thorogood (2005: 60) note: “Case studies present particular chal-
lenges in terms of anonymity.” The following comment was typical of some DHIS 
staff’s reaction when I presented the summary of the preliminary findings for their 
feedback: “Though the results reflect what was discussed, I am not comfortable with 
the political issues in your report because of the politics surrounding the NHIS and 
our work” (a DHIS manager). Fortunately, because I used two study sites and also 
visited other five intervention communities in Central Region, I was able to use 
pseudonyms when discussing the results to hide the identity of the communities and 
protect their confidentiality so that sensitive information could not be linked to a 
specific person. The individual identities of informants were also protected by using 
pseudonyms. 
To prevent others from having access to the database, after data entry, the ques-
tionnaires were stored in a safe room and only the research team had access. 
Recorded conversations were destroyed while soft copy transcripts were protected 
by a password. I did this to ensure that information provided could not be easily 
associated with particular individuals, communities, or health facilities and DHISs. 
Informed consent 
The consent form stated the aim of the study and the expected contribution to 
increasing access to healthcare in Ghana. Participants were told about the option to 
participate or decline and the right to opt out at any time. I had consent forms that I 
gave to those participants who could read and verbally explained the study to those 
who could not before seeking their permission to conduct interviews. Although the 
consent form had a column for participants who agreed to take part in the study to 
sign, nobody signed; they told me it was not necessary. I also asked permission to 
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take photographs, record interviews and include informants’ pictures in presenta-
tions and publications if necessary to which nobody objected. However, a few 
people told me not to associate them with some information they had given me. In 
such cases, I did not record those portions of the interviews. 
In conclusion, I have provided detailed information about the study design and 
context, and various approaches used to carry out this study. Also, I have presented 
methodological reflections regarding the double role I played as a researcher and a 
member of an intervention group. This information provides context to the empirical 
chapters and yields a better understanding of the findings and conclusions I present 
next. 
  
3 
Barriers and enablers to  
enrolment and retention in  
the National Health Insurance 
Scheme in Ghana 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to explore barriers and enablers to enrolment in the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and member retention. The operation of 
NHIS, has earned Ghana the reputation of having a relatively reliable nation-wide 
health insurance. Despite this achievement, there are barriers that have resulted in 
low enrolment and high membership non-renewal rates. The pre-intervention 
household survey carried out in March 2009 in Eastern and Central Regions showed 
that only a third (30.1%) of the 3,301 households were currently insured, 14.3 per 
cent had been previously insured and 55.6 per cent had never been insured. Current 
enrolment of households varied considerably among communities ranging from 9.2 
to 56.9 per cent and non-renewal rates from 2.7 to 27.5 per cent. Of the 13,857 
individuals covered in the survey, only a third (30%) was currently insured, 15.6 per 
cent had been previously insured and 54.4 per cent had never enrolled. Individual 
enrolment also varied among communities ranging from 4.8 to 66.2 per cent (Table 
A.3, Appendix 2). The reasons why enrolment is low and non-renewal rate high are 
discussed in this chapter. 
A multi-level perspective (MLP) was used to analyse stakeholders’ (community 
members, health providers and DHIS staff) behaviours and practices and the 
challenges of implementing the NHIS that influence enrolment and retention rates. 
The MLP emphasises that stakeholders and events at all levels of social organisation 
  
56
must be considered when studying a phenomenon (instead of focusing on one level 
(see chapter 1). 
This chapter presents the problems of the NHIS that are the focus of this study – 
to identify barriers to enrolment and establish interventions to expand coverage and 
retain members. It should be noted that despite the barriers presented here, health 
providers1 and district health insurance scheme (DHIS) staff are acknowledged for 
their contribution to promoting the scheme despite the challenging circumstances 
under which they work. 
For my analysis, I draw on qualitative information from seven intervention com-
munities in the Central Region and data from the baseline household survey we 
conducted in 30 communities in the Central and Eastern Regions of Ghana. Both 
techniques were used in an effort to present holistic information on barriers and 
enablers to enrolment with the NHIS and retention of members (see chapter 2). 
In health economic literature, low coverage of health insurance schemes is gener-
ally linked to economic determinants that give excessive weight to the ability to pay 
and the cost of premiums (Asante & Aikins 2008, Basaza et al. 2008, Jutting 2004). 
This chapter looks beyond economic determinants by engaging the three key NHIS 
stakeholders (community members, health providers and DHIS staff) to explore 
factors that influence people’s decision not to enrol or renew their membership. 
Attention is also paid to the historical antecedents to the introduction of the NHIS 
and their effect on enrolment. 
Barriers experienced by community members 
In everyday conversation in the community, people described the NHIS as an 
advance payment towards healthcare and asserted that it was a good arrangement to 
ensure that everybody had access to healthcare. Views gathered from key informants 
and discussions in problem-solving group (PSG) meetings indicated that almost 
everyone has heard about NHIS and believes that it has improved access to 
healthcare. A community member described the NHIS as: “Advance payment that 
gives access to healthcare. When you have the hospital card [NHIS card] you do not 
have much problem when sick. It is helping many people go to the hospital nowa-
days.” 
However, the overwhelming endorsement of the scheme does not translate into 
high enrolment and regular renewal of memberships. The actual decision to enrol 
and stay with the scheme is influenced by a number of factors categorised as 
poverty, “not often sick” and traditional concepts of risk-sharing, poor quality of 
                                              
1
  Health providers referred to in this study include medical doctors, medical assistants, nurses, disease 
control officers, dispensary assistants, health assistants and laboratory technicians among others who are 
in contact with insured patients and work on NHIS forms in public health facilities. 
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service delivery, payment of unauthorised fees and political overtones in the 
perception of the NHIS. 
“No money to pay premium” 
When I engaged community members in conversations on why they were not 
enrolling or renewing their membership in the NHIS, poverty was often mentioned. 
“No money to pay” was normally the first response given by previously or never-
insured informants. This trend was reflected in pre-intervention household survey 
(N=3301) results in which an overwhelming majority said they did not enrol 
(72.5%) or renew their membership (61.4%) in the NHIS because they could not 
afford the cost of premium (Table A.4, Appendix 2). 
Serwa, a disease surveillance volunteer and community-based growth promoter 
used by Ghana Health Service for field activities, told me some people could not pay 
the premium and needed help. For example, she wanted me to help Ama to get 
exemption from paying NHIS premium. Ama was known by almost everyone in the 
community as being extremely poor. Serwa summarised the situation of the core 
poor as follows: 
They are very poor individuals who have no stable source of income. They live on the benevo-
lence of family members, friends and neighbours. They struggle to survive. Even to get one meal 
a day is a problem and they cannot afford the cost of premium. 
I discussed Ama’s situation with the NHIS collector and requested she submits 
her name for exemption. But when I asked the collector what had happened after 
two months, she had not submitted her name for an exemption. I decided to speak to 
Ama to ascertain if what Serwa had told me was true and to ‘push’ for Ama’s 
exemption. What I saw actually confirmed that Ama could not enrol in the NHIS 
because of poverty. She was living with a woman, an acquaintance, who decided to 
house her when she first came from a nearby village to the town looking for a job. 
Ama described her situation as follows: 
I have five children, including twins. I want to enrol because if I compare the cost of premium to 
the cost of healthcare it is cheap, but I have no regular source of income and even what to eat is 
a problem. I do menial jobs and live with this woman. Though she is not a relative, she was kind 
enough to host me. People in this house support me, but they are not ready to give me money to 
enrol. As you know, one of my twin daughters died because I had no money to take her to the 
hospital when she was sick. It was so painful that I lost my daughter because of poverty. 
The death of Ama’s daughter and her inability to obtain an exemption illustrates 
that poverty accounted for some people’s failure to enrol, even if they wanted to. 
Ama’s complaint also indicates that she knew the NHIS would give her access to 
healthcare and could have prevented her child’s death. 
That said, I talked to a number of people who were not poor by local standards to 
explore further the “no money to pay” response and found that the issue goes 
beyond the premium. For example, although the premium and registration fees are 
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relatively low, enrolling all members of large households in the Ghanaian social 
context is problematic since it may not be affordable despite families owning cocoa 
and food crop farms and engaging in fishing (both of which create substantial 
incomes). Therefore, some households did selective enrolment of specific household 
members – often those who needed healthcare. Kwame, a cocoa farmer and a father 
of six children (one above 18 years) and two adult dependents (his mother and a 
nephew) said he could only enrol his wife and four children because he did not have 
money to pay for everybody. Paying GH¢ 4.00 (about US$2.5) for each child and 
his mother to cover the registration fee and premium for an adult dependant was a 
problem. When I asked him why he made this choice, he replied: 
Though premium and registration fees are low, enrolling the whole household is expensive so I 
enrolled my wife and four children and left the others because there was no money to pay for 
everybody. I enrolled those who go to the hospital and are likely to use the NHIS card. 
Nonetheless, other respondents gave additional reasons for not paying: “not get-
ting sick often”, poor quality healthcare service delivery, negative behaviour of 
health providers and health insurance is not a priority. Discussions in PSG, stake-
holders’ and community leaders’ meetings indicated that the core reasons for not 
enrolling or renewing NHIS cards was neither poverty nor the high cost of premi-
ums. There was a consensus that the premium cost was reasonable: GH¢ 4.00 
(US$2.5) initial registration fee and GH¢ 14.00 (US$10) per year premium (if 
applicable – GH¢ 1.00 annual administrative renewal fee). Although income is 
seasonal, the respondents stated that anyone really committed to enrolling could do 
so during harvest time when most healthy people could afford to pay. 
This assertion by most key informants caused me to question the “no money to 
pay” response. So, I analysed the poverty situation in both the farming (Assin 
Achiano) and fishing (Anomabo) communities to explain the difference between the 
pre-intervention household survey and qualitative results from my conversations. 
The pre-intervention household survey was conducted at the peak of the dry season 
when poverty was at its worst. Qualitative data on the other hand was gathered 
throughout the year and the inhabitants’ poverty was observed and discussed. Views 
from key informants, community leaders and PSG members indicate that poverty is 
seasonal. People experience less poverty during a bumper harvest when almost 
everyone has income. In the fishing communities, men work for boat owners or do 
canoe fishing while women sell fish and other goods. Similarly, in farming commu-
nities, people have income either from their own cocoa or food crop farms or work 
for commercial farmers. After the harvest time, income levels fall drastically for the 
majority of fishermen and farmers (except those who own boats and do deep-sea 
fishing or large food crop farmers who still earn substantial income). The respond-
ents’ financial status on the pre-intervention survey was not recorded during harvest 
time; therefore, their reported income did not reflect their average financial situation 
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throughout the year. This explains why the majority of respondents said they could 
not afford the cost of premium. An uninsured fisherman summarised the situation as 
follows: 
It is a pity that most of us have not enrolled when in fact we can afford to pay GH¢ 18.00 [for 
premium and registration fee] to enrol and GH¢ 15.00 [~ US$10] to renew our card every year at 
least during harvest time. The low level of enrolment in our community shows how insuring 
against ill-health is not our priority. Ghanaians in general don’t prepare for sickness until it 
happens. 
The “no money to pay premium’’ response can be questioned when the pre-
intervention household survey results are compared across communities. With the 
exception of Koforidua and Akosombo (in the Eastern Region), where the majority 
of the respondents are Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 
contributors2, a low poverty incidence does not necessarily lead to high enrolment in 
the NHIS. The poverty incidence was calculated using data from detailed consump-
tion expenditure on food and non-food items and the dwelling characteristics (e.g. 
water supply and availability of electricity among others) that are used in the Ghana 
Living Standard Survey (GLSS V) (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). Durable goods 
were not limited to the month preceding the survey since their prices are more stable 
and less amenable to seasonal fluctuations (Deaton 1997, Deaton & Zaidi 1999). 
The GLSS V (chosen to have uniformity with existing data) set the lower poverty 
line at GH¢ 288/year (US$ 206) and the upper poverty line at GH¢ 370/year (US$ 
264). We also estimated monthly household per capita expenditures as the monthly 
consumption expenditure divided by household size. This represented the total 
amount of money needed to meet food and non-food consumption requirements of 
household members (for more details see Aryeetey et al. 2010). Thus, all households 
whose monthly per capita expenditure fell below the upper poverty line (GH¢ 
370/year) were considered poor. Households whose monthly per capita expenditure 
fell below the lower poverty line (GH¢ 288/year) were considered to be extremely 
poor. For this study, poverty incidence (PI) is defined as the number of households 
identified as poor divided by the total number of households in the community (see 
Ghana Statistical Survey 2007, Aryeetey et al. 2010). We considered this as proxies 
for household wealth and used principal components analysis to estimate a house-
hold socio-economic status (SES) score. Finally, households were ranked into 
wealth quintiles based on their SES (core poor, poor, average, rich and very rich) 
quintiles (see Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011 and, Aryeetey et al. 2010 for details). 
                                              
2
  The Census enumeration areas in Koforidua and Akosombo are communities where the majority of 
residents contribute to SNNIT and NHIS registration is compulsory for them. Their premium is directly 
deducted from their salary. They only pay registration fee of GH¢ 4.00 [about US$2.5] and GH¢ 1.00 
[about US$0.75]. In Koforidua for example, where I was part of the household survey team, the communi-
ty is popularly called SSNIT Flats, an estate built for government workers. Almost all household heads, 
who were interviewed, were SSNIT contributors. 
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Table 3.1 is an extract from the analysis of our pre-intervention household survey 
data showing the PI and the individual insurance status in 30 communities. It shows 
that Winneba (Central Region) with 11.8 per cent PI had only 8.7 per cent current 
enrolment and 12.4 per cent previously insured compared to Burukum Maumi 
(Eastern Region) with the highest (56.4%) PI had higher current enrolment (31%) 
and lower previous enrolment (11.5%). Also, Oframase (Eastern Region) with a PI 
of 29.4 per cent had the highest current enrolment (66.2%) and one of the lowest 
non-renewal rates (5.2%). This was in contrast to Koforidua (Eastern Region) where 
no one is below the poverty line and NHIS premiums for the majority of respond-
ents are directly deducted from their salaries here, only 56.1 per cent of the popula-
tion were currently insured and 22.7 per cent were previously insured (Table 3.1). 
These examples indicate that enrolment does not neatly correlate with economic 
status; there is more to the “no money to pay premium” response. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Poverty incidence in selected communities and NHIS status of  
individuals 
See the complete Table A.3 in Appendix 2 for further details 
 
 
Multinomial logistic regression shows that current enrolment is significantly 
(p=0.000) higher among the richest quintile (41%) than the poorest quintile (27%). 
The non-renewal rate is significantly (p<0.000) lower among the core poor (13%) 
than the richest (17%) (for details see Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011). This indicates that 
although poverty contributes to low enrolment, it is less significant for renewing 
membership. This findings supports the large number of informants who state that 
poverty is the main reason why they do not enrol, but does not explain why affluent 
communities, like Koforidua (SSNIT Flats) where residents’ premiums are deducted 
from their salaries and they pay only registration fees, had lower enrolment and 
higher non-renewal rates than Oframase, for example, which is a relatively poor 
farming community. 
Community Poverty 
incidence(%)
Current enrolment 
(%)
Previous enrolment 
(%)
Winneba (Central Region) 11.8  8.7 12.4 
Anomabo (Central Region) 32.1 4.8 11.3 
Burukum Maumi (Eastern Region) 56.4 31.0 11.5 
Akosombo (Eastern Region) 11.9 35.7 33.6 
Oframase (Eastern Region) 29.4 66.2 5.2 
Koforidua (Eastern Region) 0 56.1 22.7 
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The NHIS was introduced as a poverty reduction strategy to provide accessible, 
affordable and good quality healthcare to all Ghanaians. Therefore, the minimum 
premium for informal-sector workers was fixed taking into consideration the 
prevailing economic conditions of the majority of Ghanaians. Premiums are there-
fore heavily subsidised with a value-added tax (VAT) and SNNIT contributions 
(Government of Ghana 2004, Witter & Garshong 2009) to minimise the exclusion of 
poor people. Also, participants’ comments and my observations indicate that for 
most people the “no money to pay” response was a convenient excuse to rationalise 
non-enrolment and non-renewal of their membership in the NHIS. “No money” 
served as a socially accepted idiom to hide negligence and lack of responsible 
parenthood. Key informants suggested that most uninsured people have the ability to 
pay, but are just apathetic towards the NHIS. Yet, the key informants did accept that 
the NHIS was a better alternative to ‘cash and carry’. The conclusion at all PSG and 
stakeholders’ meetings and interviews was that apart from the core poor and poor 
people with large households, household heads willing to enrol and renew NHIS 
cards for their members can do so during harvest time. This suggests that the 
significant factor that influences the average Ghanaian and rich Ghanaian’s decision 
to enrol and remain in the NHIS is neither the high cost of premium nor the afforda-
bility of the premium. This view differs from previous studies in which poverty was 
found to be largely responsible for low enrolment with SHISs (De Allegri & 
Sauerborn 2007, Asante & Aikins 2008). Poverty as an excuse for most respondents 
who did not enrol or renew their membership in the NHIS is ingrained in other 
factors, which will be discussed below. 
“I’m not often sick” and traditional concepts of risk sharing 
Another typical response from the previously insured or never insured respondents 
was: “Mentaa nyare” (I am not often sick). They saw themselves at very low or no 
risk for illness, so there was no need to enrol or renew their NHIS membership. A 
community key informant asked me in an interview: “Why should I pay for or 
continue to pay toward something I’m not likely to benefit from?” Others said they 
only registered their wives and children because they were most in need of 
healthcare. During a PSG meeting, one member explained his non-enrolment as 
follows: 
You know health insurance is new and means little to most of us. We, Ghanaians don’t think 
about securing ourselves against ill health until we are seriously ill. Health insurance is not our 
priority. I registered my children and wife because they have the greatest need for healthcare. I 
did not enrol because I hardly get sick. 
The perceived health status of each household member influenced the decision by 
the head of the household to enrol in NHIS and who to enrol. Healthy individuals 
were less likely to enrol, while those who thought they would need healthcare were 
more likely to enrol and regularly renew their membership. Criel (1998) also found 
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this phenomenon in his work on Masisi hospital insurance in Eastern Congo where 
women of child-bearing age enrol because of the prediction of need for healthcare. 
Further discussions at PSG meetings revealed that community risk-sharing ar-
rangements also influenced their enrolment decisions. Two prominent informal 
mutual support groups similar to the NHIS were identified: pataase in fishing 
communities and nnoboa in farming communities. The two groups are somewhat 
similar to the NHIS; the difference lies in the reasons for joining the groups and the 
benefits. Pataase members see death as a greater concern than ill health. One 
pataase member argued: “Death is a certain event, so one must prepare for it but 
sickness may or may not befall you.” In the case of nnoboa, people join when they 
need support on their farms and withdraw afterward. Benefits for both support 
groups are commensurate to one’s contribution and not need. These operational 
principles contrast with the NHIS’ risk- and cost-sharing based on need. In many of 
my conversations, I noticed that those who see health insurance as a kind of large 
pataase or nnoboa often gave the “I’m not often sick” response. They compared the 
two programs and did not understand why people who have expensive operations, 
such as for a hernia, and those who continuously access healthcare pay the same 
amount as those who have not gone to the hospital in the past year. They felt cheated 
and argued that their premium for subsequent years should be reduced if they had 
not accessed the healthcare system. This argument conflicts with the fundamental 
principles of health insurance where premiums are based on income irrespective of a 
members’ risk level. The respondents’ behaviour and argument suggest that they 
have not fully understood the redistribution principles of health insurance and have 
confused it with their mutual support groups. As Vander Geest et al. (1990: 1026-
1030) wrote: “differences in stakeholders’ interpretations affect policy outcomes.” 
Thus, although the aggregate meanings of risk-sharing of traditional mutual ar-
rangements and health insurance could be the same, the differences make it wishful 
thinking that people will easily appreciate the need to enrol in the NHS and consist-
ently renew their membership because of the policy makers’ assumed benefits. 
Those who did not enrol in the NHIS because they did not have a need for 
healthcare pursue their short-term self-interest with little consideration for what may 
happen to them in the long term or in the event of rare adversity. This phenomenon 
could be the influence of traditional risk-sharing groups where every member is 
certain to benefit according to his or her contribution, while an insured person has 
largely unlimited access to healthcare when sick but receives nothing if they are 
well. As Van der Geest (1992) posits, a cultural perspective limits the possibilities 
for thinking and acting in new situations. Though solidarity and reciprocity are 
predominant features of both traditional mutual risk-sharing arrangements and 
health insurance, the respondents’ reaction to the latter is influenced by the princi-
ples of the former. Thus, people’s existing knowledge largely determines their 
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reaction to new policies and not simply the benefits; traditional ideas undermine 
enrolment in health insurance schemes. Therefore, more education is needed to 
improve Ghanaians’ understanding and appreciation of the cost- and risk-sharing 
embedded in the NHIS so they do not consider the operational principles of the 
NHIS as the same as traditional mutual support groups. 
Quality of service 
Medical practice in many countries including Ghana has come under scrutiny in 
recent years since clients are demanding better care. A study by Ballard et al. (2004) 
observes that quality healthcare should aim at providing care that is timely, efficient, 
equitable and patient-centred. Literature on the quality of care is generally catego-
rised as the quality of technical care and service delivery. Technical care includes 
doctors’ diagnoses, the effectiveness of treatment and the quality of drugs. In this 
study, the technical quality of care did not seem to influence the participants’ NHIS 
enrolment or renewal decisions; the respondents were, however, concerned with 
healthcare service delivery. 
In developed countries, healthcare services have become market goods supplied 
by healthcare providers to satisfy patients’ needs. Insured patients are guaranteed 
quality services, while uninsured patients have difficulty navigating the health 
system (Ferlie & Shortell 2001) and in some cases face delays in obtaining care. 
This study found the opposite – NHIS insured patients in Ghana experience delays 
at health facilities while uninsured patients are served earlier and better. Respond-
ents who were insured complained of health providers’ negative behaviour, long 
waiting times and the lack of drugs at health facilities. 
Complaints about healthcare providers’ negative behaviour 
This section describes the behaviours of health providers during their clinical 
encounters with insured patients and the influence of this on enrolment and retention 
in the NHIS. I used behaviour as a term to describe how health providers interact 
with clients and not as a theoretical concept. The behaviours that discourage people 
from enrolling and remaining in the NHIS are referred to as negative and those that 
encourage people to enrol and renew their membership are labelled as positive. I 
dwell more on the negative behaviours in this section because that is the focus of the 
study; positive behaviours that encourage people to enrol are acknowledged later in 
the chapter. 
The issue of health providers’ negative behaviour towards insured clients (as 
opposed to uninsured) arose at all the PSG, stakeholders’ and community leaders’ 
meetings and community durbars I attended. Forms of negative behaviour men-
tioned by respondents were not showing respect to insured patients and using 
derogatory language. The phrases the insured used to describe their treatment was: 
“Wommu yԑn” (They don’t respect us). In Ghana, showing respect is crucial in 
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social life and is the basis for judging the quality of interaction between people. This 
compels people to initially respect those they come into contact with. Good commu-
nication between health providers and patients leads to patient satisfaction while 
poor communication results in frustration. In Ghana, it is common that health 
providers do not show respect to patients. As Senah (2002) observed, practicing and 
assessing biomedicine is embedded in and influenced by master-servant relationship 
where patients must submit to the authority of health providers. 
To explore the veracity of these reports in my two study locations, I spent time at 
health facilities and observed that some health providers capitalise on the difference 
in their power and the patients’ power and show disrespect. Further discussions with 
participants show that after the introduction of the NHIS, new patient categories 
have emerged – the insured and the uninsured – with implications for health provid-
er-patient encounters. While it is acknowledged in Ghana that health providers do 
not respect patients, the categories of insured and uninsured patients have introduced 
a new dimension to this phenomenon. Andersen (2004) discussed the various ways 
that patients were treated in a regional hospital in Northern Ghana depending on 
their social status such as education, wealth and relationship with staff members. 
This study found that being insured exposes a patient to worse treatment by the 
health providers resulting in a greater dissatisfaction among insured patients. The 
informants believed that these experiences contributed to the high membership non-
renewal rate. The level of disrespect shown by healthcare staff differed across 
Ghana. In one research site, people spoke unfavourably about their experience at the 
health centre. However, participants in a second research site said that they occa-
sionally experienced such behaviour at the district hospital, but rarely at the health 
centre. In the second site, a medical assistant asked me in a conversation: “Who 
should I give preference to; is it someone whose bill will be paid even if there are 
delays or one who I’m not sure can pay since the uninsured sometimes abscond after 
treatment?” 
Health providers’ negative behaviour is a sensitive issue. Since they knew that I 
was a researcher, the providers did not openly show negative behaviours in my 
presence. Nonetheless, what they told me suggests that it does happen. For example, 
I overheard nurses making derogatory remarks about insured patients several times. 
At PSG meetings, nurses also described insured patients as ‘difficult’. A typical 
phrase when discussing issues related to insured patients was: “Wcn a wckuta 
apomuden nsiakyibaa krataa no ha yԑn adwene” (NHIS card holders disturb us). 
One respondent narrated his experience when he accompanied a relative to the 
hospital during a PSG meeting. 
When you go to the hospital they talk to you anyhow. They make you wait for several hours. In 
fact, I nearly quarrelled with a nurse when we took a family member with insurance card to the 
hospital. But for the sick person, I would have insulted her and left the hospital. They don’t 
respect us. 
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During PSG meetings, healthcare providers’ reactions to complaints about the 
disrespect of insured patients were divided. There were those who argued that 
ideally health providers should strive to provide quality service to their patients 
irrespective of their NHIS status. Others acknowledged accusations of disrespectful 
behaviour, but argued that not all health providers show negative behaviour towards 
insured patients. 
I verified these accusations by exploring the views of other healthcare providers 
who were not PSG members. One reacted. 
These are genuine complaints; health workers’ behaviour is not predictable. I’ve spoken to some 
of my colleagues several times on this. Some of us don’t respect patients and see the insured in 
particular as giving us extra work. 
Nurse Julia responding to allegations that she described as ‘false rumours’ ended 
by saying: 
They [insured patients] think because they have insurance they can come here [health facility] 
anytime. They wait and come to disturb us after working hours with all sorts of complaints that 
are not emergencies [meaning conditions they can manage at home or report the next day]. 
This implies that some health providers, and certainly those at that facility, are 
not happy when the insured report for treatment when the outpatient department 
(OPD) has closed. Their concern was that they were already overburdened during 
the day, so when the insured come to the facility to complain about an illness that 
started three days or a week ago, this was irritating. They consider these patients as: 
“Disturbing them after a hectic day’s work.” 
DHIS staff also confirmed the insured patients’ claims and emphasised that it was 
hindering their effort to promote the NHIS. James lamented: “Some health workers 
are not helping us. Their attitude and behaviour undermine our effort. We work hard 
to get people enrolled, they [healthcare workers] do not treat them [patients] well 
and we lose them.” Although experiences of disrespect could arise from the nurses 
being overburdened with a heavy workload in busy health facilities, they are 
exacerbated by the insured patients’ increased use of services. The healthcare 
workers’ disrespect discourages people from enrolling and or remaining in the 
NHIS. 
Long waiting time 
It is a common sight of patients waiting for hours in a busy health facility in Ghana. 
The insured’s concern was that they wait longer than those who are uninsured. From 
my observations, what makes the situation worse is that health providers do not 
follow a ‘first come, first serve’ principle. Although both insured and uninsured 
patients indicated their dissatisfaction with this approach, insured patients seemed to 
be most affected. Evidence shows that long waiting times at health facilities are 
partly due to an unorganised flow of patients and this undermine patients’ satisfac-
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tion with their care (see Rondeau 1998). But the situation is more complex in 
Ghana. Abena’s description of her experience illustrates that delays for insured 
patients go beyond the lack of an organised patient flow. She showed me both her 
expired NHIS card and her six year old son’s and said: 
I didn’t renew my card because health providers here do not treat us nicely. The only time I sent 
my son to the hospital, the nurse kept us waiting for a long time well over an hour without 
telling me anything. Others come, pay and go and nobody told me why I had to wait. I was fed 
up and asked her why she was not attending to us. She retorted, “You wait”. From that day I 
decided I was not going to renew my card. This actually discourages many of us from enrolling 
or renewing our card. If you have your money, why should you go and waste time at the hospi-
tal? They should be told to change their behaviour. 
When I asked a health provider about insured patients’ complaints about delays at 
health facilities, he acknowledged their concerns and said: 
Health providers are suffering from ‘patient fatigue’. The NHIS has come to expose the weak-
ness of our health system; delay in service delivery and negative attitudes. If we improve our 
attitudes and everything remains the same, we will get better results. …When people go to an 
overcrowded facility they don’t mind waiting patiently, provided you explain to them why they 
have to wait. If you tell them politely that you are alone so they should have patience and you 
will attend to all of them, it will be fine with them. But when you shout at them, why are you 
now coming, and tell them because of health insurance you are coming to worry me, how would 
they understand the situation? 
Even though this assertion is true in some cases, I also observed many instances 
where health providers were chatting with each other and showed no sense of 
urgency while patients were waiting. As one PSG member indicated: “They [health 
providers] think it is normal for patients to wait for hours, so they don’t care if they 
see many people waiting.” 
Though insured patients attribute their long waiting times to the fact that they are 
not paying cash, this might not always be the case. The long waiting times may be 
legitimate and related to the providers’ heavy workload. However, the health 
providers lack good communication skills to explain the situation in the facility and 
tell insured patients why they have to wait. Most insured patients I spoke with were 
not even aware of the extra time needed to fill their NHIS forms – something that is 
not required for the uninsured. Unfortunately, due to poor communication, some 
health providers are not able to explain the staffing situation and administrative 
procedures that accompany the NHIS coverage and instead make comments that the 
insured attribute to their NHIS status. This echoes Criel’s (1998) observation that 
the low enrolment in health insurance schemes and the populations’ perceived 
quality care is influenced by the health workers’ lack of consultation skills. 
Lack of drugs in health facilities 
Being given drugs at health facilities was generally regarded as an essential aspect 
of quality service delivery. Access to drugs motivates people to seek healthcare and 
also to enrol and remain in the NHIS; a lack of drugs makes health insurance less 
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attractive. John told me he feels disappointed when he is not given medicine, but 
instead is given a prescription to go and look for drugs in accredited pharmacy shops 
that he sometimes must pay for. These assertions are supported by the pre-
intervention household survey, where an overwhelming majority (87%) of currently 
insured respondents, previously insured (90.2%) and never insured (84.7%) indicat-
ed that drug availability at health facilities needs to be improved (Table A.6, 
Appendix 2). Kumah’s description shows insured patients’ dissatisfaction: 
We don’t have an NHIS accredited pharmacy here so if all they give us at the hospital is a pre-
scription to go and look for drugs we could as well go to the store, describe our condition and 
buy the drug. The last time, I ended up paying for a drug covered by health insurance in an 
accredited pharmacy. Sometimes that is what happens and we don’t feel like renewing our cards. 
These incidents make insured patients feel disappointed about the quality of ser-
vice at health facilities. Insured patients think that because they have prepaid for 
healthcare, they have a strong entitlement and anticipate quality service including 
drugs. A boat owner I conversed with told me: 
I did not enrol or renew my membership because some health providers do not respect us. 
Moreover, you waste a lot of time when you go to the hospital so why do I bother myself if I can 
just go and buy drugs at the store when sick. 
My findings are similar to Kroeger (1983) who noted that health system factors 
influence health-seeking behaviour and lead to the decision not to seek care at a 
health facility. The author mentioned health professionals’ attitudes, satisfaction 
with treatment and the shortage of drugs as factors that determine health-seeking 
behaviour in developing countries. Both findings show that there are similarities 
between the factors that determine health-seeking behaviour and insurance decision-
making. Thus, there is a need to address factors that undermine patients seeking 
formal care when promoting health insurance since these factors have implications 
for enrolment. 
The shortage of drugs on the Health Insurance Drug List in health facilities in 
Ghana highlights the practice of Ghanaians depending on pharmacy and chemist 
shops for treatment when they cannot afford the cost of treatment under user-fees. 
This has been documented in earlier studies (Senah 1997, Asenso-Okyere et al. 
1998), but has now taken a new direction. I found that under the NHIS, pharmacy 
and chemical shops are being used as suitable options to health facilities not because 
of financial barriers, but rather due to the lack of drugs at health facilities. This 
situation should be of interest to Ghanaian health policy makers for two reasons. 
First, an overreliance on pharmacy and chemist shop-keepers, who act like doctors, 
discourages people from enrolling and remaining in the NHIS scheme. Asenso-
Okyere et al. (1998) observed that treatment from unqualified people at chemist and 
pharmacy shops to health facilities has a negative effect on people’s health. Second, 
this practice undermines the policy makers’ ambition of using the NHIS as a social 
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security to provide quality healthcare to all Ghanaians and might lead to the collapse 
of the NHIS in the long run. 
The findings of this study also echo earlier findings that show a growing dissatis-
faction with perceived quality of healthcare among insured clients in the Dangme 
West Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana (Bruce et al. 2008). Thus, participation in 
the NHIS does not necessarily lead to better healthcare services. It must also be 
noted that health facilities can hardly be blamed for not having essential drugs. The 
problem is partly due to delays in claim reimbursement by the NHIA and also the 
DHISs inability to taking steps to ensure that there are accredited pharmacy shops in 
every town where there is a hospital or health centre. In conclusion, the burden of 
having to travel outside healthcare facilities for prescribed drugs undermines health 
providers’ efforts to deliver quality service and has serious consequences for health 
insurance enrolment. 
Accusation of corruption among health providers 
Community members cited cases of corruption among healthcare providers associat-
ed with healthcare service delivery. Several instances of nurses, pharmacists and 
other health providers exploiting insured patients for private gains were reported. 
Information gathered from my interviews and informal conversations suggest that 
some health providers collect unauthorised fees from insured patients. They asked 
them to pay for drugs covered by the NHIS and hospital cards and also undersupply 
prescribed drugs. 
A major complaint was that health providers demand cash payments before treat-
ing insured patients after normal working hours and on weekends. The phrase 
normally used to describe their behaviour was: Wcsisi yԑn” (They cheat us). At a 
community durbar combined with a mass NHIS registration campaign, Adjoa 
narrated her experience at the health facility the previous evening just after we had 
ended our monthly PSG meeting Adjoa went to the facility at about 5 pm because of 
a sudden stomach pain. The nurse on duty told her she would not accept her NHIS 
card because she came late and demanded that she pay cash. She said the nurse did 
not listen to her explanation for arriving late, so she left without treatment and 
bought drugs from the chemist shop. Reflexively, I asked her whether she was 
telling me the truth. She quickly responded: “If you don’t believe me I can go and 
show you the nurse who demanded that I pay before receiving treatment even 
though I showed her my NHIS card.” 
As a researcher, I asked myself if I should take such an allegation seriously and 
follow it up. I decided not to, since it was just about three months into my fieldwork 
and I was worried it might jeopardise my data collection. Moreover, the health 
centre where Adjoa had this encounter was where we usually held PSG meetings 
and had educational activities. However, to ascertain the authenticity of Adjoa’s 
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accusation, I spoke to Anas, a nurse, while walking home after the durbar. I asked 
her to comment on what Adjoa had said about the nurse’s behaviour. She replied: 
It is true, I wish the people involved and my bosses were here. I won’t deny it because I’m a 
nurse. It is true that after normal working hours some of my colleagues don’t want to treat 
insured patients. The reason is that filling forms for insured patients is tedious, so they don’t see 
why they should wait till after OPD had closed before coming. They see it as giving them extra 
work especially when the condition is not an emergency. 
I also asked her about those who pay cash. She replied: “Well with them you 
don’t have to fill any form for any claims. You treat them, they pay cash and that is 
all.” 
In regard to the issue of paying for drugs and syringes covered by the NHIS, 
informants told me that sometimes they have no choice but to pay even though they 
know they are being cheated. An assemblyman3, told me he paid for drugs when he 
took his insured child to the hospital after working hours. He said: “They told me to 
pay because the person to fill the claim form was not at work. I paid, though I knew 
I shouldn’t.” 
In another incident, a volunteer, a PSG member and I intervened to collect money 
that an insured patient at a health facility had paid for a hospital card. The patient, 
unhappy about the demanded payment, reported the incident to the volunteer who 
happened to be at the facility and wanted to be reimbursed. The volunteer called me 
immediately and this time I decided to follow-up. I felt it was an opportunity for me 
to have concrete evidence to support the earlier reports that I had received. It is 
interesting that the provider refunded the money after a short argument. Though she 
tried to justify her action and said she thought the patient had misplaced her card, I 
observed that this was just ‘a facing saving excuse’. The patient insisted that she had 
told the healthcare worker that this was not the first time she had come to the 
facility. The volunteer told me after the incident: “When we talk, people think we 
are exaggerating. I often receive similar complaints almost every day in the commu-
nity.” 
Health providers respond about corruption 
To check the authenticity of these allegations, I asked DHIS officials for their 
comments. They confirmed the community members’ complaints. One of them 
lamented: “Collection of unauthorised fees by health providers is undermining our 
effort. When we struggle to get people enrolled, they lose confidence and do not 
renew their membership because of the payment of unauthorised fees.” This com-
ment and others that were similar suggest that building trust in the NHIS is heavily 
                                              
3
  Assemblymen are part of the political structure in Ghana; they are non-partisan local representatives in the 
District Assemblies. They work with the district chief executive who is the representative of government 
at the district level. 
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dependent on health providers’ commitment to the scheme and the acceptance of 
NHIS as a viable health financing policy. 
Health providers also confirmed the activities of some of their colleagues that 
undermined the credibility of the NHIS card. One health provider told me that his 
colleagues sell drugs that are covered by the NHIS to insured patients and ‘pocket 
the money’ and charge the DHISs; some do not supply drugs to insured patients, yet 
bill the scheme. They also told me about a recent case of health providers being 
investigated for charging insured patients a ‘lateness fee’ for coming to the facility 
late. 
At a stakeholders’ meeting organised by a PSG, Dr Atte, who is a medical super-
intendent of a district hospital, confirmed the allegations of health providers’ 
negative practices and narrated the experience of two of his patients. One was 
supposed to come for a review after finishing his drugs, but came earlier and insisted 
he had taken all his drugs. When Dr. Atte followed up with the pharmacy, he 
discovered that the patient had not been given all his drugs. The second incident was 
when a patient suspected that she was not given all her drugs, so she reported this to 
the nurse. When the nurse and Dr. Atte followed up, they found that the patient had 
not been given one of her drugs. In both cases, the DHIS was billed for all the drugs. 
Kwesi, who is a DHIS staff and a PSG member, narrated his experience of receiving 
a prescription for his child to buy a drug. He followed up and found that the DHIS 
was billed for the drug even though the drug was not supplied. 
These negative practices by health providers resulted in a lack of trust from 
community members, and the insured questioned their commitment to the NHIS. 
Thus, people who do not have regular need for healthcare prefer the user-fees or 
receiving treatment at a pharmacy or chemical shop, even though it is more expen-
sive. 
Basaza et al. (2007: 10) mentioned the “poor interest of health professionals” in 
community health insurance as a barrier to enrolment in Uganda. In Ghana, the 
health providers’ lack of interest in the NHIS must be added to their malfeasance as 
in the cases of the assemblyman, Adjoa, and Kwesi. A community leader describes 
the extent of distrust and scepticism about health providers’ commitment to the 
NHIS: “In fact, I don’t trust them [health providers]. I don’t think they like health 
insurance. I wonder if they genuinely support it.” The healthcare providers’ behav-
iour can be explained as an excessive pursuit of their parochial interests, which is to 
gain from the policy and not contribute to the goal of ensuring equity in access to 
quality healthcare by removing financial barriers. 
Accusation of inefficiency and corruption among DHIS staff 
Community members complained about delays in receiving their NHIS cards after 
registration and also waiting for hours in DHIS offices to obtain their cards. The 
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most common complaint was waiting for more than three months after registration 
before they had their ID cards to access healthcare. They complained that the 
mandatory waiting period of three months is too long and that some registrants even 
wait for as long as five to six months, while others never receive their cards. A 
typical response I got when I asked people about waiting was: 
If you are lucky you get your card after waiting for three months. Otherwise you have to come 
here several times before you get it. Others never find theirs. This is not fair because while 
waiting for so long you may fall sick and have to pay, then when you receive the card you might 
not fall sick before it expires. 
The other common complaint was that people have to spend about two hours 
waiting before they get their NHIS cards and in some cases the DHIS office could 
not find the card at all. Many DHIS offices I visited were crowded with people 
waiting to collect their ID cards. Several community members I spoke with told me 
that this is the normal situation. One of them expressed her frustration as follows: 
“I’ve been here for about two hours and have not yet got my card. I don’t understand 
why it is taking them so long to get me my card.” 
I decided to inquire about the status of this woman’s card from the public rela-
tions officer (PRO) in whose office the cards were kept. I spent just ten minutes in 
his office, but even in this short time I had insight into the problem. The office had 
piles of cards in small boxes on the floor and a single staff member had to look for 
the cards for about thirty people waiting that morning. Obviously, this was an 
operational problem. The situation could be described as inefficiency regarding 
storage of documents and retrieval or insufficient funding for DHISs. Inadequate 
space, lack of cabinets and proper filing systems made card retrieval difficult and 
this resulted in clients waiting for hours. 
The common complaint of malfeasance by some DHIS staff and collectors was 
unauthorised fee collection from their clients. Several reports of ‘fast track’ registra-
tion came up in the interviews, conversations, and discussions at PSG meetings. Fast 
track registration is when DHIS staff connive with collectors and register and issue 
NHIS cards to people through the ‘back door’ without their having to wait for the 
three months window. Some collectors also charge above the approved premium 
and registration fee, while others take money for transport before giving out the 
NHIS cards. Participants told me they were aware of such behaviours and described 
them as undercover activities that damage the credibility of DHISs and erode 
confidence in the NHIS. 
Although most DHIS staff denied this behaviour, others confirmed the practice. 
For example, when I asked a collector why people were still not enrolling after a 
PSG community durbar: 
My people are difficult. Some of them wait until they are in trouble then they run to me for help. 
Sometimes you have no choice but to try and help them. In such cases, I had to take them to the 
office and see somebody [DHIS staff] with some money to prepare the card for them instantly. 
  
72
I observed another negative practice when I went to a DHIS office for a usual 
visit. While I was conversing with two DHIS officials, two men walked in and 
wanted to renew the NHIS card of a relative who had been involved in an accident 
and admitted to the hospital for three days. After complaining that people do not 
renew their card until they are sick, the DHIS staff told the two men to go and come 
back and see the manager. From their conversation, I understood that they were 
aware of their negative behaviour. When the two men left one of the DHIS staff 
turned to me and said: “This is how they worry us.” I went back to the DHIS office 
the following day to find out if the two men had renewed the card for their relative 
in the hospital. They had indeed renewed his card without having to wait for three 
months before accessing healthcare since his card had expired more than three 
months ago (see National Health Insurance Regulations 2004). These favours are 
not done for free; they are usually rewarded. Unfortunately, these rewards are 
difficult to verify since I could not observe what transpired between the DHIS staff 
and the two men when I left. Malfeasance by DHISs’ staff can be explained as an 
excessive pursuit of self-interest instead of supporting the sustainability of the 
NHIS. The staff seemed to have little concern about sanctioning defaulters to deter 
others and influencing people to develop a habit of voluntary enrolment and mem-
bership renewal. 
Health providers’ and DHIS staff’s dishonesty are not uncommon in Ghana 
(Gyimah-Boadi 2004, Kpundeh 2004). Armstrong (2006) discusses cheating as a 
moral term and notes that although it is unacceptable, it is adopted because of the 
financial gains. In the same vein, the malfeasance reported in this study, which is 
against the ethics of public office holders in Ghana, occurs daily in public institu-
tions. In Ghana, where salary levels are low and inadequate to meet expenditures, 
the problem of supplementing incomes by collecting unauthorised fees from clients 
in public offices is not peculiar to health providers and DHIS staff. This situation 
has bedevilled the health sector where payment of unauthorised fees has been a 
long-standing tradition (Agyepong 1999, Asenso-Okyere, 1998, Blas & Linbambala 
2001, Aikins & Okang 2006). Thus, some public servants pursue extra income to 
have a comfortable life. This is often termed ‘the survival strategy’ of public 
servants and in certain circles it is not even perceived as a crime. Aryee (2005: 33), 
in his assessment of anti-corruption and public accountability, described official 
attitudes towards corruption as ranging from lukewarm to open hostility and calls it 
the ‘AIDS of democracy in Africa’. I found that corruption undermined the confi-
dence and the trust people had in the NHIS and this threatened its long-term surviv-
al. Obviously, corruption does not lead to the development of moral responsibility 
that would make Ghanaians voluntarily enrol in the NHIS and religiously renew 
their membership to achieve NHIS’ goal of universal coverage. 
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Barriers experienced by healthcare providers 
In this section, I focus on what health providers perceived as barriers to NHIS 
enrolment and retention. According to the health providers, both their heavy 
workload and delays in claiming disbursement undermine their quest to provide the 
quality healthcare service needed to build trust in the NHIS and make it a better 
alternative to cash payment. 
Heavy workload 
The introduction of the NHIS has increased both the clinical and administrative 
burden of health providers. Administratively, a significant amount of documentation 
is required to give service to insured patients. According to health providers, the 
NHIS has increased the utilisation of healthcare services and consequently, their 
workload. Filling NHIS forms prolongs the time spent attending to insured patients 
and this results in long working hours. Dr. Kasa’s, a District Director of Health 
Services, assertion typifies the health providers’ description of the situation: 
Insurance has increased utilisation services. On some busy days the OPD closes at 4 pm and 
sometimes I leave here after 5 pm. In fact, the time spent treating one insured patient amount to 
two uninsured. You spend about five minutes filling forms for one patient. This is what insured 
patients don’t realise and make too much demand on us. They think because they are insured, 
when they come, you should leave everything and attend to them. 
The NHIS form (see Appendix 3) requires information on patient’s personal data 
and all services provided at a facility. Providers complete the information about the 
diagnosis, drugs, and claim summary. The time spent to fill out the NHIS form 
carefully prolongs the insured patient’s consultation as described by Dr Kasa above. 
This NHIS procedure accounts for the long waiting that insured patients complained 
about. There were cases of NHIS forms having been rejected due to mistakes, which 
cause delays in claims reimbursement. So in facilities where patient attendance is 
high, filling NHIS forms is an arduous task for already overburdened health provid-
ers. According to the health providers, they fill endless forms every day, week and 
month. Thus the complexity of NHIS forms could explain why some health provid-
ers ask insured patients who seek healthcare after working hours to pay cash. 
Moreover, although NHIS has increased the utilisation of healthcare, there has 
been no corresponding expansion in the capacity of health facilities to cater for the 
increasing number of patients. Health facilities still operate with virtually the same 
infrastructure, limited equipment and staff. This results in overcrowding, particular-
ly in district hospitals and busy health centres. Thus the burden of the few health 
providers who attend to so many patients under difficult working conditions frus-
trates some providers. This may explain their negative reaction towards insured 
patients who appear to be making unnecessary demands on them. In the providers’ 
view, the insured patients’ conditions could be managed at home till the following 
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morning. They collect fees from insured patients, not only to make extra income, but 
also to scare them from using the service after closing times and to avoid filling out 
the NHIS forms. 
Delay in reimbursing NHIS claims 
Although NHIS helps improve health providers’ revenue, the health providers 
complained that delays in claim reimbursement negatively affect their cash flow and 
supplies. This leads to low stock levels of drugs in health facilities. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, drug shortages in health facilities contribute to patients’ 
dissatisfaction about the quality of service and health providers see this as under-
mining their work. 
The frequent shortages of drugs in health facilities were of great concern to health 
providers especially those working in facilities in communities where there were no 
NHIS-accredited pharmacies to augment the drug supply. A medical assistant 
lamented: 
Having drugs in health facilities increases the attendance of patients and a lack of drugs makes a 
facility less attractive to them. Insured patients in particular often show dissatisfaction about the 
outcome of their consultation when they are not provided drugs at facilities, especially when 
there are no accredited pharmacy shops and insured patients have to travel to other towns to get 
drugs or buy from anywhere and pay. Due to this, people prefer going to pharmacies and chem-
ist shops to buy drugs directly or seek healthcare instead of coming here. 
The medical assistant’s assertion confirmed the health providers and insured 
patients’ concerns that drug supplies in health facilities need to be improved as 
stated earlier. 
The NHIS has increased healthcare utilisation as Dr Kasa indicated. However, the 
inclusion of a large exemption group that accounts for about 50 per cent of the 
general population (Table A.1, Appendix 2) does not make the NHIS cost-effective. 
Therefore, the NHIS must rely on the value-added tax from which the DHISs 
receive about 80-90 per cent of the revenue from the NHIA (Witter & Garshong 
2009: 7). This reimbursement policy could be responsible for delays in claim 
payments. The authorities are not always able to provide funds promptly for the 
implementing institutions (including social intervention programmes), to perform 
their task efficiently. Although some improvements have been made recently in 
claims reimbursement decreasing the waiting time from five to six months (see 
Witter & Garshong 2009) to about three months, it is still far from the stipulated 
four-week period after submission. The delay in reimbursement makes it very 
difficult for health providers to meet all the drugs requirements of their clients. It 
also contributes to some health providers giving preference to uninsured patients or 
demanding cash payments from insured patients to ensure that the facility has 
enough money to meet their drug needs while they wait for their DHIS claims to be 
paid. 
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Patrick, a health provider expressed his frustration regarding drug shortages in 
health facilities as follows: 
That is why I’m against the idea that facilities should generate income and spend. The business 
of health providers should be to provide quality healthcare and not to be concerned about in-
come generation to manage their facilities. Due to this, health providers do anything to get 
money. There is a general overuse of drugs. Some providers are prescribing drugs they are not 
qualified to administer, while others are charging insured people in order to get money to meet 
some of their basic needs and maintain their stock levels, especially when the NHIA owes them 
huge sums of money. Things should be streamlined. The provision of equipment and drugs 
needed by facilities should be managed by a different body at the district level and controlled by 
a centralised body with very efficient monitoring systems. It should not be the business of facili-
ties to generate income for internal use. 
Patrick’s argument could also be considered as ‘generate and spend’. Facilities 
with low patronage are adversely affected in their internally generated fund (IGF), 
which in turn leads to low stock levels and low utilisation, thus perpetuating the 
problem of drug shortages. Therefore, to fulfil the objective of increasing access and 
providing quality service to all Ghanaians the government should make drugs 
available to all health facilities irrespective of their IGF, especially in communities 
with low enrolment. After all, health facilities can only encourage people to enrol 
and remain in the NHIS by providing quality service and that depends on drug 
availability to a large extent. 
To learn about others’ perspectives on claim disbursement delays, I approached 
the staff that processes claim forms at the District Health Directorate and DHIS 
offices. A staff member explained that some clinicians are part of the problem. He 
said: 
I think some of my colleagues, especially those at the facilities, have not yet come to terms with 
filling the NHIS forms as part of their job and carefully fill them according to the instructions. 
They see it as a burden and make too many avoidable mistakes. This makes the vetting difficult 
and slow, hence the delay. 
He showed me some of the forms that were rejected because the basic instruc-
tions were ignored. This indicates that following the bureaucratic procedures in 
delivering healthcare to insured patients is yet to be fully accepted by service 
providers, which makes the vetting laborious and delays claim reimbursement. 
Barriers experienced by staff of District Health Insurance 
Schemes 
This section examines the challenges experienced by the DHIS officials when 
implementing the NHIS. These challenges undermine their efficient functioning and 
quality service, and consequently discourage people from enrolling and remaining in 
the scheme. The barriers include inadequate staff, office space and equipment, and 
problems processing NHIS registration forms and granting exemption to indigents. 
  
76
Inadequate staff, office space and equipment 
A major DHIS staff complaint is that inadequate staff undermines their desire to 
provide quality service. They asserted that although the volume of work has in-
creased since the NHIS was introduced; the number of permanent staff remains the 
same, which puts pressure on them. However, a DHIS manager explained that 
although they have the option to hire extra hands, they have to pay them from their 
IGF which he claimed was not adequate to even meet their basic needs. Thus they 
are not able to hire enough temporary staff, and the heavy workload falls on the few 
permanent staff members. 
Office accommodation for many DHISs was not adequate. Many of the offices I 
visited were congested. The office space used by two or three officers crowded in a 
small room made moving and serving clients difficult. During my visits, I observed 
that DHIS staff, especially those at the front desk attend to many clients every day. 
It was common to see many clients waiting for hours at the DHIS offices, which 
frustrated not only them but also the staff. 
Another DHIS staff concern was the inadequate number of cameras to take peo-
ple photographs for their insurance cards especially in communities outside DHIS 
office locations. As a result, the registration process takes much longer time. A PRO 
explained the situation as follows: “Collectors register people and arrange for their 
pictures to be taken later. It makes processing NHIS registration forms difficult and 
slow.” This complicates the registration process, since the two events take place at 
separate times and are performed by two separate persons. 
The DHIS staff complained about the inadequate number of computers to process 
registration forms; the computers they have are often not functional. The staff told 
me their data entry clerks often work on a rotational basis because they do not all 
have access to computers. I saw non-functioning computers in many offices that the 
staff explained were as a result of a lack of funds to repair them immediately. 
A lack of cabinets to properly file registration forms and other documents for 
easy retrieval hampered the DHISs’ effort to ensure that clients did not wait too long 
before receiving their ID cards. As mentioned earlier, when I visited DHIS offices, I 
saw piles of ID cards in small cartons on the floor and staff spending a great deal of 
time going through the piles before retrieving cards for their clients. Thus inade-
quate equipment and supplies made it difficult for DHIS staff to achieve efficiency 
in their work. 
Problems regarding processing NHIS registration forms 
Delays in issuing NHIS ID cards are also attributed to people providing more than 
one name when registering and having their photo taken. For example, when the 
person has three names ‘Benedict Kwesi Mensah’, he might use Benedict Mensah to 
register and Kwesi Mensah for his photo. Matching the two sets of names is prob-
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lematic when processing the registration form. Data entry clerks told me they spend 
a great deal of time matching registration forms with photos. I was told about an 
incident when a man came to the office several times and could not find his ID card 
until they asked him for all his names. Next, they asked which name he had used for 
registration before they could retrieve his card. 
I observed the same situation at a PSG mass NHIS registration exercise. Although 
the registration and photo taking occurred at the same time, each was performed by 
a specific person, so there were incidents of registrants using one set of names for 
registration and another for their photo. Although I drew the officials’ attention to 
the situation, they still had a difficult time matching photos with registration forms 
due to the differences in given names. 
Problems of granting exemption to the core poor 
The primary goal of social health insurance schemes (SHISs) is to ensure that 
everybody, including the poor, has access to healthcare. It is generally asserted that 
since wealth is unfairly distributed, some people cannot make wise insurance 
decisions because they simply cannot afford to do so (Clackson 2008). This implies 
that SHISs, and in this case the NHIS, need to have exemptions to ensure that those 
who cannot pay premiums are covered. Ensuring equity in access to healthcare and 
reducing the exclusion of the poor has always been part of all health financing 
regimes in Ghana. Unfortunately, attempts to provide exemptions have historically 
been challenging, dating back to the regime of insignificant fees in the 1960s and the 
hospital fee regulations policies of 1972 and 1985. 
Ghana, as a low-income country, has decided to help the poor gain access to 
healthcare under the NHIS. Policy makers having recognised that no matter how 
small premiums are some people cannot pay and therefore, they have provided 
exemptions for them. But previous studies show that earlier Ghanaian exemption 
policies were not successful (Badasu 2004, Aikins & Arhinful 2006, Ministry of 
Health 2008). The Ministry of Health (2008) notes that the NHIS risk excluding the 
poor due to identification difficulties. 
A key finding of this study is that exemptions under the NHIS have only been 
applied to a few indigents since the beginning. Witter & Garshong (2009: 5) found 
that exemptions for indigents were one per cent in 2008. There are many reasons for 
the implementation gap. 
First, the DHIS staff claims the criteria set for identifying the core poor for pre-
mium exemption makes implementation difficult. However, after chatting with 
them, I realised that the problem is not so much the difficulty of identification, but 
rather the commitment to grant the poor an exemption due to bureaucratic proce-
dures. So DHISs use the strictest criterion for an exemption that in fact eliminates 
almost everyone. The staff put homelessness at the heart of the conditions for a 
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person to qualify as an indigent, even if homelessness does not exist in their dis-
tricts. They often ignore the other indications of indigent status that consider local 
descriptions of indigents as persons afflicted by severe poverty (see National Health 
Insurance Regulations 2004, LI 1809, 58: 1-3). Indicators that the local population 
and PSGs used to describe the poor are: individuals with no stable source of income 
who live on the benevolence of friends and neighbours with no or inadequate 
support from family members and struggle to survive while living in dilapidated 
houses. For this group of people, having a meal a day is problematic. Other condi-
tions stated in the NHIS policy, such as unemployment, are often ignored. This 
makes the application of the policy quite restrictive since in Ghana, apart from the 
cities, only ‘mad’ people live in the street. Everybody has a home no matter how 
poor. Indigents normally live in family houses, with friends or acquaintances as 
Serwa and Ama mentioned when describing the core poor earlier in this chapter. So 
using homelessness as the core criteria for exemption means almost all potential 
beneficiaries are disqualified. 
Second, in my interactions with DHIS managers and staff, it became clear that 
they rarely grant an exemption to people who are not sick. They wait until people 
are sick and cannot pay their hospital bill. Responding to my question about why 
they do not grant exemption to the core poor, a DHIS manager argued: “The criteria 
disqualify almost everybody but we occasionally give exemptions when health 
providers refer patients who cannot pay their hospital bill to us. In such cases, we go 
to their aide and register them.” 
I describe this as ‘amnesty’ and not exemption since the person is rescued when 
in crisis, which is not the objective of the NHIS policy. DHISs are supposed to 
ensure that the core poor can access healthcare when ill. In other words, being 
insured will encourage them to seek treatment in spite of their inability to pay. The 
DHIS officials agreed that it is their moral obligation to ensure that the core poor 
have access to healthcare. However, my conversations with them revealed underly-
ing issues that do not motivate them to grant exemptions to the poor. Their concern 
was that since the DHISs are expected to build up their IGF to meet some of their 
operational costs, giving exemptions to the poor means they lose money that they 
need. Therefore, considering their weak revenue base, it was not in their best interest 
to vigorously look for indigents to exempt from premium payment. So they were not 
keen to let people know about the exemption policy. One DHIS official said: “We 
have the problem of low enrolment and we need money so if we go to communities 
and continue telling them we want to exempt some people, the others won’t pay. So 
how do we get revenue?” 
Collectors who are supposed to be on the frontline identifying the poor (NHIRs 
2004, LI 1809, 58: 3) were found to rarely send people to be considered for exemp-
tion. When I asked Emma, a collector, why she has not registered a single indigent, 
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she told me that she had not found a core-poor person. At this point, I told her about 
Ama, the ‘core-poor’ woman mentioned earlier in this chapter and suggested she 
goes and verify Ama’s situation. A month later, I enquired whether she has gone to 
see Ama. She answered in the negative, so I presented the case at PSG meeting and 
all those present including the DHISs staff agreed that Ama should be exempted. 
After two months, when a mass registration was organised by the PSG in the 
community, Ama was still not registered. At this moment, Serwa, the volunteer who 
had introduced Ama to me, told me that one of Ama’s twin daughters had died. She 
had died at home since Ama did not have money to take her to the hospital. Even 
after discussing Ama’s misfortune with Emma, she still did not register her until the 
next mass registration campaign two months later. This time the volunteer brought 
Ama to Emma and so she had no choice but to register her. Emma’s attitude showed 
that she was not willing to register Ama, but could not refuse because PSG members 
were present watching her. This shows the collectors’ reluctance to register indi-
gents for an exemption, even when they are easily identified and their impoverish 
situation is established. 
I later learnt that collectors are paid a commission only on collected premiums 
and not for registration and administrative fees. So Emma’s behaviour and other 
collector’s behaviour show that processing exemptions for core poor is not in their 
interest, hence they lack motivation to do so. However, I observed that the collectors 
were registering children and the elderly. When I discussed the issue with DHIS 
managers and other officials, they admitted that they had not granted an exemption 
to any core poor person in those communities. Also, in my conversations with Ama 
and many community members, they revealed that they were even not aware of the 
exemption policy. 
It is obvious that the exemption policy under the NHIS is far from achieving its 
objective, since the homelessness criterion does not reflect local conditions and 
excludes potential beneficiaries. I acknowledge that even if the criteria for identify-
ing indigents is complex, my observation and discussions with DHIS staff, PSG 
members, community members and leaders show that at least in closely knit rural 
and urban communities (like Achiano and Anomabo), indigents are not difficult to 
find. People who are eligible for an exemption are known by almost everyone in the 
community as living in abject poverty, as the case of Ama shows (see also Aryeetey 
2012).However, DHISs’ staff were not keen to identify indigents because it was not 
in their interest and did not help them increase their IGF. 
Further discussions and observations suggest that the pressure put on DHISs to 
improve their IGF could explain the DHISs’ lack of commitment to grant exemp-
tions to the core poor. A DHIS manager told me that their current premium revenue 
is only 5 per cent of their claims. He also said that all the DHISs’ revenue accounts 
for about 10 per cent of their total expenditures. The ratio of revenue to expenditures 
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is used to measure the DHISs’ performance. Thus, low revenues put the DHISs in a 
dilemma about granting exemptions. Should they grant exemptions to indigents and 
improve enrolment? Or is it better to apply the most restrictive exemption criteria 
thus eliminating potential beneficiaries and rely on people who can pay cash, which 
increases their IGF. 
The findings above highlight three important issues for policy makers. First, the 
homelessness criterion for granting exemption to indigents disqualifies potential 
beneficiaries. Second, the lack of a commission to collectors for registering the core 
poor does not motivate them to recommend indigents to be considered for exemp-
tion. Third, the inadequate funds provided to DHISs forces them to focus on revenue 
generation rather than recruiting the poor for exemption. The three issues suggest a 
need to rethink the exemption policy, particularly the homelessness criterion and 
payment of registration fees by the core poor. 
In conclusion, the decision of the average Ghanaian to enrol and remain in the 
scheme is not necessarily influenced by poverty, but rather by factors such as a lack 
of interest in health insurance, poor quality healthcare services delivery, delay in 
receiving NHIS cards and the possibility of enrolling through the back door when 
healthcare is needed. This calls for intensive education directed to healthcare 
providers on the principles of the NHIS and effective mechanisms to stop corrupt 
practices. In addition, the quality of the DHISs’ service needs to be improved to 
attract and retain people, especially those in the NHIS rich category, by providing 
adequate drugs at DHISs facilities and improving health providers’ behaviour 
towards insured patients to assure better treatment. Also, the DHISs should give 
equal attention to identifying the core poor for exemption to prevent their exclusion 
to achieve the equity goal of the NHIS. 
Effects of politics on enrolment 
The politics surrounding the introduction of NHIS and the effect of politics on 
enrolment are discussed in this section because politics as a barrier to implementa-
tion was mentioned by respondents in all three stakeholder categories and others 
involved in NHIS implementation. Community members, DHIS staff and health 
providers spoke about how the NHIS policy-making process and the timing of its 
introduction had adverse effects on enrolment. The political undertones of the 
concerns of the Ministry of Health (MoH), Ghana Health Service (GHS) and the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) regarding the NHIS are also addressed. 
The issue of politics and the NHIS arose when I asked community members, 
DHIS staff and health providers why people were not enrolling in the scheme. Their 
responses indicated that politics negatively affected NHIS uptake irrespective of 
knowledge about the potential benefits. I was amazed at how the politics within the 
Ministerial Health Financing Task Force set up at the Ministry of Health to draft the 
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NHIS bill had reached households in the remote communities I visited. The media 
had widely published the acrimony of debates in the Task Force (see Agyepong & 
Adjei 2008) and Parliament and this was keenly followed by community members 
and influenced some not to enrol. 
Discussions with both uninsured and insured participants reflected their political 
sentiments about the NHIS. The respondents expressed their sympathy for either the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) or the National Democratic Congress (NDC). NPP 
sympathisers described the NHIS as the best healthcare policy ever introduced in the 
country. Their typical response was: “You don’t mind them. It’s unto them [NDC 
supporters]. They are saying because they are NDC they won’t enrol. For me, I think 
NPP did well by providing such a good policy.” The NDC sympathisers, however, 
saw the policy-making process as acrimonious and felt that the only way they could 
show their disapproval was by refusing to enrol. They also said they were not happy 
about the process and the way NPP discredited the NDC government. John, a petty 
trader and NDC sympathiser did not hesitate to mention politics as a factor that 
influenced his decision not to enrol. He said: 
I didn’t register because of politics I don’t belong to NNP who introduced health insurance. I 
hate what they did and said about my party who first conceived the idea even long before they 
won the elections. They should have acknowledged NDC as being the first to introduce the idea 
of health insurance even if it did not materialise before they left power. That was why I waited 
till now before registering. 
Kwesi, a community member, also told me: “I thought the NHIS cannot survive 
any change in government and that it was going to be a ‘nine days wonder’ and will 
die when a new government comes to power.” I also had reports about how NPP 
politicians wrote people’s names and promised to register them in the wake of the 
2008 general elections, however, they never returned after the elections to do so. 
This issue arose at the beginning of my fieldwork when people asked me whether I 
was part of the group that had come to write their names and promised to register 
them. Collectors at the PSG meetings confirmed the NPP politicians’ action and 
claimed that the politicians had contacted them during the campaign to compile lists 
of widows and the poor, but they never heard from them after the election. 
Health providers also confirmed the situation described by community members 
and spoke about the effect of politics on enrolment. Dr. Gyena told me: 
Politics influenced people not to enrol when health insurance was introduced. This still lingers 
on even after the change of government. I noticed in my consulting room that most patients from 
particular communities, which are strongholds of the then opposition party, are not insured. 
DHIS staff believed that the politicisation of the NHIS, especially during its in-
troduction, contributed to their operational difficulties. They said that the NHIS was 
used as a tool by both the ruling and the main opposition parties to canvass votes 
during their campaigns. As a result, political opponents who felt the NHIS was used 
by the government to secure electoral victory refused to enrol. DHIS staff believed 
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they were often perceived as political activists pursuing the interests of a single 
political party and not as public servants who were implementing public policy. This 
perception undermined the DHISs efforts to promote the NHIS. A DHIS manager 
described the situation in his district as follows: 
The timing of the introduction of NHIS made it political and contributed to people’s reluctance 
to register. They thought because it was government ‘A’ who introduced it they should not join. 
In some communities we were treated as belonging to a political party and chased out when we 
went there to educate them. They hooted at us and said we had come to take their money for the 
electioneering campaign. Communities that were NPP strongholds were more receptive and 
attended our promotional activities. You can see it in our enrolment figures. Generally, commu-
nities that were NPP strongholds registered more than those that were NDC supporters. 
A DHIS staff also told me they were chased out of a village because it was pre-
dominantly an NDC stronghold. He said: 
Due to the timing of the introduction of the NHIS and the political climate at that time, just 
before national elections in 2004, politicians took advantage of the situation and played politics 
with it. The main opposition party criticised the policy, while the ruling party painted a vivid 
picture promising that the NHIS gives free treatment as if everything was covered. So people 
expect to get everything at the facility. When this doesn’t happen they feel disappointed and say 
all sorts of things against us. 
Furthermore, MoH and the GHS staff expressed concerns about the lack of col-
laboration with the NHIA since the three institutions expected to ensure effective 
implementation of the NHIS. The staff told me that the politics were responsible for 
the lack of collaboration and this undermined efficient service delivery and ultimate-
ly enrolment. The main concern of the MoH and GHS staff was the lack of openness 
on the part of the NHIA. A GHS staff said that the lack of consultations and regular 
discussions were the main challenges they faced in service delivery. He asserted 
attempts to institute regular meetings of the MoH, GHS, NHIA and DHISs to 
discuss their activities and problems to make and implement decisions together 
failed after the first meeting. The NHIA stopped honouring their invitation and gave 
excuses including stating that the MoH could not summon them to meetings. He 
said: 
Delay in claim reimbursement, which is at an average rate of five months, is because we [GHS] 
have no way of finding out what the real problems are in claim processing. We [GHS and 
NHIA] have not sat down at the national level to agree on exactly what to do. Facilities send 
both soft and the hard copies of NHIS claims. The question is why should we continue to make 
claim processing so difficult for health facilities? Also, when it comes to monitoring, they 
[NHIA] don’t involve us. They write to the facilities without due regard to us. They only come 
to us when there is a problem. 
Moreover, NHIA piloted new software and set up their ICT system to authenticate NHIS mem-
bership without talking to us. They dealt with health facilities directly. We told them to involve 
us so we could send our staff with them to study the system. They refused and have gone ahead 
to do their own thing. Now that they are about to set up the second phase which requires all 
facilities to be computerised, have internal network and be connected to their system, they are 
now compelled to involve us so our facilities could prepare bills to fit the new system. As you 
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know some facilities don’t have electricity. It means we have to provide generators and train our 
staff to know how to use the new system; I don’t know at whose expense. We have not dis-
cussed these issues. These situations undermine operational efficiency and do not make NHIS 
attractive for people to enrol. 
The MoH staff also told me that the major problem they faced as a policy-making 
body was the lack of collaboration. According to the official, NHIA claims they are 
under the Office of the President, so the MoH cannot call them to a meeting. The 
official said: 
The biggest challenge facing us is not only lack of collaboration, but that the NHIA doesn’t 
share information. Their reports on NHIS are classified. This doesn’t help build systems that 
improve quality of service, hence the numerous complaints. 
An official of the NHIA spoke about the MoH and GHS officials’ allegations of a 
lack of collaboration and transparency when discussing the NHIS issues: 
NHIS is a pro-poor policy with premiums based on the poverty level in the country. Premium 
levels are low enough to make it possible for the majority of Ghanaians to enrol and exemptions 
are also in place for vulnerable groups. But, the problem is those implementing the policy. Some 
of DHISs and health facilities have not performed creditably while others engage in all sorts of 
corrupt practices. This has resulted in delays in claims reimbursement and other issues they are 
complaining about. They have not yet absorbed themselves into the NHIS. They read politics 
into whatever we do. The issues they are complaining about are measures aimed at improving 
and reducing corruption in the system. I’m sure we will get there soon. 
When I asked why they did not want to give out information, another official 
quickly responded: “It depends on what you are going to do with the information.” 
This statement confirms the concerns expressed by MoH and GHS officials about 
lack of collaboration. This situation suggests that systems that could make NHIA 
more responsive to implementation challenges and the emerging needs of stakehold-
ers to improve service delivery are not really being developed in a participatory 
manner. Thus, effective collaboration to ensure efficient implementation of the 
NHIS policy seems to be lacking at the highest level. 
John’s and Kwesi’s decision not to enrol, the MoH and GHS staff’s concerns 
about the lack of collaboration and the NHIA not sharing information are underlying 
issues that are worth discussing. The situation shows that governments act in ways 
that elicit negative reactions towards the very policy they are trying to promote in 
pursuit of their political ambition. Community members who politicise the NHIS 
undermined the credibility of the scheme as a social security provision aimed at 
ensuring equity in access to healthcare. Concerns expressed by MoH and GHS staff 
suggest that the lack of collaboration does not build systems that will help improve 
service delivery, since initiatives by NHIA alone could miss important challenges 
confronting implementers and service providers. By politicising social policies such 
as the NHIS, politicians are stabbing themselves in the back. The more they try to 
ensure equity in healthcare access without effectively engaging key stakeholders, the 
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more they seem to miss the real challenges that need to be addressed, hence increas-
ing the likelihood of failure. 
International politics and healthcare policy-making 
Events at the international level indicate that healthcare reforms, especially health 
insurance, generally generate fierce political debates. For example, the US 2008 
elections were also characterised by intense debates when President Obama cam-
paigned heavily on restructuring health insurance. This led to enactment of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in March 2010, informally 
referred to as Obamacare. The main observation relevant in this discussion was the 
US approach to the policy-making process that included lobbying within the 
legislature and civil society groups as well. Powerful lobbyists were used to ma-
noeuvre the legislation process to get the bill passed and safeguard transparency. 
This is not to say that the process was a perfect one, but as political scientists have 
argued, the formulation of successful public policy fundamentally depends on the 
political environment and the checks and balances that guide the process. Brinker-
hoff (2004) observes that stakeholder engagement ensures accountability and 
compliance with procedures and improves performance in his study of health 
systems in the US. He argues that this engagement helps generate a system-wide 
perspective and reveals gaps that require attention and interventions to improve 
service delivery. 
Another example is Mexico’s Ministry of Health that led the process of develop-
ing stakeholder support for a healthcare reform, which expanded social insurance 
coverage to the poor. They used strong persuasive arguments and an evidence-based 
approach to win the support of competing political and special interest groups. In 
Mexico, dissenting views did not lead to resentment. This effort has been acknowl-
edged as one of the most successful policy reforms of President Fox’s government 
(see Frenk 2006). It demonstrates that the effective engagement of stakeholders 
ensures that public policy-making does not degenerate into bitter wrangling among 
key actors. 
The Mexican and the USA approaches both provide relevant information and 
lessons for politicians and policy makers in Ghana. Their experiences show that 
lobbying and engaging political opponents in the policy-making process is essential. 
De Swaan (1988: 156), writing about state intervention to promote social security in 
nineteenth century Western Europe, provides insight into the role of politics in 
social policy making: “Creating social security was hard political work. It demanded 
strategic coalition building and tactical parliamentary and bureaucratic manoeu-
vring”. His observation shows that politicians should endeavour not to politicise 
health insurance to advance their careers, but rather use diplomacy and negotiation 
to allow for experts’ input to guide the policy-making process. This would build 
  
85 
trust in the NHIS and encourage people to enrol, while ultimately ensuring the 
equity that the politicians very much desire to achieve. Thus, when all stakeholder 
voices are heard, the possibility of failure is reduced. 
Factors that encouraged enrolment in the NHIS and renewal of 
membership 
During my fieldwork, I found issues that promoted the NHIS that deserve attention 
as well. These are discussed under two themes: (1) positive attitudes of health 
providers and (2) benefits derived from membership in the NHIS. These factors 
encouraged people to enrol and remain in the scheme. The NHIS provided financial 
relief for insured patients and reduced their vulnerability to ill health. For healthcare 
providers, the NHIS was perceived as reducing delays at home since insured patients 
presented with less complicated cases. They appreciated that the NHIS enhanced 
their work and encouraged their patients to enrol. 
Positive behaviours of health providers 
As stated earlier in this chapter, health provider-patient interaction affects NHIS 
enrolment and membership renewal. This study found that community members did 
not perceive all health providers as hostile and disrespectful towards insured 
patients. This observation is contrary to the popular perception that health providers 
do not support the NHIS. Some health providers were also seen as kind and helpful 
towards insured patients. They discussed the benefits of the NHIS with their 
uninsured patients and encouraged them to enrol. During my fieldwork, I heard 
some health providers advising their patients to enrol, especially those who had 
difficulty paying for their treatment. A key informant told me that he had registered 
because he was persuaded to do so by a medical assistant. He said: 
The Medical Assistant always convinces patients to register. The last time I was at the hospital, 
she advised me to register so that I can get some relief from paying my son’s hospital bill. It was 
because of her persuasion that I went to register. In that facility, the first thing they ask a patient 
is whether he or she has an insurance card. 
Therefore, some health provider-patient interactions created the impression that 
the NHIS would benefit patients and encouraged people to enrol. This supports 
Arhinful’s (2003) observation that perceptions ultimately play a role in people’s 
decision to join SHISs and indicates that conscious efforts by health providers to 
behave favourably towards insured patients created confidence in the NHIS and 
encouraged people to enrol. 
Benefits of the NHIS 
Previous studies in Ghana show that health insurance has a positive impact on 
healthcare utilisation (Sulzbach et al. 2005, Ansah et al. 2009). Sulzbach (2008) 
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compared baseline data in selected districts before and after the NHIS, and found 
that it increased access to formal care and significantly decreased out-of-pocket 
expenditures. This study also found that the NHIS reduces healthcare delays at home 
and in facilities, thus resulting in fewer complications among insured patients. It 
also helps the management of vulnerabilities and adversity presented by ill health, 
specifically for people suffering from chronic diseases such as diabetics and hyper-
tension. This confirms previous findings that the household cost of ill health 
contributes to impoverishment since poorer households that are affected by chronic 
disease that uses up resources which leads to the loss of livelihoods (Russel 2004, 
Save the Children UK 2005, Mulemi 2010). 
Conversations with both insured and uninsured people suggest that NHIS benefits 
(for themselves or relatives) encouraged them to remain in the scheme. The insured, 
especially those who seek healthcare regularly, were happy about the benefit 
package and the economic and social relief of the NHIS. This is reflected in the 
survey results in which the majority (76.2%) of all respondents, in Anomabo (100%) 
and Achiano (75%) said they enrolled because NHIS gave them financial protection 
against illness, helped them save money when paying hospital bills and made them 
independent since they did not need to ask for money from elsewhere (Table A.4, 
Appendix 2). A typical statement made by the insured was: “Even if there are 
problems such as negative behaviour of healthcare providers, the benefits outweigh 
such inconveniences.” Akosua narrated how her persistent ill health and high cost of 
treatment caused her to spend her capital and her husband nearly divorced her, but 
she did enrol in the NHIS a year ago. She said: 
I used to worry about my condition when I was paying for treatment every month. I think this 
even worsened my condition at a point because in addition to the disease I was also worried 
about how to pay for treatment and the threat of divorce. Now NHIS helps me get my drugs 
regularly. I don’t have crises anymore. Thank God I’ve regained my strength and able to go 
about my daily activities without feeling any shame4. I was able to accumulate some capital and 
resumed my trading. I don’t spend all my money on healthcare anymore. 
Furthermore, insured patients said that all that they think about is their transport 
to the healthcare facility and not how to get money to pay a deposit before treat-
ment. This is what Anoma said when I asked him why he continues to be a member 
of the NHIS: 
The premium compared to the cost of healthcare is reasonable. I was lucky to have insurance 
when I had to remove my hernia. I didn’t think of money to pay a deposit. Things would have 
been very difficult for me since it was during the dry season and I didn’t have money, it means I 
had to wait for the fishing season or borrow money. At the hospital too they just asked me of my 
NHIS card and immediately admitted me because I was in great pain. Otherwise they would 
                                              
4
  She explained shame as her inability to get close to people because she was always sick and not 
contributing anything to the family or community’s activities. People sometimes were also unwilling to 
get close to her and her husband wanted to divorce her. 
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have asked me to pay deposit before treatment. All these delays would have ended in something 
else; maybe death. 
Akua, a diabetic patient also narrated how the NHIS enables her go to the hospital 
regularly and have all her drugs. She said: 
This hospital card [NHIS card] has reduced my burden and worries. I don’t have to spend the 
little money for my trading activities to pay hospital bills. Though the sickness is still there, 
because I know I can get healthcare anytime, I am relaxed. Insurance has given me peace and 
relieved me from thinking about ill health. So for me, I regularly renew my card even though I 
am not satisfied with the quality of service in this hospital. Sometimes you have to spend so 
much time there. 
The above reports suggest that when the NHIS covers healthcare expenditures 
and insured patients are assured of receiving care, they are more likely to live 
positively with their disease. Thus, the NHIS reduces a person’s vulnerability to the 
adverse effects of ill health. Since this reduction in vulnerability occurs in a com-
munity, some people who are initially reluctant to enrol are ultimately encouraged to 
do so. Although people may be dissatisfied with health providers’ negative behav-
iour, this might be overlooked if drugs are available at the local healthcare facility. 
Healthcare providers told me that the NHIS reduces delays at home and heath 
facilities and solves the problem of deposits for healthcare as indicated by Anoma. 
Dr. Gyena described the benefits as follows: 
The good thing about NHIS is that it has improved utilisation and reduced delays; many more 
people are coming to the hospital now. At least the insured are reporting early with less compli-
cated cases. They also have fewer problems getting their drugs. This makes treatment more 
effective as people come for reviews regularly. 
According to hospital administrators, the NHIS has improved their revenue de-
spite the delay in the payments for claims. The NHIS has helped them recover funds 
from people who access healthcare and cannot pay. He said: “Comparing NHIS to 
the past when we lost so much money to people who cannot pay their cost of 
treatment to now when we contact the DHIS, they help such people with exemption 
and pay us.” 
Dr Gyena’s account and the medical assistant’s persuading her patients to enrol 
show that some health providers see the NHIS as enhancing their effort of providing 
quality healthcare and advise their patients to enrol to ensure they have access to 
treatment when they need it. 
Anoma, who faced the risk of death but for the NHIS, shows the linkages be-
tween SHISs and protection against health risk. Her example supports Criel’s (1999) 
assertion that SHISs avert risk. Akua, Akosua and Anoma also show that the NHIS 
helped them regain their livelihood in addition to providing economic relief from 
paying catastrophic healthcare costs. The NHIS helped to enhance their ability to 
cope with and adapt to their chronic condition and resume their economic activity. 
This underscores the importance of the exemption policy as a safety net for the core 
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poor in the midst of inadequate support from family and friends. The NHIS was 
therefore found to facilitate prompt access to healthcare and adequate treatment. 
Lack of membership in the NHIS can result in fatalities as in the case of Ama’s 
daughter who died due to lack of access to healthcare. This suggests that exemptions 
for the poorest households are critical. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the multidimensional factors that affect enrolment and 
retention in the NHIS. Reasons given for not enrolling and renewing memberships 
seemed to be simple: “No money to pay premium and registration fees.” There are, 
however, more complex factors at all levels: community, health facility, DHISs and 
politics converge to influence member enrolment and retention. 
Most of the participants indicated that neither poverty nor premium costs were a 
significant reason for not enrolling. Thus, in addition to the “no money to pay” 
response, people mentioned that they were “not often sick.” Since people could 
obtain ‘cheaper’ healthcare at chemical and pharmacy shops when they were sick, 
this encouraged them not to enrol in the NHIS or renew their membership. They did 
not see health insurance as a pressing need. Further, dissatisfaction about the lack of 
drugs at health facilities and health providers’ (including DHIS staff) negative 
behaviour and malfeasance all make people question their commitment to the NHIS. 
In addition to the community members’ low interest in health insurance, the out-
come of insured patients’ encounters with health providers discourages people from 
enrolling and remaining in the NHIS. At the same time, health providers’ persuasion 
makes some uninsured patients appreciate the NHIS, as in the case of the medical 
assistant who showed her NHIS card to patients to increase confidence in the 
scheme and thereby encourage them to enrol and renew their membership. 
For health providers, the increased utilisation of healthcare services and comple-
tion of the complex NHIS form both exacerbated their heavy workload and caused 
them stress, which resulted in some being hostile and showing disrespect to insured 
patients by asking them to pay cash or giving preference to uninsured patients. 
These issues, coupled with delays in claim payments, adversely affected the quality 
of service delivery health providers’ desire to provide quality service. 
DHISs’ staff shortages, inadequate funding and lack of equipment adversely 
affected their work output and resulted in delays in issuing NHIS cards. To manage 
their distressed financial situation, DHISs are in a dilemma as to whether or not to 
focus more on revenue generation to increase their internally generated fund or to 
grant exemptions to the poor to improve enrolment. 
Given the significance of trust in SHIS, this study shows that the lack of trust 
erodes public confidence in the NHIS and undermines its potential as a viable 
alternative to ‘cash and carry’ and to ensure access to quality healthcare for all 
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residents in Ghana. This was demonstrated by the alleged involvement of health 
providers, DHIS officials’ and NHIS collectors in malfeasance, which led to distrust 
among stakeholders and negatively affected the credibility of the NHIS. 
Finally, situating barriers and enablers at the level of local stakeholders and high-
lighting their concerns, makes revealing the reality involved in implementing the 
NHIS policy to policy makers critical. This study provides a guide for developing 
interventions that can create confidence in the NHIS and encourage people to enrol 
and regularly renew their membership. How local level multi-stakeholders collabo-
rative groups were set up and were able to develop and implement interventions 
activities to reduce these barriers, increase enrolment and retain members in the 
NHIS is the focus of the next three chapters. 
  
4 
Creating problem-solving 
groups 
Introduction 
In Tiase (not real name), the selection process changed three times before the 
community could select problem-solving group (PSG) members. After a hectic 
durbar in Tiase, George, a health provider, walked straight to me. He wanted to 
know the necessity of the elaborate participatory process (described later in this 
chapter) we used to select PSG members with a string of questions as follows: 
Why do you have to go through all these? Why didn’t you just let the chief give you people to 
join us [health providers and DHIS staffs]? That’s what we have been doing. Who has time to do 
all these? We don’t follow any laborious process like what you have done. We normally discuss 
what we want to do with the chief or people we know in the community and request for people 
to work with. If necessary then we organise a community durbar to inform them about the inter-
vention. 
George’s statements represent his experience (and perhaps that of many others) of 
how community representatives are selected to form stakeholder collaborative 
groups. His expression of surprise about the elaborate process used in forming PSGs 
and why we1 committed ourselves to it suggests that in spite of all the rhetoric about 
community involvement and participation, a few people probably decide on what to 
do and who to engage in the process. It also suggests that even those who claim to 
engage stakeholders in their intervention programmes often do not involve them 
from the onset. 
                                              
1
  Since my study was part of a multidisciplinary research project, some, but not all activities were carried 
out by the research team (two health economists and me, the medical anthropologist). Research assistants 
were hired to lead the PSG creation process. 
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A literature search on partnerships and participation shows that despite the long 
history of collaborative groups globally, the process of creating them is given less 
attention. Many studies argue in favour of and give positive accounts of partnership 
outcomes (Hawkes et al. 2004, Hawkins et al. 2002, Schensul et al. 2004). However, 
processes involved in reaching that goal are not well documented. The UK Depart-
ment of Health (2004) notes that despite the desire to include patients and the public 
in the planning and development issues, it is less clear how their involvement should 
be undertaken. This implies that even though partnership formation is not new, there 
are no blue prints to follow for creating partnerships, so most programme officers do 
their ‘own thing’. 
This chapter provides a systematic description of the selection processes and 
specific activities carried out to create and initiate PSGs. It seeks to answer three 
main questions: What processes are followed when creating PSGs? Who are 
involved? How are PSG members and facilitators selected? I provide insight into the 
complexity of the process. I also describe the challenges we encountered and how 
they were addressed. Lastly, I give suggestions to improve the PSG creation 
processes. 
Steps and activities in problem-solving group formation 
Figure 4.1 shows the four major processes and activities followed in the creation and 
initiation of PSGs. The PSG formation process started with a stakeholders’ orienta-
tion and ended with the PSG facilitators training. Although I was active in contact-
ing stakeholders and arranging the logistics to ensure that PSGs’ were formed, I did 
not play a lead role during the sensitisation durbar or in the selection of PSG 
members and facilitators. However, I did observe events, listen to discussions and 
contribute ideas when necessary. I also engaged community members, DHIS staff 
and health providers in conversations during the process. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Steps followed in setting up problem-solving groups 
 Training of facilitators 
 
 Selection of facilitators  
 
 Community durbar and 
selection of PSG members 
 
 
 Stakeholders’ orientation  
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Stakeholders’ orientation 
The PSG formation began with a stakeholders’ orientation. During this phase we 
interacted with key stakeholders (community members, health providers and DHIS 
staff) and created awareness about the problem of low enrolment and membership 
retention rates. After opinion leaders, health providers, DHIS staff and the research 
assistant presented the purpose of the intervention (see chapter five for details) in 
open forum, those present asked questions for clarification and also added their 
observation. The research team believed that sensitising the stakeholders about the 
purpose of the intervention (increasing enrolment and retention in the NHIS) would 
make them interested and willing to work together for change. I will describe how 
the community members, health providers and DHIS staff were mobilised, oriented 
and motivated to address the problems of low enrolment in the NHIS and high 
membership non-renewal rates. Before this could happen, the stakeholders had to 
recognise the problem and be concerned about coming together to address them. 
Guided by the multi-level perspective (MLP) that emphasises studying a phe-
nomenon by engaging actors at all levels (Press 1990, Green et al. 2001, Van der 
Geest et al. 1990), key stakeholders of the NHIS were engaged in the mobilisation 
effort to set up PSGs from the onset. The process started with visits by the research 
team to the District Director of Health Services (DDHSs), District Health Insurance 
Scheme (DHIS) managers, heads of local health facilities and community leaders. 
After our meetings with the DDHSs, we were introduced to disease control officers2 
(DCO) who had in-depth knowledge about all the communities in their districts. The 
DCOs led us to the community-based disease surveillance volunteers3, popularly 
called ‘volunteers’, who they engage in outreach programmes. The volunteers led us 
to the chiefs, elders and opinion leaders of the intervention communities. Discus-
sions with the volunteers focused on the intervention and its purpose. We solicited 
their support for the intervention and asked permission to engage their staff and 
community members in the programme. We also sought the volunteers’ views on 
the selection of PSG members. These visits gave us the opportunity to learn about 
the community dynamics and to utilise community structures and leaders to lead the 
PSG creation process. The orientation phase lasted three weeks during which an 
average of two visits was paid to each community, health facility and DHIS office. 
As researchers in the communities and among health providers and DHIS staff, 
we (the research team) were not sure what process would be acceptable and how to 
                                              
2
  Disease control officers are staff of GHS stationed in the district health directorates. Their job is 
surveillance and reporting on disease outbreaks. 
3
  Community-based disease surveillance volunteers are community members who work with DCOs. They 
are key persons in health-related community educational and intervention programmes. Their main task is 
to report the presence of any communicable or infectious disease in the community to the DCOs. They 
also give advice to community members to seek appropriate medical care promptly when sick. 
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motivate interest in the intervention. We decided to start our discussions by present-
ing the pre-intervention household survey results that generally showed low NHIS 
enrolment and high membership non-renewal rates. We arranged a meeting to 
introduce the project to opinion and community leaders, the DDHSs and DHIS 
managers and their staff. We discussed the problems captured by our survey. After 
presenting the results, the discussions generally became brainstorming sessions. All 
stakeholders spoke about their concerns regarding the NHIS and focused on chal-
lenges at their level: the community, health facility and the DHIS. Our meetings 
usually ended with discussions on how to address the raised concerns and the best 
strategy for selecting PSG members. Next, we introduced the purpose of the 
intervention and rationale for the multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme 
(MSPSP). 
At the health provider level, discussions were held with DDHSs, doctors, medical 
assistants, disease control officers, nurses, and those who work on NHIS forms 
among others. In most of the discussions, these stakeholders voiced concerns over 
the lack of consultation by the DHIS and NHIS operational difficulties. Dr Gyena, a 
DDHS staff member made remarks about the NHIS and support for the intervention 
and typified the health providers’ concerns. He said: 
The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) is not listening to those of us on the ground 
providing service. They could have improved their operations if they had a ‘listening ear’. Now 
we have all sorts of problems; even they can’t pay us. By bringing all of us together half the 
problem is solved. Many people come here and talk of collaboration but they tell us what to do. 
They think we don’t know anything. Our ‘voices’ don’t go anywhere. They forget that we also 
know what is ‘workable’ at the local level. Sometimes what is lacking is that the right people are 
not selected into such groups. We will support the intervention and make sure we get the right 
people in the group. 
The DHIS staff included DHIS managers, public relations officers (PROs), man-
agement information system (MIS) officers and other staff who took part in the 
discussions. They were all excited about the intervention and indicated that enrolling 
people in the NHIS was their core business, so they would support any programme 
aimed at helping them achieve their goal. However, they lamented the lukewarm 
attitudes of people towards the NHIS and the challenges of implementation. They 
indicated they had been conducting many educational activities, but people were just 
not responding. However, some DHIS staff were utterly surprised at the low 
enrolment and high non-renewal figures we had obtained from our pre-intervention 
household survey; nevertheless they did not dispute our data. One of them said: 
“Though I know that many people are not enrolling, I didn’t know the situation was 
all that bad. In fact, we really have to act.” 
In the community, chiefs and their elders, volunteers, NHIS collectors and opin-
ion leaders (such as assemblymen and Unit Committee chairmen) were those 
involved in discussions. Our meetings with them focused on why some people were 
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not enrolling and others were not renewing their memberships. Similar to other 
stakeholders, these respondents expressed worry about the low enrolment situation 
and some admitted that they had not registered themselves. Others recounted their 
own experiences with the NHIS. Below is an excerpt from one meeting with 
community leaders: 
Agnes (member of research team and medical anthropologist): We are here this morning as a 
follow-up to the baseline [pre-intervention] survey we carried out in March this year [2009]. Our 
purpose is to share our survey results with you. The results generally showed low enrolment in 
the NHIS and high non-renewal rates4. Out of the 13 communities surveyed in this region [Cen-
tral Region], only four had 33 per cent of households enrolled. Individual enrolment was less 
than 10 per cent in three communities. In this community, when you count 10 households only 
one (9.2%) had at least one member with valid NHIS card. The situation is even worse when 
you consider everybody. 
Community elder: Thank you for your information. I didn’t know so many people have not 
enrolled. I’m happy you are here to let us know how serious the situation is. I’ll say that the 
problem with health insurance is not just that we are not enrolling, but also the problems people 
encounter when they enrol or go to the health facility after enrolling. 
Agnes: So, we are here to discuss what could be done to improve the situation. Specifically, 
what action we can take to encourage people to enrol and remain with the scheme. 
Assemblyman: Definitely something must be done to get more people enrolled. Though we all 
agree that health insurance is good and that everybody should register, there are problems that 
discourage many of us from enrolling. We were told when you have the hospital [NHIS] card 
and you go to the hospital you do not have to pay, but that is not what is happening. Insured 
patients are still paying at health facilities. In this town there is no accredited drug store so you 
have to travel to other places to get your drugs. Moreover the cards are delayed after registration. 
All these discourage people from joining and the insured renewing their cards. 
Agnes: We are here to discuss how we can best deal with the problems you have mentioned. 
When we met healthcare providers and DHIS staff, they also mentioned a number of challenges 
that undermine their work. The SHINE Ghana project team thinks that factors that discourage 
people from enrolling or renewing their NHIS card could be better dealt with if community 
members, health providers and DHIS staff work together to identify and address them. We are 
proposing an intervention called a multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme to help ad-
dress these barriers that undermine enrolment and retention of members. So we are here to seek 
your views and support for the project. The first step is how to set up what we called problem-
solving groups consisting of representatives of the community members, health providers and 
DHIS staff. As the name implies this group is expected to meet regularly to identify barriers to 
enrolment and retention of members at each level, share ideas and develop their own solutions 
and implement them. 
Chief: I’m happy you are here to discuss your ideas with us, and how we can work together. I’m 
also happy about the fact that you are involving health providers and the DHIS staffs. I think if 
we work together we can achieve better results. 
Agnes: Thank you for accepting to be part of the process. The first step now is the method to use 
to get your representatives to join the PSG. 
                                              
4
  Of the 13 communities surveyed in this region (Central Region), four had enrolment levels between 
31.8% and 39.1%, and the other nine had enrolment levels between 9.2 % and 29.6%. Individual enrol-
ment was less than 10% in three communities and the lowest was 4.8% (see Table A.3, Appendix 2). 
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At the end of the visits, all professional stakeholders indicated that access to 
healthcare is an endemic problem that the NHIS is expected to solve. Therefore, 
since very low enrolment and high drop-out rates have been recorded in most 
communities, pragmatic interventions are needed to create and sustain community 
members’ interest in health insurance while all stakeholders re-orient their world-
views about the NHIS. For example, health providers and the DHIS staff lauded the 
MSPSP as an intervention that would help them address the demands of community 
members while giving them the opportunity to talk about the NHIS implementation 
challenges they were facing. They also promised to have their staff join the PSGs. 
Community leaders were happy about their involvement in the mobilisation process. 
The typical response after being briefed was: “Yԑbԑhwԑ ayi wcn a wcbetumi ayԑ 
ԑdwuma no” (We will select people who can do the work). All key stakeholders 
provided very useful information about their communities. 
Hawkes et al. (2004) analysed potential barriers to the implementation of a syphi-
lis control programme. The authors observed that engaging key players is crucial to 
ensure that an intervention programme receives adequate support and health policies 
become effective in practice. In this study, we observed that the key stakeholders’ 
involvement raised interest in the intervention. The question of the appropriate 
method for selecting community representatives to form PSGs was settled in our 
follow-up visits. After a number of techniques were suggested by community 
members, health providers and DHIS staff, a final decision was made. Some 
community leaders, who were in favour of handpicking members of PSGs, argued 
that an open selection method would be an arduous process and might not be 
successful. Others who supported the open selection process argued that the process 
would identify more credible individuals to represent the community since many 
people would be critical of the selected PSG members. In one community, an 
assemblyman who argued in support of the open selection at a community durbar 
described the advantage as follows: 
It is better if everybody participate in selecting representatives to the group than the few of us 
gathered here decide to pick people to represent the community. More importantly, taking those 
who will finally be selected through a vigorous selection process will let them be more serious 
with the intervention. They will feel they are accountable to the whole community not the few of 
us and be serious with their work. 
Kekeli, an assemblyman in another community explained why an open selection 
process in a community durbar was preferred: 
Instead of a few people deciding on who should be PSG members, it is better we involve the 
whole community even if it is strenuous and time consuming. With the durbar, the right message 
will spread faster since many people will attend and start talking to their family members and 
friends. So awareness is created among the majority within a short time. It would actually influ-
ence the majority of them to take the intervention seriously and hopefully will motivate them to 
respond positively to whatever the group decides to do. 
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After extensive discussions, opinion and community leaders in the first two 
communities unanimously agreed upon an open selection process at a durbar to 
select PSG community representatives. The consensus was that the durbar would 
create awareness among community members and lay the foundation for the 
intervention even before it started. The meetings usually ended with opinion leaders 
taking the responsibility to mobilise people to attend the durbar. 
The community orientation visits to the seven intervention communities went 
well except for the last one in Jakakrom (not real name), an urban community. As 
usual a volunteer arranged the pre-durbar meeting. Here the chief, Nana Ansah’s5 
first reaction was negative. After a briefing, he indicated that he was not going to 
tolerate such things (intervention programmes anymore), so he was not going to give 
me permission to enter the community. He told me he was not happy with the 
activities of NGOs who came to the community without properly consulting him. He 
indicated that the NGOs want to use communities to make money, so he would not 
allow me to do so. In fact, he nearly walked me out of the room. I asked politely if I 
could review what I had said and he agreed. So I repeated what I initially said and 
emphasised that I was just a researcher from the university and not from an NGO. 
Then he changed his mind and told me that he had also retired from the university 
two years ago. He explained his initial negative stand. 
I agree that any intervention that will make my people have access to healthcare must be sup-
ported because development can only occur in a community if everybody is healthy and can 
work. But people come here without proper consultation. The ‘so-called’ experts think they 
know everything and don’t involve us. The other day, I just heard a group was doing something 
down there [pointing his finger to a school]. They came without seeking our views [pointing to a 
number of elders he had summoned to come and listen to me] about what they want to do. They 
just waste money sometimes doing things that do not benefit us or solve the problem. It is good 
you want us to be part of the intervention. I’m happy you are also involving health providers and 
DHIS staff. I hope whatever comes out of your research will be used to improve the situation. 
At this point, the meeting turned into a conversation and Nana Ansah recounted 
his experience with programmes that performed poorly because the people were not 
given the opportunity to add their input about how things should be done. He told 
me that he personally had gotten the women in his community to use treated 
mosquito nets. 
Chambers (1983), a key proponent of participation, has noted the concerns like 
those of Nana Ansah and Dr Gyena. The author remarked that even when develop-
ment workers talk about community participation, at the end of the day it is still an 
                                              
5
  Chiefs in Ghana have jurisdiction over a particular geographical area. So outsiders entering the communi-
ty must seek his permission. This is sometimes violated especially in urban communities where the local 
government agencies, such as the district assemblies, have political power and oversee civic activities. As 
a result, a chief’s authority is not felt as much and is sometimes taken for granted as the case of Nana 
Ansah shows. Nana Ansah lives in an urban community and is a retired public servant 
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outsider seeking to change things for local people. This was what the MSPSP sought 
not to do; it did not intend to treat key stakeholders of the NHIS as only consumers 
of the intervention to expand coverage, but rather to engage them from the onset. 
Furthermore, casual remarks made during conversations with community mem-
bers gave me insight into the local situation and appropriate measures needed for 
support of the intervention. For example, a conversation with Agya Mensah, a Unit 
Committee6 chairman, during one of our familiarisation visits in the Kaja communi-
ty, alerted us to a chieftaincy dispute that required slightly changing the protocols 
we were following. This hint was dropped when the volunteer introduced us to Agya 
Mensah as someone we could talk to about the project. After telling Agya Mensah 
about the intervention and creation of the PSGs, I asked him which persons were 
likely to be nominated as PSG members. He told me there were many people, but 
the volunteer I was walking with had problems with a section of the community, so I 
should be careful how I involve him. I was curious and asked what kind of problem. 
He said the family of the volunteer was involved in a chieftaincy dispute so includ-
ing him might not be helpful. To be sure about what Agya Mensah had told me, I 
verified the situation with the NHIS collector (the next person the volunteer took me 
to). He confirmed the story and said that the volunteer’s family had refused to take 
part in community activities, so if he played a front role in organising the durbar, 
people might not attend.” I came back to ask Agya Mensah about when we could 
visit the chief. He said: “Due to the chieftaincy dispute, if some people see you 
going to any of the contesting chiefs, they might boycott the durbar. They might 
associate what you are doing with him. So I think we don’t have to visit any of 
them.” 
I must say that this advice yielded rich information. We gained significant insight 
into community dynamics that helped address stakeholders’ concerns. Stakeholders’ 
observations and advice informed us about the local conditions and procedures we 
could utilise to guide the selection of community PSG representatives. For example, 
due to the existing chieftaincy dispute in Kaja (not real name), Agya Mensah 
became the rallying point for mobilisation activities. He was perceived as neutral 
and acceptable to the whole community, so he took it upon himself to invite the 
feuding factions to the community-sensitisation durbar. He informed the community 
about the intervention and the need to attend the durbar. I did not visit any of the 
contesting chiefs. A public announcement was made by the village announcer 
inviting everybody, including the contesting chiefs, to the sensitisation meeting. 
Agya Mensah also advised that we use an open selection process to minimise the 
                                              
6
  A Unit Committee is the lowest level in Ghana’s decentralisation structure of governance. It is at the 
community level. Elections are non-partisan, so members are supposed to be politically neutral and not to 
show open support for any party. 
  
99 
effect of local politics on the selection process. In fact, the durbar was well attended 
and true to Agya Mensah’s word (and contrary to what happened in other communi-
ties where nominees were unanimously accepted), the nomination of one person was 
contested. The details of what happened will be discussed later in this chapter. It 
was also remarkable that no one nominated the volunteer to be a member of the 
PSG, which was not the case in other communities. My observation during the 
durbar and the selection process confirmed that the volunteer was not popular with 
the people because of his involvement in traditional politics. 
Another important issue worth mentioning is that getting people to attend durbars 
in fishing communities was very difficult compared to farming communities. 
Though they could not give me a reason, I was happy to have been cautioned by 
DHIS staff and health providers of the low attendance they normally record when 
durbars are organised in fishing communities. Armed with this information, I made 
an extra effort to interest fishermen in particular to attend the durbar so they could 
also be selected. In fact, in my conversations with them during my community 
orientation visits, they were not enthusiastic about participating in the PSGs. 
Therefore, I took pains to talk to them while they were busy mending their nets. 
Even when I explained to them that the PSG meetings and other activities would not 
take much of their time nor disrupt their work since they would be scheduled at their 
convenience, they were still adamant about not participating. I later asked the 
volunteer who normally accompanied me about the fishermen’s lukewarm attitude. 
He told me that the reason for their general lackadaisical attitudes towards such 
programmes could be because of their inability to converse in English. This was 
confirmed when I engaged one of them in a conversation. Below is an excerpt. 
Agnes: Why are you not interested in being a member of the group? 
Ebo: We don’t understand English. When people come here, they will be speaking English and 
we will not understand. But also let me ask you what do you want from the group? 
Agnes: The group is expected to meet at least once every month to discuss the reasons why 
many people are not enrolling in the NHIS and why the few who enrol some do not renew their 
membership. The group will plan activities that they think will improve enrolment and influence 
people to remain in the scheme. All communication will be done in Fanti (the local language), 
so you will have no problem communicating your views. Are there any other challenges? 
Ebo: If the language problem is solved, then we will come. We don’t have any problem with the 
group. 
Despite Ebo’s assurance, not many fishermen attended the durbars. As it was, 
fishing communities generally recorded the lowest attendance confirming what I had 
been told. The situation in fishing communities therefore demands a rethinking of 
how to get them into PSGs since they appear not to be interested in community 
durbars. This challenge is addressed in the next chapter that describes how PSGs 
devised other strategies in addition to community durbars that made it possible to 
reach fishermen with intervention activities. 
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Criteria for selecting PSG members 
Having settled on a durbar as the best forum to select PSG members we (health 
providers, DHIS staffs, community leaders, my research assistant and I) discussed 
the best selection procedure. Ideas gathered from these discussions were used to 
develop detailed guidelines for the selection process. These ideas also helped me to 
develop the framework for the PSG creation process. The following criteria were 
determined after discussions with the DHIS staff, health providers and community 
members involved in organising the durbar. We agreed that any adult resident in the 
community was eligible to nominate someone and be nominated and that at least 
two women should be in the group. Another condition was that all speakers includ-
ing the DHIS staff and health providers should communicate in the local language. 
The decision to include at least two women in each PSG was reached after the first 
community durbar when only one woman had been selected after the initial selec-
tion round. This attracted our (the research assistant and I) attention. We immediate-
ly alerted the assemblyman who was helping to facilitate the selection process. After 
a short discussion, he drew the community’s attention to the sole woman participant. 
The situation was discussed and everyone agreed on the need to have at least two 
women in the group. The research assistant and all those involved in organising the 
durbar agreed that since women are caregivers, they should be part of groups that 
discusses healthcare issues. So a second woman was nominated to join the PSG and 
having at least two women became a condition for all other PSGs. This was to 
ensure that women were given the opportunity to participate effectively in the 
intervention. The argument was that if we left women’s nominations open, they 
might not have been selected at all in some communities. 
I must admit that the initial selection of only one woman was actually not a sur-
prise to me since Ghana is a male-dominated society and women’s leadership 
capacities are generally undervalued. There is the belief about the superiority of men 
and specific roles are assigned to men and women. In this regard, Cusack (1999: 25) 
observed that in Ghana, role expectations generally “confine women to specific 
spaces.” Leadership positions for example, are seen as the preserve of men, and 
women are generally associated with reproductive functions. Farmer (2005) also 
contends that throughout the world, women are confronted with an ideology that 
situates them as inferior to men. 
Lessons learned from community orientation 
Key stakeholder engagement in setting the path for the formation of PSGs during the 
orientation phase of the process brings to the fore a number of key lessons that are 
relevant to intervention practices in Ghana. Not nominating women in the first group 
illustrates how women are relegated to the background when it comes to leadership 
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in many community gatherings and explains their under representation in leadership 
positions at the national level. 
First, discussions with health providers, DHIS staffs and community members 
indicated they were interested in the intervention because of the opportunity for 
open dialogue. Health providers felt that by working together with DHIS staff, their 
situation could improve because these discussions provided them the opportunity to 
speak about how the NHIS affected their work. 
With DHIS staff, their motivation to participate in the intervention was the oppor-
tunity to discuss the challenges they were confronted with when implementing the 
NHIS. They also said they were happy that the intervention was likely to enhance 
their work. Moreover, since they would be working with community members who 
were the targets of their membership drive activities and health providers who were 
expected to help them achieve their goal, the collaboration would help them expand 
NHIS coverage. 
Community leaders and members I spoke with asserted that in the midst of low 
enrolment, the intervention was an opportunity for them to work with DHIS staff 
and health providers to address the issues that discourage people from enrolling and 
renewing their membership. They contended that this would help solve the problem 
of lack of access to healthcare in their communities, so it must be supported. 
Building collaborative groups around perceived problems and creating an environ-
ment of mutual dependency are strategies that are more likely to arouse stakehold-
ers’ interest and encourage them to participate. As Nana Ansah pointed out, 
consulting targets of an intervention made them commit to the intervention’s 
success, since it reduced resentment towards such programmes by the people who 
are supposed to help mobilise support. This perspective echoes Hawkins et al.’s 
(2002) observation that it is imperative to use methods that effectively mobilise 
various sectors of a community to support the implementation of interventions. 
Similarly, this study found that stakeholder involvement from the beginning helped 
create a platform to discuss pertinent issues related to the intervention and its 
relevance. 
Second, the massive attendance at the seven durbars shows that once stakeholders 
were adequately sensitised to the scope of the problem, they would mobilise their 
members to patronise the selection of PSG members and take the intervention 
seriously. Events at the durbar showed that people who were committed to work in a 
group to achieve the desired change attended the durbar and were consequently 
selected. They created the support base for the intervention from the outset. This 
echoes the observation of Van der Geest et al. (1990) that involving all actors when 
studying a phenomenon is important, so the various meanings of the same phenom-
enon can be revealed. The authors argued that what may appear as self-evident at 
one level may be totally irrelevant at another. Similarly, the pre-durbar consultations 
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led to a common understanding of the intensity of the problem of low enrolment in 
the NHIS, which was not perceived by community members. This resulted in 
stakeholders’ commitment to help achieve the intervention goals. 
Third, by involving stakeholders and incorporating their ideas, such as Nana 
Ansah’s suggestion to thoroughly discuss objections raised against nominees during 
the PSG creation process, helped reduce conflict. Even when conflicts occurred, as 
in the Kaja and Tiase communities, they were resolved without confrontation. This 
shows that challenges may arise during the process, but when handled properly, 
positive results can be achieved. 
Understanding community dynamics is of interest to many researchers. As Hig-
gins & Metzler (2001: 490) have pointed out, “Insights and perspectives of commu-
nity participants enhance the knowledge and understanding of researchers about 
community dynamics and conditions.” This study in Ghana found that understand-
ing community dynamics is not only useful to researchers, but also even more useful 
to those engaged in carrying out intervention activities. This is because the interven-
tion groups’ ability to tap information about local conflicts and dynamics helps them 
to address issues and ensure the successful formation of the PSGs. 
Finally, presenting the intervention as three-pronged targeting the three key 
stakeholders of the NHIS (community members, health providers and DHIS staff) 
with ‘no blame attached’ was helpful. The stakeholders appreciated the low enrol-
ment and the difficulty of retaining members as a mutual challenge requiring a 
collaborative effort. This finding was similar to the observation of Porter et al. 
(2007) in their study of a medicine and public health partnership that the reason(s) 
for group formation (though not very strong) contributes to their success. This study 
found that forming partnerships on the basis of mutual problems requires the 
contribution of all to improve the situation and results in the stakeholders’ commit-
ment to work together to solve the problem. Health providers’, DHIS staff’s and 
community members’ recognition of their capacity to contribute to improve enrol-
ment and that they were not expected to function only as recipients of intervention 
activities made them view the intervention in a positive way. They became more 
receptive to the idea of collaboration and their interest in participating increased. 
Thus, the participatory approach we adopted in setting up PSGs indicates that 
seeking local stakeholder support for intervention programmes from the onset 
provides a fertile ground for success. 
Community durbars and selection of PSG members 
Community durbars were held to sensitise stakeholders about the intervention and 
select PSG community representatives. The durbars were attended by chiefs and 
their elders, community members, health providers and DHIS staff who were targets 
of the intervention. Being quite conscious of my position as a researcher, I did not 
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take a leading role at the durbars. Research assistants7 facilitated the proceedings at 
the durbars assisted by opinion leaders and community leaders (Assembly and Unit 
Committee members). 
On durbar days, we (the research assistant and I) always arrived early. From my 
observation, there was usually an air of anticipation before the durbar began. People 
who came early gathered in small groups and discussed the NHIS. Eavesdropping 
on their conversations, I heard community members generally talking about their 
experiences with NHIS, such as delays in receiving NHIS ID cards. Health provid-
ers were discussing the community’s lack of interest in health insurance. DHIS staff 
discussed the lukewarm attitude of community members towards the NHIS. These 
discussions boosted my morale since it was obvious that barriers to enrolment and 
retention in the NHIS were real and cut across communities, health facilities and 
DHISs. These conversations also indicated that each stakeholder’s perspective 
influenced how they define the barriers. Therefore, to understand and address the 
barriers adequately, each stakeholder’s perspective needed to be explored. 
 
Welcome and introduction: Typical of durbars in Ghana, proceedings started with 
the observation of the protocol8 related to traditional procedures at official functions, 
especially when chiefs are involved. We, the researchers and research assistants, 
were regarded as visitors to the community, so we were welcomed and introduced to 
the community by the Okyeame (the chief’s spokesman). He asked about the 
purpose of our visit and the objective of the durbar. My research assistant briefly 
talked about the reasons for the durbar and the goal of the intervention emphasising 
the role of PSG members and facilitators. Next, a DHIS staff and health provider 
gave brief speeches emphasising the benefits of the NHIS. They indicated they were 
happy about their involvement in the intervention and were confident that the 
expected objectives of bringing about significant increases in NHIS enrolment and 
ultimately ensuring equity in access to healthcare would be achieved. 
The durbar thus created a common platform for stakeholders to interact and 
communicate their views about the NHIS. It also created support for the intervention 
and highlighted the need to work together to reduce barriers to enrolment. This is in 
line with the issue of “cultural brokerage,” which implies bringing about communi-
cation, interaction and mutual dependency as expressed by Bailey & Van der Geest 
(2009: 217). The absence of which, Kinsman (2008) observed, had accounted for the 
failure of HIV/AIDS interventions in Tanzania and Uganda. This study also showed 
                                              
7
  Research assistants were hired to facilitate the durbar and the selection of PSG members and train PSG 
facilitators. They were experts in community mobilisation and development. 
8
  Before the start of any gathering involving chiefs, especially among the Akans in Ghana, traditional 
protocol demands that visitors in a single file go to shake hands with the chief and his elders and vice 
versa as a form of greeting. 
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that it is essential to create a forum that encourages broader networking and integra-
tion of stakeholders’ ideas into processes that reflect their reality from the onset. A 
NHIS collector’s remark after one of the durbars typifies comments made by 
community members to show appreciation for their involvement in the intervention. 
This is one of the best things that have happened in this community. Everybody must support it, 
since access to healthcare is an important issue. In fact, I have been trying to convince people to 
register, but they will not listen. I see this programme as something that will enhance my work. 
Bringing health providers, DHIS staff and community members together will send positive 
signal to all those sitting on the fence. They will see that the NHIS is good and change their 
mind and register. 
 
Selection of problem-solving group members: The effectiveness of any intervention 
depends to a large extent on choosing the right people to form the group. Selection 
of the community representatives required special focus because the calibre of the 
people selected to form PSGs was likely to have impact on the intervention pro-
gramme. Therefore, to ensure the acceptance of the selected community members, 
extensive consultation and locally designed procedures were used. This approach 
was guided by Butt et al.’s (2008) assertion that the success of interventions is 
related to who is involved and how they are involved. Since the intervention was 
guided by a multi-level perspective, each community was given the opportunity to 
decide on how to proceed. As mentioned earlier, the idea of an open selection 
procedure was raised by community members, such as Agya Mensah (a Unit 
Committee chairman) and Kekeli (an assembly member) in the first two communi-
ties we went to. Open selection then became the popular option when suggested by 
the research team to other communities, even when it was mentioned first. Open 
selection was therefore discussed and adopted as the procedure in all 15 intervention 
communities based on the assertion that if targets of the intervention selected their 
representatives and gave them the mandate to plan and execute their own activities, 
the likelihood of success appeared to be high. 
With regard to the selection of DHIS staff and health providers for the PSGs, 
heads of their institutions using their wisdom determined the process. This was 
because of the study’s emphasis on the effective participation of stakeholders in the 
selection of PSG members as an alternative to a predetermined top-down process. 
We requested a minimum of two representatives from DHIS staff and health 
providers to ensure that one would be available at all times. Therefore, the heads of 
the institutions selected PSG members who had insight into the NHIS in the District 
Health Directorate (DHD) and health facilities. All DHIS staff qualified for inclu-
sion in the PSGs, so the selection was based on the manager’s discretion with the 
PROs as the first choice since their main work is promoting NHIS. 
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A typical process of selecting PSG community representatives: The climax of the 
durbar was the selection of PSG members. Before the selection, my research 
assistant spelt out the criteria for membership and guidelines to be followed, 
emphasising the selection of women. Below is a summary of what took place: 
Research assistant: “Who do you nominate to represent you in the PSG?” 
A community member [Raised his or her hand and mentioned an individual’s name]: “Kwesi 
Mensah.” 
Another community member [at least two other people needed to second the nomination] said: “I 
agree to Kwesi Mensah’s nomination” 
The nominee was asked to stand in front of the crowd for everybody to see him or 
her and then return to his or her seat. Next, community members were asked 
whether anybody had anything to say against the selection of the nominee. This 
question was repeated three times. For each round, about a minute was given to 
allow people to think through the issue and raise objections if necessary. If nobody 
raised an objection, then the nominee was accepted. Every nomination was taken 
through the same process till the required number9 was obtained. When objections 
were raised, the person was asked to give reasons why the nominee did not qualify 
to be a PSG member. The research assistant led the community to discuss the issues 
thoroughly till an agreement was reached, either to accept or reject the nominee. If 
no consensus was reached, a vote (by show of hands) was conducted to arrive at a 
decision. 
When all nominations had been accepted, all persons selected were shown to the 
gathering as representatives of the community. The research assistant then finally 
asked if someone had anything to say about a nominee. If no objection was raised, 
the nominated representatives of health providers and DHIS staff joined the selected 
community members for the inauguration. All participants in the durbar faced the 
crowd while the chief and his elders congratulated the selected nominees and 
declared them officially as PSG members. Next, a PSG member pledged the group’s 
commitment to the task ahead and asked the community to support them to achieve 
the goals of the intervention. 
The chief or his representative normally gives the final word. This person advises 
the selected PSG members to work in harmony and uphold their virtues. He also 
asks the community members to support them in their work. A typical statement by 
the chief or the elder was: 
You have been selected today to serve in this important group, make sure your conduct does not 
bring any disgrace to us. Don’t betray the confidence and trust the community has in you. Es-
chew any negative tendencies and work diligently to help achieve the objectives of the group. 
                                              
9
  The required number was determined by the number of health providers and DHIS staff already 
nominated. 
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The chiefs also pledge the community elders’ support to ensure that the objectives 
of the intervention are achieved. When a chief agrees to witness the formation of 
PSGs, this means that the intervention is an important programme for the communi-
ty and should be taken seriously. 
Generally, the selection processes were smooth without incidents except in two 
communities when objections were raised against a nominee’s selection and the 
selection process. However, these objections were discussed and an agreement was 
reached by a vote and the selection processes continued. The two cases with objec-
tions are presented below to show the importance that community members attached 
to the community participatory process, the important issues that informed people’s 
decisions to nominate an individual to represent them, and how conflicts were 
addressed. 
 
Rejection of nominees: In the few cases when a nominee was rejected, the partici-
pants at the gathering discussed the issues to ensure that the process was transparent 
and no one would be blamed for favouring a particular person. In the Kaja commu-
nity (not real name), for example, the first three nominations were accepted without 
objection. When the name of a fourth nominee, Kwaku Manu was mentioned, the 
facilitator asked as usual whether all agreed to his nomination. A man got up and 
raised an objection saying that Manu was working and staying in the next town, so 
he did not qualify. However, another person supported the nomination and insisted 
that Kwaku Manu was almost always in town and his contribution to development 
activities was enormous. When given the opportunity, the nominator explained his 
position as follows: 
You all know Kwaku Manu’s contribution to the development and welfare of this town. Though 
he does not currently live in town, he is almost always here and his contribution to the develop-
ment of this town cannot be compared to anyone of us here. Moreover, he is coming down to 
settle here soon. I think this qualifies him to be part of the group. 
These arguments held up proceedings for about five minutes. A man then sug-
gested that they vote to settle the issue by show of hands, his suggestion was 
accepted, and a vote was cast. An overwhelming majority supported his nomination. 
The selection continued without any incident and everything went well. From my 
observation, the majority of the people were happy with the process. 
 
Rejection of selection process: In the Tiase community, the customary procedure 
used for selecting PSG community members was rejected three times. The first 
process, an open nomination of potential PSG members described above, was 
rejected when the selection process was almost complete. All seven candidates were 
lined up and shown to the community for the final approval. When the research 
assistant asked the final question of whether everybody agreed to the selection of the 
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nominees, a community member named Kisi protested against the selection process. 
He said: 
Nominating only seven people and accepting them by clapping hands is not good enough. Peo-
ple were not given enough opportunity to reject nominees they do not want. More people should 
be added to the seven already selected so we could vote to determine who should be part of the 
group. 
Kisi’s comment brought arguments. Some people raised objections to his sugges-
tion arguing that the process was not feasible given their situation. Others said that 
this was not a political event and there were no ballot papers to organise the election 
that Kisi wanted. This resulted in counter arguments holding up proceedings for 
about ten minutes. When the assemblyman helping to facilitate the selection 
managed to restore order, the group agreed to vote by a show of hands. Two more 
people were nominated, bringing the total to nine. The nine nominees were kept 
inside a room where they could not see what was going on in the hall. People were 
asked to vote for their favourite nominee when his/her name was mentioned. As 
people voted, they were moved to one side of the hall to prevent double voting. 
However, after the first two nominees were selected, another man also objected to 
this process. He said: 
This cannot be a better selection process. How sure are we that people are not voting or counted 
more than once? This is not acceptable. It must be replaced by a better way of voting and count-
ing votes if we still want to maintain an election process. 
This resulted in another hold up with many arguments for a few minutes. Now 
people were not happy about what was happening and started leaving the hall. The 
assemblyman, and the research assistant had difficulty maintaining order and 
bringing those who were leaving back to the hall. Order was restored when Nana 
Ameyaw, one of the elders, intervened and asked everybody to remain calm. He 
appealed to those who were leaving to come back. He said: 
These people [pointing to us] are here to involve us because they trust us. They trust that we can 
help solve the problem with insurance so we have to make sure the objective of this meeting is 
achieved. Let’s co-operate and decide on a feasible selection process. It is an opportunity we 
have to handle well. We have to support the facilitators and make sure we form this group. 
When the situation returned to normal, the on-going voting process was also 
abandoned. After a short discussion about what procedure to use, everybody in the 
hall realised it was not possible to hold a ‘proper’ election where everyone could 
vote in a secret ballot given the large number of people present (about 300). At this 
stage, Kisi, who had raised the first objection, looked confused and was worried that 
it might not be possible to form the PSG. Arguing about the community’s inability 
to agree on a process to allow everyone to vote, he appealed to all those present to 
cooperate in setting up the group. Consequently, a community member suggested a 
third process and this was accepted after many arguments. In the new process, 
instead of the community members voting for the nominees, the nominees would be 
  
108
in a lottery (explained below). Appealing to the people, the assemblyman, who was 
moderating the nominations said: “This is the only realistic process, you must all 
cooperate. There is no other way we can get these people elected since we can’t get 
ballot papers and boxes to make the process efficient.” 
Before the selection resumed, the assemblyman raised the issue of a minimum of 
two women being selected to join the group. The conclusion was that if they did not 
select two women, the community would then decide what to do. To move the 
process forward, the assemblyman wrote the word ‘Yes’ on seven pieces of paper 
and ‘No’ on two pieces of paper and put them in a bowl for the nominees to pick in 
the full view of everybody. Those who picked ‘Yes’ formed the group and those 
who picked ‘No’ were left out. Interestingly, all the previous nominees picked ‘Yes’ 
and three women picked ‘Yes’. A young man, sitting beside me, dissatisfied about 
the earlier confusion, but happy with the results, commented: “Do you think we are 
children. After all what was earlier rejected is what we still had.” The rest of the 
PSG formation activities went smoothly. The durbar ended with the following 
remarks from Nana Ameyaw: 
What happened today should be taken as something that should strengthen you [pointing to PSG 
members]. It means people are really interested in what you are going to do and want to see you 
perform. It also shows the dynamism of people in Tiase community and not division among 
them. I urge all of you to support the group to achieve the objective of the intervention. 
After the durbar in Tiase, I asked a community member how she felt about what 
happened. She said: 
I’m just happy that we were able to get the right people selected despite the confusion. I’m even 
surprised about how they had time to get all those problems solved [hold ups during the selec-
tion of PSG members]. It shows that they are serious and trust that if the right people are select-
ed the problems will be solved. We have to support the group. 
Drawing on the above comment and the peaceful atmosphere I observed after the 
durbar, most people were happy about their involvement in the selection of PSG 
members. Disagreements were discussed freely. Comments by Nana Ameyaw, the 
Unit Committee chairman and others showed that community orientation and 
extensive pre-durbar consultations made the community leaders and members 
recognise their involvement in the selection process and intervention as laudable. 
They saw participating in the selection process as an opportunity that should be 
utilised well. Interest in the intervention was generated. Tiase is a vibrant communi-
ty where the people ensure issues are discussed objectively and the right thing is 
done to maintain unity and achieve positive results. As Nana Ameyaw observed, the 
‘hectic’ selection process shows the dynamism of people and not division. 
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Profile of PSGs’ members 
At the end of the process in all seven communities, I found that the selected PSG 
members cut across all sections of the community. Neither age, religion, level of 
education nor disability influenced a person’s selection. For example, a disabled 
man was selected as a PSG member and even as a facilitator, but unfortunately had 
to turn the position down because of the problem of how to attend the facilitators’ 
training workshop. The man needed an aide to accompany him to the meeting, but 
the project could not provide funding for that. Intrigued by the disabled man’s 
selection, I asked community members what informed their nomination. Yaw, like 
many people I spoke with, told me that the critical attribute he considered for 
selection was the individual’s conduct, especially his or her commitment towards 
the welfare of the community. I asked a similar question after the incidents in Kaja 
when a nomination was contested and Tiase when the selection process was modi-
fied. Janet, who I saw arguing among the crowd in Tiase, told me that the person she 
nominated was “hard working, well-behaved and would bring development to the 
community. Not those who are only interested in their own welfare.” 
Others told me they did not want people who would bring confusion to the com-
munity because of their involvement in local politics. The two selection processes 
thus created space for everybody to participate and gave voice to those who rarely 
have the opportunity to select their representatives in forming such groups. The 
people appreciated the process since their involvement in the planning broadened 
the base of potential members. This was in contrast to the usual practice in Ghana of 
handpicking people to form intervention groups. The selection processes gave 
people like Ebo (fisherman), who were committed to the welfare of their communi-
ties but worried about alienation and their effective involvement, the opportunity to 
participate. As indicated earlier, in my conversations with community members after 
the durbar, the extent of the community members’ involvement and the elaborate 
procedures followed in the selection processes were seen as a welcome development 
in intervention practice. This approach created room for the majority of the targets 
of the intervention to participate from the onset; this is rarely the practice in Ghana 
and that is a source of worry for most community leaders and experts in community 
development. For example, Chambers (1983) criticises the behaviour of develop-
ment workers who claim to have used participatory approaches, but often end up 
deciding what to do for the community. 
PSG members range from 11-15. The variation was due to the differences in the 
number of health providers and DHIS staff who were nominated to join each group. 
There were seven community members in all the groups. PSG members included: 
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• Fishermen, farmers, GPRTU10 chairman, self-employed 
• Teachers and other formal sector workers 
• Cocoa purchasing clerks 
• Assembly/Unit Committee members11 
• Religious leaders 
(See Table A.7, Appendix 2) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Map of Central Region showing all seven intervention communities 
where PSGs were established 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the seven communities in Central Region where durbars were 
held to sensitise stakeholders about the intervention and select PSG community 
representatives. 
Lessons learned from the PSG selection process 
Lessons drawn from the participatory process used to form PSGs provide a frame-
work to address concerns about stakeholders’ involvement to attain positive results. 
                                              
10
  GPRTU – Ghana Private Road Transport Union is the largest association of private commercial drivers in 
Ghana. 
11
  Assemblymen and Unit Committee members are part of the political structure in Ghana. They are local 
representatives in the District Assemblies and non-partisan. They work with the district chief executive 
who is the government representative at the district level. 
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For example, the UNICEF’s Accelerated Child Survival and Development Pro-
gramme to reduce death among children less than five years in Ghana did not 
achieve the expected targets because there was lack of engagement of the imple-
menters and the target population of the intervention from the onset (Bryce n.d.). 
This suggests that excluding stakeholders from programmes and treating them only 
as consumers, increases the risk of failure. 
Stakeholders exchanging ideas, participating in decision-making and planning the 
durbar all worked to establish linkages and build trust. Open selection of PSG 
members laid the foundation for the intervention. For example, Nana Ameyaw, an 
elder of Tiase who saw the process as based on trust, gave his support and this 
helped to convince the people to participate so the selection of the PSG members 
could succeed. This echoes Gilson’s (2003) claim that trust facilitates collective 
action and elicits co-operation among people to achieve common goals. Similarly, 
Mantoura et al. (2007) and Bailey (1992) suggest that for networks to succeed a 
team should be well integrated in the community and be motivated to risk working 
together to prevent narrowly focused self-interest activities. Comments made after 
the durbar show that extensive consultation resulted in deeper community penetra-
tion since the message about the intervention was spread even before PSGs began 
their work. Thus, the stakeholders’ motivation to work together could be enhanced if 
they are given the chance to take charge of events and decide on the process of 
selecting members of an intervention group. 
The incidents of disagreement in Tiase and Kaja show that to have a positive 
outcome in setting up collaborative groups, the process should be painstakingly 
followed without rushing through the steps. Attention should be paid to issues that 
come up during the process and these should be addressed in an open manner. Since 
it is not likely that the provided guidelines can capture every possible scenario, 
provision should be made for adjustments (as was done in Tiase), so controversies 
can be properly handled and PSG members who are selected are acceptable to 
community members. The selection of appropriate community-supported people to 
form the PSGs laid the foundation for success in this phase of the project. 
Finally, this study shows that extensive consultation with stakeholders and non-
interference by outsiders in the selection of representatives to form collaborative 
groups created interest in the intervention and increased the probability of selecting 
committed PSG members. The incidents at Kaja and Tiase indicate that when 
community members assume the responsibility of forming PSGs, they will do 
everything possible to resolve the challenges that arise. Compromises are easily 
reached if outsiders do not impose their ideas on community members. Although 
local politics may mar community programmes, if properly handled, a positive 
outcome is possible. In the end, for successful PSG member selection and commit-
ment to a community-based intervention, adequate space should be created for 
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community members to decide what to do and who to select since they know who 
can best represent their interests. 
Selection of facilitators 
Two facilitators were selected among the selected PSG members for each PSG in all 
seven sites. The facilitators were expected to act as the leaders of PSGs, stimulate 
change and work for the sustainability and effectiveness of the groups. Facilitators 
were selected immediately after each durbar. Their task was to lead the group 
through the intervention phase; they were responsible for organising meetings and 
carrying out intervention activities. 
Guidelines for selecting PSG facilitators 
The decision to have two facilitators for each PSG was because the project only had 
funding to support two. However, guidelines for selecting the facilitators were 
discussed by all stakeholders and finalised by the PSGs. The facilitator criteria 
included: 
• One facilitator must be a community member and the second must be a health 
provider or DHIS staff 
• Both facilitators must be literate 
• Both facilitators must be relatively neutral and not actively engaged in local or 
national politics. 
The rationale for using local facilitators for PSGs was that as part of the commu-
nity they could best address practices within the group that might undermine the 
intervention. Thorp et al. (2003) in their work on the relevance of groups in econom-
ic development and poverty reduction in developing countries reported that the role 
of external leaders can be useful, but does not help in the long-term sustainability of 
groups. In this study, lessons learnt during formation of PSGs clearly indicated that 
internal leadership would help mobilise support for the intervention programme and 
resolve problems that might arise. Also, the non-engagement in politics criteria was 
informed by the rejection of potential candidates because of their relationships with 
local traditional leaders. This indicated that politics have the potential of undermin-
ing the collaborative process. 
The brief meeting to select two facilitators and a secretary for each PSG was 
chaired by the research assistant. One facilitator was chosen from the community 
members and the other from either the health providers or DHIS staff. The facilita-
tors were selected after the group members conferred among themselves. Communi-
ty members met separately to select their facilitator, while the health providers and 
DHIS staffs also had a joint meeting to select one facilitator and a secretary. When a 
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facilitator was selected from the DHIS, a health provider became the secretary and 
vice versa. 
It is interesting that at the end of the selection only two facilitators were health 
providers out of the fifteen facilitators selected from health providers and DHIS 
staff, (Table A.8, Appendix 2). This indicates that while all stakeholders showed 
interest in the intervention, the DHIS was seen as having the responsibility of 
leading the programme. Some health providers cited a lack of time when I asked 
why they were not keen to be facilitators. Others said they saw the NHIS as the core 
business of DHIS staff, so they should play the lead role. But, what became clear 
during the course of the intervention was that the health providers saw the leadership 
position as adding to their workload. Even when the field of play was level for 
participation, occupational interest and perceived gains determined the level of 
involvement. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Outcome of PSG selection process 
Problem-solving Group (PSG)  selection outcome
PSG in Anomabo
PSG in Assin Achiano
PSG
PSG
PSG
PSG
PSG
Central Region - 7 PSGs
Main focus of anthropological research in 
this study
Each PSG has
• 2 facilitators
• 1 from community members
• 1 from health provider or DHIS members
• 11-15 total members (depending on the number of 
health providers and DHIS staff)
• 7 community members
• Fishermen, farmers, GPRTU chairman, self-
employed
• Teachers and other formal sector workers
• Cocoa purchasing clerks
• Assembly/Unit Committee members
• Religious leaders
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Training the PSG facilitators 
Facilitators were PSG members selected by their colleagues to lead the group 
through the intervention period. Evidence shows that management of intervention 
groups closely correlates with their ability to achieve positive outcomes. As Keltner 
(1989) posits, the role of a facilitator is complex because human beings are complex, 
suggesting the need to equip them with special skills to lead the PSG groups. In this 
study, a three-day training workshop equipped facilitators with skills that would 
help them perform their role effectively. Skills included leadership, facilitation of 
PSG meetings, and mobilisation of stakeholders to effectively participate in inter-
vention activities to achieve positive outcomes. The trainers were consultants with 
expertise in community mobilisation and participatory approaches. 
The training workshop was interactive and characterised by an exchange of ideas 
and experiences among the trainers and the facilitators. The facilitators were 
introduced to the problem-solving cycle and techniques. Three main techniques 
were addressed: 1) brainstorming, 2) ‘but why’ and 3) using a flow chart. Also, the 
various stages of the problem-solving cycle (problem identification and prioritisa-
tion, development of solutions and implementation strategies, drawing and imple-
mentation of action plans) using mock problem-solving sessions and several 
exercises were discussed and practised. After the practice sessions, the facilitators 
received personal feedback on their competency. This provided them with the 
‘hands on’ experience needed to manage group members and stakeholders’ partici-
pation for the task ahead. 
Trainers engaged facilitators in exercises that helped them recognise that they 
occupied a position of relative equality; communication should be horizontal to 
dissolve any power differential with group members. They were asked to facilitate 
mock PSG meetings and they asserted that this was beneficial. The facilitators told 
me during and after the training that it had exposed them to skills they believed 
would help them perform their new role effectively. One said: “This training 
benefited me. I learnt skills that have improved my communication. This will help 
me be a good facilitator and build relationships among group members.” Also, the 
course prefect, a DHIS facilitator made the following remarks at the end of the 
training session: 
Initially most of us didn’t know exactly what we were going to do. This training has motivated 
us. Now we have the zeal to do the work. The exercises and assignments gave us the opportunity 
to practice what we learnt. We now feel competent and prepared to take up the task ahead of us, 
and the challenge of mobilising stakeholders and commitment to participate in the intervention. I 
think we will have no problems applying the skills acquired to achieve positive results in our 
respective communities. 
These comments show that the training created confidence in the facilitators to 
face their tasks. It also suggested a relationship between the training and the motiva-
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tion to assume leadership positions. Lasker & Weiss (2003: 15), in their work in the 
US on how to make collaborations more effective, point out that collaborative 
groups need a special kind of leadership to turn the “rhetoric of abstract principles 
into practice” and maximise the benefits of collaboration. They argued that leader-
ship influences how participants are involved in collaboration groups and deter-
mines outcome. In the current study, it appeared that the training was a critical 
component of the intervention programme, especially if it was to fulfil the purpose 
of increasing the facilitators’ commitment to the intervention. The training also 
helped to create a shared vision among stakeholders to develop the various interven-
tion activities and strategies to reach all targets. In the subsequent chapters, I present 
how these skills (learned in the training workshop) were utilised to elicit the stake-
holders’ cooperation and commitment to the intervention and outcome. 
Reflection on the selection of PSG members and facilitators 
The primary goal of choosing an open and participatory process was to provide 
community members the opportunity to nominate and be nominated for PSGs. The 
concerns of a community member, George, about the complexity and time-
consuming process stated in the introduction may have been due to challenges to the 
status quo that come with an apprehension of the unknown and questions being 
raised about benefits. While I agree with George, that the process might not have 
been a perfect alternative to the ‘handpicking’ approach commonly used to select 
representatives, his remarks and my observations indicate that although the in-
volvement of targets of intervention programmes has become popular, translating it 
into practice remains a challenge. Critical anthropologists and development experts 
have been advocating for multi-level and participatory approaches in planning and 
executing intervention projects to ensure that marginalised groups are included (cf. 
Farmer 2005, Chambers 1994). From this perspective, rather than demanding a 
choice between the two approaches, the analytical question should be whether or not 
the two main objectives were achieved. One, did ordinary people participate in the 
selection process and did dedicated people formed the PSGs? Two, were targets of 
the intervention fairly represented in PSGs? 
First, the reasons that the community members gave for their choice of candidates 
and their satisfaction with the outcome indicate that the open process of nominating, 
accepting and rejecting nominees (not necessarily democratic) with the objective of 
penetrating community structures and getting many people to participate in the 
process was achieved. Power brokers were the research assistants and opinion 
leaders who took charge of events and moderated the process. Nominations were 
keenly contested and the majority of people present took the final decision. The 
community appreciated that this innovation set aside the authority of the chiefs in 
deciding who should represent them. As revealed in the subsequent chapters, 
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although the process was tedious in terms of travelling to meet opinion and commu-
nity leaders12, the level of commitment of community representatives (compared 
with DHIS staff whose core duty it is to promote the NHIS) showed that it was 
worth the cost. The outcome suggests that the more critical people are about who 
represents them the more likely it is that committed people will be selected. Howev-
er, since involvement of the targets of the intervention (the community) was an 
important factor for choosing the multi-level approach, the question is whether or 
not the elected PSG members fairly represented all sub-groups in the community. 
As described earlier, the background of PSG members spanned various occupa-
tional and social groups so one may have been tempted to consider the group as 
representative of the community. However, the following observations question the 
effectiveness of the method: no woman selected in the first community, an average 
of two women out of thirteen PSG members in each group, only three women 
facilitators out of thirty (total) and no poor person in any PSG. These outcomes 
clearly indicate that the PSGs are not necessarily as representative of the targets of 
the intervention as expected. This revelation underscores the fact that participation 
in community groups is gendered and also not for the poor. Full participation in 
selecting group members is an admirable goal, yet it is quite challenging to make the 
final group fully representational. One could argue that women and the poor risk 
exclusion even from the groups that seek to promote their interests. I observed that 
while the poor were excluded because of poverty, women’s exclusion was due to 
their position in society regarding leadership roles. 
For women, the explanation for their exclusion is largely embedded in the culture 
and historical system in Ghana where women seem to be confined to their reproduc-
tive role. A woman’s position is reflected in proverbs that reinforce traditional 
values. One popular Akan proverb is: “Even if a woman possesses a talking drum 
she keeps it in a room belonging to a man” (see Van der Geest 1975). Only chiefs in 
Ghana own talking drums. This means that no matter how great a woman is, she has 
to depend on a man. The proverb is emblematic of Ghanaian women’s experiences 
and illustrates their subordinate position regarding public leadership. Therefore, 
despite women’s inclusion in community and national activities being on the 
national agenda for decades, women continue to be less represented in heterogene-
ous groups – even if the project is in their domain. 
Women’s disadvantages in health and wellbeing have been documented. Buor 
(2004) observed in his study of utilisation of healthcare in Ashanti Region that 
women have greater need for services than men, yet they have less access to quality 
care. He reported that there is a male dominance of decision-making, including 
causing women to have poor access to healthcare. Ironically, this study was carried 
                                              
12
  An average of three visits was paid to each intervention community during the PSG selection process. 
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out in communities with matrilineal dynastic descent and inheritance; yet, the 
women were not perceived to be capable leaders. This shows the contradictions that 
exist between women’s social power and leadership roles in Ghana. Women’s non-
selection in the first community illustrates that despite all the rhetoric about gender 
equality and mainstreaming, women are still relegated to the background regarding 
leadership positions. One point that emerged during the community conversations 
was that most people find it difficult to accept a woman as a leader. Some authors 
have shown contradictions in women’s positions. Van der Geest (1975), in his study 
in Kwahu, Ghana, observed that women’s subordination does not reflect reality. He 
showed that women have considerable power in traditional and modern politics. 
Bartle (n.d.) speaks of a covert gynaecocracy. Both authors argue that women’s 
power is hidden under a barrage of ideology expressing male dominance (Van der 
Geest 1975, Bartle n.d.) and illustrate this by pointing to women’s position in 
traditional governance in Ghana. A queen mother is a member of the chief’s counsel 
and influential in selecting a chief. On the lineage level, the male head is assisted by 
a female. In these positions, women take part in all discussions and their opinions 
are much respected, but remain in subordinate positions. At the national level, 
access to formal education and income generation activities have empowered and 
enhanced the image of women. They are seen as vessels of development just like 
men, yet their representation in leadership positions is still low. It is intriguing that 
women’s leadership capabilities are underestimated and they are the last to be 
thought of as leaders. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that in local and national gatherings women are not 
considered first as potential leaders. In Parliament, women generally occupy about 
10 per cent of the seats in Ghana. In the current Parliament, they form only 8.3 per 
cent though they constitute the majority (52.1%) of the population (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2012). Women are perceived as trespassers or supporters who are often 
brought out to campaign and win votes for men. I observed during the PSG for-
mation that even the women did not nominate fellow women for consideration. This 
suggests that their leadership capabilities hardly intrude into the consciousness of 
men and women. I argue that women do not see themselves as capable of occupying 
leadership positions and therefore do not elect each other. Otherwise, they would 
have nominated other women and voted for them, since they usually form the 
majority in such gatherings to enhance their image. 
Critical feminist theorists emphasise women’s social exclusion and the need for 
their emancipation. In the view of Lauer (2006: 622-623) for women to be able to 
take up leadership roles requires “Profound qualitative change in the nature of social 
transformation for the country overall, both in its crucial domestic development 
policies and in its profile as a nation participating in the broader geo-political 
environment.” She showed that the causal effects of women’s secondary leadership 
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roles go beyond correcting gender-specific injustices, because circumstantial 
conditions responsible for such a change have very little, if anything, to do with 
gender differences. I add that to achieve such a qualitative change, efforts should be 
directed at both men and women and the focus should be more on the later to 
encourage them to assume authoritative and self-efficacious positions. It is only 
when women recognise their capabilities and have confidence in themselves and 
their peers that they can nominate, be nominated and voted for as leaders. Taking 
such a stance could help break the antecedents of women’s exclusion from leader-
ship to make meaningful change. 
With regard to the exclusion of the poor – the main targets of the NHIS policy 
and also the intervention – their exclusion from the PSGs indicates that the selection 
method did not achieve the objective that all actors must be engaged when address-
ing a phenomenon that affects them. The reason for their exclusion is pithily 
expressed in another Akan proverb: “Ohiani ano nnuru badwam” (A poor man's 
voice is not heard on the floor of meetings). When put in the context of this study, it 
means no one takes what the poor say seriously during community gatherings. Other 
researchers have made similar observations. In his study of respect among the 
elderly in Kwahu, Van der Geest (1997) observes that having money measures one’s 
prestige and level of respect in the community. Similarly, Mercier (2002) found in 
her study of women’s groups in Tanzania that groups consisted mainly of the middle 
class. She reported that the poorest women were excluded on social grounds. These 
observations demonstrate that poverty is not only associated with economic status, 
but also a lack of recognition and access to social networks and groups (even those 
groups that seek to promote their interest). As revealed later in this book, the core 
poor, who need health insurance most, are denied access to it as they are almost 
entirely overlooked. 
Thus focusing exclusively on an open election process as the basis of involve-
ment has the tendency to reinforce rather than challenge the status quo. Without 
devising strategies alongside an open election to ensure that all sub-groups are 
represented means that only lip-service is paid to participation. The implication of 
this finding is that this approach leaves the poor trapped at the bottom of a socially 
stratified class system with no possibility of challenging their condition. Lasker & 
Weiss’ (2003: 39-40) also observe that to solve complex community problems, a 
collaborative process needs to “… involve diverse groups of people from different 
backgrounds to regularly listen to each other, talk with each other, and influence 
each other ... Without it, a collaborative process cannot achieve individual empow-
erment.” Concluding, I argue that when poor people are treated as objects of concern 
and not directly involved in intervention groups, they remain powerless, dependent 
and unable to harness external support to gain access to decent healthcare. 
  
119
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that much is gained from involving stakeholders in an 
intervention programme from the onset. It indicates that if all stakeholders assume 
the responsibility of creating PSGs, they are capable of developing effective 
methods of selecting who can best represent their interest. Being in charge of events 
creates trust among participants and the commitment to achieve the set objectives is 
developed. Challenges might come up, but compromises are easily reached to ensure 
the task is completed. This approach also provided information on the important 
criteria people considered when selecting their representatives: the person’s com-
mitment to promoting the welfare of others and development of the community, 
good conduct and non-engagement in local politics. However, the low representa-
tion of women and exclusion of the poor indicate that unless strategies are devel-
oped to include these two groups, the open election processes reduce participation to 
abstract theory. The key challenge for critical medical anthropologists, then, is how 
to increase the participation of women and the poor within the context of multi-level 
perspective to ensure that no category of actors involved in a phenomenon is 
marginalised. 
In the case of health providers and DHIS staff, with the benefit of hindsight, their 
selection based on their work schedule meant that some people who were not willing 
to devote their time and effort to PSG activities got into the group. As revealed in 
subsequent chapters, it was naïve for heads of institutions to base their selection 
solely on a DHIS staff work schedule and assume that they would perform. Their 
effective participation requires personal commitment and an inclination to pursue 
social interest rather than personal gains in the form of salaries and promotions that 
generally motivate them to excel. Therefore, there is a need to go beyond an em-
ployee’s work schedule and use more rigorous procedures to select those who are 
truly interested in the intervention. 
In the case of facilitators, selecting them on the durbar day meant that some unre-
liable persons were chosen to lead PSGs. Later events showed that those who 
nominated themselves were not honest enough to be given that responsibility as they 
misappropriated funds provided for PSG activities. This suggests that self-selection 
could be a sign of self-seeking individuals whose intention is to highjack leadership 
positions to pursue their selfish ends. This is a revelation that programme managers 
should watch out for and they should be sceptical about anyone who nominates 
himself or herself to be a facilitator. It is therefore important that facilitators are 
taken through a rigorous screening process to allow dubious characters to be 
rejected by their colleagues at the start. This would minimise the incidence of those 
who are not trustworthy becoming leaders. This is particularly important, since the 
facilitators were expected to be the catalysts around whom sustainability and 
effectiveness of the group rested. Further, training for facilitators was found to be an 
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important motivating factor that helped them develop the zeal to lead the group 
through the intervention period. The training equipped the facilitators with skills that 
increased their confidence and commitment to the intervention. 
Finally, although the scope of this study is limited (covers only seven communi-
ties in one region), it provides systematic documentation of the steps that were 
followed, activities performed and the roles that the stakeholders’ played at each 
stage. This contributes knowledge to the literature on the formation of stakeholder 
groups and could be a useful framework that can be adapted in other contexts. How 
PSGs function to identify, develop and implement interventions to improve enrol-
ment in the NHIS and retain members is discussed in the next chapter. 
  
5 
How did problem-solving 
groups work? 
Introduction 
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was introduced to address inequity 
in financial access to healthcare, one of the most enduring problems in Ghana since 
independence. Although the NHIS has made gains in improving access to 
healthcare, it has been beset with low enrolment and the inability to retain members. 
Concerns have also been raised at various forums about community and institutional 
barriers that undermine the achievement of the NHIS policy goals. Thomas, a 
District Health Insurance Scheme (DHIS) manager expressed his frustration about 
the limited progress despite efforts to expand NHIS coverage: 
It is so disappointing that after all the education we have been carrying out doing everything 
possible to get people insured, many people have refused to register. We go to schools, hospi-
tals, churches and communities, yet people are not registering. Some register but do not renew 
their membership. It’s really difficult for us. For example, Ofram (not real name), the communi-
ty you are conducting your study in is a difficult one. I don’t know how you are going to help 
improve enrolment there. 
Thomas’ concerns were typical of responses given when low enrolment was 
discussed with DHIS officials. Efforts being made to expand the NHIS coverage and 
retain members were not yielding the desired results. His comment also indicates 
how the DHISs were tackling the problems of low enrolment and high non-renewal 
rates without sufficiently engaging other stakeholders – community members and 
health providers. In many cases, the NHIS target populations were not consulted to 
voice what prevents them from responding positively to the policy. Health providers 
were also left out and had not been consulted to speak about the NHIS implementa-
tion challenges that confront them. Decisions about how to manage problems of low 
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enrolment and retention rates are made by those who may not be in tune with the 
enormity of NHIS implementation challenges. Many studies have shown the value 
of engaging stakeholders in intervention programmes (Green et al. 2001, Hawkes et 
al. 2004), but how such collaborative groups operate has not been well discussed in 
the literature. This study fills this gap by closely monitoring the multi-stakeholder 
problem-solving programme (MSPSP) 
The MSPSP was based on a multi-level perspective (MLP) that encourages 
stakeholder engagement for addressing a social phenomenon (see chapter one). As 
Farmer (2005) and Scheper-Hughes (1992) argue, without considering what happens 
at local levels, decision makers miss the majority of people whose lives are affected 
by their decisions. The rationale of the PSG concept was the assumption that 
engaging actors involved in public policy to address the challenges is more likely to 
achieve an impact than a single-level approach. This chapter describes the pathways 
of this study’s intervention and examines the activities and strategies the PSGs used 
to identify and address barriers to enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members. 
Problem-solving process 
PSGs are normally formed around defined problems and in this study that was the 
low enrolment and retention of members in the NHIS. The pre-intervention house-
hold survey established the size of the problem that needed to be solved. The survey 
showed that of the 13,857 individuals covered, only a third (30%) were currently 
insured, 15.7 per cent had been previously insured and 54.3 per cent had never 
enrolled (Table A.3, Appendix 2). To carry out their task, the PSGs adapted prob-
lem-solving tools from the literature and used approaches that were tailored to the 
local context. Though PSG facilitators were introduced to three problem-solving 
tools (brainstorming, ‘but why’ and flow charts) during their training, they found 
two were the most beneficial for their task – brainstorming and ‘but why’. Accord-
ing to facilitators, these tools were easy to explain and use. The PSGs were given a 
‘free hand’ to operate and not restricted to any tool or approach. Facilitators were 
only required to follow the principles of the MLP and effective facilitation outlined 
in the ‘SHINE Ghana training manual for facilitators developed by us (the research 
team) to guide the PSG facilitators when performing their task (see Kotoh et al. 
2009). 
Figure 5.1 shows the cyclical route that the PSGs went through to identify barri-
ers to enrolment and develop and implement interventions. It started with problem 
identification and prioritisation and ended with the implementation of action plans. 
Some steps were repeated within the cycle, depending on the feedback, after an 
intervention activity was carried out. Throughout the process, facilitators engaged 
members in interactive activities to critically analyse their experiences, interests, 
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behaviours and all issues raised to help understand the identified problems, and 
develop and implement solutions. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Steps followed in the problem-solving process 
 
 
 
Step 1: Problem identification and prioritisation 
The venue where the PSGs met was typically a health centre, community centre or 
classroom, depending on the availability of a convenient place for such an exercise. 
The meetings were usually held on ‘taboo days1 (no work days). Generally, the first 
session started with facilitators briefing members about what brainstorming and ‘but 
why’entail. The facilitator then would lead the group in a discussion to develop rules 
to guide the process by typically making them aware that: “Though the session 
involves ‘free talk’ it must be structured with rules to guide the process and encour-
age everyone to talk in a systematic way.” 
After a lengthy discussion about the techniques, the rules that were agreed upon 
included: nobody should interrupt when someone was talking without the facilita-
tor’s permission and every member had to make at least one contribution during the 
session. I must say that these rules motivated even members who appear to be shy to 
                                              
1
  ‘Taboo days’ are days set aside by communities and people are not expected to work on their farms or go 
fishing. In farming communities, one can carry farm produce, but not engage in clearing the land or 
sowing crops. These days vary from community to community. In fishing communities, fishermen use the 
day to mend their nets. Generally, communities hold most of their social events such as naming ceremo-
nies, meetings or community development activities on taboo days. 
Step1
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talk. The first activity of the problem-solving process was the identification and 
prioritisation of problems. Facilitators led the group in brainstorming using ques-
tions and answers. The main questions were: “Why are some people not registering 
with the NHIS?” “Why do some people not renew their registration?” and “What 
experiences do people have with the NHIS?” Health providers and DHIS staffs were 
asked specific questions about challenges in implementing the NHIS. All identified 
problems were listed on a flip chart in no particular order and without censoring. 
The duration of a typical brainstorming session was about two hours. 
An extract of the first brainstorming session is presented below. 
Facilitator [DHIS representative]: Today, we begin identifying barriers to enrolment. As we 
have already discussed, reasons why people do not enrol or renew their NHIS card can be found 
in the community, health facility and my outfit [DHIS]. We will start with community members, 
then health providers and DHIS staff. We will mention barriers we know while the secretary 
writes them down and later select those to be addressed. Everybody should endeavour to talk. 
We must be honest with what we say. If you are not sure of anything, don’t say it. Now, can 
anybody tell us about problems he or she, family members or friends experienced or witnessed 
others go through? 
Community representative: I have personally gone through a lot. I’ll start with registration. I 
registered six of us and had five cards after four months. That of my last child came after six 
months. Meanwhile, I was paying his hospital bill. Just last week I had to pay for a drug covered 
by the NHIS when I sent a prescription the doctor gave me to an accredited pharmacy. 
DHIS staff: My problem is the behaviour of nurses. Some of them don’t respect insured patients 
and collect unauthorised fees especially in the evenings and weekends. Our concern in this town 
is not getting all drugs from the health centre. We have to travel to other towns to get most of 
our drugs. 
Community representative: I’ll also add poverty. There are people who have no income and 
cannot pay. Though I appreciate all these problems, the underlying factor for the majority of us 
not enrolling is lack of commitment to health insurance. The reality is that we have not yet 
accepted health insurance and made it part of our budget. It is not part of our culture to insure 
ourselves against ill health. We wait till we are sick before we think of insurance. 
Health providers and DHIS staff also spoke about the NHIS implementation 
challenges that undermine their work. When ideas had been exhausted, similar 
problems were put together and arranged according to the level at which they were 
experienced or occurred and prioritised based on consensus. From my observation, 
this was an efficient way of eliciting problems from PSG members. 
The first problem identification and prioritisation sessions were usually character-
ised by heated arguments when health providers and DHIS staff defended and 
rejected negative behaviours and practices attributed to them by others. For exam-
ple, allegations of malfeasance against DHIS staff and health providers resulted in 
many arguments. However, the situation changed when facilitators reminded group 
members about the goal of the intervention and re-echoed the need for objective 
discussions. In subsequent meetings, I realised that the members were more relaxed 
and discussions were characterised with occasional jokes and laughter. The lesson 
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was that in such groups, time should be allowed for members to adjust to the group 
and grasp the task at hand and the essence of the exercise. 
After problem identification and prioritisation sessions, PSGs held meetings with 
community leaders to solicit their reaction to the identified problems. These meet-
ings were used to discuss challenges rather than apportion blame to any group. 
Generally, the community leaders’ reactions provided new insights into identified 
problems while new ones emerged. For example, the use of chemist and pharmacy 
shops as alternatives to seeking healthcare at health facilities usually came up at 
community leaders’ meetings. A community leader in one of such meetings ex-
plained the situation as follows: 
I did not renew my card because I find the pharmacies [also referring to chemist shops] a better 
option than the hospital. It is faster and you do not experience any negative behaviour of nurses 
as is often the case when you go to the hospital. At the hospital you could spend several hours 
waiting and you are not treated with respect. Wcmmu yԑn (They [health providers] don’t respect 
us). 
In addition, PSGs also held discussions with individuals in the communities by 
performing house-to-house visits to further explore problems not identified at their 
meetings. For instance, the issue of ‘not often sick’ and politics as reasons for not 
enrolling in the NHIS were mentioned only in individual conversations. 
Since the PSGs could not solve all identified problems, they selected those they 
could address and usually sought the support of the District Directors of Health 
Services (DDHSs) and DHIS managers at stakeholders meetings in dealing with 
others. This was because solving some of the problems required changing structures 
and operational systems at the national level, which was beyond the capacity of the 
PSGs. For example, the problem of heavy workloads and the complex nature of 
NHIS forms could not be solved by PSGs since they required policy action. Howev-
er, PSG activities and recommendations raised awareness and highlighted the need 
for change and could put pressure on policy makers to act. 
Step 2: Problem analysis 
Another important component of carrying out an intervention programme is to 
understand the problem to be addressed. Before PSGs started looking for solutions, 
they analysed the problems to make sure every member understood the issues they 
were trying to address. For every problem, the group looked for a root cause(s). 
PSGs generally used the ‘But why’ technique (see Serrat 2009) to get to the root 
cause(s). During this process community members, health providers and DHIS staff 
brought up experiences regarding the NHIS at their respective levels. Details of 
problem analysis sessions are presented below. 
 
‘But why?’ Asking ‘but why?’ is a technique used to explore the root causes of a 
problem to ensure that all issues that contribute to the problem are well understood. 
  
126
Here, facilitators usually stated the problem and asked about why it occurred. He or 
she continued to ask follow-up questions using ‘But why?’ after every answer till 
the group could offer no further explanations. The last response was then taken as 
the root cause. However, there could be more than one root cause to a problem or 
one root cause could result in more than one problem. Below are examples of how 
the ‘But why’ technique was used to find the root cause(s) of problems and discus-
sion that ensued between facilitators and PSG members (see Boxes 5.1-5.3). It must 
be noted that the process is not as straightforward as presented here. This is a 
complex activity that has been simplified for easy comprehension by readers. In 
practice, each ‘But why’ question elicited many answers which were discussed and 
agreement reached on which was the most feasible cause(s) of the problem. 
 
 
Box 5.1 Analysis of “no money to pay reason for low enrolment” 
Question (Q): Why are people not enrolling? 
Answer (A): Because they don’t have money to pay for everybody in the household. 
Q: But why don’t they have money to pay? 
A: Because premium and registration fees for all household members are too much for the 
head of household to pay. 
Q: But why is premium for the household too much when it covers the whole year? 
A: Because they have competing needs, yet they have to pay registration fee for children 
and premium for other dependents above 18 years. 
Q: But why do you have to pay for adult dependents? 
A: Because they are not working. 
 
 
In the above case, other root causes identified were the lack of a health-related 
risk, aversive culture among community members, lack of confidence in the NHIS, 
poverty and dissatisfaction with quality of healthcare services. 
 
 
Box 5.2 Analysis of the delay in issuing NHIS ID cards 
Question (Q): Why is there delay in issuing NHIS ID cards? 
Answer (A): Because it takes so much time to process registration forms. 
Q: But why is so much time needed to process the forms? 
A: Because of the difficulty of matching names with pictures. 
Q: But why is it difficult to match names with pictures? 
A: Because people use different sets of names to register and take pictures since they 
were not done at the same time. 
Q: But why do people use different names? 
A: Because people have several names and they tend to use different ones at different 
places depending on the situation. 
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Other root causes of delay in issuing NHIS ID cards included: people did not 
know the implications of being inconsistent with the names they used for official 
documents and inadequate and non-functional computers and cameras. In some 
cases, collectors spent monies collected from registrants and delayed the submission 
of their forms. There were other problems peculiar to communities outside DHISs’ 
office locations. These included DHISs staff’s delay in taking photographs after 
people had been registered as a result of frequent break down of their motor bikes or 
inadequate cameras to go round the numerous communities in the district. 
 
 
Box 5.3 Analysis of shortage of drugs at health facilities 
Question (Q): Why do you experience shortage of drugs in your facility? 
Answer (A): Because we don’t always have money to buy drugs. 
Q: But why don’t you have money to buy drugs? 
A: Because of delays in claims payment. 
Q: But why does claim payment delay? 
A: Because there are problems with claim processing. 
Q: But why are there delays in claim processing? 
A: Because the NHIS claim forms are complex and the bureaucracy involved in vetting 
them. 
 
 
An additional root cause of drug shortages at health facilities was the low patron-
age of health facilities resulting in a low level of internally generated funds (IGF) to 
help maintain drug stock levels when the National Health Insurance Authority 
(NHIA) delayed paying health facilities. Normally, the DHISs vet bills prepared by 
accredited health facilities and submit them to the NHIA who pays the health 
facilities directly. 
The ‘But why’ technique illustrated above shows the complex linkages that exist 
between problems and their root causes at various levels. It indicates how communi-
ty, health provider, DHIS and national level factors converge to adversely affect 
enrolment in the NHIS and retaining members. 
PSG problem analysis sessions were supported with a variety of activities. One 
activity was meeting with opinion and community leaders, health providers and 
DHIS staff. In coastal towns, PSGs met the chief fisherman, boat owners, pataase 
leaders and members with health providers and DHIS staff in attendance. The 
meetings were chaired by community PSG facilitators. Similar meetings were held 
with chief farmers, and cocoa purchasing clerks in farming communities. These 
meetings usually discussed the root causes of low interest in health insurance 
identified by the PSGs among others. In the case of health facility level barriers, 
meetings were held with the entire staff to discuss their concerns about increased 
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workloads and the cumbersome bureaucratic processes that NHIS brought into the 
healthcare delivery system. On the part of DHISs, the issue of people using multiple 
names only came up during meetings with the entire staff. As usual, these meetings 
were interactive and gave everybody the opportunity to express his or her concerns. 
Reactions from this group thus gave PSGs more insight into the problems. 
Another popular activity that the PSGs used in problem analysis was house-to-
house visits by members that were generally conducted by community representa-
tives. The approach allowed for one-to-one interactions between community 
members and PSG representatives and provided an opportunity for individuals who 
were not confident talking in public to voice their concerns. 
The main concerns usually expressed were: long waiting times at health facilities 
and DHIS offices, delays in issuing NHIS cards, health providers not respecting 
insured patients, shortages of drugs at health facilities, the difficulty of getting 
prescribed drugs in accredited pharmacy and chemist shops and having to pay for 
drugs covered by the NHIS. These activities provided in-depth information and 
better insight into the barriers the PSGs had identified, since they had the opportuni-
ty to probe further for the root causes. After a problem analysis session, a PSG 
representative told me: “Now I appreciate problems faced by health providers in 
providing better healthcare to insured patients. This has changed some of the 
negative perceptions I had about them.” 
This highlights the importance of the PSG problem-analysis sessions that brought 
out issues, which had not been captured at PSG sessions. For example, the issues of 
registration fee payments and premiums for many children and dependents that 
made the total amount of money to be paid by poor heads of households unafforda-
ble were observed at first hand. 
 
Lessons learnt: The broad-based involvement of the community through house-to-
house visits and meetings with opinion leaders brought up many experiences related 
to key problems that had not been captured at PSG problem-analysis sessions. This 
showed the complexity of barriers to enrolment with the NHIS and retention of 
members and suggested that all the stakeholders did not know all the problems in 
the community. Therefore, depending on one category of stakeholders alone for 
information can lead to what Chambers (1983) described as ‘people bias.’ Chambers 
criticised the behaviour of development professionals who spoke of participation by 
targets of their development projects, but who had only spoken to rural leaders and 
people who represented the elite, dominant and wealthy groups. People bias can 
occur if stakeholder collaborations formed to address barriers to achieving a public 
policy promotion limit their problem identification and analysis activities to their 
own group members. To diminish this bias, it is necessary to step out and listen to 
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ordinary people in the community and workers in the institutions involved in an 
intervention’s implementation. 
In this study, people who were directly affected by the intervention and those 
purported to be the causes of the problem were jointly engaged to analyse the 
problem. This reduced aggressive reactions and created conducive atmosphere 
during the PSG problem-analysis sessions. Thus, the consideration given to all 
stakeholders’ perspectives during the problem analysis reduced the initial aggression 
exhibited by some and led to an appreciation of others’ complaints about them. The 
result was an agreement on the root cause(s) of the problems and made the issues 
less sensitive in the end. This suggests that there is great benefit in bringing stake-
holders together to discuss even the most controversial issues. It is important to 
handle the sensitivities of all stakeholders tactically during the discussions to ensure 
that tempers are controlled (especially at the beginning), since they begin to appreci-
ate each other’s perspectives as the meeting progresses. 
The problem-analysis sessions also highlighted the following conflicting interests 
of actors involved in the NHIS implementation: 
• Some health providers sell drugs to insured patients and collect unauthorised 
fees. 
• DHIS staff collects money and issue NHIS cards to patients without waiting 
for the mandatory three-month waiting period. 
• NHIS collectors charge more than the approved premium and registration fees. 
• The DHISs are reluctant to grant exemptions, especially to the core poor. 
These revelations show that the behaviour of individuals at the frontline of the 
NHIS implementation is not homogenous and often conflicts with the policy goals. 
While policy makers’ may be enthused with equity issues, those at the frontline of 
NHIS implementation may be more concerned with economic gains. 
Step 3: Finding solutions to problems and implementation strategies 
After the probable root cause(s) of problems were identified, measures to address 
them were developed. To ensure that the interventions had maximum impact, the 
questions of when, where and how to carry out solutions were found to be critical 
and explored. At this stage, facilitators explained the objective of the session to 
members and engaged them in finding appropriate solutions and implementation 
strategies. Brainstorming was usually used to critically reflect on the NHIS policy 
and the implementation challenges to generate possible solutions. To encourage 
members to talk, the PSGs adopted the slogan ‘no idea is bad’ used during facilita-
tors’ training workshop, which I observed encouraged everyone to contribute to 
discussions. All ideas were listed because some sounded ridiculous at the beginning, 
but turned out to be good after analysis. 
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Tailoring the interventions: The PSGs also developed strategies for implementing 
solutions to the identified barriers. This involved selecting specific targets, imple-
mentation sites, persons to implement solutions, and where and how to reach all 
target groups. Thus, the PSGs tailored their solutions to particular target group(s) 
and identified the venue and who should be involved considering local conditions 
and available resources. Although the PSGs utilised well-known DHISs approaches, 
such as education at community durbars and health facilities, new implementation 
strategies were developed to ensure all target populations were reached. These 
included education at churches, mosques, markets, the beach, basic schools and 
households. The PSGs also held joint meetings with community leaders, health 
providers and DHIS staff to solicit their support in carrying out intervention activi-
ties. 
PSG members were divided into small groups of about four. Each group was 
assigned one or two problems to consider and report on. Next, a member of each 
group presented their work and explained their proposed solution(s) and implemen-
tation strategy(s) during the following meeting. PSGs then agreed on the presented 
alternatives (if any) and which one to implement. For example, when the solution 
was to provide education to fishermen on the need to insure oneself against ill 
health, the site was the beach and the team was made up of health providers and 
DHIS staff with community members in charge. 
From my observation, the most significant impact of these interactions was estab-
lishing and/or strengthening the relationship between community members, health 
providers and DHIS staff. A PSG member after one of such sessions expressed his 
joy as follows: 
We are motivated to contribute to discussions because facilitators appreciate the role everybody 
is playing in solving the problems identified. They encouraged us to talk about our experiences 
and reservations about the NHIS freely and suggest solutions to address the challenges. This 
made us appreciate others experiences and why they do certain things. 
This comment shows that by involving others in finding solutions to problems, 
everyone developed the commitment to help solve them. The body language of PSG 
members suggested this was a major first step in reducing identified barriers. For 
example, the facial expressions of community members during problem-analysis 
sessions suggested that they appreciated the challenges confronting health providers 
and DHIS staff in implementing the NHIS policy. Similarly, health providers and 
DHIS staff acknowledged the community members’ concerns. They normally 
nodded their heads when community members were talking about experiences 
indicating some level of appreciation of their concerns. 
 
PSGs, community leaders, health providers, and DHIS staff work together: At this 
stage, the PSGs again strategically used stakeholders’ and community leaders’ 
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meetings to solicit support in carrying out intervention activities. As usual, they 
gave an overview of the groups’ activities and the need to develop appropriate 
solutions and ensure that the intervention reached all their members so that enrol-
ment and retention rates could be improved and ultimately, more people would have 
access to healthcare. My observations and comments by community members 
during these meetings indicated that they appreciated the health providers’ presence 
at these meetings. A pataase leader’s comment at one such meeting suggested that 
for the community members, the health providers and DHIS staff’s presence 
conveyed a stronger message of their commitment to the NHIS than hearing it from 
only DHIS staff and the collector. He said: 
It is good health providers and DHIS staffs are also here to talk to us. Some of them make us 
feel they don’t like insurance. Nurses’ attitudes don’t show they support it. If you go to the 
hospital, they make you wait for too long. I hope when you go back you will tell the rest what 
we are saying. 
This kind of reaction gave the PSGs more insight into how to involve community 
leaders, health providers and DHIS staff in implementing intervention activities in 
the communities. It helped them to change their strategies. For example, in coastal 
communities, the PSGs changed their implementation strategies when they realised 
that community durbars were not an effective means to reach the majority of the 
population, particularly the men. Men, mostly fishermen, spend all day at the beach 
either mending their nets or engaged in playing games. With this insight, the PSGs 
in coastal communities focused more on small group activities such as pataase 
meetings and house-to-house visits instead of community-wide activities to ensure 
everybody was reached. However, documentary films shown in the evenings in the 
community were also well patronised by community members including men. 
 
Peer-to-peer conversations: One approach the PSGs used was to engage insured 
community members to educate their peers about the benefits of health insurance 
using their experience. During one of such meeting, a boat owner shared the NHIS’ 
benefits to his household with his colleagues. His colleagues asked the boat owner 
about the details of the benefits and quality of healthcare services. Others, who were 
complaining about the viability of the NHIS at the beginning of the discussion, 
appeared to be convinced that insurance was better than cash and carry in the end. 
These peer interactions and the information shared about NHIS’ benefits and 
experiences at health facilities reduced the negative perception about health provid-
ers’ attitudes towards insured patients. 
The benefit of the stakeholders’ involvement in the development of solutions to 
barriers was that speaking about the NHIS’ financial protection against ill health had 
a greater effect on people. It appeared that what PSG community representatives, 
community leaders and health providers say at such meetings had more weight than 
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what DHIS staff and collectors had been telling the community. For example, the 
NHIS’s protection against catastrophic healthcare payments that was addressed by 
community members sharing their own experiences and citing cases of people they 
knew made their peers appreciate the NHIS better. This proved to motivate more 
people to enrol in the NHIS than the DHIS staff and collectors telling them what to 
do. 
Step 4: Drawing an action plan 
To facilitate the implementation of intervention activities, the PSGs drew action 
plans to guide the process. Table 5.1 presents an example of an action plan drawn 
and implemented by a PSG. Action plans served as road maps for the implementa-
tion of intervention activities. For the purpose of this intervention, PSGs adopted the 
following guidelines to help develop the outline of their action plans at our PSG 
facilitators training workshop: 
• State the problem being addressed 
• Set targets to be achieved at the end of each activity 
• State the specific activity to be carried out 
• Decide on the most appropriate person(s) to be responsible for each activity 
• Do not assign all the tasks to one person 
• Have a time frame within which each activity should be carried out 
• Provide feedback at the end of every activity 
• Provide evidence to show that the event has taken place for the purposes of 
monitoring 
 
 
Table 5.1 Action plan for August-October, 2009 
Activity Community durbar Stakeholders’ meeting NHIS mass registration 
Target(s) Community leaders & 
members 
Community leaders, health 
providers & DHIS staff 
Community members 
Persons 
responsible 
Kofi, Jacob, Lucy & 
Mercy 
Philip & Judith Eugene, Kofi & Adjoa 
Time frame August September October 
Resources 
needed 
Canopy, P.A system, 
chairs, refreshment 
Pastries and drinks Chairs, tables, lunch 
for participants 
Budget GH¢ 99 GH¢ 95 GH¢ 50 
Feedback Not well patronised Most people invited 
attended 
Patronage was good. 
Needs to be repeated 
Evidence for 
monitoring 
Pictures & report of 
events on file 
Minutes of meeting & 
pictures on file 
Pictures & Number of 
people registered 
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The PSGs agreed that intervention activities with the potential of reaching most 
community members would be given priority in their action plan. Brainstorming 
was generally used to break down solutions into specific activities to develop an 
action plan for every quarter of the year. Items in the action plans included specific 
activities, targets for intervention activities, time lines set for each activity and a 
budget. For example, the third intervention activity in Table 5.1 above was mass 
registration. For this activity, the entire community was targeted. Four members of 
each PSG were appointed to be directly responsible for organising the event and 
time frame. Items needed for the occasion were stated and a budget provided. 
Impressions about the event were written as feedback and photographs were taken 
as evidence that the activities had taken place for the purpose of monitoring the 
intervention. Feedback also provided information that served as a guide for the next 
line of action or for modifications of an intervention activity, if necessary. Evidence 
for monitoring helped ensure that the PSGs adhered to what they stated in their 
action plans and the guidelines of the intervention programme. 
Step 5: Implementing intervention activities 
The consensus at the PSG meetings was that since barriers to enrolment were multi-
dimensional they would be better addressed when all stakeholders worked together 
to implement the activities outlined in their action plans. Thus, the PSGs provided 
structures for community members, while the DHIS staff and health providers met 
regularly to exchange ideas on how to reach all target groups. The PSGs’ involve-
ment in the delivery of intervention activities ensured smooth implementation and 
made it possible for all target populations to be reached. Since barriers to enrolment 
and member retention were multifaceted and linked to the culture of the communi-
ties and the context within which health providers and DHIS staff operated, inter-
vention activities were delivered at the three levels of NHIS implementation – 
communities, health facilities and DHIS offices – to ensure maximum impact. 
Intervention activities at the community level 
At the community level, intervention activities projected the NHIS’ benefits and 
tried to persuade communities to embrace the NHIS as a better alternative to paying 
cash at health facilities. The NHIS’s operational challenges confronting health 
providers and DHISs staff were also explained. The main barriers were: 
1. Low community member interest in health insurance 
2. Misapplication of the operational principles of informal mutual support groups 
such as nnoboa and pataase to the NHIS. In the case of nnoboa, people join 
the groups when they need support and withdraw thereafter 
3. Delays at health facilities experienced by insured patients when accessing 
healthcare with their NHIS card 
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4. Delays at DHIS offices when collecting NHIS cards 
5. Payments for unauthorised fees and for drugs covered by the NHIS 
6. Undersupply of prescribed drugs at health facilities 
7. Community members’ over-reliance on chemist and pharmacy shops for 
treatment 
8. Political perception of the NHIS 
Implementation strategies employed were meetings in community durbars, 
homes, beaches, markets, lorry stations, churches, mosques, schools, PTA2 meetings 
and health facilities. These forums were used to educate community members on the 
need to be insured against ill health and about the NHIS’ protection against cata-
strophic healthcare costs. The meetings also created platforms where detailed 
information was provided on NHIS’ operational guidelines and challenges that the 
health providers and DHIS staff faced in implementing the NHIS. The intention was 
to enable community members to appreciate the reality of the challenges in deliver-
ing healthcare under the NHIS regime. As enhanced knowledge does not necessarily 
translate into action, promotional activities were also carried out to whip up interest 
in the NHIS, build trust and confidence in the NHIS and improve the credibility of 
health providers and DHIS staff in communities. 
 
Community durbars: Community durbars in Ghana are held at designated places for 
large gatherings such as community centres and village squares. They are convened 
either by traditional leaders, opinion leaders, or community groups. Outsiders are 
invited or an institution may be invited to discuss important issues of public con-
cern. The durbars are usually characterised by drumming, dancing, speech making 
and question and answer sessions. 
The first intervention activity the PSGs organised was a community durbar. Many 
PSGs organised durbars every three months. The usual format was the observation 
of traditional protocol such as exchange of greetings between community leaders 
and invited guests. Next, PSG community facilitators provided information on the 
rationale for the intervention and outlined various activities to be carried out. 
Drumming and dancing followed, after which the PSG representatives from the 
community, health providers and DHISs’ staff and other invited guests took turns 
addressing the gathering. The question and answer sessions fostered open discussion 
of the identified barriers and community members’ concerns about the NHIS. Chiefs 
and elders, assemblymen and Unit Committee members, heads of health facilities, 
the District Director of Health Services (DDHSs) and DHIS managers or their 
representatives addressed most of the durbars I attended. 
                                              
2
  Parent Teacher Association is an association of parents of children of a particular school. They meet to 
discuss issues that concern the welfare of their children. 
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All speakers at these durbars typically delivered explicit messages to sensitise the 
gathering about health insurance. They projected the NHIS as a resilience-building 
factor that provides financial protection and has the potential of helping achieve the 
ultimate goal of equity in access to healthcare. This was intended to create a com-
mitment from the people to insure themselves against illness and consistently renew 
their membership. The speakers often used the experiences of people in the commu-
nity to illustrate how health insurance had helped them avoid catastrophic healthcare 
payments and enabled them to manage the adversities of ill health. For example, a 
diabetic patient explained how her health became better after enrolling with the 
NHIS. 
This hospital card [NHIS card] is good. It has really given me relief from thinking about my 
sickness. I no more have complications. I’m able to go for reviews and get my medicines every 
month so my worries about the disease have gone. You have seen how diabetics nearly de-
stroyed my life. So for me, I always renew my card. 
Health providers re-echoed the NHIS’ benefits. They informed community mem-
bers about how the insurance reduces patients’ complications and vulnerability to ill 
health. They narrated specific instances where lives were saved due to health 
insurance and deaths occurred because patients did not have money to seek early 
healthcare. While acknowledging the barriers that community members had men-
tioned, health provider PSG representatives, heads of health facilities and officials 
from the District Health Directorate explained the cumbersome bureaucratic 
processes that the NHIS brought to the healthcare delivery system. They informed 
the public about the increase in their administrative and clinical workload due to the 
time spent filling out the NHIS forms. They explained that this prolonged the 
insured patients’ consultations and the time they spent at health facilities. They also 
told them why health facilities were unable to provide patients with essential drugs 
at all times. This reduced the insured patients’ complaints about spending more time 
at health faculties than the uninsured and the shortage of drugs at health facilities. 
Health providers used the durbars to assure community members of their intention 
to improve the services, but explained that they were constrained by NHIS imple-
mentation challenges. 
DHIS representatives and DHIS managers in the PSGs also told community 
members about the NHIS benefit package. They acknowledged the community 
members’ concerns about the delays in issuing NHIS cards and described the 
bureaucracy involved in processing NHIS claim forms. They also explained the 
implications of using multiple names and emphasised the need for patients to be 
consistent with the names they use in official documents such as the NHIS, hospital 
and voter ID cards, school and church records. One of them explained: “The use of 
different names to register and take pictures makes us spend so much time in 
processing the forms. This contributes to the delay in issuing the cards.” 
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My observation and conversation with community PSG representatives during 
these durbars indicated that community members were encouraged by the health 
providers’ and DHIS staff’s acknowledgement that their colleagues’ bad behaviour 
towards insured patients. They were also happy about the attempts being made to 
remedy the situation and improve quality of service. The DHIS staff’s efforts 
influenced community members to respond positively and play an active part in the 
intervention. Also, using examples of beneficiaries to demonstrate the benefits of the 
NHIS had a positive effect. Several people usually enrolled after the durbars. 
Further, the explanation that patients needed to be consistent with the names they 
used in official documents reduced the complaints against DHIS staff. 
 
Film shows and drama: Documentary films and drama are known to capture the 
attention of viewers and make a story more real and vivid. This technique was used 
by some PSGs to follow-up the community durbars and other intervention activities 
to make the NHIS implementation challenges real to the communities. The films 
documented actual NHIS registration and users accessing healthcare. The film 
shows were interjected with discussions to reinforce very important messages. The 
films and drama demonstrated the reality of barriers and illustrated the challenges 
health providers and DHIS staff faced. The intention was to attract community 
members’ sympathies with the aim of changing their attitudes towards health 
insurance. For example, some PSGs showed documentary films to expatiate prob-
lems created when various names were used for photographs and registration and 
how this delayed the processing of registration forms. The films were shown in the 
evenings on ‘taboo days’ when everybody was at home, so they were generally well 
patronised. 
The power of films in creating vivid and more lasting impression on the minds of 
people was apparent. I observed that the films were more appealing to those com-
munity members who were reluctant to attend community durbars. I often heard 
people discuss the films and debate issues that were raised long after they had been 
viewed. Community members often referred to the films in conversations and 
discussions during PSG meetings. As the community members saw people they 
knew in the films giving testimonies about the NHIS’ benefits and using their card 
to access healthcare, the advantages of being insured was made real. Also, questions 
asked and comments made after the films indicated that the more people were 
exposed to the NHIS’ benefits, the greater the likelihood that they would appreciate 
it as better than ‘cash and carry’. 
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Some PSGs also used community groups, such as mother-to-mother support 
groups,3 to stage short dramas to demonstrate the difficulties the DHISs face when 
processing NHIS registration forms. They used the drama to portray how cumber-
some it is for a mother to go to the DHIS office several times before she can get her 
NHIS card just because she used one name to register and another name for her 
photograph. In one community, in a drama, children showed how mothers wrote the 
names of all members of the household before registering them and then showed the 
names to the registrar and the photographer. School children were also used by some 
PSGs to stage a short play emphasising how non-enrolment can lead to delays in 
healthcare by staying at home and the death of children, especially those under five 
years. 
 
Opinion and community leaders’ engagement to promote NHIS: As Viswanathan et 
al. (2004: 28) observe: “Integration of residents’ knowledge of what will work in 
their community makes it more likely that findings will address the problems.” This 
study also found that it is not enough to integrate stakeholders’ knowledge into 
intervention activities, but it is also necessary to engage them in knowledge dissem-
ination. PSGs worked together with opinion and community leaders to implement 
intervention activities. Short meetings, not more than two hours, were regularly held 
with traditional, religious and opinion leaders to solicit their support in implement-
ing intervention activities in communities. PSG community facilitators led discus-
sions at these meetings. The leaders were informed about the dangers of over-
reliance on pharmacy and chemist shops as alternatives to seeking healthcare at 
facilities. They were also encouraged to talk about the benefits of health insurance 
with community members to help improve NHIS coverage. Next, religious leaders 
included health insurance-related themes in their sermons and initiated discussions 
with their congregations. 
In fishing communities, PSG members engaged chief fishermen, boat owners and 
pataase leaders to educate fishermen and mobilise them to enrol in the NHIS. PSGs 
in farming communities also met chief farmers and cocoa purchasing clerks and 
solicited their support to educate community members. From my observations and 
discussions with community members, the meetings helped clarify misconceptions 
about health insurance and raised their interest in the NHIS. For example, cocoa 
farmers who lived on their farms during the cocoa season and came to the communi-
                                              
3
  Mother-to-mother support groups (MtMSGs) are groups of lactating mothers who organise themselves 
into clubs and engage in various activities. They share the common purpose of providing a safe environ-
ment where women can learn from one another, exchange experiences and concerns, and support one 
another in a variety of ways. MtMSGs affiliated with the GHS’ Baby-Friendly Hospital Initiative are 
committed to improving infant and young child feeding practices and maintaining formal links between 
health institutions and communities (Linkages and Partners 2003). 
  
138
ty only occasionally and others who spent the greater part of the day on their farms 
and were difficult to capture during durbars, house-to-house visits or film shows 
were reached through their leaders. Though the leaders continued to complain about 
payment for drugs and services covered by the NHIS, the meetings usually ended 
with some of their community members actually registering. After one such meeting 
during the bumper harvest, a boat owner pre-financed the registration of twenty of 
his employees. When I asked him why he did that, he explained his action as 
follows: 
Irrespective of the problems associated with health insurance, it is still better than cash payment. 
My workers usually borrow money from me to pay their hospital bill during the dry season. So 
convincing them to register will take that burden off me. 
Thus, by engaging chief farmers, cocoa purchasing clerks, chief fishermen, boat 
owners and pataase leaders in the intervention process, ‘the difficult to reach’ target 
populations were captured. One NHIS collector told me after our meeting with the 
cocoa farmers that some farmers came to register afterwards. I followed up to find 
out how the purchasing clerks had managed to convince the farmers to enrol. The 
purchasing clerks who were insured said they had shown the farmers their NHIS 
cards and told them about the benefits they had been enjoying. They explained how 
being insured reduced their vulnerability since they would not have to borrow 
money, give out their farms for a number of years or sell their farms or land to pay 
hospital bills during the dry season as was usually the case. The uninsured purchas-
ing clerks also encouraged their peers to enrol. A pataase member told me after one 
of their meetings that “[k]nowing that our leaders are insured influenced those of us 
who are still apprehensive about the viability of the NHIS to change our mind.” 
These comments suggest that engaging opinion and community leaders, purchas-
ing clerks, informal sector employers and business owners could help promote the 
NHIS. They could be consulted at harvest time to encourage their members, em-
ployees and people who do business with them to enrol. This is an important factor 
that needs to be considered when developing implementation strategies and the 
timing of intervention activities to ensure all sub-groups are reached at the appropri-
ate time. 
 
Schools: Basic [elementary] schools were another site for PSG intervention activi-
ties because that is where the children and teachers could be reached. As a PSG 
facilitator explained: “Basic schools provide good settings for reaching children, 
their families and teachers. Children need healthcare most, yet they do not have 
adequate knowledge of health insurance.” 
PSGs discovered that even though children are exempted from paying premiums 
and are only required to pay registration fees, most of them and their parents were 
not aware of this status. So, PSGs carried out educational activities at basic schools 
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to explain the NHIS operational guidelines to them. They reasoned that sensitising 
children about the need to be insured against ill health before they become adults 
would help reduce apathy towards health insurance, one of the enduring problems 
confronting the NHIS. Teachers could also educate their pupils and parents on the 
benefits of health insurance and help promote the NHIS. Teachers thus engaged 
parents in discussions during PTA meetings and other school activities and encour-
aged them to enrol every member of the household especially children. PSG 
community representatives explained that many older children earn some income 
during harvest season and could pay their registration fees if their parents could not 
pay for them. A PSG community representative stressed the importance of this as 
follows: 
When children and teachers value health insurance, they will in turn influence parents to enrol. 
Children will engage their parents in discussions about the need to enrol all household members 
and maintain their membership. This will gradually improve their attitudes towards health insur-
ance. 
In summary, sensitising children about the need to insure against ill health had a 
positive impact not only on them but their parents as well. It improved knowledge 
about the NHIS and resulted in many households enrolling all members. 
 
Health facility-based education: PSG community representatives, health providers 
and DHIS staff carried out both educational and advocacy activities in health 
facilities to reach patients. Nurses, volunteers, collectors and DHIS staff were 
specifically tasked to perform this role. They usually mounted platforms in the out-
patient department (OPD) and pre- and post-natal clinics to educate patients on 
health insurance and encourage them to enrol and remain in the scheme. Pregnant 
women and mothers were told about the need to renew their card and register their 
babies before they were three months old, since free care under a mothers’ card 
expires after this period. They explained the processes that insured patients have to 
go through in accessing healthcare and why they sometimes have to give prescrip-
tions to patients to look for drugs elsewhere. The discussions were normally interac-
tive and people asked questions and expressed their concerns about the NHIS. 
It is worth mentioning the illustration by a medical assistant who showed her 
NHIS ID card to uninsured patients as a way of building their confidence as men-
tioned in chapter three. When I asked her why she did that, she told me: “Some 
patients need to be convinced by us [health providers] that health insurance is good 
for them. I believe if they know that we are also insured, they will be motivated to 
enrol.” 
 
Other PSG intervention activities in the community: Other intervention activities at 
the community level were visits to households, beaches, markets and lorry stations 
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on ‘taboo days’ when most people stayed at home. In fishing communities, for 
example, visits to households and markets were targeted mostly at women. Men 
were met at their places of work, such as the beaches and lorry stations. Both men 
and women were reached at home on ‘taboo days’ in farming communities. 
Also, through the initiative of PSG community representatives, registration points 
were mounted in communities every ‘taboo day’ during the harvest period to 
encourage people to enrol. For example, a PSG set up a SHINE office in a commu-
nity, which served as a registration point. The SHINE offices were used for meet-
ings, registration and delivery of NHIS cards. A collector, assisted by other PSG 
community representatives, ran the office. This created interest in the NHIS as it 
brought the service to the doorstep of the community. 
Regarding the difficulty of obtaining prescribed drugs in communities where 
there were health facilities, but no accredited pharmacy or chemist shops, PSG 
community representatives argued that although they knew that it was not the 
DHISs’ responsibility to convince pharmacy and chemist shop owners to apply for 
accreditation, they had the moral responsibility to intervene. Therefore, the PSGs 
persuaded pharmacy and chemist shop owners inside and outside the district to 
apply for NHIA accreditation and open branches where hospitals and health centres 
are located. 
In the case of payment for drugs covered by the NHIS inside and outside health 
facilities and paying unauthorised fees to health providers and DHIS staff, PSG 
members encouraged insured patients to report such cases. I must mention that some 
reports were made, but only in a few cases were these followed up because insured 
patients were not bold enough to lead PSG members to confront the staff involved. I 
did witness two cases when insured patients paid for hospital ID cards and drugs 
covered by the NHIS and PSG members confronted the officials involved. The 
officials were made to refund the money to their patients. 
I must also mention that in all the intervention activities, time was set aside to 
engage individuals who could not raise their concerns during group discussions and 
activities in one-to-one conversations. I observed that these strategies made it 
possible for PSGs to reach almost every community member. They improved the 
level of understanding of health insurance and appreciation for some NHIS opera-
tional challenges. 
Intervention activities at the health provider level 
PSG intervention activities were used to address challenges that the NHIS brought 
to the healthcare delivery system and the effect on health providers and ultimately 
on clients. The three main NHIS implementation challenges faced by health provid-
ers and addressed by PSGs were: 
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• Time spent filling out what they described as “the complex NHIS forms.” 
• Heavy workloads as a result of increased utilisation of healthcare services by 
insured patients 
• Irregular payment schedule of NHIS claims, which contributed to the health 
facilities’ inability to provide essential drugs to insured patients at all times. 
Two main strategies, stakeholders meetings and documentary films, were used to 
tackle the problems. 
Stakeholders’ meetings 
PSG members made a decision that the NHIS implementation challenges would be 
better addressed if all stakeholders worked together to implement intervention 
activities. Rather than apportioning blame to specific stakeholders, intervention 
activities were intended to be a negotiation on how to improve enrolment and 
retention of members in the NHIS. As a result, regular meetings were held where 
PSG facilitators emphasised that although some NHIS operational problems were 
systemic, their negative impact on enrolment could be minimised. These meetings 
were usually attended by community leaders, heads of health facilities and their 
staff, DDHSs and DHIS managers or their representatives. Discussions focused 
mainly on health facility-level barriers, their relative contribution to low enrolment 
and high dropout rates, and how to improve the situation. 
In a typical meeting, officials from the District Health Directorate working on 
NHIS claim forms explained the need to carefully complete the forms and avoid 
making mistakes to prevent rejection. DHIS managers took turns to inform health 
providers on the operational guidelines of the NHIS. They acknowledged that the 
NHIS has increased the managers’ workload and persuaded them not to vent their 
frustration on insured patients by being rude, but rather to communicate the chal-
lenges they face in a friendly manner to the patients. 
Regarding delays at health facilities, the position of facilitators on how to address 
the problem was mentioned as follows: 
Since filling the NHIS forms is part of healthcare delivery procedure and can only be changed at 
the national level, we could only educate people about what to expect when they seek healthcare 
with the NHIS card. This will show that the problem is real and not perceived as inefficiency on 
the part of health providers. Hopefully, this will help change the negative perception they have 
about us. 
In the case of heavy workloads, the discussions focused on how to improve the 
quality of services in the midst of the increasing number of patients at health 
facilities and manage the stress. Health providers were urged to exercise patience 
with insured patients since this was an issue that PSGs could not solve. The PSGs 
suggested that the negative impact could be reduced through regular interaction with 
stakeholders to explain the health providers’ difficult working conditions. Citing 
cases of few staff attending to many patients at busy facilities, District Health 
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Directorate staff were invited to advise health providers on how to effectively 
combine their administrative and clinical workload to reduce the time insured 
patients spent at health facilities. These activities usually ended with a call to health 
providers by community leaders and DHIS staff to use open communication to make 
their clients understand the enormity of the challenges they faced. 
In addition, PSGs held separate meetings with health providers and DHIS staff to 
discuss measures that they could take to minimise the negative effect of delays in 
claim payments on facilities. After lengthy discussions on how delays in claim 
payments contribute to the shortage of drugs and undermine the quality of 
healthcare services, DHIS managers and staff expressed their sympathy and de-
scribed the situation as unfortunate. They explained that the problem was largely 
due to delays in claim submission, mistakes in the forms and the bureaucratic 
procedures. They assured the PSGs that the DHIS staff who vet the NHIS claim 
forms would contact health staff immediately to resolve problems to speed up the 
process. A medical assistant told me that these meetings established linkages that 
improved the relationships between health providers and DHIS staff working on the 
NHIS forms. She asserted: “DHIS staff now call me to discuss problems with NHIS 
claim forms and we are able to thrash out issues concerning the forms faster than 
was the case previously.” 
For accusations of disrespect, collection of unauthorised fees and priority being 
given to cash-paying patients levelled against health providers, PSG facilitators and 
health providers’ representatives made a special appeal to their colleagues to 
convince community members that health providers support the scheme, but are 
constrained by operational problems when interacting with insured patients during 
consultations. In one such meeting, a facilitator who is also a health provider 
emphasised the need to change health providers’ behaviour and respect insured 
patients: 
We need to convince people that we support health insurance and explain to them the difficulties 
we have in the facility in a friendly way. Much as we want them to appreciate our problems, we 
need to respect them. We can only show that we are committed to ensuring the policy succeeds, 
but our desire to provide quality service is undermined by inadequate staff and delay in claim 
payment, if we stop collecting unauthorised fees from insured patients and giving preference to 
patients who pay cash. These negate efforts at improving enrolment with the NHIS and retaining 
members. 
This statement resulted in arguments in the meeting, but many health providers 
accepted that the issues raised were significant factors that they ought to address to 
help PSGs improve the enrolment and retention of NHIS members, while others 
thought it was an exaggeration of the situation. At one meeting, a District Director 
of Health Services (DDHSs) who was the chair, intervened and re-echoed his 
colleagues’ concerns, but reminded them that they needed to adhere to their motto 
  
143
for service delivery – the interest of the client comes first and every patient requires 
respect. He emphasised: 
As to whether these allegations are true or not, we cannot just dismiss them. Even though it 
might not be widespread, it is our responsibility to weed out the ‘bad nuts’ among us. If we are 
able to do this, our commitment to the scheme will not be in doubt. We should realise that under 
the NHIS we are dealing with a new type of customer who is empowered to demand quality 
service because he has paid before coming to us. If we charge them any unauthorised fees or 
make them pay for drugs covered by the NHIS then they are paying double. This undermines the 
credibility of the NHIS and they have the right to complain. We therefore need to develop new 
work habits and uphold our professional ethics. Insured patients must not be made to bear the 
consequences of problems we have with the NHIS. Otherwise how can we convince them to 
understand our problems? 
DHIS managers spoke about the need for health providers to see their work as a 
business enterprise and handle their clients with decorum. They emphasised the 
critical role of health providers in promoting the NHIS and pointed out that its 
success or failure depended very much on them. He said: 
How health providers present the NHIS to patients influences how people perceive it. Discus-
sions so far show that almost everybody is not happy about the quality of service at your facility. 
I’ve also had numerous complaints about the practices that go on in your facility which discour-
age people from enrolling or renewing their membership with the scheme. I appreciate your 
problems especially the delay in reimbursing claims but it is no reason to make patients pay the 
price. If you do that, your problems will not be appreciated. So if you improve your services 
many people will enrol. 
The frank discussions among key stakeholders at these meetings, contributed 
immensely to bridging the knowledge gap between what the policy states and the 
reality on the ground. The PSGs had better insight into the NHIS operational 
challenges confronting health providers. A PSG health provider representative 
asserted: 
Such meetings would have saved us from many of the accusations community members levelled 
against us and the high hopes they have about the NHIS. DHIS projected the NHIS as covering 
everything, so insured patients believe they do not have to pay anything and should be given all 
drugs at the facility. 
In addition, speakers at all intervention activities called on health providers to 
improve their relationship with insured patients, respect them and embrace the non-
cash transactions under the NHIS to show that they support the scheme, since this 
would help build confidence in the NHIS. The PSGs seriously suggested that all 
health workers should show a personal commitment to promote health insurance and 
desist from collecting unauthorised fees from insured patients and making them pay 
for drugs covered by the NHIS. This was a call to health workers to demonstrate a 
true commitment to the implementation of the NHIS and improvement of their 
public image. In this regard, health providers in particular advised their colleagues 
to give up the practices and behaviours of the user-fees regime (health providers 
sometimes selling their own drugs to patients and collecting unauthorised fees) and 
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commit to the NHIS. I observed that despite all the nice things that DDHSs and 
DHIS managers said, these were tough issues in the health system and not easy to 
address. Community members’ facial expressions during these discussions suggest-
ed that they felt helpless. A PSG community facilitator lamented after one of these 
meetings as follows: 
Stopping corruption among health providers is a difficult task. None of the ‘bosses’ [DDHSs and 
DHIS managers] seem to have the zeal needed to fight these negative behaviours and corrupt 
practices head on. They seem not to be ready to punish severely those involved in cheating to 
deter others from doing the same things. So we [PSG members] can only appeal to the con-
science of the perpetuators. 
These comments show how handicapped the PSGs were in addressing some of 
the challenges. Despite the PSG members’ scepticism about the health providers’ 
willingness to change their negative behaviour, the intervention activities sensitised 
them about the contribution they could make to expand NHIS coverage. 
Films 
Some PSGs used documentary films of scenes of overcrowded health facilities with 
the few health providers having difficulty attending to so many patients. After 
acknowledging the negative behaviour of some of his colleagues, a health provider 
pointed out the issues that account for some of those problems. He explained: 
Our heavy workload and long working hours make some of us resort to collection of unauthor-
ised fees to compensate for their long working hours. Also, the frequent shortage of drugs and 
other supplies to take care of ever-increasing numbers of patients undermines our desire to 
provide quality healthcare. 
The situation was made real in the films. Strategies they could adopt to manage 
the situation to reduce delays were discussed thereafter. The discussions also 
highlighted how some health providers maintain quality of service delivery even in 
the midst of the challenges to encourage others to do the same, since this is one of 
the core complaints that discourage people from enrolling. 
I noticed that by the end of the intervention, health providers talked to patients 
about health insurance and the need to enrol and regularly renew their memberships 
and discussed the challenges of providing good healthcare with the patients more 
than they had done at the beginning of the programme. This suggests that some 
improvement in the situation could happen even if it was slow. 
Intervention activities at the district health insurance scheme level 
The main NHIS implementation challenges that were found to undermine DHISs’ 
work and by consequence discourage people from enrolling or renewing their 
memberships were: 
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• Delays in processing NHIS registration forms attributed to the use of multiple 
names when registering and having photographs taken 
• Delay in issuing NHIS cards due to inadequate staff, office space and comput-
ers to process NHIS registration forms 
• Difficulties of granting exemption to indigents 
Specific intervention activities PSGs used to address these challenges were meet-
ings, set community registration points and provide collectors with cameras. 
Stakeholders’ meetings 
Stakeholders’ meetings that were organised by the PSGs created a platform and 
opportunity to reduce the negative effect of the NHIS implementation challenges 
confronting DHISs. At these meetings, DHIS staff were advised to be quite meticu-
lous when registering people, so that they could detect the use of two sets of names 
– one to register and one for the photograph. They were urged to develop effective 
strategies to instruct people who register with one name and have their photograph 
taken with another to prevent mismatch of names and photographs on their NHIS 
cards. For example, interrogating people to be sure they used the same names to 
register and have their photograph taken and correct the inconsistency immediately. 
Regarding delays in issuing NHIS cards, DHIS staff cited inadequate computers 
and cameras as making the registration procedure very complicated and prolonging 
the waiting period beyond the three-month period. They attributed this situation to 
insufficient funds from the government to meet their immediate needs such as 
repairing computers and providing adequate cabinets to properly file their docu-
ments including registration forms and NHIS cards. The issue of insufficient funds 
was linked to low enrolment and high non-renewal rates. The following summary 
was a typical advice given to the DHISs’ staff at stakeholders’ meetings: 
Since much cannot be done about the government funding, we can only appeal to the NHIA 
through DHIS mangers to increase the number of permanent staff, provide more computers and 
cameras. While we wait for more computers, which might not be provided now, we have to 
strategise to increase our revenue so we can repair our equipment promptly and ultimately 
reduce the delay in issuing ID cards. Fortunately, the PSG will help us improve coverage and 
increase revenue so we can repair our computers immediately when they break down and buy 
more cameras to reduce delays in issuing NHIS cards and improve service. 
To counter corrupt practices, PSG community representatives, DHIS staff and 
managers explained how these undermine attempts to improve enrolment from their 
perspective. They explained how charging more than the approved premium and 
registration fees, prevents poor parents from registering all their household mem-
bers. They emphasised that this menace should be addressed in a holistic manner. 
First, DHIS managers appealed to DHIS staff to desist from the shameful act and 
devise ways of providing efficient service to their clients. Collectors were asked to 
stop collecting more than the approved fees and pay the money collected to DHISs 
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promptly to overcome the temptation of spending it on their personal needs. Second, 
PSG community representatives were told to tell people to report any DHIS staff or 
collector who demanded money from them to avoid waiting for the three-month 
mandatory period. Third, community representatives suggested that DHIS managers 
monitor their own staff and collectors by occasionally visiting communities to check 
on the premium and registration fees being collected. A community facilitator 
argued: 
The practice of collecting more than the approved fees and registering people through ‘the back 
door,’ will not help build confidence in the NHIS. It will rather encourage people not to enrol 
and renew their membership regularly. They will think they can be issued NHIS card instantly 
when they pay money to DHIS staff. 
At the end of the discussions, the health providers and DHIS staff agreed that 
barriers to enrolment and renewals of membership exist and need to be resolved. 
Evans & Davies (1999: 379) describe what occurs in a policy transfer when those 
implementing a programme are not likely to do: “Exactly what was intended or 
specified by those who formulated it.” In this respect, the PSGs adopted a ‘no 
blame’ stance and advised DHIS staff to give up all negative practices and show true 
commitment to expanding NHIS coverage through a gradual process of desisting 
from current practices and adopting practices that build confidence in the scheme. A 
PSG facilitator re-echoed this concern and described the situation as: “Difficult 
issues for the group to solve since they are endemic, but we will keep on talking.” 
These comments show how handicapped PSGs were in addressing the corruption 
that adversely affected enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members. However, 
concerns by PSG members sparked debates and made service providers more 
conscious of their behaviours that were undermining attempts to expand NHIS 
coverage than they had been at the beginning of the intervention. 
The difficulty of identifying the core poor for exemption was also addressed by 
PSGs during stakeholders’ meetings. After extensive debate, PSG community 
representatives and facilitators asked DHIS PROs and collectors to play lead roles in 
the implementation of the exemption policy. They urged them to educate communi-
ty members on the exemption policy and collaborate with community members to 
identify and recommend the core poor for exemption. During one of such meetings, 
a facilitator cited the case of a volunteer who persuaded the collector and DHIS staff 
to grant exemption to a woman described as core poor. He discussed how communi-
ty members, DHIS staffs and collectors could help address the difficult issue of 
granting exemption to the core poor. He argued: 
Though it took a lot of effort to grant her exemption, it indicates the core poor can be easily 
identified. If DHIS staff and collectors work with opinion and community leaders they can make 
the process less controversial. PSGs can come up with names and justify their nominations since 
their status is not questionable rather than sticking to the homelessness condition, which does 
not reflect the situation. 
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In this regard, DHISs were asked to liaise with community leaders and PSG  
representatives especially collectors and volunteers to identify and recommend the 
core poor for exemption. 
Other PSG activities to address NHIS implementation challenges at DHISs 
PSGs urged DHISs to appoint collectors in communities where there were none and 
set up registration centres to aid the registration campaign and help explain new 
policy directives to community members. Some PSGs purchased cameras for 
collectors to enable them to register people after their promotional activities, since 
more people registered when their photographs were taken at the same time. This 
helped speed up the registration process because when both activities took place 
simultaneously, difficulties associated with people using multiple names to register 
and having their photograph taken were reduced. Certainly, the cameras and the 
presence of collectors in the communities improved the registration process and 
subsequently reduced the delay in issuing NHIS ID cards, which increased confi-
dence in the scheme. This underscores the need to provide every collector with a 
camera. 
In conclusion, all intervention activities provided structures for community mem-
bers, DHIS staff and health providers to exchange ideas about pertinent issues that 
negatively impact on NHIS coverage. Sociologists refer to this as creating oppor-
tunity structure – a form of enablement for collective action (see Boudreau 1996). In 
this case, the MSPSP created linkages and provided opportunities for community 
members, health providers and DHIS staff to be part of the process of improving 
enrolment and retention in the NHIS. Moreover, though the systemic challenges 
were beyond the scope of PSGs, their intervention activities created awareness about 
the depth of the problem and generated discussions among stakeholders. The 
intervention activities set the tone for more critical reflection by community mem-
bers about insuring themselves against ill health. It also caused DHIS staff and 
health providers to reflect on their work and how their behaviours and practices 
impact NHIS coverage. 
Reflections on problem-solving sessions 
This discussion examines two main issues: (1) how PSGs were able to reach most of 
their targets and (2) the behaviour of some PSG members during the problem-
solving sessions. 
As a whole, PSG members felt the multi-level and participatory approaches 
helped create synergy4 that enabled them to reach their target populations. But, it is 
                                              
4
  Synergy refers to cooperative interaction among group members. It successfully combines effort, skills 
and resources of group members to achieve objectives (Lasker & Weiss 2003, Pathman 2008). 
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important to mention that enthusiasm for participation was not given and synergy 
did not just happen; facilitators played a key role. As Pathman et al. (2008: 10) note, 
synergy develops because “[l]eaders spotted opportunities and resources to support 
synergy, brokered relationships … value and learnt how to create synergy.” In this 
study, bringing stakeholders together to participate in the intervention was not as 
simple as presented above; it was a daunting task. However, the facilitators training 
provided specific strategies that helped them create synergy, which elicited their 
commitment to participate in the intervention. Strategies that worked well were: (1) 
presenting the intervention as something that would reduce the NHIS’ implementa-
tion challenges at three levels (communities, health facilities and DHISs), (2) the 
recognition that PSG members’ and stakeholders’ were capable of contributing 
towards the success of the NHIS and (3) allowing PSG members’ and stakeholders’ 
to lead intervention activities. The three strategies created trust and a sense of 
responsibility among the PSG members. The history of participation has shown that 
plurality of methods and adjusting to local conditions yields better results. As 
Chambers (1994: 1449) notes: “Scientific method is not competent to predict or 
prescribe for the complex open systems which matter most.” This implies that what 
happens in the field depends on the decisions and actions of individuals and these 
are relevant for success of interventions. In this study, the facilitators’ openness and 
sharing of ideas during the intervention brought out a range of locally tailored 
techniques that helped reach all target populations. 
The question of whether my presence in the PSGs limited discussions at meetings 
and problem-solving sessions was discussed in chapter two. Here, I wish to empha-
sise that with the exception of a few cases where participants denied accusations of 
negative behaviours and practices, the PSG members quite willingly shared their 
experiences and opinions. However, social desirability made some of them withheld 
information about their own negative behaviours. As discourse analysts point out, 
speakers construct alternative and sometimes contradictory versions of reality to 
achieve a goal (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 1994, 1995). In this study, my observation 
confirms earlier studies that individuals blame others and the social structure for 
their own failures (cf. Turner & Stets 2006). They portrayed an overly positive 
picture of themselves and attributed negative behaviours to others. Despite this 
shortcoming, my dual role helped maintain the group’s focus on providing the 
information needed to get to the root causes of barriers and helped develop locally 
tailored solutions and implementation strategies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows the potential of problem-solving tools and participatory ap-
proaches in opening spaces for community members, health providers and DHIS 
staff to work together to increase confidence in the NHIS. Interestingly, stakehold-
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ers’ meetings were accepted as safe places that provided a collegial setting not only 
for providing information for addressing problems, but also for establishing and 
strengthening relationships among them. 
Furthermore, the chapter showed that the effective engagement of community 
leaders, informal sector employers such as boat owners and cocoa-purchasing clerks 
created a synergy that made it possible for the intervention to reach all target 
populations, particularly community members who were difficult to reach. Commu-
nity members and leaders’ testimonies about the NHIS’ benefits and health provid-
ers’ explicit support for the insurance scheme helped create the impression that the 
NHIS could ensure that everyone has access to healthcare and this increased the 
community members’ interest in the scheme. 
The findings thus contribute to the literature on the benefits of engaging stake-
holders from the onset of interventions and using them to mobilise support for 
uptake of public policies. The results show that adopting multi-level and participa-
tory approaches helped overcome the central issue of a lack of collaboration among 
community members, health providers and DHIS staff in promoting the NHIS. The 
approaches gave ‘voices’ to those at the front-line of NHIS implementation and 
those affected by the policy; these views are rarely heard. Therefore, the DHISs 
could consider the multi-level perspective as a useful framework to guide them in 
planning and implementing interventions to address barriers at various levels to 
achieve maximum impact. It was assumed that these effects would multiply and be 
continued in a network of stakeholders. Whether PSG activities yielded positive 
outcomes is the focus of the next chapter. 
The next chapter assesses the outcome of the intervention in terms of the incre-
ment in enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members by comparing pre- and 
post-intervention survey results. It also presents qualitative information from 
community members, health providers and DHIS staffs within and outside PSGs to 
explain the outcome of the PSG intervention activities. 
  
6 
The effect of the multi-
stakeholder problem-solving 
programme on enrolment 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme 
(MSPSP), aimed at improving enrolment and retention in Ghana’s National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was described. In the next three chapters (six, seven, and 
eight), I address the main question of the study: how effective were problem-solving 
groups (PSGs) for improving enrolment and retention rates in the NHIS? 
This chapter opens with a brief overview of the phases of the study and the 
MSPSP and addresses the question what effect PSG activities had on health provid-
ers, DHISs’ staff and community members in the context of health insurance 
enrolment. It concludes with a brief overview of the survey results concerning the 
effect of the intervention on enrolment. Chapter seven will present and discuss the 
factors that enhanced the PSGs’ functioning and led to increased enrolment, and 
chapter eight reflects on the factors that limited the PSGs’ effort at improving NHIS 
enrolment and retention rates. 
Phases of the study and overview of the MSPSP 
The study was divided into three phases – pre-intervention, intervention and post-
intervention. Phase one (pre-intervention) was the conduct of a pre-intervention 
household survey in 30 communities in Central and Eastern regions of Ghana (13 
and 17 respectively). The results were used (in addition to rural, semi-urban and 
urban characteristics) to assign the communities to intervention and control groups 
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to ensure a fair representation of communities with similar characteristics in both 
groups. In phase two (intervention), the research team organised sensitisation 
durbars in the intervention communities to inform stakeholders about the MSPSP 
and select PSG community representatives. The community-elected PSG representa-
tives met with health providers and DHIS representatives (already selected by their 
heads of institutions) immediately after the durbars to select two facilitators and a 
secretary to lead the group through the twenty-month intervention period. Next, a 
three-day facilitators’ workshop was organised by the research team during which 
the MSPSP’s rationale and implementation guidelines were discussed. Facilitators 
were also exposed to facilitation approaches and problem-solving tools and tech-
niques to equip them perform their task competently. An important element of the 
workshop was the adoption of general guidelines for facilitating PSG meetings and 
intervention activities. Intervention activities were carried out in the selected 
communities and their respective health facilities and DHIS offices. No activity took 
place in control communities. The third phase was the repetition of the pre-
intervention household survey in March 2011 to assess the effect of the MSPSP on 
NHIS enrolment and retention rates. In addition, I conducted follow-up key inform-
ant interviews, conversations and focus group discussions (FGDs). The survey 
results were used to measure the impact of the intervention on enrolment and 
retention in the NHIS. Participant observation, conversation, key informant inter-
views and FGDs were used to provide an in-depth understanding of ‘how’ and 
‘why’ the observed impact occurred. 
Assessment of the effect of PSG activities on stakeholders started before the end 
of the intervention and concluded with key informant interviews and FGDs after the 
post-intervention survey. The interviews and FGDs focused on observed changes in 
health providers’, DHIS staff’s and community members’ behaviour and practices 
that directly or indirectly resulted in increased enrolment. The survey results showed 
that the intervention had a positive effect on all stakeholders and led to increase in 
enrolment; but renewal rates did not improve. Details of the quantitative results are 
presented later in a section that examines the effect of the intervention on communi-
ty members. Due to the limited observations at the end of the intervention and to 
avoid an overreliance on self-reports by community members, health providers and 
DHIS staff; I also relied on changes they observed at different levels. For example, I 
used community members’ observations at health facilities to verify what the health 
providers had told me. 
Effect of the MSPSP on health providers 
At the start of the intervention, health providers often complained that the NHIS led 
to increased utilisation of healthcare services and thereby resulted in an increased 
workload. Of particular concern, was the time spent filling out NHIS forms, which 
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prolonged the insured patients’ consultations and staff’s working hours. Health 
providers also indicated that delays in claim payments led to drug shortages and 
undermined their attempts to improve the quality of services. These challenges 
influenced some health providers’ to be unfriendly towards insured patients and give 
preference to cash-paying patients. It also led to staff collecting unauthorised fees. 
The effect of the intervention (MSPSP) was assessed in terms of how PSGs were 
able to encourage health providers to manage their workload and improve their 
behaviour towards insured patients. In this regard, all three categories of stakehold-
ers (community members, DHIS staff and health providers) observed three changes 
that can be linked to the intervention – improved attitude towards patients, a decline 
in delays in treatment and a reduction in requests for unauthorised fees. 
Improved health provider attitudes towards patients 
The consensus among health providers at all FGDs was that although the interven-
tion did not reduce their workload, it helped change their attitudes towards insured 
patients. The main explanation was that the discussions at the community durbars, 
stakeholders meetings and other activities influenced them to accept their workload 
since insured patients could not be blamed. Others attributed the change in staff 
attitudes to meetings with officials from the District Health Directorate who sensi-
tised them to understand that the NHIS enabled patients to report early to health 
facilities and with fewer complications. As a result, the staff adopted more friendly 
ways of communicating the challenges they faced when providing healthcare to 
insured patients. A nurse explained why she changed her behaviour towards insured 
patients as follows: 
Though our workload has not reduced and treating insured patients involved a lot of writing, the 
benefit of fewer complications presented by them discussed at our meetings influenced many of 
us to stop blaming them for our heavy workload. We realised that it is better to encourage them 
to report early than come here in critical conditions, which make us spend more time on them. 
However, shortage of drugs still persists and undermines the quality service insured patients are 
asking for. 
I also observed during my routine observational visits to health facilities that 
those who had used derogatory language when interacting with insured patients had 
now stopped. I engaged these staff in conversations to explore reasons for the 
change. I walked home with Nurse Julia who had been accused of being disrespect-
ful and hostile to insured patients most often and had demanded that they pay cash 
for accessing healthcare in the evenings and weekends. She told me this: 
After the many complaints about us during meetings, we accepted that we have to improve our 
behaviour despite the problems we face providing healthcare to insured patients. Also, since we 
are involved in the intervention, we explain to insured patients the difficulties we face providing 
them healthcare and educated them about the need to come to the facility during normal working 
hours rather than in the evenings and weekends if it is not an emergency to reduce the suspicion 
that it is because they are insured. 
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Reduction in requests for unauthorised payments 
PSG activities led to improvements in provider practices and the quality of service. 
For example, incidences of payment for drugs and other supplies at health facilities 
were curtailed. To confirm what Nurse Julia said, I asked Nurse Anas (a PSG 
member) who had told me at the beginning of the intervention that she was not 
happy about the behaviour of some of her colleagues’ towards insured patients, 
whether she had observed any changes in that respect. She stated: 
Our involvement in the intervention created the awareness that whatever we do will be exposed. 
So we are careful about what we do. Nurse Julia for example, has stopped collecting money 
from insured patients who access healthcare in the evenings and weekends and talk to patients to 
enrol. 
A medical doctor narrated how the PSGs’ exposure of a staff member made him 
institute measures that helped stop illegal payment for medicines and other supplies 
in the facility. He stated: 
As I told you at the beginning of the intervention, we are pleased to be involved from the onset, 
so I told my staff that despite the workload and other challenges we face, we need to work like 
professionals. So we instituted measures that ensured both insured and uninsured patients are 
served as they come and stopped those who sell drugs covered by the NHIS to insured patients. 
We also talk to patients to enrol and encourage them to report difficulties they face here. My 
staff are now careful about what they do since they know their bad behaviour will be exposed. I 
believe this encouraged people to enrol. 
Since it was not possible to use observation to validate all the reports such as 
collecting unauthorised fees, I engaged community members and DHIS staff in 
conversations and FGDs to verify what I was told. For example, I asked insured 
patients whether there had been any improvement in the way health providers 
treated them at the facility. One of them, who criticised the behaviour of nurses with 
passion at the beginning of the intervention, told me another story. She said: 
The group has made them change their bad behaviour when people complained about them. The 
nurses who were disrespectful and collected money in the evenings and weekends changed after 
the durbar. I think they were afraid. What is left is to provide drugs in the hospital as drug short-
ages discourage people from enrolling and renewing their insurance cards regularly. 
Decline in delays in treatment 
DHIS staff also confirmed an improvement in health providers’ behaviour during a 
FGD and added this: 
After discussions at stakeholders’ meetings the clear change in the hospital is a reduction in 
waiting time and improvement in the way the nurses talk to insured patients. The excuse that 
time needed to fill NHIS forms was the reason for giving uninsured patients preference has been 
resolved and the situation is better now. Many of them no more separated insured patients’ cards 
from the uninsured. 
The observed effects of PSG activities on health providers’ behaviour and prac-
tices revealed that though their workload did not decrease, the facilities instituted 
measures that influenced the staff to adopt more positive attitude towards insured 
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patients. These measures helped improve the staff’s behaviour and service delivery 
and encouraged many people to enrol even in the midst of unresolved challenges. 
Both Nurse Julia and Nurse Anas’ statements indicate that awareness and frequent 
discussions about insured patients’ complaints at stakeholders meetings influenced 
them to adopt a positive attitude. I observed that the nurses stopped giving prefer-
ence to uninsured patients in queues that were usually formed at the OPD and served 
everyone according to the order in which they presented their cards. Also, disrespect 
and use of derogatory language to describe insured patients as ‘difficult’ and 
‘disturbing them’ gradually disappeared as the intervention progressed and by the 
end of the intervention period I rarely heard such language. Reports about payments 
for drugs and other supplies in health facilities and the demand for cash when 
assessing healthcare in the evenings diminished. As D’Ambruoso et al. (2008) 
observes, client-provider interaction and patients’ satisfaction about the care 
provided are particularly important in health insurance with the degree of participa-
tion determined by perceived quality of care. From this point of view, these positive 
health provider-patient relationships influenced many people to enrol and remain in 
the NHIS. 
Various reasons may account for the positive changes in health providers’ behav-
iour. It was conscious effort to behave favourably towards insured patients during 
the intervention even in the midst of the difficulties they face. As Turner & Stets 
(2006: 29) have noted, social actors’ behaviour are often ‘self-directed’ to conform 
to what others expect from them. This implies that people sometimes alter their 
behaviour in particular situations to achieve an objective. Similarly, the positive 
change in health providers’ behaviour and practices was a result of self-initiated 
measures either to create good impression about themselves to show the researcher 
and/or District Directors of Health Services and District Health Insurance Scheme 
(DHIS) managers that the negative perceptions about them were not true and to 
redeem their image. To a certain extent, these views could be true, but there are 
good reasons to believe that the observed changes were real and not acted. My 
assertion is based on the fact that the multi-level approach used in gathering infor-
mation made it possible for me to verify what I was told and observed. For example, 
I observed health providers increasingly show respect and not using derogatory 
language when interacting with insured patients; insured patients and DHIS staff 
confirmed this change during spontaneous conversations. 
Another possible underlying reason for the positive change in providers’ behav-
iour was the feeling of being change agents in the intervention and a genuine 
commitment to help the intervention succeed. As pointed out, providers were 
previously not usually involved in intervention programmes from the onset and 
treated as objects. Now they were pleased to be part of the planning and execution, 
which motivated them to ensure that the objectives of the intervention were 
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achieved. Obviously, involving stakeholders in interventions from the onset to 
address barriers to public policy uptake, leads to a better appreciation of the chal-
lenges that accompany such policies and influence them to be committed to success. 
Effect of the MSPSP on District Health Insurance Schemes’ staff 
Barriers identified and addressed at the level of DHISs included: (1) inadequate 
equipment, (2) difficulties in processing NHIS registration forms, (3) lack of filing 
systems and (4) overcharging for fees and back door registrations. By the end of the 
intervention almost all DHIS staff mentioned the main effects that the MSPSP had 
on them that helped improve their performance and by consequence enrolment in 
the NHIS. They indicated that the PSGs’ sensitisation activities and stakeholders 
meetings had led to the adoption of strategies to manage the challenges they faced: 
providing cameras for collectors to take photographs immediately they registered 
people and being meticulous about people not using multiple names, improving their 
filing system (which made retrieval of information and NHIS cards easier), and 
exposing back door registrations and collectors and DHIS staff who overcharged for 
fees. These measures improved the registration process and made it possible for 
DHISs to issue NHIS cards by the end of the three-month mandatory waiting period. 
Cameras, matching names, and improved filing systems 
A DHIS representative during a FGD outlined measures that helped increase 
enrolment as follows: 
The challenge the PSGs threw to us during our meetings made us introduce measures that helped 
improve the registration process. Our staffs now match names on registration forms with pic-
tures and correct mistakes in the field. The collector was provided camera to help him do that. 
We also educated people about the problems created when they are not consistent with the 
names they use for registration and when taking pictures. These reduced delays in issuing NHIS 
cards, built confidence in the NHIS and encouraged people to enrol. 
A DHIS manager, who had doubted that the PSGs could improve enrolment at the 
beginning of the intervention, gladly expressed his positive opinion about the group 
this time. He said: 
Debates during stakeholders’ meetings and other activities made us seriously reflect on our work 
and devise ways of improving our work. We repaired our computers promptly, gave camera to 
collectors and made shelves for filing documents. These improved the registration process and 
makes retrieval of documents faster. Though I cannot give you exact figures, because our data is 
not organised by communities, I can say for sure that since the intervention started, revenue 
from the community increased significantly compared to others. 
Changes at the DHISs mentioned by health providers’ during and at the end of the 
intervention were fairly similar to what others said. The following statement by a 
medical assistant captured their observation: 
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Before you [PSG] started work, we used to have problems with patients for having NHIS cards 
with their pictures but different names. We don’t have such problems anymore. This shows the 
DHIS has improved its work. 
Such assertions from DHIS staff were corroborated by community members who 
noted that the NHIS cards were delivered by the end of the three-month waiting 
period. Two views were expressed. A PSG community representative in a FGD 
stated: 
This is the second time I registered. The first time they could not find my card so I decided not 
to register until the intervention. You can ask the collector [pointing to her]. Some people also 
had their names mismatched with other people’s pictures. When I registered now, we all had our 
cards on time. No more missing cards.  
Overcharging for fees and back door registrations 
In addition, the PSGs’ exposure of some collectors’ and DHIS staff who charged 
more than the approved premium and registration fees for NHIS cards for people 
who were sick through the ‘back door’ led to reduction in this practice. For example, 
a DHIS manager applauded the PSG community representatives for their vigilance 
in helping to check their staff and collectors’ corrupt practices in the following 
statement: 
The group’s exposure of the collector and DHIS staff who charged more than the approved fees 
and issue NHIS cards to people without waiting for three months led to the termination of the 
collector’s contract and the staff was seriously reprimanded. Regular discussion of such issues 
minimise back door registrations and the cheating that was going on. My staff are afraid of being 
exposed and punished. 
I overheard a community member telling the facilitator about the improvement in 
issuing ID cards: 
You [PSG members] have come to put things right at the DHIS office. I remember before you 
people came, things were not working well. When you register, you wait for some time before 
your picture is taken; you wait again for four months before you get your card. It happened to 
me and before I had my card, I had waited for six months. These things are not happening any 
more. Now it is left with the DHIS manager to identify and punish the few staff that still cheat to 
deter others and grant exemptions to poor people as we have discussed at our meetings with 
them. 
Summary 
These key stakeholder views and observations about the positive effects the inter-
vention had on DHIS staff indicate that service delivery improves if resources are 
provided and a group is monitoring the activities of public sector workers. For 
example, PSGs reported that ‘undercover practices’ such as collecting more than the 
premium and registration fees and back door registrations that were hidden from 
DHISs’ managers diminished as a result of PSGs’ exposure of those involved. My 
analysis revealed that the negative behaviours and practices persisted because of two 
mutually inclusive factors: First, lack of commitment by authorities’ to sanction 
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those involved. Second, lack of courage on the part of victims to report those 
involved to the authorities. Together, these factors perpetuated malpractices among 
DHIS staff. Contrarily to Aryee’s (2005) observation, official responses to corrup-
tion in Africa range from lukewarm to hostility; this study found that the DHIS 
managers willingly sanctioned staff found to be cheating. This posture shown by the 
managers at the beginning of the intervention encouraged residents to report (and 
some even demanded) that the offenders were sanctioned as it happened to the 
collector whose contract was abrogated because of malpractice. So the fact that 
PSGs were ready to report DHIS staff and collectors to the authorities prompted 
many of them to change their behaviour, which reduced malpractices. 
The positive changes in DHIS staff’s behaviour appeared to be a conscious effort 
to fulfil their promise at the beginning of the intervention that they would ensure 
that the intervention succeeded since expanding NHIS coverage was their core 
business. As Turner & Stets (2006) observe, social actors sometimes modify their 
behaviour to achieve an objective. It can be concluded that the changes in behaviour 
and practices was a self-directed action that improved the DHISs’ operations and 
increased confidence in the NHIS ability to fulfil their promise of supporting PSGs 
to achieve their goal. This indicates that involving implementers of a policy from the 
onset of an intervention and providing the required resources motivates them to 
improve their performance. These findings reinforce the previous observation that 
engaging stakeholders to address public policy challenges yields better results since 
it captures all perspectives and provides better insight of the real situation instead of 
a single-level approach, which misses out majority of people whose lives are 
affected by the policy (Van der Geest et al. 1990, Press 1990). 
Effect of the MSPSP on community members 
The NHIS policy requires registration and annual renewal of all household members 
(Government of Ghana 2003). However, community members’ poverty, low interest 
in protecting themselves against ill health, and political perception of the NHIS 
contributed to low enrolment and high membership non-renewal rates. The effect of 
the MSPSP was therefore expected to change community members’ attitudes 
towards the NHIS, reduce the political perception of the NHIS and influence them to 
enrol and renew their membership annually. Conversations about whether the PSG 
activities influenced people to enrol in the NHIS and renew their membership 
started before the end of intervention and ended with discussion of the survey 
results. 
Three major changes 
Information consistently mentioned in my conversations during the course of the 
intervention and FGDs at the end demonstrated three main effects of PSG activities 
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on community members that led to increase enrolment. First, many community 
members indicated that the PSGs’ educational activities helped them to understand 
the risk-sharing principles of health insurance and influenced many people to enrol 
all household members instead of the selective registration they had been doing. 
They also stated that the PSGs’ promotional activities created interest in the NHIS 
and made them appreciate the need for protection against ill health to avoid paying 
expensive direct out-of-pocket charges. Second, the PSG activities made them 
change their negative perception about health providers and improved their relation-
ships with them. Last, involvement of their peers as PSG members and leaders in 
identifying and addressing NHIS challenges as well as implementing intervention 
activities removed the community members’ political perception of the NHIS. 
Understanding risk-sharing and changing negative perceptions 
The following comment by a boat owner captures the effect that the PSG activities 
had on community members. 
The intervention improved our understanding of health insurance and changed our attitude 
towards health insurance. You know health insurance is not part of our culture, so many of us 
did not see why we should pay for health insurance. Now almost everybody including children 
knows that insurance is better than paying cash at the hospital. By discussing the problems at the 
hospital with us, we appreciate why insured patients have to wait longer than the uninsured and 
why they don’t always give us drugs at the hospital. Also, the testimonies given at durbars 
created confidence in insurance and influenced some of us to register everybody in our house 
instead of only those who needed healthcare. However, many people are still reluctant to regis-
ter. But I think if the group continues their education with time they will change. 
To verify what community members told me, I talked to DHIS staff and health 
providers to find out their opinion about the statements from community members 
about the effect of the MSPSP. A DHIS manager, who at the beginning of the 
intervention held the notion that community members were difficult and was 
worried about how the PSG could improve enrolment, spoke highly of the MSPSP 
in the following remarks at the end of the intervention. 
I think the education at durbars, house-to-house visits, the film shows and other activities made 
them [community members] think seriously about health insurance. Before the group started 
work, people were not serious about health insurance. I think the group has been able to improve 
their attitude towards health insurance. The more than double increase in enrolment achieved is 
very good. We were unable to achieve this all these years. But the high membership non-
renewal rate is because some people still wait until they are ready to go to hospital before they 
rush to renew their card. This attitude tells you how difficult it is to keep people in the scheme. I 
don’t know what can change that. 
The above view was also shared by several health providers I engaged in conver-
sations at the end of the intervention. The following example summarises their 
observation. 
Before your programme started, not many people came here with insurance. I think your educa-
tion has encouraged them to enrol. But there are still those who, though know insurance is good 
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for them, will wait till they have some serious sickness before rushing to register. They come 
here and cannot pay their bill and give the excuse that they registered about a month ago and 
their card is not ready. 
Knowing how easy it is for people to tell a researcher what he or she wants to 
hear, I sometimes eavesdropped on conversations to obtain information healthcare 
providers would ordinarily not tell me. On one such occasion, I heard two nurses at 
the OPD, talking about how the PSG helped improve the enrolment of pregnant 
women and mothers. One of them said: 
Have you noticed that since the group started work many pregnant women and mothers come 
here with insurance cards? They now understand the free enrolment for themselves and register 
their babies two weeks after delivery. You remember we used to have a lot of argument with 
them especially those who register late and their cards were still valid long after delivery and 
think their babies should also be given free treatment after six weeks without registering them. 
Now they register their babies early. 
Political perceptions 
A nursing mother also told me that though some problems still persist, the interven-
tion increased her confidence in the scheme and influenced her to enrol. She said: 
When health insurance started, we saw it as politics and many people were not interested, but 
your education at community durbars and the hospital and house-to-house visits helped us 
understand the benefits of the scheme and changed our perception. However, the problem of 
shortage of and paying for drugs at the hospital and going round looking for drugs is still there. 
But as I always say being insured is better than going to hospital without insurance. 
Health providers’ disappointment with outcome 
Despite the positive remarks some health providers who were involved in promoting 
the NHIS were not too impressed about the outcome of the intervention. A medical 
assistant (a PSG member), who showed her NHIS card to uninsured patients and 
encouraged them to enrol, expressed her disappointment about the results as 
follows: 
As I’ve always been complaining, people still come here without health insurance. Despite our 
efforts at encouraging them to enrol not even half of the people are registered Many have seen 
the need to protect themselves against sickness, but still wait until they are sick before they think 
of health insurance. The men especially say they hardly fall sick. I don’t know what can change 
them. 
 
In summary, I observed that the regular interactions among community members 
and leaders, health providers and DHIS staff, testimonies given at community 
durbars and the documentary films had positive impression on the community 
members. These activities influenced many people to appreciate the need for 
protection against sickness. The community members also appreciated the challeng-
es health providers face when providing healthcare under the NHIS and talked about 
them in a more positive way. This helped increase confidence in the NHIS and 
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influenced people to enrol. My findings were verified through spontaneous conver-
sations with several stakeholders throughout the intervention period, at PSG meet-
ings and during key informant interviews and FGDs. Stakeholders could not have 
continuously made up their observations just to please me. Thus the reported 
observed changes were a fair reflection of the effect the intervention had on each 
stakeholder. 
Post-intervention survey results 
The positive effect of the intervention on community members comes out clearly in 
our post-intervention survey results on enrolment (currently insured) in the NHIS 
presented in Figure 6.1. The data covered 13,857 individuals at pre-intervention: 
7,234 and 6,623 in intervention and control communities respectively. For the post-
intervention survey, the data covered 12,810 individuals: 6,790 in intervention 
communities and 6,020 in the control group. Household heads were the respondents 
who gave information on the individuals (members of their households). 
The results affirmed that PSG activities influenced people to enrol, but not to 
consistently renew their membership. Figure 6.1 shows the intervention significantly 
increased enrolment by 10.6 per cent (p=0.000) (from 29.7 to 40.3 per cent) and 
membership non-renewal rate by 6.9 per cent (i.e. from 15.5 per cent to 22.4). 
Further, we used a probit regression model to analyse the effect of the intervention 
on current and previous enrolment. The results showed that, holding all other factors 
constant, residents within the intervention communities were 17 per cent more likely 
to enrol and 5 per cent less likely to drop out of the NHIS compared to those in the 
control group following the intervention. 
To find out whether the NHIS had reached the poor, the primary target of the 
policy and the intervention, the population was categorised into wealth quintiles 
using household consumption expenditure (see chapter three, Aryeetey et al. 2010). 
The health insurance status of all individuals covered in the survey was assessed and 
is presented in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 shows the enrolment rate across the five wealth quintiles at baseline 
and post intervention. Enrolment in the poorest quintile declined from 23.6 per cent 
to 17.6 per cent. There was a slight improvement in enrolment for the poor quintile 
(28.6% to 31.3%). However, there were increases in enrolment for the third to the 
fifth quintile. A striking finding was that membership non-renewal rate was higher 
among the richest (23.7%) and rich (23.8%) than among the poorest (15.4%) and the 
poor (18.4%). This point will be discussed in the next chapter. The statistics indicate 
that although the intervention increased overall enrolment, it failed to achieve its 
main objective: to draw more poor people into the scheme. 
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Figure 6.1 Changes in NHIS status in intervention and control communities 
 
Estimated effect of PSG activities on enrolment and membership non-renewal rates 
N=13066 β1 (95% CI) Std. error P-value2 
Currently insured  0.17 (0.12-0.21) 0.024 0.000 
Previously insured -0.05 (-0.01-0.00) 0.023 0.047 
Source: Fieldwork, March 2009 and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Changes in NHIS status by wealth quintiles in intervention communities 
 
Source: Fieldwork, March 2009 and 2011. 
                                              
1
  β is the coefficient of the independent variable (dummy for intervention) on the dependent variable and 
used to predict the effect of the intervention on enrolment and non-renewal rates. Positive values show 
positive relationship and negative indicates inverse relationship. 
2
  Statistical convention holds that a significant difference exist between two variables only if the ‘p-value is 
less than 0.05 at 95% confidence interval. A p-value close to 1 indicates no difference between the two 
variables. 
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The lower enrolment observed among the poor supports previous studies that 
enrolment in the NHIS increases with income (Asante & Aikins 2008, Sarpong et al. 
2010). In their study in a rural district of Ghana, Sarpong et al. (2010) found that 38 
per cent of the population was enrolled in the NHIS. In this group, 21 per cent 
belonged to low, 43 per cent middle and 60 per cent to high socio-economic status 
households. The poor respondents cited the cost of transport to health facilities as 
the cause of their low enrolment. However, the higher non-renewal rate among the 
average and rich categories contrasts with the health economic literature in Sub-
Sahara Africa, which gives excessive weight to the cost of premiums as responsible 
for low coverage in health insurance schemes (Jutting 2004, Asante & Aikins 2008, 
Basaza et al. 2008, Sarpong et al. 2010).The findings in this study indicate that 
although poverty contributes to low enrolment, it does not determine renewal rates. 
Low enrolment among the poorest quintile was attributed to the failure of DHISs to 
exempt them from paying premiums as the policy stipulates. 
With regard to the enrolment within intervention communities, 10 communities 
showed significant increases in enrolment (p=0.000), two had no change (p>0.05) 
and three recorded significant decreases (p<0.05). Of the fifteen communities, only 
two had approximately two-thirds of the population enrolled (68%, 63%), two about 
half (53%), six between 30 and 50 per cent and five less than a third (15% to 25%). 
The non-renewal rates were generally high – between 13 to 41 per cent (see Table 
A.9, Appendix 2). The reasons and explanations behind these figures are examined 
in the next two chapters. 
Conclusion: Dialogue among stakeholders and trust 
In the current study, the positive effects of the MSPSP on enrolment clearly indicate 
that creating space for regular dialogue among stakeholders made it possible to 
capture barriers at all levels and helped to develop activities that led to the reduction 
in NHIS implementation challenges compared to the DHISs working alone. Com-
munity leaders’ involvement encouraged members to develop interest in the NHIS 
and accept the need for protection against ill health. Moreover, since enrolment in an 
insurance scheme is partly about trust, health providers’ involvement in the inter-
vention and the observed changes removed doubts that they (community members) 
might not be treated well. As Schneider (2005) points out, trust-building practices 
reassure the insured that they will receive care when sick and motivate them to 
enrol. Similarly, the increase in enrolment can be explained by health providers 
directly promoting the NHIS and the adoption of practices that improved trust 
between them and community members. This reassured the community members in 
their support of the NHIS and increased their confidence in the scheme. However, 
the PSGs’ inability to improve enrolment among the poorest quintile brings to the 
fore the reasons why the exemption is not reaching them, which will be discussed 
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elaborately in chapter eight. But, first in chapter seven we will examine the factors 
that enhanced the PSGs’ functioning more closely. 
  
7 
Factors that enhanced  
problem-solving groups’ 
achievements 
Introduction 
This chapter provides insight into how the PSGs were able to improve enrolment in 
the NHIS and explains the results using both positive and negative cases to examine 
factors that influenced the outcome of the intervention. Five main factors were 
identified to enhance PSGs’ work and led to positive outcome of the multi-
stakeholder problem-solving programme (MSPSP) are presented in Figure 7.1 These 
factors were mentioned and discussed at the facilitators’ training workshop, key 
informant interviews and FGDs and observed at PSG meetings and intervention 
activities. 
A recent study suggests that emphasis on how multi-site intervention programmes 
are implemented is necessary for evaluating their impact (Oakley et al. 2006). In this 
study, the examination of the MSPSP implementation process revealed that facilita-
tion approaches, stakeholders’ engagement, supervision of PSGs and motivation for 
members led to positive results. These factors created conducive group environment, 
built trust among PSG members and stakeholders, sustained their commitment to the 
intervention and led to an increase in enrolment. A synopsis of how these factors 
enhanced the PSGs’ work, ensured smooth implementation of the MSPSP and 
resulted in increased enrolment is provided in this chapter. Why some PSGs (those 
who did not employ these approaches) failed to increase enrolment is also examined 
and reference is made to particular cases to explain these outcomes. 
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Figure 7.1 Factors that enhanced PSGs’ functioning and achievements 
 
 
 
Facilitation approaches 
Quality of facilitation describes how facilitators conducted PSG activities in a 
manner that promoted group cohesiveness, cordial relationships among members 
and a sustained commitment to the MSPSP. Since the MSPSP’s objectives may not 
have been shared by every member to the same degree, facilitators needed to use 
approaches that would make them effective leaders and inspire the group to achieve 
positive results. Pillsbury (2008: 131) underscores the importance of facilitative 
skills as follows. “To be an effective leader, one must be driven by an impulse that 
solidifies a commitment to a vision…and connecting that vision and values to a 
position of responsibility for executing a programme.” With PSGs, it was not only 
the facilitators’ commitment to the vision of the intervention that was important, but 
also how to turn the intervention into a collective idea worthy of being followed by 
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members. Before they started work, facilitators were trained to adopt three main 
facilitation approaches: bottom-up, inclusive decision-making and interdependency. 
Bottom-up approach 
The bottom-up approach that the facilitators used was informed by Chambers’ 
(1992) description of what effective participation should be in his work on commu-
nity development. Chambers’ proposition emphasised that community members 
should define their realities and mobilise resources to address their needs. This was 
discussed and adopted at the facilitators’ workshop as a key guiding principle in 
implementing the intervention to ensure the effective participation of PSG members. 
Facilitators employed non-dominating processes in the conduct of PSG activities. 
PSG members designed the intervention, controlled the resources provided, and 
drew and implemented their own action plans. A typical strategy that the facilitators’ 
employed to achieve this was that they did not always lead PSG meetings and 
problem-solving sessions, but instead they often took a ‘back-seat’ after introducing 
the activities. This posture encouraged PSG members to come out with ideas that 
formed the basis of their discussion. For example, during the problem identification 
and prioritisation sessions, facilitators opened the meeting by briefing PSG members 
about the agenda and asked a community representative, health provider or DHIS 
representative to lead the activities. Members primarily controlled the discussion. 
Facilitators contributed ideas when necessary and ensured that the discussions 
remained focused on the agenda. In essence, the members identified the barriers, 
developed solutions and implementation strategies and drew their action plans. A 
PSG DHIS representative described how the bottom-up approach helped sustain 
members’ commitment in the intervention in the following statement. 
We remained committed to the intervention because facilitators depended on our experiences 
and ideas to plan activities. This helped us identify the ‘real’ problems that discouraged people 
from enrolling in the NHIS and renewing their membership. Everybody’s contribution led to the 
development of intervention activities and strategies that made it possible for us to reach every-
body. 
Inclusive decision-making and trust 
The inclusive decision-making adopted as a benchmark for PSGs’ effective func-
tioning is in line with Lasker & Weiss’ (2003) observation that collaboration must 
allow for inclusion and the equal participation of members in the process. In this 
study, facilitators addressed this issue in the PSGs’ activities by ensuring that every 
member played a leading role in the identification of barriers, development and 
implementation of activities at one time or another, depending on their capabilities. 
The facilitators did not behave as if they knew all the problems and solutions. This 
approach created trust and allayed the fear of isolation while preventing self-
alienation by members who were apprehensive about their effective participation 
from the beginning of the intervention. As Huckman (1987: 323) observed, “[g]roup 
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experience should satisfy rather than frustrate the personal needs of members.” This 
study also found that the facilitators’ encouragement of members to lead group 
activities and make decisions based on consensus satisfied the members’ sense of 
belonging. For example, Ebo who did not want to be part of the PSG because he 
could not speak English and feared alienation, became confident and contributed to 
discussions during PSG meetings and problem-solving sessions. 
A brief background to Ebo’s case is useful to illustrate my observation. I noticed 
Ebo when he rejected his nomination during the PSG creation meeting. All attempts 
by his peers to convince him to accept his nomination failed. Realising that they saw 
him as somebody who could be an effective member, I persuaded him to agree to be 
elected. He accepted my plea and was elected. Later, I observed him closely. I 
noticed that Ebo did not talk during the first two meetings. The facilitator had to 
persuade him to contribute to discussions during the third meeting and later made 
him responsible for arranging PSG meetings and intervention activities at the 
community. Six months into the intervention, I had a conversation with him about 
how he felt as a group member. Ebo described his feeling as follows: 
I’m happy in the group. At the beginning I didn’t want to be a member because I could not 
speak English so I felt I’ll be ignored, but when I became a member, the facilitator encouraged 
me to talk during meetings. We all decided how to do the work. I then realised I can do the 
work. Also, facilitators informed us about money received and we all decide how to spend it. 
There is no suspicion but trust among us. We are all working to achieve good results. 
On the basis of Ebo’s comment and my observation as a participant in the PSGs, I 
can say that the inclusive decision-making and the active role everybody played in 
the conduct of PSG activities created trust and commitment to achieve the group’s 
objectives. Ebo’s statement indicates that the facilitators’ encouragement of less 
confident members and recognition of members’ contributions as important in the 
decision-making process led to their active participation. Also, since no PSG 
member dominated the problem-solving sessions, trust developed among them and 
sustained their commitment to the group and the intervention. According to Currall 
and Inkpen (2006) trust develops over time among groups and individuals. They 
observed that building trust is an incremental process; one may trust in small ways 
first, see whether it is upheld or violated, and then proceed with caution in trusting 
one step at a time. In the current study, I observed that trust developed slowly among 
PSG members as the intervention progressed as a result of respect for each other’s 
views. However, its sustenance depended on the leaders’ ability to engage all 
members in deciding the best way to get things done and distributing key roles 
across the group. 
I must state however that this strategy was not applied in all PSGs. Some facilita-
tors dominated the PSG activities. This created distrust and stifled the group’s work 
and so the groups did not achieve positive results. The details of what happened will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Interdependency and trust 
Interdependency means that the group members depended on each other to carry out 
a task instead of acting individually. In the context of the MSPSP, interdependency 
involved the facilitators’ dependence on PSG members to plan and implement 
intervention activities and seeing each other as equals. This required that PSG 
members learned from each other and contributed towards the achievement of their 
objectives. The approach was used to create a conducive group environment similar 
to what Schwarz (2006: 300) described as a culture of collaboration: “All parties 
involved jointly design ways to work together to meet their related interests and 
learn with and from each other, sharing responsibility, authority, and accountability 
for achieving results.” 
In the case of the MSPSP, the PSG facilitators’ created a collaborative environ-
ment that made it possible to harness the members’ skills as the basis of their 
success. They achieved this by creating interdependent relationships so that the 
group could only function when everybody played his or her role. In applying this 
approach, the facilitators shared the roles for pre-intervention activities among 
members and ensured that each person played his or her role as expected. This led to 
smooth implementation of the group’s activities. A facilitator explained during a 
FGD how his reliance on the PSG members fostered synergy and ensured smooth 
implementation of their activities, which ultimately resulted in increased enrolment. 
I make sure every member felt as part of the group and we saw each other as equals. Everybody 
contributed to our activities. This inspired everybody to actively participate in the development 
and implementation of intervention activities and remained committed to the group. 
Interdependence among PSG members created a relationship based on mutual 
respect so that members saw themselves as equals and prevented dominance by a 
few members. For example, some members led group meetings and problem-solving 
sessions, while others wrote letters to invite guests, called members to remind them 
about meeting dates and time and arranged venue for intervention activities. These 
assignments made members accountable to the group and contributed to achieving 
positive results. Consistent with this finding is the observation by Williams (2001) 
that the presence of trust facilitates cooperative behaviour. In his study on ways of 
developing trust among dissimilar groups, he suggests that managers may structure 
tasks to ensure inclusiveness and cooperation among members. 
 
In summary, the bottom-up approach, inclusive decision-making and interdependen-
cy approaches created a favourable group environment and made it possible for PSG 
members to talk about issues that bothered them. The PSG facilitators’ non-
dominance and reliance on members encouraged the members to share their experi-
ences and ideas as well as critically analyse stakeholders’ behaviours and practices 
that negatively affected enrolment. This led to the appreciation of each other’s 
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challenges and influenced the PSG members to see their contribution as valuable in 
the intervention process and put their shoulders to the wheel while contributing 
ideas to achieve set objectives. This discussion illustrates how the facilitation 
approaches influenced PSG members to attend meetings regularly and participate 
effectively in the intervention to ensure they achieved positive results. 
Engaging stakeholders in leadership and professional roles 
The key advantage of engaging all stakeholders, including leaders and professionals, 
in the MSPSP is that it helped reveal multiple perspectives of barriers to enrolment 
and retention in the NHIS and led to the development of appropriate solutions and 
implementation strategies. Instead of serving as targets of the intervention, the 
stakeholders in leadership and professional roles were engaged from the onset and 
participated in all phases of the MSPSP. The five PSGs (seven PSGs in total) that 
engaged with the community and opinion leaders, heads and staff of health facilities, 
DHIS managers and their staff were able to achieve a significant increase in enrol-
ment. For example, in fishing communities engaging community and opinion 
leaders, chief fishermen, boat owners and pataase leaders in implementing interven-
tion activities made it possible to access the difficult-to-reach community members. 
Similarly, chief farmers’ and cocoa purchasing clerks’ involvement in the interven-
tion made it possible to reach all farmers. Difficult-to-reach community members 
included fishermen (who were mostly at sea) and farmers (who spent most of their 
time in their farms), who could not be reached with community-wide activities such 
as durbars and house-to-house visits. The support from key specific stakeholders 
contributed to an increased enrolment in those communities. The two other PSGs 
that did not engage specific key stakeholders (as mentioned above) failed to increase 
enrolment. 
Health providers and DHIS staff’s involvement in the MSPSP helped reduce 
negative practices such as a preference for cash-paying patients and the sale of drugs 
covered by the NHIS to insured patients in health facilities. Their contribution as 
advocates of the NHIS in health facilities convinced people who were sceptical 
about their commitment to the scheme to change their attitudes. A PSG community 
facilitator explained in a FGD how they were able to increase enrolment as follows: 
We were able to increase enrolment because of the support of boat owners, community leaders, 
health providers and DHIS staff. All of them took part in executing intervention activities. This 
made things easy for us to be able to reach everybody. For us [as] community facilitators, our 
leaders’ involvement in the intervention put pressure on us to work hard to sustain members’ 
commitment to ensure success. For example, the nurse who showed her NHIS card to patients 
actually helped convince many people to enrol. 
A community member who enrolled during a mass registration exercise in a con-
versation explained why she enrolled: 
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I enrolled because of how our leaders are working with DHIS staff to explain health insurance to 
us and address our concerns. The nurses’ presence in particular showed they support it. Also, 
holding meetings here and hearing about benefits of insurance from people here convinced me to 
enrol. In addition, the collector’s and volunteer’s regular visits to my house, education at 
schools, churches and the mass registration exercises during the fishing season when we had 
money was helpful. The more they came to talk to us, the more my children harassed me to enrol 
them. 
A DHIS staff in another FGD explained how they were able to improve enrol-
ment. 
The regular meetings made us see the intervention as a collective one and encouraged us to 
commit ourselves to change community members’ attitudes towards health insurance and health 
providers and DHIS staff’s practices that discourage people from enrolling. 
These comments and events suggest that bringing stakeholders in leadership and 
professional roles together to share NHIS related experiences and implementation 
challenges led to better conceptualisation of the MSPSP and contributed to its 
success. PSGs’ mass registration exercises during fishing and cocoa seasons every 
fortnight when people had money contributed to PSGs’ success in increasing 
enrolment. These findings underscore the need for collectors to be situated in all 
communities whether rural, urban or within DHISs’ office locations. 
The cooperation among these stakeholders built inter-institutional linkages and a 
synergy that helped achieve positive outcome. The linkages helped mobilise support 
for the intervention, removed explicit resistance and aided smooth implementation. 
The synergy that Lasker et al. (2001) point out creates an advantage in collabora-
tions and in the case of the MSPSP it built trust, gave more credibility to the 
intervention, tapped information about the local environment and made it possible to 
reach target populations that could not have been reached otherwise. 
Robertson & Minkler (1994) observe that treating stakeholders as targets of poli-
cies and consumers of problem-solving efforts undermines collaborative effort. The 
two PSG facilitators who did not involve stakeholders in leadership and professional 
roles and treated them as objects of the intervention were unable to achieve positive 
results. This indicates that the significant increase in NHIS enrolment was as a result 
of the effective engagement of stakeholders in leadership and professional roles. 
Trust among stakeholders 
The involvement of stakeholders from various levels helps to build ownership and 
create favourable conditions for the development of commitment to the intervention 
(Hawkes et al. 2004, Nastasi & Hitchcock 2009). In this study, stakeholder engage-
ment in the PSG intervention fostered changes in behaviour, created confidence in 
the NHIS and encouraged people to enrol. I observed that the interaction between 
PSG members and their distribution of tasks to ensure that all parties participated 
determined their success. Mutual trust among stakeholders seemed to be an im-
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portant condition for effective functioning since it reduced the power differentials 
among the individuals within the PSGs. 
Managing tension in PSG intervention meetings 
I noticed that the way that PSG intervention meetings were conducted diffused the 
tension apparent at the beginning that I was worried might lead to confrontation. In 
one meeting, I observed tension left over from a durbar (organised by the PSG) 
when people aggressively accused health providers of giving preference to cash-
paying patients and malfeasance at the facility. For example, Nurse Julia put up a 
‘very serious face’ before the start of the meeting. She did not smile at any PSG 
member as she usually does. I could see from her countenance that she was ready to 
respond in a hostile way if someone said anything negative about health providers. 
However, the facilitator presented problems identified at all three levels (communi-
ty, health facility, and national), informed those in attendance about intervention 
activities that had been conducted so far in the community, and stated that the group 
was there to listen to the health providers’ side of the story. Thus, the tension in the 
room gradually disappeared. Nurse Julia contributed to the discussion and talked 
freely about her experience with insured patients. 
Supervision of PSGs: regional and local 
Supervision of PSGs was instituted to ensure that the facilitators adhered to the 
MSPSP’s general implementation guidelines. NHIA regional managers accepted 
adding the PSGs’ supervision to their routine monitoring of DHISs and DHIS 
managers or District Director of Health Services (DDHSs)1 were local supervisors. 
The supervisors agreed to visit the PSGs quarterly to ensure that they implemented 
the intervention activities outlined in their action plans at the regional stakeholders 
meetings organised by the research team. 
This monitoring strategy aimed to create linkages between the regional, district 
and local levels and was informed by Glaser & Taylor’s (1973) and Davis & 
Howden-Chapman’s (1996) observations that if an organisational authority structure 
is bypassed when introducing change, the process can be inhibited. Involving 
authority structures becomes even more important when the change is initiated from 
outside the organisation and staff support must be solicited. It was observed in this 
study that engaging regional and district officials ensured a smooth implementation 
of the MSPSP and built support across levels. PSG facilitators and members told me 
that being supervised influenced them to remain committed to the intervention’s 
success. Moreover, since the ultimate goal of the study was to integrate the MSPSP 
                                              
1
  Only one DDHS was involved in supervising PSGs, and this was because the DHIS manager was the 
facilitator. 
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into the DHIS structure, the NHIA regional and DHIS managers’ and DDHSs’ 
supervisory roles were expected to make them appreciate the MSPSP and under-
stand how PSGs were formed and functioned so they could facilitate scaling-up if 
needed. A PSG health provider representative explained why she remained commit-
ted to the group: 
Our bosses [supervisors] are watching and will be disappointed if we don’t achieve positive 
results. So I have to uphold the confidence they have in me. Also, the Director’s presence in 
some of our intervention activities influenced me to work hard so we could achieve our goal. 
Regional supervisors did not perform well 
On the part of the regional supervisors, later events indicate that though they 
accepted monitoring PSG activities, giving them the responsibility over estimated 
their commitment to the MSPSP. For example, one regional supervisor participated 
in only one PSG meeting and two intervention activities during the twenty-month 
period instead of the quarterly visits required. A PSG facilitator shared his thoughts 
about regional supervisors’ performance and reasoned they did not perform their 
role diligently: 
The regional supervisor does not feel personally accountable for the success or failure of the 
intervention since he does not have to show results. When he came here, he only spoke with 
Gaby [facilitator and the DHIS manager]. He did not talk to any of us. 
I also spoke to one of the regional supervisors to find out why he had not per-
formed his task as expected. He told a research teammate during the course of the 
intervention that he thought the intervention was over. Though he gave reasons for 
his inability to visit PSGs, such as not receiving their action plans early enough, I 
suspect that he did not see himself as personally accountable for the MSPSP’s 
success or failure. 
Local supervisors performed well 
Local supervisors, on the other hand, showed more commitment and participated in 
PSG activities regularly. A PSG secretary praised a DHIS manager as follows: 
The DHIS manager [local supervisor], compared to the regional supervisor, performed his role 
better. Unlike the regional supervisor, who only participated in two intervention activities as 
against the quarterly visits required, he attended meetings and our activities regularly and asked 
what we are doing. This made us remain committed to achieving our objectives. 
These comments suggest that PSG facilitators and members, knowing their su-
pervisors were closely observing them, made a conscious effort to achieve the goals 
of the MSPSP. However, since enrolment also increased in communities where 
regional supervisors did not visit, the impression among PSG members was that the 
regional supervisors did not contribute much to their success. This indicates that 
more attention should be given to district-level supervision. It is better to engage 
supervisory authorities closer to the implementation site, in this case the DHIS 
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managers, rather than those further away to oversee intervention groups. This also 
gives credence to a bottom-up approach as a major strategy to achieve intervention 
goals. 
Motivation of PSG members 
Personal commitment to promote the wellbeing of others was a key motivational 
factor for the PSGs’ success, but monetary incentives were also important. PSG 
members received a small allowance of GH¢ 8.00 [about US$5.00] for transport and 
lunch to encourage them to attend meetings. Nothing was given for participating in 
intervention activities. I observed that while many PSG members attended meetings 
regularly and participated in intervention activities, some did not. This raises the 
question of what actually motivated some to be committed to the MSPSP, while 
others were not bothered. The following excerpt from a FGD with PSG members 
reveals what inspired them to participate in the MSPSP and remain committed. 
Agnes: Why did you actively participate in PSG activities? 
Community representative: Though the allowance of GH¢ 8.00 for attending meetings was 
important, it was too small to be the main motivator. Nothing was given for planning and carry-
ing out intervention activities. We remained committed because we were seen as capable of 
ensuring that the intervention succeeds. Also, the marked ‘T shirts’ by which we were identified 
sustained our commitment to achieving positive results. 
Health providers’ representative: We were not given any money for implementing intervention 
activities, which took many hours. So money was not the main motivator, but recognition of our 
potential to achieve results. Those who were not active often complained the allowance was too 
small; they were not bothered whether the intervention succeeded or not. 
DHIS facilitator: The fuel I usually buy to come here is more than what I get for attending 
meetings. But I feel I have to get people enrolled and ensure they receive quality healthcare. 
Agnes: What about those who were not regular at meetings and intervention activities? 
Community representatives: It is because they were not concerned about the wellbeing of others. 
In this community, it is common to find individuals organising activities that promote the wel-
fare of others. For example, Baaba [pointing to the volunteer] is not really paid for carrying out 
activities that promote the health of community members. 
Agnes: Auntie Baaba why were you committed to the intervention? 
Baaba: Though I’m not paid and only given ‘small’ money, just like what I do for the hospital, 
I’m happy to contribute to the community’s wellbeing and also happy that the community and 
health facility recognise my effort as helping improve people’s health. 
PSG members’ levels of participation 
I noticed during the course of the intervention that the PSGs devised various ways of 
making members feel more connected to the group and participate in its activities; 
unfortunately, insufficient monetary rewards resulted in apathy among some 
members. Though participation in group activities is often perceived as based on 
  
175
self-interest (Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990), the findings here suggest that in the PSGs, 
it goes beyond that and is comparable to what Tocqueville (1840) describes as 
enlightened self-interest. He observed that though self-interest is seen as primary in 
people’s lives, they commit themselves to social institutions that transcend their 
private worlds. Tocqueville concluded that both self and social interests are neces-
sary to prevent the pursuit of only private interests to ensure that the weak are not 
left behind. Thus, the behaviour of non-active PSG members could be described as 
lack of social interest. They were not ready to sacrifice their time to attend meetings 
or participate in intervention activities. 
Conclusion 
Olson (1965) in his analysis of group behaviour observed that most people value 
social status, personal prestige and self-esteem, which he termed social incentives to 
group-oriented action that makes the individual contribute towards the achievement 
of collective goals. In a way, the PSG members’ commitment to ensure that every-
one enrolled in the NHIS and had access to healthcare was based on social incen-
tives. As PSG members’ pointed out, their commitment to the MSPSP was not so 
much the money they got for attending meetings, but rather the desire of ensuring 
that almost every community member was enrolled, provided with quality 
healthcare and not cheated. But underlying this was the value of being recognised 
among peers and the ability to contribute to the welfare of community members. 
This notwithstanding, the allowance also contributed to sustaining PSG members’ 
commitment to the intervention. To some, it solved the problem of money for 
transport to attend meetings. Thus both self-interest and societal interest were 
necessary to sustain the voluntary spirit and keep people committed to intervention 
programmes to ensure that the vulnerable in society also have access to collective 
goods (in this case, healthcare through the NHIS). However, there were others who 
seemed to see money as their main motivation; hence they were not motivated by 
the token incentives given to PSG members. 
  
8 
Factors that limited problem-
solving groups’ achievements 
Introduction 
The problem-solving group (PSGs) increased overall enrolment in the NHIS. 
However, disaggregation of the data by community showed that enrolment increased 
in 11 communities, declined in 2 communities and did not change in 2 communities 
(see Table A.9, Appendix 2). Thus the intervention failed to achieve positive results 
in four communities. This chapter examines first which factors might have impeded 
the functioning of the PSGs leading to some of these disappointing results. In the 
second half of the chapter, I will reflect on six challenges to health insurance 
enrolment, which the PSGs failed to improve appreciably. 
Factors that impeded the PSGs’ functioning 
The PSG members attributed their failure to the facilitators’ non-adherence to the 
multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme’s (MSPSP) implementation guide-
lines. Qualitative information revealed four PSG-specific issues that contributed to 
this failure: (1) facilitator domination of PSGs and lack of trust, (2) stakeholders in 
leadership and professional roles were not included in activities, (3) no local 
collectors, and (4) a lack of supervision. 
Facilitator domination and lack of trust 
Some facilitators down played the importance of making PSG members the design-
ers of the intervention and adopting inclusive decision-making and interdependency 
approaches in facilitating activities. These facilitators dominated group activities, 
made decisions without members’ consent and did not allow members to play 
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leading roles. This situation was revealed during my visits to the PSGs where 
members in a conversation complained about the facilitators’ behaviour. A PSG 
secretary explained the situation in the group as follows: 
We lost interest in the intervention because of Gaby’s [facilitator, DHIS staff] domineering 
behaviour. He has turned the intervention into a one-man show. He does not call meetings and 
do things without informing us and rejects action plans we drew in his absence. This eroded the 
trust we had in him. Now the group just exists in name. No serious activity is going on. 
To check what I had been told, I scheduled a meeting with Gaby and travelled on 
two occasions to discuss the allegations against him, but he gave excuses so we 
could not meet. I also sent Gaby a couple of emails about the accusations, but he did 
not respond or resume the PSG activities. I reported his behaviour to the regional 
supervisor. Below is an abridged version of an email communication from the 
supervisor. I changed the names of the community and persons mentioned in the 
email to protect their identity. Report on my investigation into PSG activities at 
Mensakrom (abridged version): 
Per your request for further investigation into the activities of the PSG at Mensakrom, I made 
contacts with a number of PSG members to find out first-hand information on their activities. 
The key observations were: 
• Gaby was solely responsible for the activities of the PSG to the extent that when he was not 
available, decisions and activities planned cannot be carried out. PSG meetings and interven-
tion activities are postponed anytime he is not available. 
• Ato [the community facilitator], who is a signatory to the PSG account disclosed that Gaby 
has about GH¢ 950.00 of the funds for the intervention with him. Gaby corroborated this rev-
elation and pledged to make the money available for PSG activities. 
Key stakeholders excluded from the intervention activities 
Stakeholders in leadership and professional roles were not involved in the interven-
tion and no activity was organised at health facilities or DHIS offices. An FGD with 
PSG members at the end of the intervention also confirmed the above observation. 
The following is an excerpt of their explanation as to why they could not increase 
enrolment. 
Agnes: How can you explain your inability to improve enrolment and retain members in the 
NHIS? 
Community representative: We [PSG members] were ready to work but for Gaby’s behaviour. 
He made the intervention his personal property. We went to his office to complain about the 
group’s inactivity. His behaviour discouraged us so we relaxed. For a long time, no meeting or 
intervention activity has taken place. 
Health provider: We were unable to improve enrolment because we did not follow the interven-
tion guidelines. We did not involve community leaders, health providers and DHIS staff in our 
activities. Even there is no collector to register those we managed to convince to enrol. 
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No local collectors 
One significant issue was that there were no collectors in two communities out of 
the seven in the Central Region that registered people who decided to enrol after the 
intervention activities. Both the health provider above and a PSG community 
representative in the second group’s FGD (the group whose NHIS memberships had 
declined) below mentioned this problem. 
Lack of supervision 
Finally, the facilitators’ local supervisors – a DHIS manager and a DDHSs – were 
transferred during the course of the intervention and so did not benefit from supervi-
sion. Comments from the abovementioned FGD continue here. 
DHIS staff: Our inability to improve enrolment was due to lack of supervision. The supervisors 
did not do their work well. This made it possible for Gaby to sideline us and do whatever he 
wants. It was an over expectation on your part that both the regional supervisor and Gaby would 
perform their task without your supervision. 
Further evidence of these four issues related to problem-solving groups’ failures 
To explore further why the two PSGs out of the seven in the Central Region could 
not increase enrolment, I engaged members of the second group in an FGD. They 
also mentioned the four obstacles above as causing their PSGs’ abysmal perfor-
mance. They explained that these problems made people lose interest in the inter-
vention. A PSG community representative explained why they could not improve 
enrolment as follows: 
Our failure was obvious. No regular meetings and intervention activity has taken place for 
months. Even the few we carried out, health providers and DHIS staff were not involved. No 
activity was carried out at health facilities and DHIS offices as required. No collector here to 
register those who we convinced to enrol. The facilitator’s domineering behaviour made us lose 
interest in the intervention. 
 
In summary, events in these two communities that did not improve enrolment and 
the comments illustrate the central role facilitators’ played in the intervention. The 
evidence indicates that the facilitators’ dominating behaviour failed to create the 
trust needed to sustain PSG members’ interest in the intervention and eventually 
stalled PSG activities. Previous findings in similar research have documented that 
trust is indispensable in collaborative relationships (Gambetta 2000, Currall & 
Inkpen 2006). Second, the two facilitators’ non-compliance with the intervention 
implementation guidelines largely accounted for the lack of intervention impact. 
This indicates that supervision was critical to the PSGs’ success, since some 
facilitators are not likely to do the right thing if left alone. As Durlak & DuPre 
(2008) premise that effective programme implementation is associated with better 
outcomes. Third, the facilitators failed because they did not follow implementation 
procedures, engage all stakeholders or make sure that collectors were available. 
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Finally, they did not promptly address challenges the PSGs faced or motivate them 
to resume their activities. All of the above mentioned issues could have been 
managed if the two facilitators had had appropriate supervision. Thus, supervision of 
facilitators’ programme implementation is as critical as the programme’s formula-
tion and so must be given equal attention. 
Why problem-solving groups failed to achieve maximum impact 
This section examines some areas where the PSGs were less successful. The four 
factors that undermined the PSGs’ efforts to encourage significantly more people to 
enrol and regularly renew their memberships are presented in Figure 8.1. These 
were poverty and inadequate exemption for the core poor, community members’ 
negative attitudes towards health insurance, the shortage of drugs in health facilities 
and the requests for unauthorised fees at health facilities. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Factors that limited the problem-solving group’s achievements 
 
 
 
 
Poverty and inadequate exemptions for the core poor 
The NHIS was introduced to ensure equitable access to healthcare particularly for 
the poor. The law stipulated premium exemptions for the core poor notably identi-
fied as indigents. However, literature on NHIS indicates that enrolment among the 
poor is low (Witter & Garshong 2009, Asante & Aikins 2008, Sarpong et al. 2010). 
Asante and Aikins (2008) in their study in Eastern and Brong Ahafo Region ob-
served that the poor are not enrolling because the premium was expensive. In this 
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study, however, the poor indicated that the cost of premium was reasonable and 
health insurance was better than on-the-spot-payments. So why is enrolment among 
the poor and the poorest quintile so low? Based on the qualitative information 
gathered during and after the intervention, two reasons were revealed: people had no 
or inadequate income to enrol all household members and exemptions were not 
being granted to the core poor. 
The cumulative money required to enrol an entire household was too high for the 
poor since they have many dependents. One woman explained: “I know insurance is 
good and the premium is reasonable, but look at me, I don’t get much money from 
the fish I sell and nobody helps me. How can I insure myself and my five children? I 
wanted to pay for only the children, but the collector refused.” A boat owner, and 
community PSG representative, also explained why few poor enrol in the following 
statement in an FGD. 
Many people could not enrol and renew their card because of poverty. These days we go to sea 
and come back with almost nothing so the small income they get cannot be used to pay for 
insurance. For the core poor, even money to buy food is a problem. So there are some people 
who have to be exempted. Look at those people we [PSG members] recommended; only one 
was exempted. Even that you have to persuade them [the collector and DHIS staff] before they 
gave it to her. 
These comments indicate that the poor’s inability to pay premium is a result of 
low or no income. For example, the core poor are described as persons afflicted by 
‘ohia buburoo’ (severe poverty). They did not have regular source of livelihood and 
engaged in menial jobs that provided an income they could barely live on; therefore, 
the health insurance premium was beyond their means. There were a few people 
who wanted to enrol only their children because they felt their children needed to be 
insured. Some of them came to me asking for help to pay the premium or get an 
exemption. Others were introduced to me by community leaders for support. 
Although children are exempted from paying premiums, the NHIRs 2004 (LI 1809: 
56) stipulates that they are registered only if a parent or guardian is enrolled. Though 
this provision has been modified and registration of children 0-5 years of age has 
been decoupled from their parents and guardians in 2010, parental requests to enrol 
only their children (below 18 years) was often not granted by collectors. 
The poverty literature suggests that the poor remain uninsured because of liquidi-
ty and other behavioural constraints, even when they might be better off with 
insurance. Schneider (2004) in his explanation of low enrolment among the poor in 
low- and middle-income countries observes that they rely on solidarity from family 
and friends to smooth out financial shocks related to ill health. However, community 
support for the core poor in this study during ill health was virtually absent. The 
reality was often described as follows: “Abusua dc funu sen yarefo” (The extended 
family loves a corpse than a sick person). This implies that support is more likely to 
be provided to extended family members after death for a funeral than during ill 
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health. Thus, the absence of family support and no or little income to pay insurance 
premiums make it imperative to grant the poor an exemption to ensure their inclu-
sion in the NHIS. However, like earlier studies, the majority of the core poor in this 
study did not benefit from exemptions. Witter & Garshong (2009), in their assess-
ment of the NHIS coverage found that exemptions granted to indigents in 2008 
formed only one per cent of Ghana’s population. Thus, the comments above 
(combined with our survey results show that 17.6 per cent of the core poor were 
insured) when compared with the 28.5 per cent of Ghanaians living below the 
poverty line (GLSS V) indicate that the poor are not benefiting from exemptions. 
DHIS representatives often provide explanations as to why they did not grant 
exemptions to the core poor. They said that the law defines the poor as homeless. 
PSG members usually rejected this definition. They argued that the criterion was not 
reasonable, since no one is homeless in their communities, but people were very 
poor and could not pay the premiums, so they needed to be exempted. Further 
discussions with DHIS staff and collectors indicated that they were not enthusiastic 
about identifying indigents for exemptions, but were more interested in revenue 
generation. DHIS staff’s comments and countenance when discussing the issue 
revealed their unwillingness to undertake activities to identify the core poor who 
were referred to as indigents in the policy for exemptions. The criteria for identify-
ing the core poor are stipulated in the National Health Insurance Regulations 
(NHIRs) 2004, LI 1809: 58 as follows: 
1. A person shall not be classified as an indigent under a district scheme unless that person 
a. is unemployed and has no visible source of income. 
b. does not have a fixed place of residence according to standards determined by the DHIS. 
c. does not live with a person who is employed and who has a fixed place of residence 
d. does not have any identifiable consistent support from another person. 
2. The conditions under sub-regulation (1) for ascertaining who is an indigent shall be incorpo-
rated in the registration form of a district scheme. 
3. A person assigned the duty by a district scheme of registering persons for the scheme, shall 
elicit the information required under the sub regulation (1) for the classification of indigents as 
part of the registration process. 
4. Every district scheme shall keep and publish a list of indigents in its area of operation and 
submit the list to the NHIA for validation. 
Though these criteria are restrictive, the DHIISs seemed uncommitted to under-
take any activity to identify the poor. Their decision was often based on the financial 
implications for their offices and not the fact that the core poor could not be identi-
fied. As stated in 1b above, the DHIISs have the mandate to determine what applies 
in their district regarding the homelessness criterion. However, they used this 
criterion as an excuse for not exempting the core poor. The following comment by a 
DHIS staff illustrates their attitude towards granting exemptions to the core poor. 
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We use the homelessness criterion, which disqualifies almost everybody, but go to the aid of 
those who cannot pay their hospital bill when referred to us mostly by the facility authorities. 
We need money so if we go to communities and tell them about exemption for the core poor, 
how do we get revenue? 
This comment indicates that although identification difficulties exist, the lack of 
commitment to ensure the core poor’s inclusion in the NHIS contributes to their low 
enrolment. This finding supports earlier work that exemptions in Ghana have not 
achieved their goal (Nyonator & Kutzin 1999, Garshong et al. 2001, Badasu 2004). 
In her review of exemptions under the user-fee regimes, Badasu (2004) cited a lack 
of specificity of identification criteria and financial reimbursement as the main 
causes of their failure. This study found that the problem is wider. The main 
problem was DHISs’ lack of interest in implementing the policy. They pursue 
activities to enrol premium-paying members and virtually do nothing to identify 
indigents thus causing their exclusion from the NHIS. Their emphasis on the 
homelessness criterion, a situation that does not exist in their districts, and disregard 
of the local conditions stated in the policy such as unemployment and no visible 
source of income that could be used to identify indigents, illustrate the DHISs’ staff 
and collectors in attention to the exemption policy. As the manager indicated, they 
waited until people cannot pay their hospital bill before going to their rescue and 
granting them an exemption. Throughout my fieldwork, I did not see DHISs’ staff or 
collectors make a conscious effort to ensure that the core poor were identified and 
enrolled. 
To conclude, the condition of the core poor makes it imperative to grant them 
exemptions to ensure their inclusion in the NHIS. However, it appears that the 
DHISs focus more on their revenue-generating function to the exclusion of exempt-
ing the core poor from premium payments, thereby denying them access to 
healthcare. The revelation that the NHIS is not reaching the poor, as expected, calls 
for a rethinking of the exemption policy. Monitoring the implementation process 
and devising more effective strategies to ensure that the NHIS’ goal of removing 
financial barriers to access to healthcare services, are needed. 
Negative attitude towards health insurance 
By the end of the intervention, community members generally acknowledged that 
health insurance protects the insured against catastrophic healthcare expenditures 
and so perceived the NHIS as better than cash payment at health facilities. There 
was also the view that they had a better appreciation of the health providers’ heavy 
workloads and that discrimination against insured patients has reduced. As a result 
of these positive observations, all those who participated in the intervention ex-
pressed disappointment about the generally low levels of enrolment and high non-
renewal rates. More surprising was the less than 50 per cent enrolment among the 
rich (46%) and richest (44%) quintiles and high non-renewal rates of 24 per cent. 
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This indicates that the general low enrolment and retention rates were not because of 
poverty. Collectors said they were not too surprised and maintained that only a few 
people renewed their cards promptly; others waited until they needed healthcare. 
The following excerpt from a FGD with PSG members provides some of the reasons 
that account for low enrolment despite the PSGs efforts to improve enrolment and 
renewal rates. 
Agnes: Why have some people never enrolled in the NHIS? 
NHIS collector: Despite the education about health insurance, many people still say I’m not 
often sick. As we have been discussing their participation in traditional mutual support groups 
influence their behaviour. People join only when they are sure of benefitting. We describe it as: 
‘You reap as you sow’. Men in particular say health insurance is for children and women who 
often go to hospital. 
PSG secretary [health provider]: The low interest in health insurance, though improved, has not 
changed much. They know health insurance is important, but will not enrol until they have a 
serious sickness. Many delay and come to the hospital with complications to disturb us. 
Agnes: What about those who do not renew their membership? 
Community PSG facilitator: Insuring against ill health, we all know, is not part of our culture. 
What we know is to regularly pay funeral dues because we know we will benefit. This explains 
why people are reluctant to renew their NHIS card every year, especially if they have not gone 
to the hospital. When you ask them they say meretwen kakra (I’m waiting for a little while). But 
they will rush to renew when they are sick. Some renew only after they have been admitted to 
the hospital. 
Community representative [GPRTU1 chairman]: If health insurance was treated like motor 
insurance all drivers would have been insured. People don’t care because nobody is punished for 
not enrolling or having a valid health insurance card. We would have consistently renewed our 
cards if we were punished as it is done in the case of motor insurance. 
Influence of mutual support practices 
I also met a few people at DHIS offices who were renewing their NHIS cards 
because they were sick and others who came to enrol because they needed 
healthcare. For example, during one of my routine observational visits to a DHIS 
office, I met Joe who looked desperate and asked him what was wrong. He respond-
ed angrily: “Madam I thought I didn’t need health insurance but for this sickness. 
Now I’ve registered and my card is delaying.” When I queried him further, he said: 
“I need the card to go to hospital for hernia surgery.” 
Joe’s comment and PSG members’ views expressed above reveal that the com-
munity members’ conceptualisation of the NHIS is still influenced by the traditional 
mutual support group they participate in. The comments also indicate that although 
many people accepted the NHIS as better than on-the-spot payment and recognised 
the need to enrol and renew their membership; this did not translate into action. 
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Hence, there was a pervasive risk-averse attitude towards health insurance and 
adverse selection (enrolling only family members who appear to be at risk) that 
made it virtually impossible for the PSGs to get more people to enrol and renew 
their membership regularly. These attitudes are extensively reported in the literature 
on health insurance schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa as undermining their expansion 
(Arhinful 2003, Criel & Waelkens 2003, Kamuzora & Gilson 2007). In their study 
of a Community Health Fund (CHF) in Tanzania, Kamuzora & Gilson (2007) 
observed that non-acceptance of paying before falling sick undermines the expan-
sion of the CHF, but they did not explain the reason behind this attitude. 
This study found two main reasons underlying people’s decision to join or not 
join and remain in the NHIS. First, and ironically, local insurance traditions do not 
help convince people to join the NHIS, but rather discourage them to do so. Indeed, 
traditional mutual support practices have negative influence on people’s attitude 
towards health insurance. Analysis of their operation shows that though they have a 
health insurance element, their operational guidelines for risk-sharing principles are 
not the same. In a review of the concepts underlying traditional risk-sharing, 
Platteau (1997) noted that traditional mutual support schemes are based on balanced 
or generalised reciprocity, while insurance is based on conditional reciprocity. Under 
balanced and generalised reciprocity, people receive as much benefit as they contribute. 
For conditional reciprocity, on the other hand, insured persons receive a return only if 
they fall sick. The ‘reap as you sow’ principle observed among traditional support 
groups facilitates cooperation and exchange of services and obligations among 
members, but they are largely based on balanced reciprocity and the certainty of 
benefiting. In many of these groups, such as nnoboa and savings and loan arrange-
ments used to manage livelihood activities, the benefits are largely proportional to 
one’s contribution and not need. As already stated, in the case of nnoboa, people 
join only when they need support to sow and harvest crops and weed their farm and 
pull out from the group until another farming season. 
Other groups such as pataase, which focus on life events, mainly death, are well 
patronised because they cover the funeral costs of the members, their spouse, 
children and parents. So people join and remain committed because they are sure of 
benefitting. Explanations provided by key informants indicate that they perceive the 
NHIS’ benefit as limited in scope and only for the individual. For example, death is 
seen as certain so one has to contribute towards it, hence the preference to pay 
funeral dues. Sickness, on the other hand, is perceived as a random event, which the 
healthy believe might not befall them, so they are reluctant to enrol and remain in 
the NHIS. Thus the logic of not enrolling in the NHIS was that it is a risk-sharing 
arrangement where their investment may not benefit them. This explains why only 
household members who are likely to need healthcare are enrolled. This practice is 
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technically referred to as ‘adverse selection’ and contributed to the low enrolment 
and renewal rates among the average and rich quintiles. 
Many respondents expressed the view that despite complaints of shortage of 
drugs and payments of unauthorised fees, being insured was still better than cash 
payment at health facilities. So they rush to register or renew their membership only 
when they need healthcare. This indicates that they appreciate the benefits of health 
insurance, but apply the reciprocity principle of traditional support groups. This 
attitude negates the policy makers’ assumption that because many Ghanaians 
already participate in traditional mutual support networks they will willingly enrol 
and remain in the scheme. Rather, the incentive for enrolling and remaining in the 
NHIS is based on individual gains and largely informed by their health status and 
not a motive of embarking on a risk-sharing endeavour that requires the commit-
ment of all to succeed. 
Unenlightened self-interest 
Joe’s case conveys the pervasive nature of community members’ risk-averse attitude 
towards health insurance. PSG members’ assertions that apart from the core poor 
and poor people with many dependents, anybody willing to enrol all household 
members and renew their membership can pay a premium of GH¢ 14 [US10.00] and 
registration fee of GH¢ 4.00 [US2.50] per annum illustrates that the ‘wait and see’ 
attitude was not due to poverty. Thus the views and observations above show a 
pervasive negative attitude towards health insurance. This finding is consistent with 
earlier work on enrolment in SHISs and CBHISs. In his study, Arhinful (2003) 
explored the reason why people do or do not enrol in health insurance schemes in 
Ghana and found that the motive of enrolling is a self-interest goal of averting risk. 
In another study, Criel & Waelkens (2003) made the same observation when they 
explored reasons for low enrolment in the Maliando Scheme in Guinea Conakry. 
They found that poverty was not the most outstanding barrier to enrolment, but 
rather there were other behavioural constraints. In the current study, a careful 
appraisal of the discussions suggests that apart from the core poor and the poor, the 
‘no money to pay’ and ‘I am waiting for a while’ excuses for not enrolling or 
renewing their membership were socially desirable reasons to cover less worthy 
motives. The fact that people quickly enrol or renew their memberships when they 
need healthcare illustrates that though people have accepted that the NHIS is better 
than on-the-spot payment and appreciate its implementation challenges, they 
comfortably adopt strategies to derive maximum benefit with minimum financial 
investment. I call this ‘unenlightened self- interest’ because eventually the situation 
will turn out to be less advantageous for the people. They will pay more when they 
have to access healthcare without health insurance since the cost of treating malaria 
almost equals the cost of premium. Their action is also a threat to sustainability of 
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the scheme, which requires regular contributions into a common fund so that those 
who fall ill will be catered for to ensure individual and societal progress. 
Summarising, some people’s reluctance to enrol and renew their membership in 
the NHIS is influenced by their knowledge of traditional risk-sharing arrangements. 
However, it needs to be pointed out that even in such networks, tendencies for 
exploitation exist, but sanctions are used to ensure fulfilment of the agreed arrange-
ment based on trust. Mutually agreed sanctions are effectively applied to prevent 
exploitation for individual benefits. Unfortunately, in the case of NHIS, lack of 
enforcement of such mechanisms, perpetuates risk aversion and adverse selection 
practices where people rush to renew their cards only when they needed healthcare 
without paying penalties. As Putnam (1995: 67) points out: “When economic 
negotiation is embedded in dense networks ... , incentives for opportunism arise.” It 
is to check such opportunistic tendencies that the NHIRs 2004 LI 1809 59(1)2 needs 
to be applied to sanction defaulters. As a GPRTU chairman indicated, many people 
did not enrol or renew their membership because there was no sanction to discour-
age them. 
Finally, for any intervention aimed at promoting the NHIS to achieve maximum 
impact, it is critical to identify issues in the social environment and conditions under 
which traditional risk-sharing network operate, educate people about the similarities 
and differences, and enforce regulations that prevent exploitation of the scheme. 
This suggests that a more practicable way of moving the NHIS towards universal 
coverage is needed. 
Shortage of drugs in health facilities 
The shortage of drugs3 was a concern for both community members and health 
providers. Both saw it as undermining healthcare delivery to insured patients and by 
consequence limiting the PSGs’ efforts to improve NHIS enrolment and retention of 
members. 
In the case of the community members, there was consensus that people enrolled 
because of the PSGs’ assurance that they would receive quality service, which to 
them included being given drugs at health facilities. So when this expectation was 
not met, and the community members were given prescriptions to get drugs else-
where, some decided not to renew their memberships. This situation also discour-
aged people from enrolling. Insured patients were mostly concerned about going 
                                              
2
  The NHIRs 2004 LI 1809 59(1) states that a member of DHIS who defaults in the payment of contribution 
for a period exceeding three months shall be suspended from the scheme and reinstated after paying all the 
contributions in arrears, a penalty of 50% of the total contribution that is due. The defaulter is reinstated 
but will only enjoy benefits after three months from the date of re-instatement. 
3
  Shortage of drugs may not always be the right term. The problem can also be the inability to obtain certain 
drugs because they are not on the Health Insurance Drug List. The drugs may be available in the facility 
but only for those who pay cash. 
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round looking for accredited pharmacy and chemist shops to fill their prescriptions. I 
must state that although these shops are supposed to augment the drug supplies at 
health facilities, they do not exist in all the communities where health centres and 
hospitals are located. In such cases, patients have to travel to other towns when 
given prescriptions. In this respect, insured patients blamed health providers and 
DHIS staff for not doing enough to ease their frustration of looking for drugs outside 
health facilities. Many of them spoke about how they had to pay for drugs covered 
by the NHIS in some health facilities and accredited pharmacy shops. One man 
expressed dissatisfaction about seeking healthcare with the NHIS card and did not 
renew his card. He explained why he made this decision: 
I enrolled because I wanted to live without worrying about how to pay for my healthcare. I 
expect to get all my drugs at the hospital without payment. I was disappointed when I got a 
prescription to look for a drug store that serves people with health insurance card. I had to travel 
to another town. I did so but ended up paying for the drug. That’s why I decided not to renew 
my card. They should tell us the truth so we know what to expect when we seek healthcare 
instead of telling us 95% of diseases and drugs are covered; yet we end up paying. What then is 
the advantage of being insured? 
In a FGD, a PSG community representative narrated how he had to pay for drugs 
at a facility as follow: 
Though I protested when I was asked to pay for the drug, I had to give in. They explained they 
got it from a private person and gave me the option to take a prescription. Because of the trouble 
of going round to look for accredited shop, I decided to pay. 
I also observed insured patients’ dissatisfaction from their facial expressions 
when they were given prescription to get drugs from outside health facilities. Their 
disappointment was about how to go round looking for accredited shops and having 
to pay for the drugs. The complaint about payment for drugs by insured patients was 
supported by our survey results which show that the majority (64%) of currently 
insured respondents in intervention communities agreed that: “Even though one is 
insured you still have to buy drugs” (Table A.11, Appendix 2). 
Giving patients prescriptions is not new in Ghana, but insured patients have an 
extra burden of spending hours locating an accredited pharmacy or chemist shop to 
obtain the drugs without paying. Their dissatisfaction increases, especially when 
they had to travel outside the health facility’s location and have to pay. Many key 
informants argued that the burden of roaming around looking for accredited shops 
and paying for drugs did not make the economic sense of enrolling in the NHIS and 
consistently renew their card especially when they did not regularly access 
healthcare. 
In the case of health providers, their concern was that though they strived to im-
prove service delivery, they could not always meet insured patients’ expectation of 
providing all drugs they need at the facility. They attributed the situation to drug 
administration and acquisition guidelines under the NHIS regime outlined as 
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follows. Only drugs included in the Health Insurance Drug List are used to treat 
insured patients. These drugs are purchased from the Regional Medical Stores 
(RMS) and can only be bought from private suppliers after obtaining a non-
availability certificate4. They complained that the bureaucracy involved in obtaining 
the non-availability certificate negatively affected their stock management. They 
maintained that this arrangement for purchasing drugs in addition to delays in claim 
payment made it difficult for them to purchase drugs promptly and in enough 
quantities to meet patients’ needs. A Medical Assistant described the situation as 
follows: 
We are expected to buy drugs from the Regional Medical Store and can only buy from private 
suppliers if we get non-availability certificate. Getting the certificate is not a one-day issue 
Sometimes we go there several times before getting it. So it is not possible to buy such drugs 
immediately to meet patients’ needs. Also, though claim payment has improved, sometimes only 
60%, 70% or 80% is paid. For example, 60% of the April bill was paid in August and the re-
maining 40% this month [September]. We are yet to be paid the bill submitted for May. All 
these make it impossible to get drugs to meet patients’ needs and do not help in promoting 
health insurance. 
Our post-intervention survey results confirm the concerns expressed by both 
insured patients and health providers that shortage of drugs in health facilities leads 
to dissatisfaction among insured patients. The result shows that an overwhelming 
majority (83.7%) insured respondents and (90.3%) previously insured respondents 
indicated that: “Availability of drugs at health facilities should be improved” (Table 
A.11, Appendix 2). This illustrates the critical role of obtaining drugs at health 
facilities in determining satisfaction about the quality of service and its contribution 
to the gap between what insured patients expect and what is actually delivered. 
In Ghana, drugs are perceived as a significant component of healthcare delivery. 
Drugs are symbolic representation of health facilities and their availability creates a 
positive image of a particular facility and adds value to health provider-patient 
clinical encounter. As Whyte et al. (2002) point out, drugs are part of everyday life 
of Ghanaians and important for their survival. They show that drug use is common 
among Ghanaians and doctors give medicines to satisfy their patients. In another 
study, Van der Geest et al. (1996) observe that health providers see drugs as indis-
pensable in their encounter with patients while patients also expect to be given drugs 
to solve their problems. Both studies thus show the significant place that drugs 
assume in any clinical encounter between patients and health providers in Ghana. 
Most insured patients in the current study asserted that the essence of enrolling in 
the NHIS was to seek care at a health facility and obtain drugs for their ailment. 
Therefore, the absence of drugs reduces the level of satisfaction of the clinical 
                                              
4
  The non-availability certificate is given by the Regional Medical Stores to enable public health facilities 
buy drugs they do not have from private suppliers before they can be paid by the NHIA. 
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encounter. In fact, both insured patients and health providers’ concerns show how 
absence of drugs undermines quality of service. The finding thus confirms the 
observation that the shortage of drugs in health facilities eroded the confidence that 
the PSGs created in the NHIS and undermined their efforts to improve enrolment 
and retention rates. For many people, enrolling and remaining in the NHIS is 
determined by whether they were given drugs at health facilities or not. To such 
people, a single episode of paying for drugs or going round looking for an accredited 
shop may make them decide not to renew their membership. 
Payment of unauthorised fees at health facilities 
Though the NHIS has no co-payments, there were reports of payment of fees by 
insured patients at health facilities. This generated the most heated debates as a 
factor that limited the PSGs’ efforts at improving enrolment and retention rates. 
According to PSG members, the reason why this practice (though reduced during 
the intervention) could not be eliminated was because payment of unauthorised fees 
is a public sector phenomenon and impossible for PSGs to eliminate alone. They 
asserted that many public sector workers devise ways of collecting such fees for 
services rendered to clients to earn extra income. They explained the practice helps 
them ‘make ends meet’, that is, to be able to meet one’s expenditures considering 
the low salaries. This practice has already been discussed in chapter two and has 
also been documented by earlier studies (see Agyepong 1999, Armstrong 2006, 
Gyimah-Boadi 2004, Aryee 2005). Here, I discuss another component of the 
phenomenon revealed in the course of the intervention and emphasised during 
FGDs. It was observed that some health providers use the excuse of inadequate 
resources and delays in claim payment to collect money from insured patients. An 
insured patient explained the situation follows: 
We all know health providers have been collecting unofficial fees from patients under the user 
fees but people complain less because we are not sure which of the money we pay is approved 
fee or not. But now we [insured patients] know we don’t have to pay, so when I had to pay for 
drugs covered by the NHIS, I argued with them, but had to pay. I saw it as cheating. 
Some health providers, reacting to these allegations cited delays in NHIS claim 
payments and insufficient logistics as reasons for collecting money from insured 
patients. Others agreed that the practice is bad and tarnishes their image. Communi-
ty members and DHIS staff in their reaction did not accept the explanation of 
inadequate resources and accused health providers of exploiting insured patients. A 
facilitator, DHIS staff, shared the group’s frustration in addressing this allegation as 
follows: 
We could not eliminate the collection of unauthorised fees because it is an open secret that many 
of them [health providers] benefit from such fees they called welfare, ward funds, doctors’ fees 
and others. We do not have any way of checking whether the money is used to purchase essen-
tials for the facility or goes into their pockets. For us, what we know is that when you have for 
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example, malaria and you go to the hospital; you don’t have to pay anything. So we see it as 
cheating and this discourages many from enrolling and renewing their card. 
Nurse Anas, a PSG member, in her reaction to this allegation, accepted that col-
lection of unauthorised fees is a challenge that could not be resolved by the PSGs 
alone. She shared her thoughts in the following statement: 
We can’t deny that we sometimes collect unauthorised fees. Some of those monies are used to 
purchase certain things we need in the facility. To eliminate the practice, the authorities must 
provide adequate funds and the NHIS claims paid promptly. If that doesn’t happen, then those 
who hide behind that will not stop. We should also understand that it takes time for such chang-
es to happen. 
The above comment indicates that the practice has been going on in health facili-
ties, but was not reported by patients because it was not evident which fees were 
legal. For insured patients, it is obviously illegal when they are asked to pay for 
services and supplies that they know are covered by the NHIS. The tag of cheating 
assigned to the practice indicated that insured patients see the fees as preventing 
them from enjoying the free service they are entitled to having prepaid. Thus, asking 
them to pay such fees was a disincentive to register all members of their household, 
especially those who did not have an immediate need for healthcare. In the case of 
the poor, such payments discouraged them from spending their meagre income to 
enrol and renew their membership. These findings indicate that while the NHIS is 
intended to ensure equity in access to healthcare and protect people against cata-
strophic expenditure, frontline staff expected to facilitate its implementation make it 
expensive (especially for the poor) to enrol and remain in the scheme. 
To some extent, the health providers’ explanations could be a genuine attempt to 
maintain their stock level while they wait for reimbursement of NHIS claims. But 
the genuineness of these rationales is a matter of concern and needs to be addressed 
together with delays in reimbursement to increase confidence in the NHIS and build 
trust among stakeholders. As Mechanic (1998) observed, patients’ trust in health 
providers to act in their interest is crucial for health insurance enrolment. Failure to 
do this will make it virtually impossible to sustain confidence in the NHIS. The 
consensus among PSG members regarding payment of authorised fess was that no 
matter the genuineness of the intention, the practice added to the cost of enrolment. 
Illegal fees discourage people, especially those who do not use services regularly, 
from enrolling and renewing their membership consistently. 
As a concluding remark on the PSGs’ limited achievements involving local level 
actors, though effective, could not adequately address all the NHIS implementation 
challenges within the twenty-month intervention period because some were systemic 
and needed policy level action. Other challenges were attitudinal and therefore 
difficult to change and required more understanding of the social environment. 
Extended time is needed to engage community members and their leaders for any 
meaningful change to take effect. 
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Conclusion 
A multi-level approach was used to assess the impact of a MSPSP programme on 
enrolment and retention in the NHIS. The results show that the space the PSGs 
created for interaction among stakeholders led to significant increase in enrolment, 
but could not improve retention rates. The bottom-up, inclusive decision-making 
and interdependency approaches that facilitators employed in conducting PSG 
activities, monetary and non-monetary incentives for members and supervision of 
the group contributed to MSPSP’s success. These sustained the PSGs’ commitment 
to the intervention. In addition, effective involvement of community leaders and 
professional stakeholders in the intervention activities built trust between them and 
PSG members and nurtured synergy, which facilitators utilised to reach all target 
populations in the intervention. This finding makes it clear that the DHISs acting 
alone cannot manage the complex mix of problems and build the trust network 
required to address the issue of low enrolment in the NHIS. 
However, the findings reveal multi-dimensional factors that hindered the PSGs’ 
efforts at improving enrolment in the NHIS and retaining members and made it 
virtually impossible to adequately address all the identified NHIS implementation 
challenges. Thus involving local level actors though effective, did not adequately 
address all the challenges. Factors that were identified that limited the PSGs’ 
success included poverty, community members’ negative attitudes towards health 
insurance, shortages of drugs in health facilities and payment of unauthorised fees. 
These were found to be systemic and their elimination was not possible within the 
twenty-month intervention period. There is a need for policy-level action to change 
some aspects of the NHIS operational guidelines. Other challenges were attitudinal 
and so they were difficult to change within the intervention period. This change 
requires more understanding of the social environment to develop appropriate 
intervention activities. Finally, working on the psyche of all actors involved in 
implementing the NHIS to make accessing healthcare with NHIS card more attrac-
tive needs extended time to engage DHIS staff, health providers, residents and their 
leaders for meaningful change to take effect. 
The next chapter is the synthesis of the key findings of the study. I present an 
appraisal of the MSPSP and discuss why people enrolled or did not enrol in the 
NHIS, and why they renewed or did not renew their membership. I also provide the 
conclusions of the study, policy recommendations to enhance NHIS implementation 
and improve uptake and points out areas for further research. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
Introduction 
With a shift in health financing policies from fee-free to cost sharing, many countries 
in Africa are setting up health insurance schemes to reduce inequity in healthcare 
access. In Ghana, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was introduced in 
2004 to ensure equity in access to healthcare as the cost of treatment denied many 
people formal care. However, NHIS’ coverage remains low and the poor, who are 
the primary target, are less represented. This study developed a multi-stakeholder 
problem-solving programme (MSPSP) to improve NHIS enrolment and retain 
members, especially the poor. Figure 9.1 presents the pathways of the MSPSP and 
outcomes. The programme started with the creation of problem-solving groups 
(PSGs) which consisted of representatives of community members, health providers 
and district health insurance schemes’ (DHISs) staff in intervention communities. 
The figure also shows the barriers identified by the PSGs at the onset of their work 
and the various activities carried out to address them. The intervention outcome 
shows that PSG activities led to a significant increase in NHIS enrolment, but could 
not improve retention rate due to poverty and inadequate premium exemptions, 
negative attitudes towards health insurance, shortages of drugs at health facilities 
and collection of unauthorised fees. This indicates that local stakeholder collabora-
tion to address policy implementation barriers, though helpful, is not the panacea to 
all the challenges. 
In this chapter, I synthesise the outcomes of the intervention in six main sections. 
I start with theoretical reflections taking up the concepts of multi-level perspective, 
resilience and trust to discuss factors that influenced people to enrol in the NHIS and 
renew their membership and how the PSGs were able to increase enrolment. Next, I 
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Figure 9.1 Schematic representation of the MSPSP and the outcomes 
Barriers to NHIS enrolment 
and retention for community 
members
• Poverty 
• Traditional concepts of risk-
sharing 
• Poor quality of service
• Healthcare providers’ negative 
behaviour
• Payment of unauthorised fees 
and drugs 
• Political perception of the NHIS
Barriers to enrolment 
and retention for DHIS 
staff
• Inadequate office space 
and equipment
• Difficulties processing 
NHIS forms
• Problems regarding 
granting core poor 
exemptions
Barriers to 
enrolment and 
retention for 
health providers 
• Heavy workload
• Delay in claim 
payment
Intervention 
activities at 
DHIS offices
•Stakeholders’ 
meetings
• Set registration 
points in 
communities and 
provided cameras for 
collectors
Intervention 
activities at 
health facilities
•Stakeholders’ 
meetings
•Documentary 
films 
Outcome
Significant 
increase in  
NHIS 
enrolment
Outcome
1. Low NHIS 
enrolment
2. High non-
renewal rate
Factors that hindered 
NHIS enrolment and 
renewal of membership
1. Poverty and inadequate 
exemptions
2. Negative attitudes 
towards health  
insurance 
3. Shortage of drugs in 
health facilities
4. Collection of 
unauthorised fees
Factors that induced  
NHIS enrolment 
and renewal of 
membership
1. NHIS provides 
financial protection
2. Reduces 
complications
3. Prompt delivery of 
NHIS cards
4. Improved quality of 
service
Intervention activities 
in the community
• Community durbars & 
stakeholders’ meetings
• Education at health
facilities schools, P.T.A
meetings churches and
mosques
• Documentary films,
drama
Steps in the problem-solving process
•Identify and prioritise problems 
•Analyse problems 
•Develop solutions and implementation strategies 
•Draw action plan
•Implement action plan
Setting up problem-solving groups
• Stakeholders orientation
• Community durbar to select PSG 
members
• Selection of facilitators
• Training of facilitators
 
 
discuss the reasons for persistent low enrolment and high non-renewal rates. Then, I 
present my conclusions followed by recommendations. I end the chapter with areas 
for further research. 
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Understanding the findings 
The introduction of the national health insurance scheme (NHIS) in Ghana was part 
of a social development agenda with the goal of ensuring equity in access to good 
healthcare. Promotion was based on stimulating solidarity values among community 
members to inspire them to enrol. In this section, I put the findings into theoretical 
context using the concepts of multi-level perspective, resilience and trust that were 
introduced in the first chapter of this book. Each section begins with a brief explana-
tion of the concept and its relevance in understanding enrolment in health insurance 
and retention of members. 
Multi-level perspective 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) means looking at issues and events associated 
with a subject of study across different levels and actors to provide a more complete 
description and credible explanation. The perspective allowed me to conceptualise 
the NHIS based on the premise that it is an enterprise with various actors situated at 
different levels of the healthcare delivery system. These actors are stakeholders and 
include politicians, policy makers, district health insurance scheme (DHIS) staff, 
health providers and community members who are active agents involved in the 
NHIS policy making, implementation and uptake. I conceived the NHIS as a multi-
level enterprise because enrolees and DHISs’ staff are only linked by premiums and 
the healthcare providers contracted to provide services for a fee. In this sense, the 
stakeholders involved in this transaction (the NHIS) strive to maximise their 
interests thus affecting the success or failure of the enterprise. The MLP helped me 
to capture stakeholders’ interests, behaviour and practices as well as contextual 
factors that affect the achievement of the NHIS’ policy goals. Critical analysis of the 
NHIS indicated that the interests of various stakeholders interacted to affect enrol-
ment and retention rates. For example, although stakeholders generally accepted the 
NHIS as better than on-the-spot payment to ensure equity in access to healthcare, 
the pursuit of their own interests undermined the attainment of policy goals. For 
instance, politicians, in their desire to win power, rushed to introduce the policy 
without adequate public sensitisation and education about the scheme’s underlying 
principles. There was little opportunity to build consensus among other stakeholders 
or to scale up the capacity of health facilities to handle the expected increase in 
utilisation of healthcare services. These two issues created resentment among some 
community members and health providers who associated the NHIS with party 
politics and this undermined enrolment. 
The MLP also revealed that a new policy can be introduced by a government to 
improve the wellbeing of the citizens, but the expected change(s) are affected by 
several factors from various angles that interact to either hinder or enhance its 
uptake. Long (2001), in his analysis of development policy, argues that discourses 
  
196
are introduced by an institution, such as the state, but it is the actors (individuals or 
institutional representatives) who use, manipulate and transform them. In the case of 
the NHIS policy, as a new healthcare payment mechanism to improve access to 
healthcare, the decision to enrol or not to enrol depended on community members’ 
ideas about health insurance despite the fact that all stakeholders appreciated the 
insurance scheme. Community members’ interpretation of the NHIS was often 
rooted in traditional discourse about risk- and cost-sharing. They applied existing 
knowledge and held their personal gains above attainment of policy goals. This 
indicates that targets of public policies are not just objects without agency, but play 
roles that determine a policy’s success or failure. Arhinful (2003: 150) also noted 
that enrolling in health insurance schemes is based on self-interest. He wrote: 
People’s motive for participating in an insurance scheme in the present social context is there-
fore based first and foremost on what they believe would best advance their own self-interested 
goal of averting a risk or securing a gain for themselves. 
In the current study, one can argue that since our post-intervention survey results 
showed that the majority (59.7%) of the general population did not have a valid 
NHIS card and 37.3 per cent had never enrolled the NHIS’ benefits of ensuring 
equity in access to healthcare was not appreciated or pursued equally by all stake-
holders. As I discuss later in this chapter, the poor – the primary target of the policy 
– seem not to be the priority of politicians, policy makers, implementers and rich 
community members. DHISs staff held their institutional interest and personal gains 
above the attainment of policy goals. They focused on revenue generation at the 
expense of exempting the core poor. In the case of health providers, while some 
persuaded people to enrol, others were hostile towards insured patients because of 
the increased workload that accompanied the NHIS. The rich saw health insurance 
as a less pressing issue than funeral contributions, so they did not share the NHIS 
costs by paying premiums according to their incomes. They also did not help poor 
family members enrol, because it did not bring the same prestige as contributing 
towards their funerals. All these conflicting interests culminated in low enrolment 
and retention rates with the poor being the most affected. 
A focus on the MLP helped reveal the complexity of health insurance. What 
seems to be an unambiguous concept to enhance equity in access to healthcare 
appreciated by all stakeholders can provoke diverse reactions. The MLP helped 
explain why and how various stakeholders at multiple levels (and sometimes even 
at the same level), reacted in ways that conflicted with policy goals. Their actions 
usually benefited the stakeholders themselves and not the objects of the policy goals 
– the poor. The MLP disclosed the pragmatic realities of the NHIS and provided 
information on the rather egocentric motives that engulfed it. The lack of enthusiasm 
to genuinely pursue policy goals and address the actual challenges that implementers 
and targets of the policy face became apparent. 
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Finally, implied in the MLP is its contribution to policy change. In this sense, 
stakeholders must participate in the process of bringing about change or accomplish 
change through advocacy. The MSPSP and the positive result – an increase in 
enrolment – demonstrate MLP’s relevance in intervention practice especially in 
anthropological research. In this regard, Scheper-Hughes (1990: 190-196) suggests: 
We [critical anthropologists] are to put anthropological knowledge at the service of the power 
brokers. … Medical anthropology should exist for us as a discipline and as a field of struggle. 
Our work should be at the margins, questioning premises, and subjecting epistemologies that 
represent powerful, political interests to oppositional thinking. 
Taking such a stance and pursuing this agenda means advocating for the poor and 
projecting how the interest of politicians, policy makers, service providers and 
community members undermine the attainment of NHIS’ equity agenda. We must 
engage these stakeholders to discuss the NHIS implementation challenges that arise 
and devise activities to improve their behaviour and practices. Such interventions 
should be multi-level-oriented, involve stakeholders and aim to: (1) develop com-
munity-oriented mechanisms to pursue the NHIS’ equity agenda and (2) improve the 
quality of healthcare service by making health providers and community members’ 
concerns the basis of reform. The long-term effect will undoubtedly be a reduction 
in health providers’ workload, improvement in their behaviours and quality of 
service and an increase in the exemptions granted to the core poor. At the communi-
ty level, the continuous inclusion of all stakeholders in discussions is likely to result 
in positive attitudes towards health insurance, a reduction in adverse selection and 
ultimately move the NHIS toward universal coverage. 
In conclusion, the earlier chapters have shown that the MLP provided an in-depth 
understanding of the factors that influenced enrolment and retention in the NHIS. It 
revealed the multiple layers of the NHIS and the need to use a critical medical 
anthropological lens to identify and address the challenges. It proved a useful 
approach for interpreting the stakeholders’ interests, behaviours and practices and 
the social context in which the health insurance scheme operates. The MLP thus 
proved an effective tool for PSGs to address the stakeholders’ conflicting interests 
and build an equitable health insurance scheme. This knowledge might help develop 
appropriate intervention activities to improve the implementation and uptake of 
health insurance in Ghana and other countries. 
Resilience 
Resilience refers to the ability to maintain normal functioning despite exposure to 
adversity. Niehof (2008: 217) in her analysis of the concept of resilience describes it 
as follows: 
The concept of resilience overlaps that of vulnerability. The vulnerability context is an important 
factor in people’s ability to ‘bounce back’ when faced with adversity and it is the context in 
which entry points for supportive policies and programmes should be identified 
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In the context of ill health, resilience refers to people’s strength to reduce their 
vulnerability to sickness and recover from or live positively with their disease. This 
strength is conditioned on both personal strength and a supportive environment. 
These two dimensions of resilience, inner power and external factors, interact to 
strengthen patients to regain their health or cope with their sickness. Thus people’s 
purposive action to harness external support is important in the development of 
resilience. The monetisation of healthcare has made economics a prominent feature 
for resilience during the therapeutic process especially in patients with chronic 
diseases. This makes resilience relevant in a health insurance discourse. 
In Ghana, the NHIS was introduced to provide a fall-back position for people 
who were ill. From this perspective, I conceive the NHIS as an important mediating 
factor in the interface between vulnerability and resilience when someone is sick. 
Sickness often leads to a depletion of resources and decline in wellbeing; so, 
external support is needed to strengthen patients’ recovery from or ability to cope 
with their disease. Given the focus of this study – reaching the poor in the NHIS – 
the question is whether the NHIS is helping sick people mitigate the adverse effects 
of ill health? The concept of resilience is thus useful to address the question of 
whether or not the NHIS strengthens the poor and vulnerable to manage the adversi-
ties of ill health and maintain normal functioning. Resilience provides a framework 
to examine two main issues: why people enrol and remain in the NHIS and what 
contributes to low enrolment among the poor and core poor. 
First, I interpreted the community members’ responses and actions in regard to 
the NHIS using the concept of resilience. This approach revealed that people 
enrolled and remained in the NHIS because it helped them address the adversities of 
ill health. It was apparent that the NHIS provides people who are ill with the 
security of healthcare and fills the gap of inadequate or no support from extended 
family members. In the past, seeking healthcare did not involve much money and 
payment could be in kind. Therefore, it was easier for extended families to arrange 
treatment for sick members and offer them material and emotional support (see 
Arhinful 2003). But this support has dwindled and is now virtually absent in Ghana. 
Kumado & Gockel (2003), in their study of social security in Ghana, also reported a 
breakdown in traditional social and economic support provided by the extended 
family for vulnerable members and called for a state-sponsored form of social 
security. Traditional support that helped build resilience during ill health in the past 
has lost its value due to the monetisation of healthcare. As the cost of healthcare 
increases, more financial resources are needed to support sick family members. 
Nuclear family members, who now bear the burden of caring for sick members, 
might be in a precarious economic situation and unable to provide the needed 
financial support to enable sick people to seek healthcare and enhance their resili-
ence during ill health. Health insurance is expected to replace the traditional family as 
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a source of economic resilience in times of illness. As Arhinful’s (2003: 120) study 
in Ghana indicates, people had a favourable perception of health insurance: “Com-
munity people conceptualise the value of health insurance in terms of its economic, 
psychological and social support attributes.” Key informants mentioned similar 
attributes of the NHIS in the current study. People enrolled and remained in the 
NHIS because it guaranteed them access to treatment without catastrophic 
healthcare payments and helped them mitigate the worst effects of sickness. Health 
providers also mentioned that insured patients had fewer complications than the 
uninsured; thanks to early reporting. Our post-intervention household survey 
affirmed these observations and showed that the NHIS reduced household out-of-
pocket healthcare expenditure by 86 per cent (see Aryeetey 2012). The post-
intervention survey also indicated that insured poor suffering from acute illness were 
5.5 times more likely to use primary healthcare out-patient department compared to 
the uninsured poor and 2.7 times at the secondary level (district and regional 
hospitals) (see Jehu-Appiah 2012). Other studies in Ghana have also reported that 
health insurance improves access to healthcare and leads to better health outcomes 
(Mensah et al. 2010, Durairaj et al. 2010, Amporfu 2011). Mensah et al. (2010) 
observe the dramatic differences in maternal and infant health indicators of insured 
and uninsured persons due to more preventive check-ups and out-patient attendance 
and prenatal care. Durairaj et al. (2010) also reported that the NHIS provides social 
and financial protection to insured patients and contributes to a decline in hospital 
deaths among the insured due to early treatment. These observations indicate that 
health insurance provides a safety net for community members and strengthens 
patients’ resilience to manage the disease. 
Key informants suffering from chronic diseases mentioned characteristics of the 
NHIS that demonstrated its resilience-enhancing role. They reported that the NHIS 
provides quick and regular access to healthcare thereby strengthening them to 
manage their condition. In Ghana, like many African countries, local aetiological 
discourse holds that prolonged sickness is often not a natural episode but linked to 
some wrongdoing. For example, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, diabetics and hyper-
tension may be socially interpreted and the patient often blamed for his or her 
predicament. The patient is usually accused of immoral behaviour or committing a 
crime (see Dapaah 2012) and often isolated by family members while financial 
support is withheld. This phenomenon leads to what a key informant described as a 
feeling of shame (Ԑyԑ animguase). An insured patient describes the NHIS’ resili-
ence-enhancing role as follows: 
Health insurance has removed the shame. My husband nearly divorced me because I spent all 
our money on treatment. With health insurance I no more spend much money on treatment and 
he has stopped blaming me. So I don’t worry anymore about the diseases and have resumed my 
trading. 
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It is clear that people enrolled and renewed their membership because by taking 
care of the economic burden, the NHIS strengthened them not only to manage the 
debilitating effects of prolonged illness, but it also provided a safety net to offset the 
negative impact of accusations from family members and others. The insurance 
strengthens the sick not to succumb, but to see beyond the disease and live positive-
ly with their condition. 
In theory, the NHIS is pro-poor, as discussed later in this chapter, but not in prac-
tice. From the perspective of health insurance as a resilience-enhancing tool, one 
would expect that the poor would be the most eager to join. However, the opposite 
proves to be the case. I do not want to revitalise Lewis’ (1971) much criticised 
concept of ‘culture of poverty’, but the low rate of poor NHIS members suggests 
that poverty may have affected people’s inner strength and reduced their ability to 
plan their life. Poverty not only reduces the external resources of resilience, but also 
the internal ones; it demoralises the families who cannot afford to pay the premiums 
for all members of the household. Thus they chose to practice adverse selection or 
wait until the last minute to buy insurance when they are in dire need of healthcare. 
To conclude, this discussion has shown the relevance of resilience in the health 
insurance discourse. It shed light on the resilience-building attributes of the NHIS as 
a safety net that gives financial relief to patients and strengthens them not to be 
overwhelmed by adversity, but to see beyond their disease, reorganise their lives and 
bounce back to normalcy. Consideration of resilience provides an in-depth under-
standing about people’s exposure and response to the adversities of ill health. 
However, enrolment in the NHIS among the poor and core poor remains low. 
Apparently more is at stake than the mere need for resilience. The next section looks 
at trust and mistrust as concepts that may shed more light on people’s reaction to 
health insurance. 
Trust 
Many developing countries promote social health insurance to improve access to 
quality healthcare services. However, the low demand for health insurance has been 
shown to be based on a lack of trust in the promises of health insurance (cf. Criel & 
Waelkens 2003). 
Trust is the expectation of honest behaviour by all agents to promote the interest 
of those involved in a transaction. In health insurance, trust is the assurance that the 
premiums that are paid will guarantee access to decent healthcare. The decision to 
enrol is based first and foremost on trust (Schneider 2005). The concept of trust thus 
helped me understand the conditions that stimulate enrolment in the NHIS and retain 
members and the ones that create distrust and discourage people from enrolling. 
I employed the concept of trust based on the premise that people might enrol and 
remain in the NHIS because they are sure of access to quality healthcare when sick 
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(trust). Conversely, they might not enrol if they have doubts that their NHIS card 
will be promptly delivered to enable them to benefit from the premiums they pay 
(mistrust). Mechanic (1998) argues that trust in insurance is multi-dimensional with 
aspects varying in importance depending on the circumstances: (1) patients’ trust in 
providers, which is based on their ability to diagnose and treat illness and to act in 
the patients’ interest; (2) trust in insurers, based on their reputation of improving 
access to healthcare; and (3) trust generated by regulations and control mechanisms 
for the legal enforcement of commitments like contracts. As a result, personalised 
trust develops between insurers, health providers and insured patients and general-
ised trust between community members and the institutions involved in implement-
ing the NHIS (DHISs and health facilities) and their employees. People may 
therefore decide to enrol with the expectation that the institutions and their staff will 
fulfil their promise of providing quality healthcare as stated in the NHIS policy. 
In the current study, building trust was both a systemic and behavioural issue. 
Examining statements of insured patients and those who did not renew their mem-
bership, two main trust-building factors at the level of each stakeholder emerged. 
These were financial protection by the NHIS and good quality healthcare services. 
Poor quality services created distrust between community members and health 
providers and undermined confidence in the NHIS. However, creating trust-building 
conditions was a major challenge for DHISs. Delays in issuing national ID cards 
after the three-month mandatory waiting period prevented clients from accessing 
healthcare nationwide. Trust also depended on drug acquisition and administration 
guidelines, and the National Health Insurance Authority’s (NHIA) ability to prompt-
ly pay NHIS claims to enable health facilities to maintain their stock levels. These 
actions were beyond the health providers and even the health system’s control. Also, 
health providers’ workload, as a result of increased healthcare utilisation and 
lengthy completion of NHIS forms, undermined the quality of service and weakened 
trust in the NHIS. 
With the challenges mentioned above, building trust in the NHIS was driven by 
the PSGs’ recognition of distrust among stakeholders of the NHIS. PSGs believe 
that trust between NHIS’ stakeholders (community members, health providers and 
DHIS staff) is fundamental in improving enrolment and retention rates. Therefore, 
they set out to first and foremost build trust among them to elicit their cooperation 
and commitment to achieve the intervention goal, As Gilson (2003) observes, trust 
facilitates collective action to achieve common goals. The trust concept revealed 
that participation in collective activities depended on asking group members to lead 
intervention activities. This elicited cooperation and ensured the PSGs’ effective 
functioning and the commitment to achieve intervention goals. PSGs then engaged 
stakeholders to devise approaches to improve trust in the NHIS. The main strategy 
the PSGs used was to engage health providers, insured community members, 
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opinion leaders and DHIS staff to project NHIS’ benefits, discuss challenges they 
faced in providing healthcare to insured patients and address their concerns. Insured 
community members shared their experiences regarding the NHIS’ protection from 
catastrophic healthcare payments compared to when they were not insured. They 
showed that NHIS’ benefits far outweighed the inconvenience of delays at health 
facilities, roaming about looking for prescribed drugs and the possibility of un-
friendly interactions during clinical encounters. Health providers also explained the 
benefits of health insurance and discussed the challenges involved in providing 
healthcare to insured patients during clinical interactions and other intervention 
activities. 
These friendly interactions did not only make people appreciate the benefits of 
the NHIS and the challenges involved in providing healthcare to insured patients, 
but also bridged the power differential gap between health providers and community 
members. The interactions influenced the former to eschew negative behaviours and 
practices that led to distrust. Though PSGs improved trust in the NHIS and con-
vinced people to enrol, they could not solve the practical problems that should have 
retained people and encouraged many more to enrol even if they did not need 
healthcare. For example, key informants mentioned that the basis of trust in the 
NHIS was the guarantee of treatment, which reduced their worries about the disease 
and helped them lead normal lives. However, this trust is lost if their experience 
does not reinforce it. 
Thus, trust helped explain the pre-condition for enrolment in the NHIS and mem-
bership renewal. These included: the NHIS’ attributes of financial protection, health 
providers’ competence in providing treatment and appreciation of health providers’ 
constraints in providing insured patients treatment (not necessarily the quality of 
services delivered). However, what constituted trust was fraught with ambiguities 
and contradictions. There were contradictions in what key informants mentioned as 
the basis of their trust and what actually influenced them to enrol and renew their 
membership. Key informants said they did not enrol or renew their membership 
because of health providers’ disrespect, request for unauthorised fees, and the 
burden of roaming to get prescribed drugs from accredited private pharmacy and 
chemist shops, and extra payments for drugs and other supplies. 
Insured patients who had pre-paid for their healthcare felt they had greater enti-
tlement to quality service, and drugs were the most important component for them. 
Thus, the policy makers’ assumption that private pharmacies and chemist shops 
would augment drug supplies at health facilities and satisfy insured patients totally 
missed the point of what would create trust in the NHIS. Instead, this assumption 
caused discontent about clinical encounters. So, although PSG activities improved 
trust in the NHIS, their inability to resolve the practical problem of ensuring that all 
benefits stated in the NHIS policy were delivered reduced the level of trust. This 
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contributed to the limited increase in enrolment and no improvement in retention 
rates. As Gambetta (2000) suggests, we can limit the extent to which we need to 
trust agents in cases of distrust. This implies that even when there is distrust, some 
level of trust still persists to keep agents in the transaction. In this study, though 
there was distrust, some insured members remained in the scheme because it served 
their interests; the NHIS gave them access to cheaper healthcare. An example is as 
follows. Some insured patients paid for drugs covered by the NHIS at health 
facilities. Although this created some distrust, they still had faith in the NHIS and 
perceived the payment as a problem that health facilities could not resolve. They 
preferred to pay instead of receiving a prescription since they could avoid the burden 
of roaming to obtain the drugs in accredited shops. They rushed to enrol or renew 
their membership only when they needed to go to the hospital. Thus, the benefits of 
the NHIS are still attractive to those who need healthcare. 
In conclusion, the concept of trust helped to understand and explain barriers to 
enrolment and retention in the NHIS. It also revealed that the pre-conditions of trust 
depended on the social context in which the scheme operates. Though I have 
emphasised that health providers’ expertise in providing regular access to healthcare 
and the financial protection of the NHIS as the basis of community members’ trust, 
in resource-poor countries where providing quality services is a herculean task, trust 
can be improved and distrust reduced if structures are put in place for regular 
interaction between stakeholders of the scheme. However, if services promised in 
the policy are not delivered, it becomes difficult to attract many more people to 
enrol and to retain them. In the next section, I will focus on the four main obstacles 
to expanding NHIS’ coverage. I shall illustrate these with the concepts I just 
discussed – multi-level perspective, resilience and trust as well as mistrust on the 
enrolment and retention of members. 
Re-examining low enrolment and retention 
Community members generally acknowledged that the NHIS was better than on-the-
spot payment at health facilities and the premium was affordable, but this did not 
naturally translate into the decision to enrol and remain in the scheme. Our post-
intervention household survey results showed a less than 50 per cent enrolment 
among the general population (41%), the rich (46%), and richest (44%) quintiles and 
high non-renewal rates (22.4%). More worrying was the less than 30 per cent 
enrolment (between 15.3% and 25.1%) in five of the 13 communities that had 
improved enrolment. These results are striking against the backdrop that the premi-
um is heavily subsidised from value added tax. The cost of premium is GH¢ 14.00-
GH¢ 48.00 (US$10.00-US$35.00) per annum and GH¢ 4.00 [US$2.50] as a registra-
tion fee to join the NHIS per person and GH¢ 1.00 administrative fee to renew 
membership. Exemption is provided for vulnerable groups: children below 18 years, 
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SSNIT pensioners, older people above 70, pregnant women and the core poor. With 
the exception of pregnant women, people in all exempt categories pay the registra-
tion fee. In fact, all those who participated in the intervention were disappointed 
about the outcome. The reasons for their limited achievement were attributed to 
‘missing links’ and contradictory expectations of various stakeholders. The missing 
links are differences in the stakeholders’ interests in the NHIS policy and expecta-
tions regarding what would stimulate enrolment and retain members and thus move 
the NHIS towards universal coverage. 
For this concluding chapter, I have selected four important factors that discourage 
people from enrolling or remaining in the NHIS for further discussion because they 
deserve special attention if the NHIS is to move towards universal coverage. These 
are healthcare service delivery challenges, the politicisation of the NHIS, a lack of 
commitment to reach the core poor with the NHIS and adverse selection. Each of 
these challenges, which reduced the ability to achieve policy goals, will be ad-
dressed below. 
Challenges to healthcare delivery 
Policy makers often consider the NHIS as a panacea to the existing inequity in 
access to quality healthcare. The assumption is that the NHIS will provide adequate 
funds for health facilities to improve the quality of their services. However, a vital 
but often underestimated constraint is the limited capacity of health facilities to 
implement the policy. So the expectation that the NHIS will provide adequate funds 
promptly to enhance quality of healthcare was not evident. A key finding of this 
study was that policy makers did not sufficiently consider the details of what was 
necessary to enhance service delivery, build trust in the NHIS, stimulate enrolment 
and retain members to achieve universal coverage within five years as stated in the 
National Health Insurance Policy Framework (see chapter one). In this section, I 
discuss two main factors that I describe as missing links that undermine the quality 
of service and achievement of NHIS policy goals. These include health providers’ 
increased workload as a result of the introduction of the NHIS and the shortage of 
drugs on the National Health Insurance Drug List at health facilities. 
Increased workload 
This study found that the NHIS was implemented within a health system already 
overburdened with patient numbers without providing the adequate resources to 
cope with the increase in the utilisation of services. As critical medical anthropolo-
gists observe, new health policy initiatives introduce problems into healthcare 
delivery systems. For example, Pfeiffer & Nichter (2008), in their critique of global 
health initiatives, noted that the introduction of narrow interventions usually 
undermines the expected benefits when inadequate effort is put into institutional 
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building. NHIS policy makers focused on stimulating enrolment and not much was 
done to increase the health facilities’ capacities to handle the growing number of 
patients. As expected, many people, who hitherto had not had access to formal 
healthcare or cut treatment short because they could not pay under the user fee 
regime (Asenso-Okyere et al. 1998, Nyanator & Kutzin 1999, Osei-Akoto 2003), do 
have access now. Though the increase is desirable, indicating that the NHIS is 
achieving its goal of improving access to healthcare, the result has been a heavy 
workload and long working hours that has undermined health providers’ ability to 
provide quality service. Consequently, insured patients experience delays and hostile 
treatment. Boakye (2008) made a similar observation in his evaluation of the 
Nzema-East District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana. He found that 
increased workload affected the quality of service and patients waited for long hours 
before being attended to. 
Following the increase in utilisation of services, health providers exercised sub-
stantial discretion and devised strategies to implement new policies while adopting 
ways to manage the burden. They categorised patients into insured and uninsured to 
address the increase in patient numbers and completion of the NHIS forms. General-
ly, clinicians are used to hurriedly writing only a few words or phrases and not 
spending time filling out long and complicated forms. The additional task of 
completing the NHIS forms for the many insured patients they attend to psychologi-
cally drew a negative reaction to these patients. In this respect, two types of health 
providers were identified during the intervention based on how they treated insured 
patients. One group of health providers explained the benefits of the NHIS and 
persuaded patients to enrol. Others were hostile, used defamatory language when 
interacting with insured patients, demanded cash payments from them and gave 
preference to uninsured patients. Insured patients described these practices as 
cheating, which created distrust between healthcare professionals and community 
members since the idea of enrolling in the NHIS was not to pay money at a health 
facility. The negative practices eroded confidence in the NHIS. Health providers are 
not a homogenous category in the way they treat insured patients and some of their 
actions conflict with the NHIS policy goal of providing access to quality healthcare 
and free treatment. Thus the NHIS does not automatically lead to better services. 
This finding supports Ekman’s (2004) findings. In his review of the literature on 
non-profit making community-based health insurance schemes (CBHIs) in low-
income countries, he observed that these schemes have weak or no effect on quality 
of service. His findings and my observation further strengthen the argument that 
both CBHISs and SHISs do not necessarily lead to quality service. 
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Shortage of drugs 
Another missing link and contradictory expectation relates to insured patients’ 
conceptions about quality service. I observed that the quality healthcare service 
needed to build trust in the NHIS did not depend on health providers alone; it also 
depended on national level actors. In this respect, there was a misunderstanding 
about what insured patients expect, what will enable health providers meet their 
needs and what policy makers’ thought would satisfy the patients. Insured patients 
expected to receive all their prescribed drugs from the health facilities. Health 
providers anticipated prompt payment of NHIS claims to maintain their stock levels 
and meet insured patients’ drugs requirements. Policy makers on the other hand, felt 
that accredited pharmacies and chemist shops could augment drug shortages at 
health facilities and satisfy insured patients’ needs. Clearly, this illustrates a signifi-
cant misunderstanding about what insured patients considered crucial to quality 
services and what policy makers considered reasonable. Community perceptions are 
often quite different from what policy makers have in mind. 
Anthropologists have extensively studied the meaning of medicines and shown 
that providing drugs is a major issue in the appreciation of a clinical encounter (e.g. 
Whyte & Van der Geest 1994, Van der Geest et al. 1996, Senah 2002). A doctor or 
nurse without medicines is a contradiction in terms, like “a bar without beer” (Van 
der Geest, personal communication). In this study, the unavailability of drugs at 
health facilities led to patient dissatisfaction about the clinical encounter and by 
consequence discouraged people from enrolling and renewing their membership. 
Van der Geest et al. (1996: 156) writing on the value of drugs in the clinical encoun-
ter note: “Medical practitioners see pharmaceuticals as indispensable means in their 
encounter with sick people who come for help and advice. ... patients and their 
relatives expect medicines to solve their problems.” 
In the current study, both health providers and patients saw medicines as an es-
sential commodity in health facilities and a critical component of quality service. 
Their availability leads to satisfaction with care among all parties. Their shortage not 
only frustrated patients, but also health providers. Arhinful (2009) also identified a 
similar problem in his survey on the general pharmaceutical situation in health 
facilities in Ghana. He found that only 80 per cent of key drugs were available in 
public facilities and called for an improvement in the distribution of drugs. This 
indicates that shortage of drugs is not a problem only for insured patients. 
To insured patients, the symbolic role of drugs in their clinical encounters clashes 
with drug shortages at health facilities. Almost all insured patients mentioned the 
shortage of drugs as a factor that reduced their confidence in the NHIS. This raises 
the question whether policy makers’ decision to contract with private shops to 
augment drug supplies at health facilities was sufficiently deliberated with regard to 
the expectations of insured patients. The shortage of drugs and risk of additional 
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payments discouraged people from enrolling and renewing their NHIS membership. 
The burden of roaming and looking for accredited pharmacies and chemist shops to 
obtain prescribed drugs forced some patients to buy from non-accredited shops. A 
recent study indicates that households’ ability to access healthcare does not only 
depend on wealth, but also on perceptions about the quality of healthcare. Infor-
mation that only poor quality service is available is likely to deter households from 
seeking healthcare. Conversely, if services are viewed as high quality, significant 
resources might be spent to access them (Save the Children UK 2008). 
In the case of health providers, their concern was that drug shortages undermined 
their attempt to provide good service. They anticipated prompt reimbursement of 
fees charged to maintain their stock levels. This would allow them to have control 
over the treatment episode. Health providers know that the absence of drugs not 
only affects the quality of services in the eyes of the patient, but it also has a 
negative impact on treatment since some patients do not buy all prescribed drugs. 
Thus, health providers’ wish to provide good care during the clinical interaction 
explains why some facilities buy drugs from private sources without a non-
availability certificate to maintain their stock level and sell them to patients. 
Our survey results showed that 64 per cent of patients buy drugs despite being 
insured. For the poor, payments for drugs and other supplies was a burden on their 
meagre income and so discouraged them from enrolling and renewing their insur-
ance membership. Thus, while the NHIS is intended to ensure equity in access to 
healthcare and protect the poor against on-the-spot payments, the lack of prudent 
planning to ensure its effective implementation makes healthcare expensive even for 
insured patients. This shows how macro-level policies targeted at the poor are bound 
to fail without adequate measures to achieve their goals. 
Politicisation of health insurance 
The popular discourse in Ghana, especially among health experts and national level 
stakeholders of the NHIS, was that service delivery to insured patients has not 
improved because the NHIS has been politicised. As discussed earlier, the policy-
making process was dominated by the political allies of the then government. 
Despite the bickering that went on in and outside Parliament in protest against the 
National Health Insurance Bill, the bill was passed into law under a certificate of 
urgency. As a result, the NHIS was perceived by many as a tool to build political 
capital (see chapter one). This induced resentment towards the scheme instead of 
creating the perception that the NHIS was a social security scheme that would 
enhance the health of Ghanaians. As a result, the then opposition (now in govern-
ment) capitalised on the protests by organised labour groups and discouraged 
potential members not to join. There were also accounts that some villagers, who 
were sympathisers of the opposition party chased DHIS staff out of their communi-
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ties. They accused them of being government supporters. Another political issue 
raised by key informants was the lack of improvement in DHISs operations and poor 
quality healthcare services. They believed that this was largely due to a lack of 
collaboration among the three institutions involved in the NHIS policy formulation 
and implementation: the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) (the policy-making body) and the Ghana Health Service (GHS) 
(the implementing body and main healthcare service provider). According to key 
informants from the MoH and the GHS, the improvements that should occur as the 
NHIS grows are not happening as expected because the NHIA does not involve the 
MoH or the GHS in efforts to improve the scheme. They mention that the NHIS is 
missing some of the critical implementation challenges. They asserted that the NHIS 
has been politicised and there is no transparency in their activities. One of the key 
informants described the situation in the following statement. 
Very little information on the situation of the DHISs filters into the public domain and that has 
been the situation since the NHIS was introduced. No joint planning between NHIA and us 
[MoH and GHS] for monitoring and evaluation of DHISs and health facilities. This doesn’t help 
build systems that will improve service delivery, hence the numerous complaints. The typical 
example is piloting of ICT software to authenticate NHIS membership being carried out without 
involving GHS as the main service provider. The computerisation of health facilities with an 
internal network to be connected to DHISs’ system is taking much longer time than projected. 
Presently, the capitation system of provider payment1 being piloted in the Ashanti 
Region is being opposed by some service providers (The Society of Private Medical 
and Dental Practitioners and the Ghana Registered Midwives Association), interest 
groups (The Asante Development Union and Asante Students Union) (Domfeh n.d.) 
and the main opposition party (the New Patriotic Party) (Ennin n.d.) due to a lack of 
consensus. The coordinator of the Asante Development Union expressed their 
reservations as follows: “Understanding of the policy is very minimal. … the policy 
is complex and technical and therefore requires much understanding before starting. 
… Stakeholders should be brought on board for consensus building and proper 
education done.” Thus history seems to be repeating itself. The situation where the 
NHIS policy-making process was highly centralised and dominated by political 
associates of the government and the bill was passed in the midst of severe criticism 
by the opposition and civil society organisations (see Agyepong & Adjei 2008, 
Rajkotia 2007) to fulfil a campaign promise before the pending election. At the 
moment, the agenda appears to contain costs with or without stakeholders support. 
                                              
1
  Capitation payment system is a method of payment in which physicians are paid a fixed prearranged 
amount for each patient for a defined set of services within a specified period regardless of any treatments 
offered. The advantages are: it is less expensive to administer and cost of treatment per patient is lower. 
Its disadvantages include: the patient's choice of primary healthcare provider is limited to a particular 
physician or group of physicians and optimal treatment may not always be delivered since physicians are 
required to keep costs down to make more profit (Agyepong & Yankah n.d.). 
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This seems to be based on the need to prove the regime’s legitimacy and the 
continuity of the NHIS policy that has a significant political ‘aroma’. This supports 
the key informant’s observation that there is no collaboration between stakeholders. 
Decisions on the NHIS were primarily based on political expediency. This posture 
by policy makers does not build confidence in the NHIS as a public good expected 
to promote the public’s wellbeing. In essence, the NHIS agenda seems not to be 
driven by concerns about public well-being, but rather by accumulating political 
capital. Clearly, this does not build trust in the scheme nor improve service delivery 
that could stimulate enrolment; hence the poor quality service being experienced by 
insured patients and the challenges health providers face implementing the policy. 
The excessive documentation, drug administration and acquisition difficulties and 
delay in claim payment, drug shortages, collection of unauthorised fees and inade-
quate exemption granted the core poor have been discussed in the public domain 
since the NHIS was introduced; but, these issues have not been given the attention 
required by politicians and policy makers. 
Not reaching the poor 
In Ghana, the NHIS was introduced to address the problem of inequity in access to 
healthcare that characterised earlier user-fee regimes. The NHIS was linked with the 
country’s poverty reduction strategy and expected to reach the poor first. This 
explains why the premium is heavily subsidised by a tax and formal sector workers’ 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contributions and why there 
is an exemption provided for the core poor. Ironically, this study found that the poor 
and the core poor were the least enrolled. Our post-intervention household survey 
results show that only 31 per cent of the poor and 18 per cent of the core poor were 
enrolled. Witter & Garshong (2009: 5) found that exemption for indigents in Ghana 
fell from fewer than four per cent of the population in 2005 to one per cent in 2008. 
This indicates that the inequity in access to healthcare persists and even grows. In 
fact, throughout my fieldwork I did not see the DHISs organising any activity to 
identify the core poor for premium exemptions. Why this is so, is examined in this 
section. 
For the poor, the inability to pay the NHIS premium was the most important 
barrier to enrolment and renewal of membership. According to the respondents, 
although the premium is reasonable and the benefits far outweigh the costs of 
becoming sick without insurance, they did not pay because of poverty. Appraisal of 
their situation revealed that due to the social responsibility of caring for parents and 
other close relatives in Ghana, the poor also have a large number of dependents to 
enrol. The heads of households (usually the men) had to enrol their wives, children, 
their own relatives and those of their spouses and other dependents. Given their low 
income, enrolling all these family members was beyond their means. In addition, 
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extra payments for healthcare services and drugs discouraged some insured poor 
from renewing their membership. This supports the observation by Save the Chil-
dren UK (2008) that poor families face barriers in accessing basic healthcare. The 
authors mentioned that compulsory or voluntary informal payment were a barrier to 
healthcare for poor families. They reported that about 25 per cent of the healthcare 
users in Ghana made informal payments to public health providers. 
The inequality trend in enrolment was worst for the core poor because they were 
strapped because they have no stable source of income. Their low enrolment 
indicates that the exemption is fundamental to ensure they are not excluded from the 
NHIS. In a discussion of community-based health insurance schemes in developing 
countries, the World Health Organisation (2003) also points out that exemption for 
the poor are crucial to ensure they are enrolled. However, the exemption provided to 
prevent their exclusion is not reaching them. This defeats the purpose of the NHIS 
as a safety net, which is expected to provide the poor with access to healthcare and 
free them from expensive healthcare costs. 
Though the NHIS has performed relatively well in providing protection against 
expensive healthcare payments among the general population, the mere 18 per cent 
enrolment amongst the core poor indicates that little attention has been paid to the 
equity goal. Critical analysis of the implementation gap revealed that it is not simply 
a problem of identification. The gap has other dimensions already mentioned in 
previous chapters. Further discussions and observations revealed other dimensions 
of the problems that will be considered in this discussion, because the situation cries 
for attention to ensure the NHIS reaches the core poor. I discuss two main dimen-
sions of the implementation gaps: the lack of commitment of DHIS staff and 
collectors to pursue the equity agenda of the NHIS and government’s lip-service to 
ensuring that the core poor are exempted. 
Lack of commitment 
The exemption implementation gap can be explained as the DHISs’ inability to 
balance the two roles of the NHIS: to generate revenue and pursue equity in access 
to healthcare (Mclntyre et al. 2003, Ekman 2004). As Mclntyre et al. (2003) point 
out, there should be trade-offs to achieve both goals. However, in the case of the 
NHIS, DHISs’ staff and collectors, who are to pursue both policy goals, have 
gradually drifted their focus in favour of revenue generation. Less attention is paid 
to the NHIS’ equity goal. The DHISs’ mandate to vigorously apply the exemption 
policy as implementers of the pro-poor NHIS has been relegated to the background. 
Like previous exemption policies under user-fee regimes that could not fulfil their 
goal (see Nyanator & Kutzin 1999, Badasu 2004, Aikins & Arhinful 2006), the 
NHIS has also failed to provide the core poor access to healthcare. These studies 
mentioned problems of identification of the poor and the governments’ delay in 
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reimbursing health providers as the main causes of failure. In this study, the DHISs’ 
staff thought that the reasons they gave for the poor not being exempted were 
morally acceptable excuses to cover up for their lack of commitment to ensure that 
the core poor were not excluded from the scheme. Critical observation of DHIS staff 
and collectors’ countenance when discussing the issue and the NHIA’s inaction to 
resolve the identification problems demonstrated the lack of commitment to the 
policy goals. As Criel (1999) observes, the effectiveness of SHISs is the ability to 
reduce genuine exclusion. Thus, the NHIS’s inability to reach the core poor ques-
tions its viability as a health insurance scheme aimed at protecting the vulnerable. It 
must be noted that although children are exempted, those above five years are only 
registered if a parent or guardian is enrolled. This means lack of exemption to the 
core poor affects their children as well. 
The main explanation for the DHISs’ stance is the requirement to generate reve-
nue to meet some of their recurrent expenditures. This has influenced them to make 
revenue generation a priority. As a result, the DHISs use the most restrictive 
criterion, homelessness, which does not apply to the core poor in these communities 
– to disqualify potential beneficiaries. The local condition of unemployment, no 
visible source of income and inconsistent support from another person stated in the 
policy, are all criteria that apply to the core poor and yet are ignored (see National 
Health Insurance Regulations 2004, 58: 1-3). A key informant explained: “If we tell 
them [community members] about the other criteria and they come demanding 
exemption, how do we get revenue?” As stated in chapter three, apart from mad 
people everybody including those identified as core poor, lived in family houses, 
dilapidated structures or with friends. I did not find a single normal homeless person 
in the ten intervention communities (seven in Central Region and three in the 
Eastern Region) I visited during my fieldwork. In farming communities, the poor 
generally had no stable source of income. Some did menial jobs for friends and 
neighbours, some were farmers, but did not have a regular income. In fishing 
communities, some were engaged by boat owners as labourers only during the 
bumper harvest while others were totally unemployed and usually lived on the 
occasional kindness of family members or neighbours while struggling to survive. 
Thus, apart from homelessness, other community indicators share commonalities 
with what is stated in the policy, but are rarely considered by the DHISs. 
At this point, it is necessary to mention that the study communities, just like many 
rural and urban communities in Ghana, are closely knit with many households living 
in one structure. In this living arrangement, the core poor are not difficult to find. 
They are not ashamed to seek help. Their neighbours, the community and opinion 
leaders often look for assistance so they can afford formal care. But, unfortunately, 
requests for exemptions during the intervention were often not granted on the basis 
of the homelessness criterion. In some cases, I had to intervene to get a poor person 
  
212
enrolled to prevent a fatality since they were seriously sick and needed to go to the 
hospital. The irony was that collectors and DHISs’ staff who were supposed to 
facilitate the exemption process were PSG members, but often reluctant to follow 
through. This showed their lack of commitment. The question then becomes, whose 
interest is the NHIS policy supposed to serve, the poor or the rich? If the former, 
then why use a criterion that excludes them? As social scientists posit, poverty is a 
social construct whose understanding requires a contextual approach (Hulme et al. 
2001, Aryeetey et al. 2010, Aryeetey 2012). In their study of community concepts of 
poverty in the Central Region of Ghana, Aryeetey (2012) also observed that the 
national level indicators of poverty are inappropriate from the community perspec-
tive. They suggest that in developing such a policy, it is necessary to engage 
communities to ensure that there is an understanding of their situation and perspec-
tives to inform the process. 
The lack of interest from the collectors, who were expected to recommend the 
core poor to the DHISs to be certified as qualified for exemption, may have been to 
do with the fact that they were not paid for registering the exempt group. So, they 
usually do not disseminate information about exemptions. If they did give exemp-
tion information, then it was normally about homelessness. Thus, unlike other 
exemption categories with indisputable criteria such as age and pregnancy, the core 
poor’s exemption depended on the discretion of collectors to recommend them and 
ultimately the DHISs’ approval. Clearly, this stance by DHISs’ staff and collectors 
demonstrates a lack of commitment to prevent the exclusion of the core poor from 
the NHIS. 
The findings of this study show how policies that target the poor are experienced 
and how the intended impact is not often achieved due to implementers’ attitude. In 
an analysis of the behaviour of frontline public service workers in the United States 
of America, Lipsky (1980:13) refers to street level bureaucrats and observes that 
they generally exhibit a high margin of discretion in resource allocation decisions 
especially in resource-constrained systems. He observes that the actions of the 
frontline workers then “effectively become public policy rather than the objectives 
of the documents and statements developed at the policy level.” Although Lipsky’s 
study was in another social context, the nature of public service in essence seems to 
be the same in most countries. The DHISs and collectors can be described as street 
level bureaucrats who use their discretion regarding which aspects of the NHIS 
policy need to be emphasised and pursued: revenue generation or exemption. They 
found the latter less appealing, which made the policy largely pro-rich. These 
bottlenecks attest to the evidence in the literature that many healthcare interventions 
targeted at the poor, do not actually reach them as envisaged (Con & Walford 1998, 
Basaza et al. 2008, Kamuzora & Gilson 2007). In their study in Tanzania on the 
exemptions of the Community Health Fund, Kamuzora & Gilson (2007) also 
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observed that the targets of exemptions did not know about their existence because 
of managers’ negative attitudes. They noted that the managers felt that the exemp-
tions would erode their financial base and often refuse requests for exemptions. 
Lip service 
The homelessness criterion as the basis for granting the core poor exemption raises 
some intriguing questions about why it was put in the policy. Was it just a matter of 
a wholesale transfer of policies from other social contexts such as Western Europe 
and the United States of America where homelessness is a condition of the core 
poor? Or were policy makers not familiar with the reality at the local level in 
Ghana? Analysis of these questions reveals hidden insights regarding the motivation 
to establish a criterion that eliminates potential beneficiaries. Contrary to general 
opinion that the implementation gap is mainly due to identification difficulties, I 
think the explanation runs deeper. I point out the lack of commitment at the policy 
level to ensure that the core poor are enrolled as a factor. I put forward two possible 
explanations. First, if policy makers were genuinely committed to exempting the 
core poor, they would have paid collectors for enrolling them just as they do for the 
premium-paying category. This would motivate the collectors to pursue the NHIS’ 
pro-poor agenda and identify the core poor. Second, if the policy makers were really 
committed to running a pro-poor NHIS, some groundwork would have been done to 
ensure that all the criteria reflected the conditions of the target group. I explain why 
these actions were not taken by looking at the political situation at the time that the 
NHIS was envisioned and the financial implications of granting exemptions to those 
who would qualify as core poor. As mentioned earlier, setting a condition that 
eliminates the target equals a lack of interest in achieving the set goal. The question 
that comes to mind is why was such a condition set? From this perspective, I argue 
that setting such a condition could have been a strategy to lessen the financial 
burden of enrolling all core poor while also serving as propaganda to accumulate 
political capital for the election that was due in a few months before the NHIS was 
introduced. The scheme was introduced nation-wide in March 2004 and elections 
were held in December of the same year. Meanwhile, the financial implication of 
enrolling all the exempt categories was too significant for the country, so a criterion 
that would reduce the financial burden was needed. 
One may question this explanation, but a critical analysis of the financial implica-
tions provides insight and strengthens my argument. The NHIS has a large exemp-
tion group (about half of Ghana’s population). For example, in the two regions used 
for the study, our household baseline survey showed that children (0-17 years) form 
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46.6 per cent of the population and people above 70 years form 3.6 per cent.2 The 
figure for pregnant women could not be computed from our data. In the case of the 
core poor, a recent Ghana Living Standard Survey shows that about a third (28.5%) 
of Ghana’s population live below the poverty line (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). 
The Ministry of Finance pays GH¢ 14 for each person exempted per annum to the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA). Considering the core poor alone, it 
means that the government would have to pay premiums for about 2.5 million 
people. This equals a total cost of about GH¢ 35 million (US$25 million) per 
annum, which would be a significant demand on the country’s budget. A country 
with a cross-national per capita income of US$520 in 2006 (World Bank 2010) and 
already over stretched with unfulfilled needs in other sectors of the economy, such 
as education and roads, means that the money to cover the exemptions is not easily 
available. The International Labour Organisation (2006) made a similar observation 
in their financial assessment of the NHIS. They cautioned that with the large 
exemption group in relation to income, the National Health Insurance Fund might 
not remain viable over the medium to long term. For example, by the end of 2008, 
the National Health Insurance Authority owed health facilities about US$34 million 
(see Witter & Garshong 2009). 
Thus considering the financial burden, there was nothing to lose if in practice the 
homelessness criterion eliminated almost all potential beneficiaries while appearing 
to be fulfilling the government’s moral obligation to the poor and showing the 
international community they were committed to ensuring equity in access to 
healthcare. The politics of the NHIS policy-making process has been described as 
characterised by political rhetoric (Rajkotia 2007, Agyepong & Adjei 2008). Witter 
& Garshong (2009) also observe that the original objective of introducing the NHIS 
was essentially political. Thus, what was important at that time was to win votes for 
the pending election. The practicalities of its implementation were overlooked, 
probably intentionally. If this was not the case, and the politicians were truly 
committed, whose definition of the core poor should have counted; the one by 
policy makers or by the community? The government had the option to set a 
criterion that reflected the realities of the core poor in Ghana. As Agyepong & Nagai 
(2011: 232) point out: “A policy is only as good as its implementation arrange-
ment.” Poverty needs to be defined by the community. Aryeetey et al. (2010), in 
their analysis of various methods of identifying poor households, observe that the 
community criteria of classifying the poorest members correlated with mean testing 
and the proxy mean testing considered as the gold standard. This view starts from 
                                              
2
  These figures roughly agree with the nation-wide figures. The 2008 Ghana Demographic Health Survey 
reported that 41% of Ghana’s population was below 15 years. The 2000 population census reported that 
5.3% were above 64 years (Ghana Statistical Service 2002). 
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the assumption that opinion and community leaders understand local conditions of 
poverty and are in a better position to devise effective guidelines that could be used 
to identify them. 
The argument is strengthened when one considers the fact that the non-
applicability of the homelessness criterion has been discussed in the public domain 
since the inception of the NHIS, but both past and present governments seem not to 
be concerned and no solution is in sight. This is not to say that nothing is being done 
to improve the applicability of the exemption policy and enrolment of the core poor, 
but the moral urgency required on the part of both the DHISs and the government 
seems to be lacking. This is often the case when reforms are introduced and the 
economy is too weak to support implementation. These reflections underscore the 
need for civil society groups to look at programmes that target the poor with a lens 
that sees beyond the policy document and effectively monitor implementation. 
Otherwise, social security programmes targeted at the poor will not reach the 
majority since they have no voice to make demands. The poor are voiceless; they are 
the silent ones in society who cannot challenge DHISs for not granting them 
exemptions even when all indicators show that they qualify. Clearly, this shows that 
even if the implementation arena is littered with other barriers, it is ironic that policy 
makers’ professed goal of ensuring equity in access to healthcare is not being given 
the urgency it requires. 
“I’m not often sick”: Adverse selection 
Contrary to the philosophy of social health insurance schemes (SHISs) that requires 
people to enrol and consistently renew their memberships, whether they benefit or 
not, the NHIS is beset with pervasive adverse selection. The mutual cooperation that 
was expected to stimulate voluntary enrolment was absent. Many people enrolled 
with just the motive of benefitting and not of sharing the risk or cost. This is 
reflected in the less than 50 per cent enrolment among the general population (40%) 
after the intervention. The intriguing aspect was the enrolment level among the rich 
quintiles: rich (46%) and richest (44%) and high non-renewal rates (22%) within the 
same groups. This tendency contradicts the policy goal of attaining universal 
coverage by the end of five years against the backdrop of a heavily subsidised 
premium. The improbable reason given by the majority of all respondents was their 
inability to pay the premium. The majority (67%) and (73%) said they did not renew 
their membership and never enrolled because they could not pay premium (Table 
A.10, Appendix 2). Almost all key informants gave the same reason as their first 
response when I asked them why they did not enrol or renew their membership. But, 
as I engaged them in further discussion, their real intention emerged. They said: 
“I’m not often sick” and “I’m waiting for a while.” This indicates that the decision 
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to enrol and remain in the NHIS for most people is not poverty, but rather a rational 
calculation. 
The situation observed was that many household heads enrolled only those who 
needed healthcare and renewed their membership only when they had to go to the 
hospital. This contradicts the crucial assumption by policy makers that the solidarity 
principles exhibited by the rich kinsmen’s generous contributions to the funerals of 
the poor would be transferred to secure them against ill-health as well as motivate 
them to enrol and remain in the NHIS. In Ghana like other African countries, the 
NHIS was introduced based on the assumption that traditional norms that oblige 
kinsmen to support poor members will motivate people to enrol (see also Arhinful 
2003, Sommerfeld et al. 2002). In contrast, people merely appreciated the NHIS’ 
benefits as reducing the financial burden of expensive healthcare costs. The need to 
share the costs and risks for their mutual benefit did not seem to impact people’s 
decisions; rather many looked for ways and means to get the maximum benefit with 
minimum contribution. As Arhinful remarked, the ‘solidarity’ that existed in 
community-based health insurance scheme (CBHIs) in Ghana was the unintended 
consequence of self-interest. People are not willing to pay for people they do not 
know, as would be the case in a national health insurance, because it will not 
produce social capital for them. Arhinful (2003: 150) states: 
In the emerging mutual insurance setting, a contract that asserts payment of a fixed voluntary 
premium is the only social tie that binds members together. For most of these people there is no 
sense of emotional attachment to other members of the group, apart from the few that they 
probably know and live with. The absence of opportunities for the accumulation of social capital 
thus diminishes the binding feeling of solidarity and for that matter the binding force of reci-
procity underlying such schemes. 
This lack of solidarity to share the risks and costs that Arhinful noted was also 
observed in the current study. The risk- and cost-sharing principles only ‘worked’ 
for SSNIT contributors whose premiums were (forcibly) deducted at the source. 
Non-SSNIT formal sector contributors and informal sector workers were not willing 
to pay premiums based on their income. Almost everybody paid the minimum and 
in many cases discontinued paying if they did not benefit. For example, boat owners 
paid the same premium as their employees when they enrolled them. They enrolled 
their employees because fishermen are prone to accidents and need regular access to 
healthcare. However, the higher premium the boat owners were expected to pay 
because they earned more than their employees was rejected. The owners insisted on 
paying the minimum. Arhinful (2003) refers to this as: ‘solidarity of self-interest’: 
joining a group with a minimum contribution to satisfy personal needs. Other 
researchers also commented on people’s low interest in health insurance. In their 
analysis of declining subscriptions in a mutual health organisation in Guinea-
Conakry, Criel & Waelkens (2003) attributed low enrolment in health insurance 
schemes in Africa to a lack of risk perception. I have argued that the situation is 
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more complex in Ghana. People perceive they are at risk, but wait until they need 
healthcare before rushing to enrol or renew their membership. A similar observation 
was made by Adusei-Asante (2009) in his study of a rural district in the Eastern 
Region of Ghana. He found that only mothers and their children and people with 
chronic sicknesses, who needed regular healthcare, enrolled and renewed their 
membership in the NHIS routinely. They opted out when their need for medical care 
was over. 
Also, a nation-wide survey by the Ghana Statistical Service in 2008 found that 
Private Commercial Health Insurance Schemes covered less than one per cent of 
Ghanaians (Ghana Statistical Service 2009). These findings question the general 
notion, and the assertion of key informants of this study, that people will enrol in an 
insurance scheme if they are confident they will receive quality service. Like private 
enterprises, healthcare services to private insurance enrolees are provided by well-
equipped health facilities with good quality service, positive staff attitudes towards 
insured patients and only rare incidences of drug shortages. The low patronage of 
private health insurance schemes confirms the observation that many Ghanaians 
have not yet accepted the conditional reciprocity embedded in health insurance. Nor 
do they use it as protection against ill health. Thus, the intervention outcome was 
influenced by the low interest in the NHIS, which was a country-wide phenomenon. 
These observations indicate that the minimum solidarity needed to drive people to 
enrol and remain in the scheme was absent. People tended to enrol if they were 
certain to benefit; they did not accept cost redistribution and risk-sharing in health 
insurance. The selective enrolment of household members reveals an adverse 
selection and negative risk-averse attitudes towards health insurance as implied in 
the “I’m not often sick” and “I’m waiting for a while” reasons for not enrolling or 
renewing their membership. This indicates that these people fully perceive the risk 
of not being insured as more expensive, but wait and rush to enrol or renew their 
membership only when they need healthcare. 
A more distressing finding was that these actions were encouraged by the lack of 
sanctions against defaulters and ‘back door registration’. Some people managed to 
enrol and access healthcare without waiting for the three-month mandatory period. 
This unscrupulous behaviour perpetuated by some DHIS staff and collectors was 
largely due to ineffective monitoring. According to some collectors, they did it as a 
favour for a small fee. This gave more people the hope of manipulating the registra-
tion process and so they did not enrol until they were sure of benefitting. Putnam 
(1995: 67) calls this a “dilemma of collective action” when people want to benefit 
from collective goods with minimum input. He notes that the dilemma of collective 
action can only be resolved when civic engagements foster sturdy norms and social 
trust. But, I argue that for the intriguing phenomenon of mutual benefit being 
subsumed by individualistic tendencies, the problem can only be addressed when the 
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rules are strictly enforced and effective monitoring mechanisms put in place. 
Otherwise, the NHIS will continue to suffer from parochial interests and the goal of 
attaining universal coverage will remain a mirage. 
The problem of low achievement of health policy, in spite of massive support, has 
also been observed by critical observers of other health issues. Van der Geest et al. 
(1990: 1025) examined why Primary Health Care (PHC) so rarely worked, although 
there was “unanimous approval of PHC” at Alma Ata in 1978. They attributed the 
failure of PHC to the diverse interests that multiple actors at various levels had in 
the policy so the idea of using PHC as a strategy to attain health for all by the year 
2000 was not accomplished. In their study, the authors mentioned the low financial 
appeal of PHC to health providers, inadequate funding by governments and the 
community’s cultural values that led to the acceptance of some of the proposals and 
rejection of others. In the same vein, although all stakeholders accepted that the 
NHIS improved access to healthcare and reduced complications among insured 
patients, the various interests undermined the achievement of the NHIS’ goal. 
Politicians saw it as a tool to secure electoral victory, so they did not wait to expand 
the health facilities’ capacity to handle the expected increase in patient numbers 
before introducing the scheme. They did not seriously consider what constitutes 
quality service to insured patients and also paid lip service to the exemption policy. 
Health providers saw it as increasing their workload, and hence were hostile to 
insured patients and charged extra fees. Community members thought that they 
could benefit with minimal financial investment, while the DHISs were more 
interested in revenue than granting exemptions to the core poor to ensure the equity 
agenda was achieved. These distinct – and often conflicting – interests converged to 
limit the PSGs’ efforts at improving enrolment and retention rates. 
Conclusions 
This study set out to generate evidence to show that local stakeholders can collabo-
rate to improve enrolment in the NHIS and retain members. The study aimed to 
prove that in-depth information can lead to a better understanding of health insur-
ance decision-making in Ghana. Three researchers (including the author of this 
book) set up a multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme (MSPSP) that en-
gaged local NHIS stakeholders to identify barriers to enrolment and retention of 
members and developed and implemented solutions to expand coverage. I used a 
multi-level perspective as a conceptual framework and methodological tool to 
analyse and explain challenges to enrolment in health insurance and retention of 
members. I described the MSPSP and examined the approaches that the facilitators 
employed in implementing the intervention. I examined the outcome of the interven-
tion and factors that led to increase in enrolment and studied reasons for the PSGs’ 
limited success by employing quantitative and qualitative research methods. The 
  
219
results show that many factors mediated the effect of the intervention; therefore, 
drawing a decisive conclusion about the outcome is difficult. However, the follow-
ing key conclusions are presented. 
The study has shown that stakeholders’ engagement in the educational and advo-
cacy activities in communities and health facilities stimulated enrolment in the 
NHIS. This approach led to a better understanding of the barriers to enrolment and 
increased confidence in the NHIS. For example, insured opinion and community 
leaders shared the benefits they derived from the NHIS with community members 
and convinced people that it was a viable alternative to on-the-spot payments. 
Health providers educated community members and their patients on the benefits of 
health insurance and persuaded them to enrol. In contrast, the PSG facilitators who 
dominated PSG activities and made unilateral decisions created distrust, stifled 
intervention activities and could not sustain the group through the intervention 
period. These facilitators did not engage stakeholders in intervention activities, so 
they could not establish the trust relationships needed to increase confidence in the 
NHIS. Hence, they failed to achieve a positive outcome. This finding demonstrates 
that the bottom-up, inclusive decision-making and interdependency approach that 
most facilitators employed in PSG activities and interactions among stakeholders 
created trust and ensured the stakeholders’ effective participation. This approach 
also sustained the facilitators’ commitment to achieve positive results. 
The study also found that people (apart from the core poor and some poor house-
holds with many members), enrolled in the NHIS because the cost of the premium 
was affordable and relieved them from expensive healthcare expenditure. It also 
strengthened community members’ resilience to manage the adversities of ill health. 
However, quality service is yet to be the basis for enrolling and remaining in the 
NHIS. Almost all insured patients complained about the poor quality of healthcare 
services. Prominent complaints included delays at health facilities, disrespect, extra 
payments and the burden of roaming to obtain prescribed drugs from accredited 
private pharmacies and chemist shops due to the shortage of drugs on the National 
Health Insurance Drug List in health facilities. These issues all caused discontent, 
created distrust and eroded the confidence that the PSGs had built in the scheme. 
This shows that the NHIS is not the cure for poor quality healthcare service. Con-
scious efforts must be made to resource health facilities and position them to meet 
the expectations of insured patients. In addition, ‘back door’ registrations due to 
inefficient monitoring systems gave some people the hope that they could obtain the 
NHIS card to access services without waiting for the three-month mandatory period. 
The PSGs’ limited achievement was attributed to the social and institutional con-
text in which the NHIS operates. Community members were influenced by the 
generalised reciprocity embedded in traditional risk-sharing arrangements. This 
undermined the acceptance of the conditional reciprocity of health insurance and led 
  
220
to adverse selection as many household heads enrolled and renewed NHIS cards 
only for members who needed healthcare. Others did not regularly renew their 
memberships because of the lack of sanctions against defaulters. They rushed to 
renew their membership only when they needed healthcare. This finding contrasts 
the policy makers’ assumption that participation in traditional mutual support groups 
stimulates enrolment and the commitment to remain in the scheme. 
For health providers, the NHIS can be described as a paradox; on the one hand, 
they saw it as reducing complications, which would encourage people to enrol. On 
the other hand, it was perceived as increasing their workload due to increased 
utilisation of healthcare and completion of NHIS forms. As a result, two categories 
of health providers were observed. One devised strategies to cope with the burden of 
work by being hostile to insured patients and giving preference to uninsured 
patients. Others charged insured patients to compensate for their heavy workload 
and to avoid filling out the NHIS forms. The second category treated insured 
patients well and persuaded people to enrol because the NHIS reduced complica-
tions among patients. 
In the case of the DHISs, inadequate equipment especially cameras adversely 
affected their output of work. It created difficulties in processing of registration 
forms and resulted in delays in issuing NHIS cards. So collectors were provided 
cameras to take photographs as they simultaneously registered people. This facilitat-
ed registration processes and led to prompt delivery of NHIS cards, which influ-
enced people to enrol. 
I started this study to explore if PSGs could identify barriers and develop and 
implement intervention activities to improve NHIS enrolment and retain members. 
However, during the intervention, the focus was expanded beyond PSGs to cover a 
wider context and higher level actors involved in the NHIS. Issues arose that 
exposed more linkages that needed to be explored. 
The findings indicate that although local level stakeholders can collaborate to 
increase enrolment, more understanding of the barriers is needed and national-level 
interventions are required to improve enrolment (especially among the poor) and 
retain members. Nonetheless, each of the three concepts – multi-level perspective, 
resilience and trust – employed in this study enhanced the understanding of health 
insurance decision-making and the reasons behind low enrolment and retention rates 
in Ghana. The findings without doubt contribute to the discourse about the potential 
of multi-stakeholder collaborative groups in helping reduce barriers and improve 
coverage of social health insurance schemes in developing countries. 
Recommendations 
This study has shown the potential of using local level stakeholders of Ghana’s 
NHIS to reveal and address the multidimensional factors that interact to undermine 
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enrolment and retention of members. However, the PSGs’ achievement was limited 
because of the social environment in which NHIS operates and reservations about 
quality of healthcare service delivery. The practical and policy concerns are apparent 
from the preceding discussions on how to limit or eliminate adverse selection, 
improve enrolment of the poor and core poor, improve quality of service and scale-
up problem-solving groups and ensure their effective functioning. 
Policy implications 
Kinsmen and the entire community provide support during funerals. Cash and other 
donations are given to the bereaved family to enable them give the dead a befitting 
burial. This support did not transform to communal solidarity to share risk and cost 
of ill health. Relying on solidarity as a virtue to motivate people to enrol in the 
NHIS and consistently renew their membership does not seem realistic. Rather, 
policy makers should move away from the solidarity principle to promote health 
insurance and devise pragmatic intervention activities that emphasise enlightened 
self-interest and project the benefits of health insurance to the individual and 
immediate family. Overall solidarity will be the unintended de facto result of such 
self-interest (Arhinful 2003). Extensive education and promotion is required to 
convince Ghanaians that health insurance is first advantageous to themselves and 
their families. 
The study also highlighted the adverse effects of self-interest and tendency of 
some community members and DHIS staff to manipulate the registration process to 
their advantage. Moreover, the PSGs’ intensive education and promotion had a 
limited impact on voluntary enrolment and renewal of NHIS membership. This 
makes it imperative for the DHISs to strictly apply the National Health Insurance 
Regulations, 2004 (LI 1809, 59: 1) and sanction defaulters to wait for three months 
before accessing healthcare services upon renewal of their membership. This will 
deter people from adopting the wait and see strategy and consistently renew their 
memberships. 
History yields important lessons about how to address low enrolment in voluntary 
health insurance schemes. The initial stages of social security in Western Europe, 
where health insurance was made compulsory to all wage earners, indicate that some 
coercive action is required to compel all residents in Ghana to enrol. Some might 
argue that since it is more expensive to access healthcare without health insurance, 
there is no need to coerce people to enrol because without it, they pay more. Unin-
sured patients experience more complications and higher risks of death than the 
insured do because of delays at home and lack of access to healthcare. Since the 
economic cost of prolonged illness does not only hinder an individual’s wellbeing, 
but the country’s development as well, it makes economic sense to ensure that all 
citizens are healthy. The following forms of coercion are recommended. One, a 
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premium for formal sector workers who do not contribute to Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SNNIT which is a government pension scheme in Ghana 
for most formal sector workers) should be deducted at source. Two, NHIS enrol-
ment should be made a requirement for obtaining voter identity cards, driving 
licenses, passports, marriage certificates and admission to educational institutions. 
At the same time, heads of health facilities and DHIS managers should institute 
measures to stop frontline staff that looks for opportunities to manipulate the system 
for personal gains. 
The revelation that the NHIS is not reaching the poor and the core poor calls for 
strategies that will reduce their exclusion. In the case of the poor, the decoupling of 
the registration of children less than five years from their parents or guardians 
should be effectively implemented to reduce fatalities among them. For the core 
poor, the homelessness criterion should be removed from the exemption policy since 
it does not reflect reality. Since the NHIRs 2004 LI 1809, 58: 3 mandates DHISs to 
assign the duty of eliciting the information required for the classification of indi-
gents according to standards determined by the scheme to collectors, the DHISs’ 
staff and collectors should engage opinion and community leaders to develop 
indicators that reflect their reality rather than national documents prepared by people 
who are usually not familiar with local conditions. Moreover, this study revealed 
that the core poor are not difficult to find. Community members described them as 
persons afflicted by ‘ohia buburoo’ (severe poverty) (see also Aryeetey 2012). 
Removing the homelessness criterion will be a first step in making it possible for the 
core poor to demand exemptions with the support of opinion and community 
leaders. This will force the DHISs to pursue the equity agenda of the NHIS. 
Enrolling and remaining in a health insurance scheme is largely influenced by 
trust, which depends on health facilities’ ability to provide quality healthcare to 
insured patients. This requires the creation of an improved image for the NHIS that 
resonates with quality healthcare service and makes it easier and faster to obtain 
healthcare and not the reverse. This means that health facilities need to be strength-
ened to provide services that are responsive to patients’ needs. Since drugs are 
essential component of quality service, the priority should be to provide insured 
patients drugs at facilities with no extra payment. In the short term, the NHIA 
should allow health facilities to purchase small quantities of the drugs they need 
urgently from private suppliers without the non-availability certificate to reduce the 
incidence of drug shortages. Also, supervision at health facilities should be strength-
ened to check the collection of unauthorised fees and the selling of drugs covered by 
the NHIS to insured patients and to make sure that the staff performs their tasks 
diligently. In the long run, the on-going electronic network to connect DHISs to the 
NHIA should be expanded to cover all accredited hospitals and health centres 
nation-wide for easy claim processing and payment. This will reduce the time spent 
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treating insured patients and ease health providers’ workload. Since the fees charged 
will be reflected in the DHISs’ system, claims will be promptly paid to enable health 
facilities maintain their stock levels. These measures will build trust among insured 
patients and health providers and boost confidence in the NHIS. This will influence 
people to accept the NHIS as better than cash payment at health facilities. It will 
also make the compulsory enrolment more bearable and influence both the rich and 
the poor to enrol so that the cost and risk are shared. 
For the above measures to be effective, stakeholders should be continuously 
engaged in identifying and addressing their concerns through conversations and key 
informant interviews. To achieve positive results, these measures should be seen as 
part of the quality assurance activities undertaken to reveal the NHIS’ implementa-
tion challenges across regions and districts, and efforts made to address them. The 
evaluation outcome should be incorporated into both the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA) and Ghana Health Service’s (GHS) annual review reports. These 
reports should be discussed at joint annual review meetings by the NHIA and GHS 
at national, regional and district levels to provide a platform for sharing ideas that 
will lead to improvement in healthcare service and DHISs’ operations. 
How to scale up PSGs and make them more effective 
The results of this study confirmed that collaboration by local stakeholders leads to 
increase in enrolment. I therefore recommend that PSGs should be scaled up 
nationwide and used for intensive education and advocacy activities. When carried 
out over a long period, these activities will reduce the negative practices among 
stakeholders that undermine enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members. 
The NHIA’s proposal that every DHIS should be divided into Health Insurance 
Communities and Community Health Insurance Committees (CHICs) was a lauda-
ble idea, but not implemented. The CHIC was to promote community ownership of 
the NHIS and ensure their efficient operations. They were supposed to oversee the 
collection of premium and registration fees and to ensure that monies collected were 
deposited in the District Health Insurance Fund. I recommend that the CHIC agenda 
be revisited and the membership expanded to include health providers and DHIS 
staff. Thus, PSGs should be established in every town. A number of small villages 
could collectively form a single PSG to save costs, since those communities patron-
ise the same health facility and DHIS. The DHISs should facilitate the formation of 
PSGs and provide a small budget for their activities. The procedure for selecting 
members is described in chapter four. Lessons learnt show that consultation with 
opinion and community leaders and institutional heads to devise a selection ap-
proach, which ensures that only committed representatives are selected, is critical. 
Also, the low representation of women in PSGs and exclusion of the poor highlight 
the need to develop additional strategies to ensure that both are fairly represented in 
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the group. Health providers and DHISs’ representatives should not be selected based 
solely on their work schedule; being an effective PSG member requires a specific set 
of skills and a volunteering spirit that not all employees have. Therefore, heads of 
health facilities and DHIS managers should engage their staff in a discussion and 
give them the option to accept or decline their nomination. In addition, all nominees 
should be confirmed or rejected by their colleagues through secret voting since they 
are likely to have better insight into the above mentioned characteristics. Facilitators 
should be selected at the first PSG meeting through secret voting and the DHIS 
manager should facilitate the meeting. These procedures will ensure that only people 
committed to promoting the welfare of others become PSG members and facilita-
tors. This is important because the allowance paid for participation is usually not 
enough to keep those who do not have the spirit of volunteerism to be committed to 
the intervention. 
Since how a programme is presented and run determines its success or failure, 
appropriate strategies at each stage of the life span of a programme must be devel-
oped. Five measures are recommended to make PSGs efficient. First, all PSG 
members should be given adequate orientation to ensure that they understand well 
the rationale of the intervention and their task from the onset. Second, a nurturing 
environment that creates space and effective mechanisms should be developed for 
community members, health providers and DHISs’ staff to freely express concerns 
about problems they face without looking over their shoulders. This means stake-
holders need to be sensitised to accept the work of PSGs as part of quality improve-
ment initiative that requires their commitment to succeed. The involvement of health 
providers and DHISs staff should focus on building trust between them and PSG 
members to encourage open and dispassionate discussion of issues. With trust in 
place, the PSGs can pursue the interest of all stakeholders and openly discuss 
challenges that undermine enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members, and 
develop intervention activities to reach all target groups. For example, the DHISs’ 
reluctance to grant exemptions to the core poor because of the homelessness 
criterion could be taken up by PSGs and engage them in discussions to develop 
locally tailored criteria to identify the core poor. Third, DHIS managers should not 
be part of PSGs. They should be supervisors who spend funds and closely monitor 
PSGs’ activities and ensure the money given out is spent on the intervention. Fourth, 
there should be an annual review meeting for PSG members, facilitators and DHIS 
managers at the district level. The meetings should be used to evaluate their activi-
ties, share experiences and learn about best practices to help improve their work and 
address their concerns. This will also motivate community members and facilitators 
to remain committed and work harder to achieve positive results. Accountability on 
the part of facilitators will also be ensured. Finally, the NHIA regional managers 
should play an oversight role and incorporate PSG activities into their programme of 
  
225
work and reports. As mentioned earlier, PSG activities should be discussed at joint 
review meetings of the NHIA and GHS at the district, regional and national levels. 
These recommendations when implemented will reduce the NHIS’s implementa-
tion challenges and stimulate enrolment and retain members. It will also ensure that 
the poor and the core poor are not excluded from the NHIS. 
Implications for future research 
The MSPSP, as a pilot project, provided insight into factors that enhanced and 
limited PSGs’ achievement at improving enrolment in the NHIS and retaining 
members. However, more qualitative research is needed to understand the specific 
factors to develop effective intervention activities for addressing them. For example, 
more understanding of local discourses on informal risk-sharing arrangements and 
how this affects enrolment is required. This will generate more knowledge to help 
develop effective intervention activities that will influence people to accept health 
insurance as a state social security policy that needs their support to ensure every-
body has access to healthcare. 
More research is also needed to develop appropriate criteria for exempting the 
core poor and how to cultivate the political commitment to include them. In the case 
of the poor, ways should be explored on how to ease the heads of households’ 
burden of many dependents. 
Further research is also needed to find ways to reduce the bureaucracy involved 
in treating insured patients and thus, reduce the health providers’ negative behaviour 
towards them. In addition, more efficient registration processes and effective 
monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to make DHISs more efficient. 
Further, the lack of transparency in the policy making and implementation pro-
cess as a result of lack of collaboration among national level actors – MoH, NHIA 
and GHS – was identified as a hindrance to the development of efficient systems to 
build confidence in the NHIS. In this respect, further studies are needed to explore 
inculcating the notion of participatory, transparent and bottom-up approaches to 
policy making and implementation in politicians, policy makers and implementers. 
This will help improve collaboration among stakeholders to develop systems to 
improve DHIS operations and the quality of healthcare services to insured patients 
and make the NHIS more attractive. Moreover, intervention science is an underde-
veloped yet crucial academic subject requiring theory building through empirical 
research, so further research on PSG formation and functioning is needed to inform 
policy makers and programme officers in the field. 
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Appendix 1: List of acronyms 
CEA Census Enumeration Area 
CHIC Community Health Insurance Committee 
CHAG Christian Health Association of Ghana 
CHPS Community-based Health Planning and Services 
DDHSs District Director of Health Services 
DHD District Health Directorate 
DHIS District Health Insurance Scheme 
GHS Ghana Health Service 
GLSS Ghana Living Standard Survey 
GoG Government of Ghana 
GPRTU Ghana Private Road Transport Union 
GSS Ghana Statistical Service 
IGF Internally Generated Fund 
LI Legislative Instrument 
MLP Multi-level Perspective 
MSPSP Multi-stakeholder Problem-solving Programme 
NHIL National Health Insurance Levy 
NHIR National Health Insurance Regulations 
NHIS National Health Insurance Scheme 
OPD Out-patient Department 
PRO Public Relations Officer 
PSG Problem-solving Group 
SSNIT Social Security and National Insurance Trust 
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WHO World Health Organisation 
  
Appendix 2: Tables 
Table A.1 Profile of households and individuals in intervention and control 
communities 
 Overall Intervention comunities Control communities 
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Overall (households) 3301 3152 1646 1562 1635 1590 
Overall (Individuals) 13857 12810 7234 6790 6623 6020 
Age       
0-17 46.5 46.3 48.0 48.1 44.9 44.4 
18-69 49.8 49.7 49.1 48.5 50.7 51.1 
70+ 3.6 3.9 2.9 3.4 4.4 4.5 
Sex       
Male 47.8 47.5 48.1 47.6 47.5 47.0 
Female  52.2 52.5 51.9 52.4 52.5 53.9 
Highest education n=3299 n=3152 n=1646 n=1562 n=1653 n=1590 
None 26.2 26.3 26.0 27.9 26.3 24.7 
Primary 22.0 20.6 26.7 21.7 17.3 19.6 
Secondary  42.4 44.4 40.8 44.1 44.1 44.7 
Higher education 9.4 8.7 6.6 6.3 12.3 11.0 
Marital status n=3299 n=3152 n=1646 n=1562 n=1653 n=1590 
Single 16.3 15.9 16.0 14.4 16.6 17.4 
Married 63.9 62.7 65.9 66.2 62.0 59.2 
Divorced 19.8 21.4 18.1 19.3 21.4 23.4 
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Table A.2 Profile of key informants in each study and the national level 
Stakeholders Position / employment Number 
Community members Fishermen, farmers 3 
Traders, farmers, unemployed 3 
Traditional and opinion leaders 3 
Religious leaders 2 
Health facility staff Staff nurse 1 
Community health nurse 1 
Midwife 1 
Medical assistant 1 
District health Directorate staff Disease control officer 1 
Hospital administrator 1 
District director of health 1 
District Health Insurance Scheme staff Accountant 1 
Manager 1 
Total 20 
 National Health Insurance Authority staff 2 
Ministry of Health staff 1 
Ghana Health Service staff 1 
Total  4 
Grand total 24 
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Table A.3 NHIS status of households and individuals in 30 communities in Central 
and Eastern Regions (%) 
Communities Poverty incidence Households (N = 3301) Individuals (N = 13857) 
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Elmina (U) 10.9 31.8 2.7 65.5 41.8 3.4 54.8 
Amama (R) 28.4 29.4 4.6 66.1 27.3 3.8 68.9 
Moree (U) 28.8 21.6 16.2 62.2 14.7 11.1 74.3 
Anomabo (U) 32.1 9.2 10.1 80.7 4.8 11.3 83.8 
Apam (U) 39.8 23.0 23.9 53.1 16.8 33.3 49.9 
Winneba (U) 11.8 14.5 14.5 70.9 8.7 12.4 78.9 
Nyakrom (U) 14.5 12.7 10.0 77.3 6.3 8.2 85.4 
BremanAyipey (SM) 38.9 25.9 13.0 61.1 27.3 26.0 46.7 
Kokoben (SM) 43.6 18.2 19.1 62.7 15.3 16.9 67.7 
Assin Achiano (R) 43.6 19.1 10.9 70.0 20.5 12.7 66.9 
Jukwaa (U) 10.9 35.5 9.1 55.5 28.8 8.1 63.0 
Dunkwa-on-Offin (U) 29.1 33.6 13.6 52.7 41.3 13.7 45.0 
Assin Akrofuom (SM) 24.5 39.1 16.4 44.5 41.6 20.4 38.0 
Afoso (SM) 29.1 50.0 12.7 33.3 56.1 11.9 31.9 
Akim Akroso (U) 18.2 17.3 10.0 72.7 20.1 11.2 68.7 
Asamankese (U) 14.5 37.3 10.0 52.7 40.5 12.0 47.5 
Alafia No. 1 (R) 23.6 24.5 22.7 52.7 23.3 32.1 44.6 
Kokoso Aboabo (R)  31.8 13.6 15.5 70.9 12.0 12.9 75.1 
Akim Apapam (SM) 24.8 47.3 8.2 44.5 47.6 4.5 47.9 
Akyem Hemang (SM) 30.6 33.9 17.4 48.6 32.7 22.2 45.1 
Koforidua (U) 0.0 50.9 26.4 22.7 56.1 22.7 21.2 
Ntoaso (R) 27.9 16.2 26.4 54.5 14.1 18.5 67.4 
Adawso (SM) 20.9 29. 16.4 54.5 16.7 16.7 66.5 
Burukum Maumi (R) 56.4 33.6 13.6 52.7 31.0 11.5 57.5 
Nuaso (SM) 8.2 40.0 25.5 34.5 48.6 20.6 30.8 
Akosombo (U) 11.9 32.1 27.5 40.0 35.7 33.6 30.6 
Pitiku (SM) 31.5 26.1 5.4 68.5 31.9 3.3 64.8 
Kwakese (R) 34.8 26.8 26.8 46.4 26.0 34.2 39.7 
Bunso (SM) 23.6 53.6 27.5 43.6 57.8 2.9 39.3 
Oframase (SM) 29.4 56.9 4.6 38.5 66.2 5.2 28.6 
Total  30.1 14.3 55.6 30.0 15.7 54.3 
Rural = R, Semi-urban = SM, Urban = U 
Source: Fieldwork, baseline household survey, March 2009. 
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The poverty line used is according to GLSSV report: Lower poverty line is GH¢ 
288: minimum amount of money needed to meet nutritional requirements of 
household members for a year. Upper poverty line is GH¢ 370: total amount of 
money needed to meet food and non-food consumption requirements of household 
members annually. All households whose monthly per capita expenditure falls 
below GH¢ 30.8 are considered poor. 
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Table A.4 Reasons for enrolling, not renewing membership and not enrolling in the 
NHIS 
 Overall 
(N=3301) 
Anomabo 
(N=109) 
Achiano 
(N=110) 
Reasons for enrolling n=1007 n=9 n=20 
Financial protection against illness 76.2 100 75.0 
It is better than cash and carry 20.2 0 23.0 
The school insured my child 0.5 0 0 
A relative asked me to join 1.5 0 0 
Community opinion leader asked me 
to join 
0.3 0 0 
Employer paid 1.4 0 0 
Reasons for not renewing registration n=422 n=11 n=11 
Cannot afford cost of premium 61.4 81.8 63.3 
Did not use services last year 7.1 0 0 
Not satisfied with provider 6.4 0 0 
Difficulty of accessing service 3.3 0 0 
Facility too far 4.5 0 0 
No transport money 0.2 0 0 
Inappropriate timing of premium 
payment 
4.5 0 0 
Had to buy drugs outside the facility 1.2 0 0 
I believe I was given poor quality care 0.7 0 0 
Covered elsewhere 0.2 0 0.3 
Other 10.4 18.2 27.3 
Reasons for never enrolling n=1736 n=88 n=72 
Cannot afford cost of premium 72.5 86.4 80.6 
Mostly healthy do not need to insure 8.6 2.3 1.4 
No confidence in the NHIS 6.6 6.8 1.4 
Registration point too far 2.1 0 5.6 
No close facility 1.1 0 5.6 
No scheme in the area 0.5 0 2.8 
Covered elsewhere 0.1 0 0 
My employer pays for me 0.5 0 0 
Have private insurance 0.2 0 0 
Never heard of NHIS 0.1 0 0 
Other 7.6 4.5 2.8 
Source: Fieldwork, baseline household survey, March 2009  
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Table A.5 Benefits of NHIS derived by the insured 
Benefits of NHIS Agree Neutral Disagree 
30 communities (n=933)    
NHIS saves money from paying hospital bills 89.7 7.0 3.3 
Did not need to borrow money to pay hospital bills 87.1 9.0 3.9 
HI makes me independent, I don’t need to ask for money 
from elsewhere when ill 
88.6 8.4 3.0 
Anomabo (n=10)    
NHIS saves money from paying from paying hospital bills 70 0 30 
Did not need to borrow money to pay hospital bills 60 10 30 
HI makes me independent, I don’t need to ask for money 
from elsewhere when ill 
60 40 0 
Achiano (n=21)    
NHIS saves money from paying from paying hospital bills 95.2 0 4.8 
Did not need to borrow money to pay hospital bills 85.7 4.8 9.5 
HI makes me independent, no need to ask for money from 
elsewhere when ill 
71.7 19.0 9.3 
Source: Fieldwork, baseline household survey, March 2009 
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Table A.6 Opinions associated with the NHIS and quality of service delivery 
Source: Fieldwork, baseline household survey, March 2009  
 Currently insured Previously 
insured 
Never insured 
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N=3298 
         
Three months’ probation period 
for receiving service is adequate 
17.5 11.9 70.6 11.7 14.0 74.3 12.2 20.2 67.7 
Even though one is insured you 
still have to buy drugs 
47.5 9.6 42.9 41.6 8.7 49.7 38.7 14.7 46.6 
Attitude of health staff should be 
improved 
81.7 13.1 5.1 81.5 11.5 7.0 80.9 15.0 4.1 
Availability of drugs should be 
improved 
87.7 9.6 2.7 90.2 7.4 2.3 84.7 13.1 2.2 
N=3297 
         
Expect prompt attendance at the 
facility 
86.1 14.0 0 82.2 17.8 0 22.8 17.9 59.3 
It is good to be a member even if I 
don’t fall sick 
89.0 2.7 8.4 74.5 15.1 10.4 65.6 6.3 28.1 
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Table A.7 Profile of PSG members in the two case study communities 
Achiano Anomabo 
Community members 
Chemist shop owner, volunteer (facilitator) Volunteer  
Cocoa purchasing clerk, farmer NHIS collector (facility) 
A community elder Secretary to the traditional council 
Mobile banker / farmer Trader, volunteer 
Teacher / NHIS collector Teacher 
Cocoa purchasing clerk / farmer Fisherman 
Cocoa purchasing clerk GPRTU chairman 
Kushea Health Centre Anomabo Health Centre 
In-charge / midwife Community Health nurse 
Biostatistician Health assistant 
Praso Health Centre Nurse 
Medical Assistant  District hospital 
Dispensary Assistant Focal person on health insurance at the 
District Hospital 
DHIS 
Public relations officer (Secretary) Public relations officers (facilitator) 
Data entry operator Management information system officer 
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Table A.8 Profile of PSG facilitators 
 No. Role/Position 
Community members 3 Assemblymen 
1 NHIS collector 
5 Health volunteers in central 
1 Traditional birth attendant 
3 Self-employed 
2 Farmers 
Ghana Health Service staff 1 Medical Assistant 
1 Focal person on health insurance at the District 
Hospital 
1 Principal field technician (Disease control unit) 
District Health Insurance 
Scheme staff 
  
Central 1 NHIS manager 
Central 5 Public relation officers 
Eastern 1 Claims managers 
Eastern 5 Public relation officers 
Total 30  
  
  
247
Table A.9 Changes in NHIS status of individuals in intervention communities after 
the MSPSP 
Source: Fieldwork, March 2009 and March 2011 
Note: ‘∆’means change  
 
N Currently insured (%) Previously insured (%) 
Intervention 
communi-
ties  
2011
 
2009
 
2011
 
2009
 
∆%
 
P
-v
alu
es
 
χ2
 
2011
 
2009
 
∆
 %
 
P
-v
alu
es
 
χ2
 
Akosombo 452 468 53.1 36.0 17.1 0.000 27.42 24.6 33.4 -8.9 0.003 8.74 
Akyem 
Hemang 
439 486 47.6 32.7 14.9 0.000 21.35 17.1 22.2 -5.1 0.050 3.84 
Anomabo 445 520 15.3 4.8 10.5 0.000 30.20 18.7 11.4 7.3 0.001 10.20 
Apam 452 501 16.6 16.8 -0.2 0.943 0.005 40.7 33.3 7.4 0.018 5.55 
Asaman-
kese 
386 358 53.4 40.5 12.9 0.000 12.34 30.6 12.0 18.6 0.000 37.73 
Assin-
Achiano 
459 528 49.5 20.3 29.2 0.000 93.45 19.6 12.7 6.9 0.003 8.79 
Assin 
Akrofuom 
475 524 63.2 41.4 21.8 0.000 47.18 15.6 20.4 -4.8 0.047 3.94 
Breman-
Ayipey 
540 578 50.0 27.3 22.7 0.000 60.70 13.2 26.0 -12.8 0.000 28.86 
Bunso 438 445 48.9 57.8 -8.9 0.008 7.02 29.7 2.9 26.8 0.000 116.48 
Elmina 368 446 32.3 40.9 -8.6 0.011 6.40 26.9 3.8 23.1 0.000 88.22 
Kokoso-
Aboabo 
481 434 35.8 12.0 23.8 0.000 69.77 15.4 12.9 2.5 0.283 1.15 
Ntoaso 398 426 25.1 14.3 10.8 0.000 15.28 26.1 18.3 7.8 0.007 7.31 
Oframase 451 441 67.6 66.2 1.4 0.654 0.20 17.1 5.2 11.9 0.000 31.50 
Pitiku 639 639 23.6 31.9 -8.3 0.001 10.96 21.9 3.3 18.6 0.000 100.63 
Winneba 367 437 21.3 8.7 12.6 0.000 25.48 25.1 12.4 12.7 0.000 21.69 
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Table A.10 Reasons for enrolling, not enrolling and renewing membership in the 
NHIS 
Source: Fieldwork March 2011  
 Intervention communities 
Reasons for enrolling n = 657 
Financial protection against illness 75.2 
NHIS is better than cash and carry 23.6 
The school insured my child 0.8 
A relative asked me to join 0.0 
Community opinion leader asked me to join 0.1 
Employer paid for me 0.3 
Reasons for not renewing registration n = 538 
Cannot afford cost of premium 67.3 
Did not use services last year 7.7 
Not satisfied with provider 7.8 
Difficulty of accessing service  5.4 
Facility too far 0.6 
No transport money 0.2 
Inappropriate timing of premium payment 1.7 
Had to buy drugs outside the facility 0.7 
I believe I was given poor quality care 0.9 
Covered elsewhere 0.7 
Other 7.2 
Reasons for not enrolling n = 826 
Cannot afford cost of premium 73.2 
Healthy do not need to insure 12.3 
No confidence in the NHIS 6.2 
Registration point too far 1.1 
No close facility 0.4 
No scheme in the area 0.4 
Have private health insurance 0.7 
My employer pays for me 0.1 
Other 5.6 
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Table A.11 Opinion about NHIS and quality of service expected in intervention 
communities after the MSPSP 
 Currently insured Previously 
insured 
Never insured 
N=3297 
A
g
ree
 
N
eutral
 
D
isag
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eutral
 
D
isag
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eutral
 
D
isag
ree
 
Health personnel treat patients 
with insurance cards in an equal 
way  
66.0 7.5 26.5 48.5 9.9 41.7 38.1 22.0 39.9 
It is good that scheme does not 
register children without their 
parents 
32.7 10.4 56.8 20. 
7 
11.4 67.9 20.7 18.3 61.0 
District scheme personnel are 
trustworthy 
75.4 13.0 11.6 53.4 26.9 19.8 49.4 36.4 314.2 
Even though one is insured you 
still have to buy drugs 
64.0 11.6 24.4 58.2 10.8 31.0 50.0 19.8 0.2 
Attitude of health staff should be 
improved 
76.6 14.7 8.7 87.0 9.6 3.4 74.7 18.3 7.0 
Availability of drugs should be 
improved 
83.7 11.2 5.1 90.1 7.1 2.8 78.6 17.7 3.7 
Expect prompt attendance at the 
facility 
75.8 11.4 12.8 68.8 18.5 12.7 64.7 21.6 13.8 
Source: Fieldwork, March 2011 
  
Appendix 3: NHIS form filled by healthcare providers on 
insured patients 
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Summary 
This study presents the outcome of a multi-stakeholder problem-solving programme 
(MSPSP). It aimed at improving enrolment and retention in the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana. The NHIS was introduced in 2004 following 
criticism that on-the-spot payments denied vulnerable groups access and did not 
achieve the overall benefit of quality healthcare. The aim was to improve the quality 
of service and ensure equity in access to healthcare. However, despite the heavily 
subsidised premium and exemption for vulnerable groups, enrolment among the 
general population has remained low and the poor, who are the target of the policy, 
are the least enrolled. The primary aim of this anthropological study was to assess if 
and how problem-solving groups (PSGs) could increase enrolment in the NHIS and 
retain members. 
Chapter one is an introduction to the study, which is part of a larger multidiscipli-
nary project involving economic and anthropological approaches. The chapter 
presents the research objective and questions and some relevant theoretical concepts. 
The theoretical foundation of the study is situated within critical medical anthropol-
ogy based on the idea that medical anthropologists have both professional and moral 
obligation to explore and address the socio-economic, cultural and political contexts 
in which health inequities manifest. Taking note that many stakeholders are in-
volved in the NHIS policy – politicians, policy makers, implementers, healthcare 
workers and community members – I employed the multi-level perspective (MLP) 
as a conceptual framework and methodological tool to describe and analyse how the 
multiple (sometimes conflicting) interests, views and practices of these various 
actors affected the policy uptake. My other standpoint was that stakeholder collabo-
ration often fails because they do not effectively engage implementers and the target 
population of the policy from the onset. 
Chapter two presents the study design, relevant information about the study sites, 
data collection tools, analytical techniques and a reflection on the researcher’s role 
as a participant observer in the intervention group. This study draws on data from 
qualitative research in seven intervention communities in the Central region includ-
ing: Anomabo and Assin Achiano, which I used as case study communities, and five 
others I visited during the study. Pre- and post-intervention household surveys were 
also conducted, in March 2009 and March 2011, respectively in 30 communities in 
the Central and Eastern Regions of Ghana. 
To show the depth of the problem to be addressed, chapter three discusses barri-
ers and enablers to enrolment in the NHIS and retention of members. It presents the 
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experiences of users and implementers of health insurance within and outside PSGs. 
It also looks at the historical context in which the NHIS was introduced, which 
affected people’s decisions to enrol or not and the work of the DHISs. Community 
members mentioned poverty, traditional concepts of risk-sharing, disrespect of 
health providers towards insured patients, delays at health facilities, difficulties in 
obtaining prescribed drugs, collection of unauthorised fees and national politics. 
Health providers faced problems of heavy workloads as a result of the increased 
utilisation of healthcare, bureaucratic red tape and delays in claim payments leading 
to shortages of drugs. Staff of the DHISs complained about inadequate equipment, 
difficulties processing NHIS forms and granting exemptions to the core poor. The 
NHIS was perceived by many as a tool to build political capital, so some political 
opponents of the then government decided not to enrol. 
Chapters four and five focus on the problem-solving intervention programme. 
Chapter four describes processes followed to set up the intervention group, PSGs, 
and the selection of facilitators. Four main themes are discussed. First, stakeholders’ 
were sensitised about the problems of low enrolment in the NHIS and high member-
ship non-renewal rates and the purpose of the intervention. This raised their interest 
in the intervention and made them willing to work together for change. How they 
were involved in the setting of PSGs forms the second theme of the chapter. I 
describe how community members, health providers and DHIS staffs were mobi-
lised to assume the responsibility of forming PSGs. Heads of health facilities, 
District Health Directorates and the DHISs selected their staff based on their work 
schedules while community members devised an open election process. Opinion 
leaders and research assistants led events at community durbars to select their 
representatives. This strengthened trust among stakeholders, and laid the foundation 
for the intervention and a commitment to achieve set objectives. However, the low 
representation of women and exclusion of the poor indicate that unless extra 
strategies are developed to include them, the open election processes reduce partici-
pation to abstract theory. The third theme is the selection of facilitators for PSGs. 
Facilitators and secretaries were selected from PSG members to form the leadership. 
The fourth theme is facilitators training. Facilitators were the catalysts for PSGs 
functioning and were equipped with special skills in a three-day workshop. The 
workshop helped the facilitators provide the required leadership to create a shared 
vision among PSG members and stakeholders, facilitate meetings and mobilise the 
PSGs to effectively participate in intervention activities to achieve positive out-
comes. 
Chapter five discusses the tools and participatory approaches the PSGs employed 
to identify barriers to enrolment and retention of members, and develop and imple-
ment intervention activities to improve NHIS coverage. Barriers experienced by the 
community included: poverty, collection of unauthorised fees and traditional 
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concepts of risk sharing. Health providers mentioned the heavy workload and delays 
in claim payments while the district health insurance staff complained about 
inadequate equipment and difficulties faced processing NHIS forms. Intervention 
activities developed and implemented to redress these barriers were durbars, 
documentary films, drama, and community leaders’ and stakeholders’ meetings, 
education at health facilities, churches, mosques, schools, lorry stations, setting 
registration points in the community and provision of cameras to collectors to take 
pictures immediately as they registered people. 
Chapter six presents the outcome of the problem-solving intervention programme. 
Overall, PSGs significantly increased enrolment by 10.6 per cent from 29.7 to 40.3 
per cent but could not improve retention rates. Probit model analysis showed that 
residents in intervention communities were 17 per cent more likely to enrol com-
pared to control communities. Ten communities showed significant increases in 
enrolment, two had no change and three recorded significant decreases. PSGs 
however, failed to influence the poorer and poorest quintiles to enrol. They had the 
lowest enrolment rates – poorest 17.6 per cent, poor 31.3 per cent – compared to the 
46.4 and 44.4 per cent among the rich and richest quintiles. Disappointingly, 
membership non-renewal rates increased among the general population: from 15.5 
to 22.4 per cent. Nonetheless, probit model analysis showed that residents in 
intervention communities were five per cent less likely to drop out of the NHIS 
compared to those in the control group. 
Chapters seven and eight examine factors that enhanced the PSGs’ functioning 
and factors that limited their efforts at improving enrolment and retention rates. 
Chapter seven discusses factors that stimulated enrolment. These were the aware-
ness that NHIS provided prompt access to healthcare and financial relief from 
catastrophic payment and reduced complications among patients. The advocacy role 
of opinion and community leaders and health providers to promote the NHIS was 
another stimulating factor. Insured opinion and community leaders sharing the 
benefits they derived from the NHIS convinced people that it was a viable alterna-
tive to on-the-spot payment. Health providers educated community members and 
their patients on the benefits of health insurance and persuaded them to enrol. These 
health providers had a greater impact on community members than the regular 
education by DHIS staff and collectors. Rather than the traditional practice, where 
health providers and community members are considered only as implementers and 
consumers of the NHIS policy and excluded from planning and executing interven-
tion activities, their involvement in this intervention led to increase in enrolment. 
Chapter eight revealed that contrary to the popular notion that the NHIS would 
ensure equity in access to quality healthcare services was not evident. The PSGs’ 
achievements were limited by their inability to resolve some of the barriers identi-
fied in chapter three: poverty, inadequate exemption for the poorest quintile, 
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negative attitudes towards health insurance, unenlightened self-interest, shortages of 
drugs at health facilities, collection of unauthorised fees at health facilities and 
payment for drugs covered by the NHIS. 
The study concludes with a discussion of the key findings in chapter nine. I argue 
that although the NHIS improves access to healthcare, provides financial relief and 
reduces complications among patients, a range of factors including politicians, 
policy makers, implementers and targets of the policy continued to undermine 
equity and improvement of quality service goals. Politicians saw health insurance as 
a tool to secure electoral victory and failed to expand health facilities’ capacity to 
handle the expected increase in patient numbers before introducing the insurance 
scheme. They also did not seriously consider what constitutes quality service to 
insured patients, so there were missing links and contradictory expectations among 
the various stakeholders at multiple levels regarding what would improve quality of 
service and stimulate enrolment and retain members in the NHIS. The politicians 
only paid lip service to the exemption policy by setting homelessness as a criterion 
for poverty, a condition that rarely exists in Ghanaian communities, thus denying the 
core poor their exemption. Health providers who saw the NHIS as increasing their 
workload tended to be hostile to insured patients and charged extra fees. Community 
members thought they should benefit with minimum financial investment so usually 
enrolled only household members who needed healthcare. The DHISs staffs were 
more interested in revenue generation than granting exemptions to the core poor. 
They emphasised the homelessness criterion that eliminates almost all potential 
beneficiaries and ignored other criteria stated in the policy that more accurately 
reflect the status of the core poor in their districts. The DHISs’ staff and collectors 
pursued activities to enrol premium-paying members and made no effort to prevent 
the exclusion of non-paying poor from the NHIS. 
The multiple – and often conflicting – interests converged to limit the PSGs’ 
efforts at improving enrolment and retaining members in the NHIS. Although the 
intervention could not achieve all objectives, by situating barriers and enablers at the 
level of local stakeholders and highlighting their concerns, the reality involved in 
implementing the NHIS policy and uptake is made clearer to policy makers. This 
study adds ethnographic information to the growing literature on social health 
insurance in Africa and sheds light on how to identify and address barriers to 
achieve policy goals. 
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